2026-08-03T08:05:28Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:9148 2024-03-06T10:43:28Z ddc:004 open_access

Practical and Provably Secure Onion Routing Ando, Megumi Lysyanskaya, Anna Upfal, Eli Anonymity traffic analysis statistical privacy differential privacy In an onion routing protocol, messages travel through several intermediaries before arriving at their destinations; they are wrapped in layers of encryption (hence they are called "onions"). The goal is to make it hard to establish who sent the message. It is a practical and widespread tool for creating anonymous channels. For the standard adversary models - passive and active - we present practical and provably secure onion routing protocols. Akin to Tor, in our protocols each party independently chooses the routing paths for his onions. For security parameter lambda, our differentially private solution for the active adversary takes O(log^2 lambda) rounds and requires every participant to transmit O(log^{4} lambda) onions in every round. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Megumi Ando and Anna Lysyanskaya and Eli Upfal 2018 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 107, 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.144 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-91482 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.144 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode