14 Search Results for "Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley"

Volume

OASIcs, Volume 110

4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Tokenomics 2022, December 12-13, 2022, Paris, France

Editors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Aggelos Kiayias, and Marianne Verdier

Document
Complete Volume
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022
OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Aggelos Kiayias, and Marianne Verdier

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume
Cite as

4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 1-82, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@Proceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022,
  title =	{{OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{1--82},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184169},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022},
  annote =	{Keywords: OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume}
}
Document
Front Matter
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Aggelos Kiayias, and Marianne Verdier

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization
Cite as

4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 0:i-0:xii, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  title =	{{Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{0:i--0:xii},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184172},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0},
  annote =	{Keywords: Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}
}
Document
Invited Talk
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.1
Algorithmic Game Theory and Blockchains (Invited Talk)

Authors: Elias Koutsoupias

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Algorithmic game theory has developed into a mature field over the past three decades. However, the emergence of blockchains has raised new fundamental questions at the intersection of computer science, economics, and game theory.
Cite as

Elias Koutsoupias. Algorithmic Game Theory and Blockchains (Invited Talk). In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 1:1-1:2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{koutsoupias:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.1,
  author =	{Koutsoupias, Elias},
  title =	{{Algorithmic Game Theory and Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:2},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184180},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchains, Mining games, Reward sharing schemes, Distributed game theory}
}
Document
Invited Talk
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.2
How Blockchain Tokens Are Changing Platform Economics (Invited Talk)

Authors: Hanna Halaburda

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Blockchain technologies are technologies inspired by Bitcoin, which emerged in 2008. Since then, many cryptocurrencies, altcoins, and other blockchain applications have emerged. For example, Ethereum introduced smart contracts, and with them came tokens, fungible tokens, non-fungible tokens, decentralized finance (DeFi), and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). All these technologies can be grouped under the umbrella term "blockchain technologies." Each new generation of blockchain technology promises decentralization, disintermediation, a level playing field for entry, and improved value creation and distribution. However, it is essential to examine to what extent and under what conditions blockchain technologies deliver on these promises. It turns out that sometimes they do, and sometimes they do not. This distinction is essential to apply blockchain technologies effectively for large-scale practical applications. I focus here on blockchain-based cryptographic tokens and their impact on platform economics. Blockchain-based tokens, in conjunction with smart contracts, allow for new design choices in platforms. Therefore, I explore how these new design choices may help solve old problems in platform economics.
Cite as

Hanna Halaburda. How Blockchain Tokens Are Changing Platform Economics (Invited Talk). In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 2:1-2:7, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{halaburda:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.2,
  author =	{Halaburda, Hanna},
  title =	{{How Blockchain Tokens Are Changing Platform Economics}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:7},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184196},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, token, platform economics}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.3
1DLT: Rapid Deployment of Secure and Efficient EVM-Based Blockchains

Authors: Simone Bottoni, Anwitaman Datta, Federico Franzoni, Emanuele Ragnoli, Roberto Ripamonti, Christian Rondanini, Gokhan Sagirlar, and Alberto Trombetta

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Limited scalability and transaction costs are some of the critical issues that hamper a wider adoption of distributed ledger technologies (DLTs). That is particularly true for the Ethereum [Wood, 2014] blockchain, which, so far, has been the ecosystem with the highest adoption rate. Several solutions have been attempted in the last few years, most of which adopt the approach to offload transactions from the blockchain mainnet, a.k.a. Level 1 (L1), to a separate network. Such solutions are collectively known as Level 2 (L2) systems. While improving scalability, the adoption of L2 introduces additional drawbacks: users have to trust that the L2 system has correctly performed transactions or, conversely, high computational power is required to prove transactions’ correctness. In addition, significant technical knowledge is needed to set up and manage such an L2 system. To tackle such limitations, we propose 1DLT: a novel system that enables rapid deployment of an Ethereum Virtual Machine based (EVM-based) blockchain that overcomes those drawbacks.
Cite as

Simone Bottoni, Anwitaman Datta, Federico Franzoni, Emanuele Ragnoli, Roberto Ripamonti, Christian Rondanini, Gokhan Sagirlar, and Alberto Trombetta. 1DLT: Rapid Deployment of Secure and Efficient EVM-Based Blockchains. In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 3:1-3:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{bottoni_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.3,
  author =	{Bottoni, Simone and Datta, Anwitaman and Franzoni, Federico and Ragnoli, Emanuele and Ripamonti, Roberto and Rondanini, Christian and Sagirlar, Gokhan and Trombetta, Alberto},
  title =	{{1DLT: Rapid Deployment of Secure and Efficient EVM-Based Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:15},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184209},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, EVM, Layer Two, Scalability, Network Fees}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.4
Consistency of Automated Market Makers

Authors: Vincent Danos and Weijia Wang

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Decentralised Finance has popularised Automated Market Makers (AMMs), but surprisingly little research has been done on their consistency. Can a single attacker extract risk-free revenue from an AMM, regardless of price or other users' behaviour? In this paper, we investigate the consistency of a large class of AMMs, including the most widely used ones, and show that consistency holds.
Cite as

