4 Search Results for "Simkin, Mark"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.5
Interactive Non-Malleable Codes Against Desynchronizing Attacks in the Multi-Party Setting

Authors: Nils Fleischhacker, Suparno Ghoshal, and Mark Simkin

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 267, 4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023)

Abstract
Interactive Non-Malleable Codes were introduced by Fleischhacker et al. (TCC 2019) in the two party setting with synchronous tampering. The idea of this type of non-malleable code is that it "encodes" an interactive protocol in such a way that, even if the messages are tampered with according to some class F of tampering functions, the result of the execution will either be correct, or completely unrelated to the inputs of the participating parties. In the synchronous setting the adversary is able to modify the messages being exchanged but cannot drop messages nor desynchronize the two parties by first running the protocol with the first party and then with the second party. In this work, we define interactive non-malleable codes in the non-synchronous multi-party setting and construct such interactive non-malleable codes for the class F^s_bounded of bounded-state tampering functions.
Cite as

Nils Fleischhacker, Suparno Ghoshal, and Mark Simkin. Interactive Non-Malleable Codes Against Desynchronizing Attacks in the Multi-Party Setting. In 4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 267, pp. 5:1-5:26, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{fleischhacker_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2023.5,
  author =	{Fleischhacker, Nils and Ghoshal, Suparno and Simkin, Mark},
  title =	{{Interactive Non-Malleable Codes Against Desynchronizing Attacks in the Multi-Party Setting}},
  booktitle =	{4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:26},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-271-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{267},
  editor =	{Chung, Kai-Min},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-183331},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: non-malleability, multi-party protocols}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.10
Distributed Shuffling in Adversarial Environments

Authors: Kasper Green Larsen, Maciej Obremski, and Mark Simkin

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 267, 4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023)

Abstract
We study mix-nets in the context of cryptocurrencies. Here we have many computationally weak shufflers that speak one after another and want to joinlty shuffle a list of ciphertexts (c₁, … , c_n). Each shuffler can only permute k << n ciphertexts at a time. An adversary A can track some of the ciphertexts and adaptively corrupt some of the shufflers. We present a simple protocol for shuffling the list of ciphertexts efficiently. The main technical contribution of this work is to prove that our simple shuffling strategy does indeed provide good anonymity guarantees and at the same time terminates quickly. Our shuffling algorithm provides a strict improvement over the current shuffling strategy in Ethereum’s block proposer elections. Our algorithm is secure against a stronger adversary, provides provable security guarantees, and is comparably in efficiency to the current approach.
Cite as

Kasper Green Larsen, Maciej Obremski, and Mark Simkin. Distributed Shuffling in Adversarial Environments. In 4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 267, pp. 10:1-10:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{larsen_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2023.10,
  author =	{Larsen, Kasper Green and Obremski, Maciej and Simkin, Mark},
  title =	{{Distributed Shuffling in Adversarial Environments}},
  booktitle =	{4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-271-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{267},
  editor =	{Chung, Kai-Min},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-183385},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Distributed Computing, Shuffling}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2022.8
Multiparty Computation with Covert Security and Public Verifiability

Authors: Peter Scholl, Mark Simkin, and Luisa Siniscalchi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 230, 3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2022)

Abstract
Multiparty computation protocols (MPC) are said to be secure against covert adversaries if the honest parties are guaranteed to detect any misbehavior by the malicious parties with a constant probability. Protocols that, upon detecting a cheating attempt, additionally allow the honest parties to compute certificates, which enable third parties to be convinced of the malicious behavior of the accused parties, are called publicly verifiable. In this work, we make several contributions to the domain of MPC with security against covert adversaries. We identify a subtle flaw in a protocol of Goyal, Mohassel, and Smith (Eurocrypt 2008), meaning that their protocol does not allow to identify a cheating party, and show how to fix their original construction to obtain security against covert adversaries. We present generic compilers that transform arbitrary passively secure preprocessing protocols, i.e. protocols where the parties have no private inputs, into protocols that are secure against covert adversaries and publicly verifiable. Using our compiler, we construct the first efficient variants of the BMR and the SPDZ protocols that are secure and publicly verifiable against a covert adversary that corrupts all but one party, and also construct variants with covert security and identifiable abort. We observe that an existing impossibility result by Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Seyalioglu (TCC 2012) can be used to show that there exist certain functionalities that cannot be realized by parties, that have oracle-access to broadcast and arbitrary two-party functionalities, with information-theoretic security against a covert adversary.
Cite as

Peter Scholl, Mark Simkin, and Luisa Siniscalchi. Multiparty Computation with Covert Security and Public Verifiability. In 3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 230, pp. 8:1-8:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{scholl_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2022.8,
  author =	{Scholl, Peter and Simkin, Mark and Siniscalchi, Luisa},
  title =	{{Multiparty Computation with Covert Security and Public Verifiability}},
  booktitle =	{3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2022)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-238-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{230},
  editor =	{Dachman-Soled, Dana},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2022.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-164861},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2022.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Multi-party computation, covert security, public verifiability}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2020.5
Use Your Brain! Arithmetic 3PC for Any Modulus with Active Security

Authors: Hendrik Eerikson, Marcel Keller, Claudio Orlandi, Pille Pullonen, Joonas Puura, and Mark Simkin

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 163, 1st Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2020)

Abstract
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows a set of mutually distrustful parties to compute a public function on their private inputs without revealing anything beyond the output of the computation. This paper focuses on the specific case of actively secure three-party computation with an honest majority. In particular, we are interested in solutions which allow to evaluate arithmetic circuits over real-world CPU word sizes, like 32- and 64-bit words. Our starting point is the novel compiler of Damgård et al. from CRYPTO 2018. First, we present an improved version of it which reduces the online communication complexity by a factor of 2. Next, we replace their preprocessing protocol (with arithmetic modulo a large prime) with a more efficient preprocessing which only performs arithmetic modulo powers of two. Finally, we present a novel "postprocessing" check which replaces the preprocessing phase. These protocols offer different efficiency tradeoffs and can therefore outperform each other in different deployment settings. We demonstrate this with benchmarks in a LAN and different WAN settings. Concretely, we achieve a throughput of 1 million 64-bit multiplications per second with parties located in different continents and 3 million in one location.
Cite as

Hendrik Eerikson, Marcel Keller, Claudio Orlandi, Pille Pullonen, Joonas Puura, and Mark Simkin. Use Your Brain! Arithmetic 3PC for Any Modulus with Active Security. In 1st Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 163, pp. 5:1-5:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{eerikson_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2020.5,
  author =	{Eerikson, Hendrik and Keller, Marcel and Orlandi, Claudio and Pullonen, Pille and Puura, Joonas and Simkin, Mark},
  title =	{{Use Your Brain! Arithmetic 3PC for Any Modulus with Active Security}},
  booktitle =	{1st Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2020)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-151-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{163},
  editor =	{Tauman Kalai, Yael and Smith, Adam D. and Wichs, Daniel},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2020.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-121104},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2020.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secure Multiparty Computation, Information Theoretic Security}
}
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