2 Search Results for "Mićić, Jovana"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12
Eating Sandwiches: Modular and Lightweight Elimination of Transaction Reordering Attacks

Authors: Orestis Alpos, Ignacio Amores-Sesar, Christian Cachin, and Michelle Yeo

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 286, 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023)

Abstract
Traditional blockchains grant the miner of a block full control not only over which transactions but also their order. This constitutes a major flaw discovered with the introduction of decentralized finance and allows miners to perform MEV attacks. In this paper, we address the issue of sandwich attacks by providing a construction that takes as input a blockchain protocol and outputs a new blockchain protocol with the same security but in which sandwich attacks are not profitable. Furthermore, our protocol is fully decentralized with no trusted third parties or heavy cryptography primitives and carries a linear increase in latency and minimum computation overhead.
Cite as

Orestis Alpos, Ignacio Amores-Sesar, Christian Cachin, and Michelle Yeo. Eating Sandwiches: Modular and Lightweight Elimination of Transaction Reordering Attacks. In 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 286, pp. 12:1-12:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{alpos_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12,
  author =	{Alpos, Orestis and Amores-Sesar, Ignacio and Cachin, Christian and Yeo, Michelle},
  title =	{{Eating Sandwiches: Modular and Lightweight Elimination of Transaction Reordering Attacks}},
  booktitle =	{27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-308-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{286},
  editor =	{Bessani, Alysson and D\'{e}fago, Xavier and Nakamura, Junya and Wada, Koichi and Yamauchi, Yukiko},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-195029},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Consensus, MEV, Byzantine behavior, Rational behavior}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.10
Security Analysis of Ripple Consensus

Authors: Ignacio Amores-Sesar, Christian Cachin, and Jovana Mićić

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 184, 24th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2020)

Abstract
The Ripple network is one of the most prominent blockchain platforms and its native XRP token currently has one of the highest cryptocurrency market capitalizations. The Ripple consensus protocol powers this network and is generally considered to a Byzantine fault-tolerant agreement protocol, which can reach consensus in the presence of faulty or malicious nodes. In contrast to traditional Byzantine agreement protocols, there is no global knowledge of all participating nodes in Ripple consensus; instead, each node declares a list of other nodes that it trusts and from which it considers votes. Previous work has brought up concerns about the liveness and safety of the consensus protocol under the general assumptions stated initially by Ripple, and there is currently no appropriate understanding of its workings and its properties in the literature. This paper closes this gap and makes two contributions. It first provides a detailed, abstract description of the protocol, which has been derived from the source code. Second, the paper points out that the abstract protocol may violate safety and liveness in several simple executions under relatively benign network assumptions.
Cite as

Ignacio Amores-Sesar, Christian Cachin, and Jovana Mićić. Security Analysis of Ripple Consensus. In 24th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 184, pp. 10:1-10:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{amoressesar_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.10,
  author =	{Amores-Sesar, Ignacio and Cachin, Christian and Mi\'{c}i\'{c}, Jovana},
  title =	{{Security Analysis of Ripple Consensus}},
  booktitle =	{24th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2020)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-176-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{184},
  editor =	{Bramas, Quentin and Oshman, Rotem and Romano, Paolo},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-134956},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Ripple, Blockchain, Quorums, Consensus}
}
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