2 Search Results for "Ojha, Dev"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.4
Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets

Authors: Theo Diamandis, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra, and Guillermo Angeris

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 282, 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)

Abstract
Public blockchains implement a fee mechanism to allocate scarce computational resources across competing transactions. Most existing fee market designs utilize a joint, fungible unit of account (e.g., gas in Ethereum) to price otherwise non-fungible resources such as bandwidth, computation, and storage, by hardcoding their relative prices. Fixing the relative price of each resource in this way inhibits granular price discovery, limiting scalability and opening up the possibility of denial-of-service attacks. As a result, many prominent networks such as Ethereum and Solana have proposed multidimensional fee markets. In this paper, we provide a principled way to design fee markets that efficiently price multiple non-fungible resources. Starting from a loss function specified by the network designer, we show how to dynamically compute prices that align the network’s incentives (to minimize the loss) with those of the users and miners (to maximize their welfare), even as demand for these resources changes. We derive an EIP-1559-like mechanism from first principles as an example. Our pricing mechanism follows from a natural decomposition of the network designer’s problem into two parts that are related to each other via the resource prices. These results can be used to efficiently set fees in order to improve network performance.
Cite as

Theo Diamandis, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra, and Guillermo Angeris. Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets. In 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 282, pp. 4:1-4:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{diamandis_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2023.4,
  author =	{Diamandis, Theo and Evans, Alex and Chitra, Tarun and Angeris, Guillermo},
  title =	{{Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets}},
  booktitle =	{5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-303-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{282},
  editor =	{Bonneau, Joseph and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-191933},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchains, transaction fees, convex optimization, mechanism design}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.10
F1 Fee Distribution

Authors: Dev Ojha and Christopher Goes

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
In a proof of stake blockchain, validators need to split the rewards gained from transaction fees each block. Furthermore, these fees must be fairly distributed to each of a validator’s constituent delegators. Delegators accrue this reward throughout the entire time which they are delegated, and they have a special operation to withdraw accrued rewards. The F1 fee distribution scheme works for any algorithm to split fees and inflation between validators each block, with minimal iteration, and the only approximations being due to finite decimal precision. Per block there is a single iteration over the validator set, to enable reward algorithms that differ by validator. No iteration is required to delegate or to withdraw. The state usage is one state update per validator per block and one state entry per active delegation. F1 can optionally handle arbitrary inflation schemes, auto-bonding of rewards, and varying validator commission rates.
Cite as

Dev Ojha and Christopher Goes. F1 Fee Distribution. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 10:1-10:6, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{ojha_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.10,
  author =	{Ojha, Dev and Goes, Christopher},
  title =	{{F1 Fee Distribution}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:6},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119749},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Proof of Stake, Fee Distribution, Cosmos}
}
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