2026-08-14T00:27:36Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:27102 2026-08-12T06:00:27Z ddc:004 open_access

Resilience of Inner-Product Masking Scheme Against Hamming Weight Leakage Biswas, Aniruddha Hwang, Jihun Maji, Hemanta K. Ye, Xiuyu Local leakage resilience additive masking inner product masking Hamming weight leakage Fourier analysis Krawtchouk polynomials Additive masking is a widely used countermeasure against side-channel attacks in which a secret is additively split into multiple random shares. However, over binary fields, the number of 1’s in the binary representation (i.e., the Hamming weight) of the shares reveals information about the original secret. Inner-product masking scheme has been proposed as a promising alternative that is secure against such information leakage. In this work, we establish that inner-product masking over a binary extension field is provably secure against Hamming weight leakage, and it translates into security against arbitrary symmetric function leakage from the shares. In addition, we present an efficiently computable score function that quantifies its security against leakages, enabling users to test and certify its security. Finally, we derive a relationship between the leakage resilience of inner-product masking and additive masking over arbitrary fields; roughly speaking, they are at least as secure as additive masking. Our approach is Fourier-analytic and involves estimating spectral norms of the Hamming slice by studying Krawtchouk polynomials. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Aniruddha Biswas and Jihun Hwang and Hemanta K. Maji and Xiuyu Ye 2026 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 385, 7th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2026) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2026.9 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-271023 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2026.9 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode