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          <dc:title>Making Existential-unforgeable Signatures Strongly Unforgeable in the Quantum Random-oracle Model</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Eaton, Edward</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Song, Fang</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>digital signatures</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>strongly unforgeable</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>quantum random-oracle</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>lattices</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>Strongly unforgeable signature schemes provide a more stringent security guarantee than the standard existential unforgeability. It requires that not only forging a signature on a new message is hard, it is infeasible as well to produce a new signature on a message for which the adversary has seen valid signatures before. Strongly unforgeable signatures are useful both in practice and as a building block in many cryptographic constructions.&#13;
&#13;
This work investigates a generic transformation that compiles any existential-unforgeable scheme into a strongly unforgeable one, which was proposed by Teranishi et al. [Teranishi/Oyama/Ogata, Cryptology-Indocrypt 2006] and was proven in the classical random-oracle model. Our main contribution is showing that the transformation also works against quantum adversaries in the quantum random-oracle model. We develop proof techniques such as adaptively programming a quantum random-oracle in a new setting, which could be of independent interest. Applying the transformation to an existential-unforgeable signature scheme due to Cash et al. [Cash/Hofheinz/Kiltz/Peikert, J. of Cryptology 2012], which can be shown to be quantum-secure assuming certain lattice problems are hard for quantum computers, we get an efficient quantum-secure strongly unforgeable signature scheme in the quantum random-oracle model.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Edward Eaton and Fang Song</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2015</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 44, 10th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2015)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
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          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2015.147</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-55540</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2015.147</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
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