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        <identifier>oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:27104</identifier>
        <datestamp>2026-08-12T06:00:27Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Adaptive Garbled Circuits and Garbled RAM from Non-Programmable Random Oracles</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Barnum, Cruz</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Heath, David</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Kolesnikov, Vladimir</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Ostrovsky, Rafail</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Adaptive Garbling</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Garbled RAM</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Random Oracle Model</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>Garbled circuit techniques secure in the adaptive setting - where inputs are chosen after a garbled program is sent - are motivated by practice, but they are difficult to achieve. Prior adaptive garbling is either impractically expensive or encrypts the garbled program with the output of a programmable random oracle (PRO). This latter approach introduces a strong model and incurs computational overhead.&#13;
&#13;
We present a simple framework for proving adaptive security of garbling schemes in the non-programmable random oracle (NPRO) model. NPRO is a milder model than PRO, and it is close to the assumption required by the widely used Free XOR extension. Our framework is applicable to a number of existing GC techniques, which are proved adaptively secure without modification (and hence incurring no overhead).&#13;
&#13;
As our main application, we construct and prove adaptively secure a garbling scheme for tri-state circuits, a model that captures both Boolean circuits and RAM programs (Heath et al., Crypto 2023). For TSC C, our garbling of C is at most |C|⋅ λ bits long, for security parameter λ. This implies both an adaptively secure garbled Boolean circuit scheme, and an adaptively secure garbled RAM scheme where the garbling of a T-step RAM program has size O(T ⋅ log³ T ⋅ log log T ⋅ λ) bits. &#13;
&#13;
Our scheme is concretely efficient: its Boolean circuit handling matches the performance of half-gates, and it is adaptively secure from NPRO.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Cruz Barnum and David Heath and Vladimir Kolesnikov and Rafail Ostrovsky</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2026</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 385, 7th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2026)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
          <dc:type>Text</dc:type>
          <dc:type>doc-type:ResearchArticle</dc:type>
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          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2026.11</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-271048</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2026.11</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
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