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        <datestamp>2024-03-06T10:36:55Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>A Catalog of EXISTS-R-Complete Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Games</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Bilò, Vittorio</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Mavronicolas, Marios</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Nash equilibrium</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>complexity of equilibria</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>EXISTS-R-completeness</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>[Schaefer and Stefankovic, Theory of Computing Systems, 2015] provided an explicit formulation of EXISTS-R as the class capturing the complexity of deciding the Existential Theory of the Reals, and established that deciding, given a 3-player game, whether or not it has a Nash equilibrium with no probability exceeding a given rational is EXISTS-R-complete. Four more decision problems about Nash equilibria for 3-player games were very recently shown EXISTS-R-complete via a chain of individual, problem-specific reductions in [Garg et al., Proceedings of ICALP 2015]; determining more such EXISTS-R-complete problems was posed there as an open problem. In this work, we deliver an extensive catalog of EXISTS-R-complete decision problems about Nash equilibria in 3-player games, thus resolving completely the open problem from [Garg et al., Proceedings of ICALP 2015]. Towards this end, we present a single and very simple, unifying reduction from the EXISTS-R-complete decision problem from [Schaefer and Stefankovic, Theory of Computing Systems, 2015] to (almost) all the decision problems about Nash equilibria that were before shown NP-complete for 2-player games in [Bilo and Mavronicolas, Proceedings of SAGT 2012; Conitzer and Sandholm, Games and Economic Behavior, 2008; Gilboa and Zemel, Games and Economic Behavior, 1989]. Encompassed in the catalog are the four decision problems shown EXISTS-R-complete in [Garg et al., Proceedings of ICALP 2015].</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Vittorio Bilò and Marios Mavronicolas</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2016</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 47, 33rd Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2016)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
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          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2016.17</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-57189</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2016.17</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
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