3 Search Results for "Azouvi, Sarah"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.5
Security Analysis of Filecoin’s Expected Consensus in the Byzantine vs Honest Model

Authors: Xuechao Wang, Sarah Azouvi, and Marko Vukolić

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 282, 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)

Abstract
Filecoin is the largest storage-based open-source blockchain, both by storage capacity (>11EiB) and market capitalization. This paper provides the first formal security analysis of Filecoin’s consensus (ordering) protocol, Expected Consensus (EC). Specifically, we show that EC is secure against an arbitrary adversary that controls a fraction β of the total storage for β m < 1- e^{-(1-β)m}, where m is a parameter that corresponds to the expected number of blocks per round, currently m = 5 in Filecoin. We then present an attack, the n-split attack, where an adversary splits the honest miners between multiple chains, and show that it is successful for β m ≥ 1- e^{-(1-β)m}, thus proving that β m = 1- e^{-(1-β)m} is the tight security threshold of EC. This corresponds roughly to an adversary with 20% of the total storage pledged to the chain. Finally, we propose two improvements to EC security that would increase this threshold. One of these two fixes is being implemented as a Filecoin Improvement Proposal (FIP).
Cite as

Xuechao Wang, Sarah Azouvi, and Marko Vukolić. Security Analysis of Filecoin’s Expected Consensus in the Byzantine vs Honest Model. In 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 282, pp. 5:1-5:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{wang_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2023.5,
  author =	{Wang, Xuechao and Azouvi, Sarah and Vukoli\'{c}, Marko},
  title =	{{Security Analysis of Filecoin’s Expected Consensus in the Byzantine vs Honest Model}},
  booktitle =	{5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-303-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{282},
  editor =	{Bonneau, Joseph and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-191943},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Decentralized storage, Consensus, Security analysis}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2023.6
Base Fee Manipulation in Ethereum’s EIP-1559 Transaction Fee Mechanism

Authors: Sarah Azouvi, Guy Goren, Lioba Heimbach, and Alexander Hicks

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 281, 37th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2023)

Abstract
In 2021 Ethereum adjusted the transaction pricing mechanism by implementing EIP-1559, which introduces the base fee - a network fee that is burned and dynamically adjusts to the network demand. The authors of the Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) noted that a miner with more than 50% of the mining power could be incentivized to deviate from the honest mining strategy. Instead, such a miner could propose a series of empty blocks to artificially lower demand and increase her future rewards. In this paper, we generalize this attack and show that under rational player behavior, deviating from the honest strategy can be profitable for a miner with less than 50% of the mining power. We show that even when miners do not collaborate, it is at times rational for smaller miners to join the attack. Finally, we propose a mitigation to address the identified vulnerability.
Cite as

Sarah Azouvi, Guy Goren, Lioba Heimbach, and Alexander Hicks. Base Fee Manipulation in Ethereum’s EIP-1559 Transaction Fee Mechanism. In 37th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 281, pp. 6:1-6:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{azouvi_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2023.6,
  author =	{Azouvi, Sarah and Goren, Guy and Heimbach, Lioba and Hicks, Alexander},
  title =	{{Base Fee Manipulation in Ethereum’s EIP-1559 Transaction Fee Mechanism}},
  booktitle =	{37th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2023)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-301-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{281},
  editor =	{Oshman, Rotem},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2023.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-191325},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2023.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, Ethereum, transaction fee mechanism, EIP-1559}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2022.19
Modeling Resources in Permissionless Longest-Chain Total-Order Broadcast

Authors: Sarah Azouvi, Christian Cachin, Duc V. Le, Marko Vukolić, and Luca Zanolini

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 253, 26th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2022)

Abstract
Blockchain protocols implement total-order broadcast in a permissionless setting, where processes can freely join and leave. In such a setting, to safeguard against Sybil attacks, correct processes rely on cryptographic proofs tied to a particular type of resource to make them eligible to order transactions. For example, in the case of Proof-of-Work (PoW), this resource is computation, and the proof is a solution to a computationally hard puzzle. Conversely, in Proof-of-Stake (PoS), the resource corresponds to the number of coins that every process in the system owns, and a secure lottery selects a process for participation proportionally to its coin holdings. Although many resource-based blockchain protocols are formally proven secure in the literature, the existing security proofs fail to demonstrate why particular types of resources cause the blockchain protocols to be vulnerable to distinct classes of attacks. For instance, PoS systems are more vulnerable to long-range attacks, where an adversary corrupts past processes to re-write the history, than PoW and Proof-of-Storage systems. Proof-of-Storage-based and PoS-based protocols are both more susceptible to private double-spending attacks than PoW-based protocols; in this case, an adversary mines its chain in secret without sharing its blocks with the rest of the processes until the end of the attack. In this paper, we formally characterize the properties of resources through an abstraction called resource allocator and give a framework for understanding longest-chain consensus protocols based on different underlying resources. In addition, we use this resource allocator to demonstrate security trade-offs between various resources focusing on well-known attacks (e.g., the long-range attack and nothing-at-stake attacks).
Cite as

Sarah Azouvi, Christian Cachin, Duc V. Le, Marko Vukolić, and Luca Zanolini. Modeling Resources in Permissionless Longest-Chain Total-Order Broadcast. In 26th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 253, pp. 19:1-19:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{azouvi_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2022.19,
  author =	{Azouvi, Sarah and Cachin, Christian and Le, Duc V. and Vukoli\'{c}, Marko and Zanolini, Luca},
  title =	{{Modeling Resources in Permissionless Longest-Chain Total-Order Broadcast}},
  booktitle =	{26th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2022)},
  pages =	{19:1--19:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-265-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{253},
  editor =	{Hillel, Eshcar and Palmieri, Roberto and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2022.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-176398},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2022.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, consensus, resource, broadcast}
}
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