Vincent Danos and Weijia Wang. Consistency of Automated Market Makers. In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 4:1-4:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{danos_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.4,
  author =	{Danos, Vincent and Wang, Weijia},
  title =	{{Consistency of Automated Market Makers}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:12},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184217},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Automated Market Makers, Decentralised Finance}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.5
Interest Rate Rules in Decentralized Finance: Evidence from Compound

Authors: Amit Chaudhary, Roman Kozhan, and Ganesh Viswanath-Natraj

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
We study the fundamentals of interest rate rules on the decentralized finance protocol Compound. Interest rates are set by the governance of the protocol, and are based on the utilization of an asset: which is the ratio of a cryptocurrency that is borrowed to its total supply in the protocol. We discuss factors that determine the slope parameters of interest rate rules. Slope parameters are typically higher for more volatile cryptocurrencies. We argue liquidation risk can explain the cross-sectional variation in interest rate rules. We also draw parallels between these rules to the demand for loanable funds in traditional money markets.
Cite as

Amit Chaudhary, Roman Kozhan, and Ganesh Viswanath-Natraj. Interest Rate Rules in Decentralized Finance: Evidence from Compound. In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 5:1-5:6, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{chaudhary_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.5,
  author =	{Chaudhary, Amit and Kozhan, Roman and Viswanath-Natraj, Ganesh},
  title =	{{Interest Rate Rules in Decentralized Finance: Evidence from Compound}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:6},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184226},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cryptocurrency, decentralized finance lending protocols, monetary policy, stablecoins, governance token}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.6
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG

Authors: Dahlia Malkhi and Pawel Szalachowski

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Many cryptocurrency platforms are vulnerable to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) attacks [Daian et al., 2020], where a malicious consensus leader can inject transactions or change the order of user transactions to maximize its profit. A promising line of research in MEV mitigation is to enhance the Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) consensus core of blockchains by new functionalities, like hiding transaction contents, such that malicious parties cannot analyze and exploit them until they are ordered. An orthogonal line of research demonstrates excellent performance for BFT protocols designed around Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG). They provide high throughput by keeping high network utilization, decoupling transactions' dissemination from their metadata ordering, and encoding consensus logic efficiently over a DAG representing a causal ordering of disseminated messages. This paper explains how to combine these two advances. It introduces a DAG-based protocol called Fino, that integrates MEV-resistance features into DAG-based BFT without delaying the steady spreading of transactions by the DAG transport and with zero message overhead. The scheme operates without complex secret share verifiability or recoverability, and avoids costly threshold encryption.
Cite as

Dahlia Malkhi and Pawel Szalachowski. Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG. In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 6:1-6:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{malkhi_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.6,
  author =	{Malkhi, Dahlia and Szalachowski, Pawel},
  title =	{{Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:17},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184231},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: DAG, MEV, consensus, BFT}
}
Document
Extended Abstract
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7
Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract)

Authors: Andrea Canidio and Vincent Danos

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
We provide a game-theoretic analysis of the problem of front-running attacks. We use it to study a simple commit-reveal protocol and discuss its properties. This protocol has costs because it requires two messages and imposes a delay. However, we show that it prevents the most severe front-running attacks ("bad MEV") while preserving legitimate competition between users, guaranteeing that the earliest transaction in a block belongs to the honest user who values it the most ("good MEV").
Cite as

Andrea Canidio and Vincent Danos. Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract). In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 7:1-7:5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{canidio_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7,
  author =	{Canidio, Andrea and Danos, Vincent},
  title =	{{Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:5},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184241},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Front running, Game theory, MEV, Transactions reordering, commit-reveal}
}
Document
Extended Abstract
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.8
The Demand for Programmable Payments: Extended Abstract (Extended Abstract)

Authors: Charles M. Kahn and Maarten R.C. van Oordt

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
In [Kahn and Van Oordt, 2022], we examine the desirability of programmable payments, arrangements in which transfers are automatically executed conditional upon preset objective criteria. We study optimal payment arrangements in a continuous-time framework where a buyer and a seller of a service interact. We stack the cards in favor of programmable payments by considering an environment where neither agent has any legal recourse if the other fails to deliver upon their promises. We identify scenarios where programmable payments could improve economic outcomes and scenarios where they cannot. Direct payments increase the surplus by avoiding the liquidity cost of locking-up funds in a programmable payment arrangement until the moment where the conditions are satisfied to release those funds to the payee. Programmable payments will be desirable, and may in fact be the only viable payment arrangement, in situations where economic relationships are of a short duration. Nonetheless, there is a limit to the length of the arrangement a single programmable payment can support, because eventually the additional liquidity cost of locking up more funds for a longer period starts to exceed the additional surplus generated from extending the length of the arrangement. For longer periods multiple payments are necessary. Sufficiently long optimal chain-of-payments arrangements always start with direct payments because of the lower liquidity costs. Only towards the end of a relationship do the parties switch to the use of programmable payments. Moreover, the optimum for infinitely long payment arrangements consists of direct payments only. These results suggest that programmable payments are unlikely to become the new "standard" for all payment arrangements. Many have argued that technological developments in the payments space will lead to an explosion of so-called micro-payments. Our results suggest a more complex relationship between transactions cost and the number of payments. Lower transaction costs increase the number of payments for the extensive margin in the sense of increasing the set of potential buyer-seller pairs where transaction costs are no longer prohibitively expensive. For the intensive margin, that is, within buyer-seller pairs, we find the opposite effect: lower transaction costs are associated with fewer payments, as trust becomes easier to achieve.
Cite as

Charles M. Kahn and Maarten R.C. van Oordt. The Demand for Programmable Payments: Extended Abstract (Extended Abstract). In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, p. 8:1, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{kahn_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.8,
  author =	{Kahn, Charles M. and Oordt, Maarten R.C. van},
  title =	{{The Demand for Programmable Payments: Extended Abstract}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:1},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184255},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Electronic payment, smart contracts, programmable payment}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4
On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 82, 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)

Abstract
Committee-based blockchains are among the most popular alternatives of proof-of-work based blockchains, such as Bitcoin. They provide strong consistency (no fork) under classical assumptions, and avoid using energy-consuming mechanisms to add new blocks in the blockchain. For each block, these blockchains use a committee that executes Byzantine-fault tolerant distributed consensus to decide the next block they will add in the blockchain. Unlike Bitcoin, where there is only one creator per block, in committee-based blockchain any block is cooperatively created. In order to incentivize committee members to participate in the creation of new blocks, rewarding schemes have to be designed. In this paper, we study the fairness of rewarding in committee-based blockchains and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the system communication under which it is possible to have a fair reward mechanism.
Cite as

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains. In 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 82, pp. 4:1-4:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:15},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-157-3},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{82},
  editor =	{Anceaume, Emmanuelle and Bisi\`{e}re, Christophe and Bouvard, Matthieu and Bramas, Quentin and Casamatta, Catherine},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135261},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Consensus, Committee, Fairness, Proof-of-Stake, Reward, Selection}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.12
Rational Behaviors in Committee-Based Blockchains

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Bruno Biais, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 184, 24th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2020)

Abstract
We study the rational behaviors of participants in committee-based blockchains. Committee-based blockchains rely on specific blockchain consensus that must be guaranteed in presence of rational participants. We consider a simplified blockchain consensus algorithm based on existing or proposed committee-based blockchains that encapsulate the main actions of the participants: voting for a block, and checking its validity. Knowing that those actions have costs, and achieving the consensus gives rewards to committee members, we study using game theory how strategic participants behave while trying to maximize their gains. We consider different reward schemes, and found that in each setting, there exist equilibria where blockchain consensus is guaranteed; in some settings however, there can be coordination failures hindering consensus. Moreover, we study equilibria with trembling participants, which is a novelty in the context of committee-based blockchains. Trembling participants are rational that can do unintended actions with a low probability. We found that in presence of trembling participants, there exist equilibria where blockchain consensus is guaranteed; however, when only voters are rewarded, there also exist equilibria where validity can be violated.
Cite as

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Bruno Biais, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. Rational Behaviors in Committee-Based Blockchains. In 24th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 184, pp. 12:1-12:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.12,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Biais, Bruno and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{Rational Behaviors in Committee-Based Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{24th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2020)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-176-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{184},
  editor =	{Bramas, Quentin and Oshman, Rotem and Romano, Paolo},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-134973},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: BFT Consensus, Blockchains, Game Theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16
Correctness of Tendermint-Core Blockchains

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 125, 22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018)

Abstract
Tendermint-core blockchains (e.g. Cosmos) are considered today one of the most viable alternatives for the highly energy consuming proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Their particularity is that they aim at offering strong consistency (no forks) in an open system combining two ingredients (i) a set of validators that generate blocks via a variant of Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (PBFT) consensus protocol and (ii) a selection strategy that dynamically selects nodes to be validators for the next block via a proof-of-stake mechanism. The exact assumptions on the system model under which Tendermint underlying algorithms are correct and the exact properties Tendermint verifies, however, have never been formally analyzed. The contribution of this paper is as follows. First, while formalizing Tendermint algorithms we precisely characterize the system model and the exact problem solved by Tendermint, then, we prove that in eventual synchronous systems a modified version of Tendermint solves (i) under additional assumptions, a variant of one-shot consensus for the validation of one single block and (ii) a variant of the repeated consensus problem for multiple blocks. These results hold even if the set of validators is hit by Byzantine failures, provided that for each one-shot consensus instance less than one third of the validators is Byzantine.
Cite as

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. Correctness of Tendermint-Core Blockchains. In 22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 125, pp. 16:1-16:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{Correctness of Tendermint-Core Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018)},
  pages =	{16:1--16:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-098-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{125},
  editor =	{Cao, Jiannong and Ellen, Faith and Rodrigues, Luis and Ferreira, Bernardo},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-100764},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Consensus, Proof-of-Stake, Fairness}
}
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