<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd">
  <responseDate>2026-07-20T05:27:08Z</responseDate>
  <request identifier="2877" metadataPrefix="oai_dc" verb="GetRecord">https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai</request>
  <GetRecord>
    <record>
      <header>
        <identifier>oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:2877</identifier>
        <datestamp>2024-03-06T10:33:40Z</datestamp>
        <setSpec>ddc:004</setSpec>
        <setSpec>open_access</setSpec>
      </header>
      <metadata>
        <oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
          <dc:title>Computationally Sound Abstraction and Verification of Secure Multi-Party  Computations</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Backes, Michael</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Maffei, Matteo</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Mohammadi, Esfandiar</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Computational soundness</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Secure multi-party computation</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Process calculi</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Protocol verification</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>We devise an abstraction of secure multi-party computations in the applied $\pi$-calculus. Based on this abstraction, we propose a methodology to mechanically analyze the security of cryptographic protocols employing secure multi-party computations. We exemplify the applicability of our framework by analyzing the SIMAP sugar-beet double auction protocol. We finally study the computational soundness of our abstraction, proving that the analysis of protocols expressed in the applied $\pi$-calculus and based on our abstraction provides computational security guarantees.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Michael Backes and Matteo Maffei and Esfandiar Mohammadi</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2010</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 8, IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2010)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
          <dc:type>Text</dc:type>
          <dc:type>doc-type:ResearchArticle</dc:type>
          <dc:type>publishedVersion</dc:type>
          <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2010.352</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-28771</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2010.352</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
          <dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/legalcode</dc:rights>
        </oai_dc:dc>
      </metadata>
    </record>
  </GetRecord>
</OAI-PMH>
