2026-07-25T00:34:05Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:8417 2024-03-06T10:41:54Z ddc:004 open_access

Justified Representation in Multiwinner Voting: Axioms and Algorithms Elkind, Edith voting committee selection axioms PAV Suppose that a group of voters wants to select k 1 alternatives from a given set, and each voter indicates which of the alternatives are acceptable to her: the alternatives could be conference submissions, applicants for a scholarship or locations for a fast food chain. In this setting it is natural to require that the winning set represents the voters fairly, in the sense that large groups of voters with similar preferences have at least some of their approved alternatives in the winning set. We describe several ways to formalize this idea, and show how to use it to classify voting rules; surprisingly, two voting rules proposed in the XIXth century turn out to play an important role in our analysis. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Edith Elkind 2018 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 93, 37th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2017) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2017.1 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-84179 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2017.1 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode