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Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker in Action Bana, Gergei Adao, Pedro Sakurada, Hideki Security Protocols Symbolic Adversary Computational Soundness We show that the recent technique of computationally complete symbolic attackers proposed by Bana and Comon-Lundh [POST 2012] for computationally sound verification of security protocols is powerful enough to verify actual protocols. In their work, Bana and Comon-Lundh presented only the general framework, but they did not introduce sufficiently many axioms to actually prove protocols. We present a set of axioms -- some generic axioms that are computationally sound for all PPT algorithms, and two specific axioms that are sound for CCA2 secure encryptions -- and illustrate the power of this technique by giving the first computationally sound verification (secrecy and authentication) via symbolic attackers of the NSL Protocol that does not need any further restrictive assumptions about the computational implementation. The axioms are entirely modular, not particular to the NSL protocol. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Gergei Bana and Pedro Adao and Hideki Sakurada 2012 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 18, IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2012) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2012.546 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-38888 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2012.546 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/legalcode