3 Search Results for "Chung, Hao"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.98
Maximizing Miner Revenue in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

Authors: Ke Wu, Elaine Shi, and Hao Chung

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 287, 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024)

Abstract
Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the transaction fee mechanism design fundamentally departs from classical mechanism design. They then systematically explored the mathematical landscape of this new decentralized mechanism design problem in two settings: in the plain setting where no cryptography is employed, and in a cryptography-assisted setting where the rules of the mechanism are enforced by a multi-party computation protocol. Unfortunately, in both settings, prior works showed that if we want the mechanism to incentivize honest behavior for both users as well as miners (possibly colluding with users), then the miner revenue has to be zero. Although adopting a relaxed, approximate notion of incentive compatibility gets around this zero miner-revenue limitation, the scaling of the miner revenue is nonetheless poor. In this paper, we show that if we make a mild reasonable-world assumption that there are sufficiently many honest users, we can circumvent the known limitations on miner revenue, and design auctions that generate asymptotically optimal miner revenue. We also systematically explore the mathematical landscape of transaction fee mechanism design under the new reasonable-world assumptions, and demonstrate how such assumptions can alter the feasibility and infeasibility landscape.
Cite as

Ke Wu, Elaine Shi, and Hao Chung. Maximizing Miner Revenue in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design. In 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 287, pp. 98:1-98:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{wu_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.98,
  author =	{Wu, Ke and Shi, Elaine and Chung, Hao},
  title =	{{Maximizing Miner Revenue in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design}},
  booktitle =	{15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024)},
  pages =	{98:1--98:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-309-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{287},
  editor =	{Guruswami, Venkatesan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.98},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-196266},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.98},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Mechanism Design, Transaction Fee}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.97
What Can Cryptography Do for Decentralized Mechanism Design?

Authors: Elaine Shi, Hao Chung, and Ke Wu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 251, 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)

Abstract
Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (SODA'23) initiate the study of a new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee mechanism design (TFM). Unlike the classical mechanism design literature, in the decentralized environment, even the auctioneer (i.e., the miner) can be a strategic player, and it can even collude with a subset of the users facilitated by binding side contracts. Chung and Shi showed two main impossibility results that rule out the existence of a dream TFM. First, any TFM that provides incentive compatibility for individual users and miner-user coalitions must always have zero miner revenue, no matter whether the block size is finite or infinite. Second, assuming finite block size, no non-trivial TFM can simultaneously provide incentive compatibility for any individual user and for any miner-user coalition. In this work, we explore what new models and meaningful relaxations can allow us to circumvent the impossibility results of Chung and Shi. Besides today’s model that does not employ cryptography, we introduce a new MPC-assisted model where the TFM is implemented by a joint multi-party computation (MPC) protocol among the miners. We prove several feasibility and infeasibility results for achieving strict and approximate incentive compatibility, respectively, in the plain model as well as the MPC-assisted model. We show that while cryptography is not a panacea, it indeed allows us to overcome some impossibility results pertaining to the plain model, leading to non-trivial mechanisms with useful guarantees that are otherwise impossible in the plain model. Our work is also the first to characterize the mathematical landscape of transaction fee mechanism design under approximate incentive compatibility, as well as in a cryptography-assisted model.
Cite as

Elaine Shi, Hao Chung, and Ke Wu. What Can Cryptography Do for Decentralized Mechanism Design?. In 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 251, pp. 97:1-97:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{shi_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.97,
  author =	{Shi, Elaine and Chung, Hao and Wu, Ke},
  title =	{{What Can Cryptography Do for Decentralized Mechanism Design?}},
  booktitle =	{14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)},
  pages =	{97:1--97:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-263-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{251},
  editor =	{Tauman Kalai, Yael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.97},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-176005},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.97},
  annote =	{Keywords: Transaction Fee Mechanism Design}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2018.27
An O(1)-Approximation Algorithm for Dynamic Weighted Vertex Cover with Soft Capacity

Authors: Hao-Ting Wei, Wing-Kai Hon, Paul Horn, Chung-Shou Liao, and Kunihiko Sadakane

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 116, Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2018)

Abstract
This study considers the soft capacitated vertex cover problem in a dynamic setting. This problem generalizes the dynamic model of the vertex cover problem, which has been intensively studied in recent years. Given a dynamically changing vertex-weighted graph G=(V,E), which allows edge insertions and edge deletions, the goal is to design a data structure that maintains an approximate minimum vertex cover while satisfying the capacity constraint of each vertex. That is, when picking a copy of a vertex v in the cover, the number of v's incident edges covered by the copy is up to a given capacity of v. We extend Bhattacharya et al.'s work [SODA'15 and ICALP'15] to obtain a deterministic primal-dual algorithm for maintaining a constant-factor approximate minimum capacitated vertex cover with O(log n / epsilon) amortized update time, where n is the number of vertices in the graph. The algorithm can be extended to (1) a more general model in which each edge is associated with a non-uniform and unsplittable demand, and (2) the more general capacitated set cover problem.
Cite as

Hao-Ting Wei, Wing-Kai Hon, Paul Horn, Chung-Shou Liao, and Kunihiko Sadakane. An O(1)-Approximation Algorithm for Dynamic Weighted Vertex Cover with Soft Capacity. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 116, pp. 27:1-27:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{wei_et_al:LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2018.27,
  author =	{Wei, Hao-Ting and Hon, Wing-Kai and Horn, Paul and Liao, Chung-Shou and Sadakane, Kunihiko},
  title =	{{An O(1)-Approximation Algorithm for Dynamic Weighted Vertex Cover with Soft Capacity}},
  booktitle =	{Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2018)},
  pages =	{27:1--27:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-085-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{116},
  editor =	{Blais, Eric and Jansen, Klaus and D. P. Rolim, Jos\'{e} and Steurer, David},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2018.27},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-94312},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2018.27},
  annote =	{Keywords: approximation algorithm, dynamic algorithm, primal-dual, vertex cover}
}
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