2 Search Results for "Paes Leme, Renato"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.105
Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade

Authors: Jieming Mao, Renato Paes Leme, and Kangning Wang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 215, 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)

Abstract
We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define message complexity corresponding to the minimum number of interactive rounds necessary to achieve the best possible outcome. Our main result is that for bilateral trade, agents don't stop talking until they reach an efficient outcome: Either agents achieve an efficient allocation in finitely many rounds of communication; or the optimal communication protocol has infinite number of rounds. We show an important class of bilateral trade settings where efficient allocation is achievable with a small number of rounds of communication.
Cite as

Jieming Mao, Renato Paes Leme, and Kangning Wang. Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade. In 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 215, pp. 105:1-105:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{mao_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.105,
  author =	{Mao, Jieming and Paes Leme, Renato and Wang, Kangning},
  title =	{{Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade}},
  booktitle =	{13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)},
  pages =	{105:1--105:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-217-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{215},
  editor =	{Braverman, Mark},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.105},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-157014},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.105},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, bilateral trade, information design}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.142
Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising

Authors: Gagan Goel, Stefano Leonardi, Vahab Mirrokni, Afshin Nikzad, and Renato Paes-Leme

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 55, 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)

Abstract
Internet display advertising industry follows two main business models. One model is based on direct deals between publishers and advertisers where they sign legal contracts containing terms of fulfillment for a future inventory. The second model is a spot market based on auctioning page views in real-time on advertising exchange (AdX) platforms such as DoubleClick's Ad Exchange, RightMedia, or AppNexus. These exchanges play the role of intermediaries who sell items (e.g. page-views) on behalf of a seller (e.g. a publisher) to buyers (e.g., advertisers) on the opposite side of the market. The computational and economics issues arising in this second model have been extensively investigated in recent times. In this work, we consider a third emerging model called reservation exchange market. A reservation exchange is a two-sided market between buyer orders for blocks of advertisers' impressions and seller orders for blocks of publishers' page views. The goal is to match seller orders to buyer orders while providing the right incentives to both sides. In this work we first describe the important features of mechanisms for efficient reservation exchange markets. We then address the algorithmic problems of designing revenue sharing schemes to provide a fair division between sellers of the revenue collected from buyers. A major conceptual contribution of this work is in showing that even though both clinching ascending auctions and VCG mechanisms achieve the same outcome from a buyer perspective, however, from the perspective of revenue sharing among sellers, clinching ascending auctions are much more informative than VCG auctions.
Cite as

Gagan Goel, Stefano Leonardi, Vahab Mirrokni, Afshin Nikzad, and Renato Paes-Leme. Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising. In 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 55, pp. 142:1-142:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

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@InProceedings{goel_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.142,
  author =	{Goel, Gagan and Leonardi, Stefano and Mirrokni, Vahab and Nikzad, Afshin and Paes-Leme, Renato},
  title =	{{Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)},
  pages =	{142:1--142:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-013-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{55},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Mitzenmacher, Michael and Rabani, Yuval and Sangiorgi, Davide},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.142},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-62863},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.142},
  annote =	{Keywords: Reservation Markets, Internet Advertising, Two-sided Markets, Clinching Auction, Envy-free allocations}
}
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