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          <dc:title>Quantitative Security Analysis (Dagstuhl Seminar 12481)</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Köpf, Boris</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Malacaria, Paquale</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Palamidessi, Catuscia</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Security</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Privacy,Information theory</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Programming languages</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Formal methods</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>The high amount of trust put into today's software systems calls for a rigorous analysis of their security. Unfortunately, security is often in conflict with requirements on the functionality or the performance of a system, making perfect security an impossible or overly expensive goal. Under such constraints, the relevant question is not whether a system is secure, but rather how much security it provides. Quantitative notions of security can express degrees of protection and thus enable reasoning about the trade-off between security and conflicting requirements. Corresponding quantitative security analyses bear the potential of becoming an important tool for the rigorous development of practical systems, and a formal foundation for the management of security risks.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Boris Köpf and Paquale Malacaria and Catuscia Palamidessi</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2013</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 2, Issue 11 (2013)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>Article</dc:type>
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