2026-07-22T16:58:43Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:7475 2024-03-06T10:40:34Z ddc:004 open_access

Selling Complementary Goods: Dynamics, Efficiency and Revenue Babaioff, Moshe Blumrosen, Liad Nisan, Noam Complements Pricing Networks Game Theory Price of Stability We consider a price competition between two sellers of perfect-complement goods. Each seller posts a price for the good it sells, but the demand is determined according to the sum of prices. This is a classic model by Cournot (1838), who showed that in this setting a monopoly that sells both goods is better for the society than two competing sellers. We show that non-trivial pure Nash equilibria always exist in this game. We also quantify Cournot's observation with respect to both the optimal welfare and the monopoly revenue. We then prove a series of mostly negative results regarding the convergence of best response dynamics to equilibria in such games. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Moshe Babaioff and Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan 2017 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 80, 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.134 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-74757 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.134 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode