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Optimal Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes Gerding, Enrico H. Dash, Rajdeep K. Yuen, David C. K. Jennings, Nicholas R. Bidding strategies Vickrey Auctions Perfect Substitutes Simultaneous Auctions Budget Constraint Global Bidder We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids locally in a single auction, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, provided there are no budget constraints. With a budget, however, the optimal strategy is to bid locally if this budget is equal or less than the valuation. Furthermore, for a wide range of valuation distributions, we prove that the problem of finding the optimal bids reduces to two dimensions if all auctions are identical. Moreoever, we address markets with both sequential and simultaneous auctions, non-identical auctions, and the allocative efficiency of the market. Finally, by combining analystical and simulation results, we analyse equilibrium strategies in case of several global bidders. However, a stable solution is then only found if there are local bidders as well. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Enrico H. Gerding and Rajdeep K. Dash and David C. K. Yuen and Nicholas R. Jennings 2007 Is Part Of Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.18 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9934 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.18 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode