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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12256
URL: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1225/
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Fiat, Amos ; Levy, Meital ; Kaplan, Haim ; Olonetsky, Svetlana

Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing

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07261.KaplanHaim.Paper.1225.pdf (0.3 MB)


Abstract

As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give
tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on
related machines. We also give tight bounds for $k$-strong
equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most
$k$, for unrelated machines.


BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{fiat_et_al:DSP:2007:1225,
  author =	{Amos Fiat and Meital  Levy and Haim Kaplan and Svetlana Olonetsky},
  title =	{Strong Price of Anarchy  for  Machine Load Balancing},
  booktitle =	{Fair Division},
  year =	{2007},
  editor =	{Steven Brams and Kirk Pruhs and Gerhard Woeginger},
  number =	{07261},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum f{\"u}r Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1225},
  annote =	{Keywords: Game theory, Strong Nash equilibria, Load balancing, Price of Anarchy}
}

Keywords: Game theory, Strong Nash equilibria, Load balancing, Price of Anarchy
Collection: 07261 - Fair Division
Issue Date: 2007
Date of publication: 26.11.2007


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