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False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms Yokoo, Makoto Combinatorial auctions mechanism design false-name bids In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e.g., multiple e-mail addresses). If only one good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a {em false-name bid}. In this talk, I describe the summary of existing works and open problems on false-name bids. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Makoto Yokoo 2010 Is Part Of Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.3 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25621 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.3 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode