11 Search Results for "Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagRep.12.10.106
Intelligent Security: Is "AI for Cybersecurity" a Blessing or a Curse (Dagstuhl Seminar 22412)

Authors: Nele Mentens, Stjepan Picek, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 12, Issue 10 (2023)

Abstract
This report documents the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 22412 "Intelligent Security: Is "AI for Cybersecurity" a Blessing or a Curse". The seminar brought together 25 attendees from 10 countries (Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA). There were 17 male and 8 female participants. Three participants were from the industry, and the rest were from academia. The gathered researchers are actively working in the domains of artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, emphasizing hardware security, fuzzing, physical security, and network security. The seminar aims to foster sharing experiences and best practices between various cybersecurity applications and understand how and when certain approaches are transferable. The first two days were devoted to 20-minute self-introductions by participants to achieve these goals. At the end of the second day, we made a list of topics that were decided to be the focus of the seminar and that will be discussed in the groups in the next few days. On the third and fourth days, the work was conducted in four discussion groups where at the end of each day, all participants gathered to report the results from the discussion groups and to align the goals. On the last day, we again worked in one group to summarize the findings and foster networking among participants. A hike was organized in the afternoon of the third day. The seminar was a success. The participants actively participated in the working groups and the discussions and went home with new ideas and collaborators. This report gathers the abstracts of the presented talks and the conclusions from the discussion groups, which we consider relevant contributions toward better interdisciplinary research on artificial intelligence and cybersecurity.
Cite as

Nele Mentens, Stjepan Picek, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi. Intelligent Security: Is "AI for Cybersecurity" a Blessing or a Curse (Dagstuhl Seminar 22412). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 12, Issue 10, pp. 106-128, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@Article{mentens_et_al:DagRep.12.10.106,
  author =	{Mentens, Nele and Picek, Stjepan and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza},
  title =	{{Intelligent Security: Is "AI for Cybersecurity" a Blessing or a Curse (Dagstuhl Seminar 22412)}},
  pages =	{106--128},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{12},
  number =	{10},
  editor =	{Mentens, Nele and Picek, Stjepan and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.12.10.106},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-178229},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.12.10.106},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Hardware Security, Machine Learning, Explainability}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.CERTS.2019.4
Sustainable Security & Safety: Challenges and Opportunities

Authors: Andrew Paverd, Marcus Völp, Ferdinand Brasser, Matthias Schunter, N. Asokan, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Paulo Esteves-Veríssimo, Andreas Steininger, and Thorsten Holz

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 73, 4th International Workshop on Security and Dependability of Critical Embedded Real-Time Systems (CERTS 2019)

Abstract
A significant proportion of today’s information and communication technology (ICT) systems are entrusted with high value assets, and our modern society has become increasingly dependent on these systems operating safely and securely over their anticipated lifetimes. However, we observe a mismatch between the lifetimes expected from ICT-supported systems (such as autonomous cars) and the duration for which these systems are able to remain safe and secure, given the spectrum of threats they face. Whereas most systems today are constructed within the constraints of foreseeable technology advancements, we argue that long term, i.e., sustainable security & safety, requires anticipating the unforeseeable and preparing systems for threats not known today. In this paper, we set out our vision for sustainable security & safety. We summarize the main challenges in realizing this desideratum in real-world systems, and we identify several design principles that could address these challenges and serve as building blocks for achieving this vision.
Cite as

Andrew Paverd, Marcus Völp, Ferdinand Brasser, Matthias Schunter, N. Asokan, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Paulo Esteves-Veríssimo, Andreas Steininger, and Thorsten Holz. Sustainable Security & Safety: Challenges and Opportunities. In 4th International Workshop on Security and Dependability of Critical Embedded Real-Time Systems (CERTS 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 73, pp. 4:1-4:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{paverd_et_al:OASIcs.CERTS.2019.4,
  author =	{Paverd, Andrew and V\"{o}lp, Marcus and Brasser, Ferdinand and Schunter, Matthias and Asokan, N. and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Esteves-Ver{\'\i}ssimo, Paulo and Steininger, Andreas and Holz, Thorsten},
  title =	{{Sustainable Security \& Safety: Challenges and Opportunities}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Workshop on Security and Dependability of Critical Embedded Real-Time Systems (CERTS 2019)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:13},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-119-1},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{73},
  editor =	{Asplund, Mikael and Paulitsch, Michael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.CERTS.2019.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-108954},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.CERTS.2019.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: sustainability, security, safety}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagRep.1.12.62
Privacy and Security in Smart Energy Grids (Dagstuhl Seminar 11511)

Authors: Stefan Katzenbeisser, Klaus Kursawe, Bart Preneel, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 1, Issue 12 (2012)

Abstract
The ``smart energy grid'' promises to improve the reliability and efficiency of the future energy grid by exchanging detailed usage information between the end consumers and the utilities. This application raises different questions with regard to privacy and security. For instance, detailed meter readings enable to infer detailed information on the private life of the consumers; furthermore, manipulations of meter readings open the possibility of fraud. The goal of the seminar was thus to raise awareness of the privacy and security problems associated with smart meters and bring together academic researchers as well as utility experts in order to start an open dialogue on smart grid privacy and security problems and potential solutions.
Cite as

Stefan Katzenbeisser, Klaus Kursawe, Bart Preneel, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi. Privacy and Security in Smart Energy Grids (Dagstuhl Seminar 11511). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 1, Issue 12, pp. 62-68, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2012)

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@Article{katzenbeisser_et_al:DagRep.1.12.62,
  author =	{Katzenbeisser, Stefan and Kursawe, Klaus and Preneel, Bart and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza},
  title =	{{Privacy and Security in Smart Energy Grids (Dagstuhl Seminar 11511)}},
  pages =	{62--68},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2012},
  volume =	{1},
  number =	{12},
  editor =	{Katzenbeisser, Stefan and Kursawe, Klaus and Preneel, Bart and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.1.12.62},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-34518},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.1.12.62},
  annote =	{Keywords: privacy, security, smart grid, digital metrology}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagRep.1.12.1
Secure Computing in the Cloud (Dagstuhl Seminar 11491)

Authors: Benny Pinkas, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Nigel P. Smart

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 1, Issue 12 (2012)

Abstract
This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 11491 ``Secure Computing in the Cloud''. Cloud Computing offers a lot of benefits for end customers: high-end machines, incredible amounts of storage, high availability and everything available at the touch of a button. In this seminar we concentrate on compute clouds: Clouds, that do not only offer storage but also computations that can be outsourced in form of virtual machines (VMs). Outsourcing computations as well as data to a third party, in this case the cloud provider, are accompanied by the qualms of confiding data to the cloud provider based on blindly trusted service level agreements. The participants of this seminar discuss the involved risks, create threat models as basic assumptions that describe the (un-)trusted entities and present solutions that augment trust in the cloud provider, the integrity and verifiability of computations and data processed in the cloud.
Cite as

Benny Pinkas, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Nigel P. Smart. Secure Computing in the Cloud (Dagstuhl Seminar 11491). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 1, Issue 12, pp. 1-10, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2012)

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@Article{pinkas_et_al:DagRep.1.12.1,
  author =	{Pinkas, Benny and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Smart, Nigel P.},
  title =	{{Secure Computing in the Cloud (Dagstuhl Seminar 11491)}},
  pages =	{1--10},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2012},
  volume =	{1},
  number =	{12},
  editor =	{Pinkas, Benny and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Smart, Nigel P.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.1.12.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-33838},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.1.12.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: cloud computing, outsourced computation, verifiability, integrity, confidentiality, trust}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.1
09282 Abstracts Collection – Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware

Authors: Jorge Guajardo, Bart Preneel, Pim Tuyls, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware (2010)

Abstract
From 05.07 to 08.07.2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09282 "Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware" was held in Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available
Cite as

Jorge Guajardo, Bart Preneel, Pim Tuyls, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi. 09282 Abstracts Collection – Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, pp. 1-11, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{guajardo_et_al:DagSemProc.09282.1,
  author =	{Guajardo, Jorge and Preneel, Bart and Tuyls, Pim and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza},
  title =	{{09282 Abstracts Collection – Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  pages =	{1--11},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24073},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Foundations, PUF models, PUF applications, anti-counterfeiting, forgery resilience, side-channel attack models}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.2
09282 Executive Summary – Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware

Authors: Jorge Guajardo, Bart Preneel, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Pim Tuyls

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware (2010)

Abstract
From 05.07 to 08.07.2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09282 ``Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware '' was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. This paper provides a summary of the motivation for the seminar and the importance of the research area, a list of the participants and the program of talks given during the seminar.
Cite as

Jorge Guajardo, Bart Preneel, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Pim Tuyls. 09282 Executive Summary – Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, pp. 1-7, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{guajardo_et_al:DagSemProc.09282.2,
  author =	{Guajardo, Jorge and Preneel, Bart and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Tuyls, Pim},
  title =	{{09282 Executive Summary – Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  pages =	{1--7},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24086},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Foundations, PUF models, PUF applications, anti-counterfeiting,forgery resilience, side-channel attack models}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.3
An efficient fuzzy extractor for limited noise

Authors: Boris Skoric and Pim Tuyls

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware (2010)

Abstract
A fuzzy extractor is a security primitive that allows for reproducible extraction of an almost uniform key from a non-uniform noisy source. We analyze a fuzzy extractor scheme that uses universal hash functions for both information reconciliation and privacy amplification. This is a useful scheme when the number of error patterns likely to occur is limited, regardless of the error probabilities. We derive a sharp bound on the uniformity of the extracted key, making use of the concatenation property of universal hash functions and a recent tight formulation of the leftover hash lemma.
Cite as

Boris Skoric and Pim Tuyls. An efficient fuzzy extractor for limited noise. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{skoric_et_al:DagSemProc.09282.3,
  author =	{Skoric, Boris and Tuyls, Pim},
  title =	{{An efficient fuzzy extractor for limited noise}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24094},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fuzzy Extractor, PUF, physical unclonable function, universal hash}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.4
Anti-Counterfeiting: Mixing the Physical and the Digital World

Authors: Darko Kirovski

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware (2010)

Abstract
In this paper, we overview a set of desiderata for building digital anti-counterfeiting technologies that rely upon the difficulty of manufacturing randomized complex 3D objects. Then, we observe how this set is addressed by RF-DNA, an anti-counterfeiting technology recently proposed by DeJean and Kirovski. RF-DNA constructs certificates of authenticity as random objects that exhibit substantial uniqueness in the electromagnetic domain.
Cite as

Darko Kirovski. Anti-Counterfeiting: Mixing the Physical and the Digital World. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, pp. 1-11, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{kirovski:DagSemProc.09282.4,
  author =	{Kirovski, Darko},
  title =	{{Anti-Counterfeiting: Mixing the Physical and the Digital World}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  pages =	{1--11},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24063},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Certificates of authenticity, RF-DNA, physically unique one-way functions}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.5
Engineering On-Chip Thermal Effects

Authors: Patrick Schaumont

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware (2010)

Abstract
Temperature effects can be used to maliciously affect the behavior of digital crypto-circuits. For example, temperature effects can create covert communication channels, and they can affect the stability of physical unclonable functions (PUFs). This talk observes that these thermal effects can be engineered, and we describe two techniques. The first technique shows how to filter the information through a covert temperature channel. This leads to detectors for very specific events, for example, someone touching the chip package. The second technique shows how to mitigate the impact of temperature on a PUF design while avoiding costly post-processing. We discuss the design of a compact ring-oscillator PUF for FPGA which is tolerant to temperature variations.
Cite as

Patrick Schaumont. Engineering On-Chip Thermal Effects. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{schaumont:DagSemProc.09282.5,
  author =	{Schaumont, Patrick},
  title =	{{Engineering On-Chip Thermal Effects}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24032},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: PUFs, temperature effects, covert temperature channel, ring oscillator PUF, FPGAs}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.6
How to Make Smartcards Resistant to Hackers' Lightsabers?

Authors: Philippe Teuwen

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware (2010)

Abstract
Cracking smartcards has always been a prized hobby, for the academic glory , for fun (ha, breaking the self-claimed unbreakable...) and for profit (ask the mafia). State-of-the-art techniques include laser blasts that inject various transient or permanent faults in a program execution, potentially making the smartcard do whatever the attacker wants. After a brief recap of the attack tools and their effects, we'll see how the programmer can protect his code with software techniques ranging from cookbook recipes to tool chain automation and how he can evaluate the robustness of his code by means of fault injection simulators.
Cite as

Philippe Teuwen. How to Make Smartcards Resistant to Hackers' Lightsabers?. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, pp. 1-8, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{teuwen:DagSemProc.09282.6,
  author =	{Teuwen, Philippe},
  title =	{{How to Make Smartcards Resistant to Hackers' Lightsabers?}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  pages =	{1--8},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24010},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fault-injection, smartcard, simulator}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.7
Simplification of Controlled PUF primitives

Authors: Boris Skoric and Marc X. Makkes

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware (2010)

Abstract
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are physical objects that are unique, practically unclonable and that behave like a random function when subjected to a challenge. Their use has been proposed for authentication tokens and anti-counterfeiting. A Controlled PUF (CPUF) consists of a PUF and a control layer that restricts a user's access to the PUF input and output. CPUFs can be used for secure key storage, authentication, certified execution of programs, and certified measurements. In this paper we modify a number of protocols involving CPUFs in order to improve their security. Our modifications mainly consist of encryption of a larger portion of the message traffic, and additional restrictions on the CPUF accessibility. We simplify the description of CPUF protocols by using flowchart notation. Furthermore we explicitly show how the helper data for the PUFs is handled.
Cite as

Boris Skoric and Marc X. Makkes. Simplification of Controlled PUF primitives. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{skoric_et_al:DagSemProc.09282.7,
  author =	{Skoric, Boris and Makkes, Marc X.},
  title =	{{Simplification of Controlled PUF primitives}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24044},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: PUF, physical unclonable function, controlled PUF, CPUF}
}
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