Abstract
In self-encryption, a device encrypts some piece of information for itself to decrypt in the future. We are interested in security of self-encryption when the state occasionally leaks. Applications that use self-encryption include cloud storage, when a client encrypts files to be stored, and in 0-RTT session resumptions, when a server encrypts a resumption key to be kept by the client. Previous works focused on forward security and resistance to replay attacks. In our work, we study post-compromise security (PCS). PCS was achieved in ratcheted instant messaging schemes, at the price of having an inflating state size. An open question was whether state inflation was necessary. In our results, we prove that post-compromise security implies a super-linear state size in terms of the number of active ciphertexts which can still be decrypted. We apply our result to self-encryption for cloud storage, 0-RTT session resumption, and secure messaging. We further show how to construct a secure scheme matching our bound on the state size up to a constant factor.

1 Introduction
In many deployed applications, the design of the application involves various devices communicating with each other securely. They sometimes require one of the devices to encrypt some piece of information that will be used in the future by itself. We call this self-encryption. One application is massive client-server connections where millions of clients connect to a server, causing the server being unable to afford to store any client-specific information. On the other hand, recent protocols such as TLS 1.3 offers an alternate way to make the server to resume past sessions without going through a new round-trip handshake when a client reconnects to the server.\(^1\) While clients would surely benefit from a smooth connection experience, the server has to “remember” each session in a secure manner, possibly by keeping a (small or big) size of state. More precisely, when a client connects to a website for the first time, the web server generates a ticket for the client. This ticket is a piece of information that helps the server to remember the session. Somehow, this is a helper that the server encrypts for itself which is to be kept by the client like cookies. When the client reconnects to the same website with her ticket, the server may use the information contained in the ticket to resume their session. As desired, it gives the freedom not to store any client-specific information on the server-side. However, the server needs a secret state for

\(^1\) As of November 2019, 34% of TLS connections use session resumption [11].
the cryptographic operations which are used in generating and decrypting tickets. From the
security point of view, then, the concern becomes to provide security against replay attacks
or occasional exposures of the internal state of the server.

In general, the internal state is any type of information that would let a device decrypt
(some part of) the communication. In this work, we investigate the security of self-encryption
which comes in two forms: forward security (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS).
Intuitively, forward security provides security for the past communication when exposure
happens, whereas post-compromise security aims to heal the future communication when
exposure occurs [6]. Before going forward with security, we list three applications.

0-RTT in TLS 1.3
In the TLS 1.3 protocol, a client connects to a server and establishes a common secret key
through a handshake key agreement protocol. This is succeeded with a full round trip time
(1-RTT) communication. Ideally, when the client reconnects to the same server after a while,
the connection should be resumed with no round trip time (0-RTT). 0-RTT has been an
active research domain in the last few years [2, 7, 10]. It is achieved in practice through
two elementary approaches called session caches and session tickets as described by Aviram,
Gellert, and Jager (AGJ) [2]. In the former technique, the server resumes the session by
assigning a different resumption key for each connection and sending the client a look-up
index that links to the resumption key. The ticket is that index. When the client comes back,
it includes the ticket and the payload data. This provides forward security. Nevertheless, the
solution depends on maintaining a big database on the server, which is not alluring.

The other approach for 0-RTT in TLS 1.3 configurations is to create session tickets for
each client by using a long-term secret key K (the ticket encryption key). Therefore, instead
of storing a unique key for each session, the server generates a secret material for each client
and encrypts it under K. The secret material is called resumption key whereas the encrypted
resumption key is the ticket. The client stores both the resumption key and the ticket.
Later on, the client encrypts the payload with the resumption key and includes her ticket in
0-RTT message to remind herself. The server can decrypt the ticket with K and retrieve
the resumption secret to decrypt the payload. This approach avoids storing a big database; it is
easy to implement and to integrate in existing systems, yet, it does not provide any kind of
security in the case of a key exposure.²

In their recent work, Aviram, Gellert, and Jager (AGJ) [2] studied the forward security
and the resistance to replay attacks of session resumption, specifically focusing on session
tickets. However, they did not consider PCS in their security model.

Cloud Storage
In a single client-server cloud storage, the client wants to outsource her files in a remote
storage (cloud) in an encrypted form. The encryption of the files occurs locally on the client
who keeps the secret decryption material. The adversary has full access to the cloud and
can also keep archives of removed storage. If the client encrypts all files with the same key,
the leakage of the key becomes catastrophic as all files (even the removed ones) become
compromised. Besides, the client aims to minimize the storage on her local while maintaining

² In TLS 1.3, it is considered good practice to rotate the long-term key K every few hours by assuming
that all the clients will resume their sessions in the “life-time” of K. Nevertheless, as soon as the key K
is compromised, there is neither FS nor PCS during the active period of K.
strong security in case of a compromise of her internal state. This cloud storage problem shares similarities with the 0-RTT problem: the cloud client and the 0-RTT server want to minimize their storage while conserving security.

On the other hand, keys should not be used more than what the encryption method can guarantee to be secure or age too long. This is part of a common good practice in key management. Regulations actually mandate the encrypted files to be updated from an old key to a new key often enough. This is called key rotation. The fundamental motivation, however, comes with the desire to achieve resilience to key exposure. Key rotation was formally studied by Boneh et al. [3]. More recently, Everspaugh et al. [9] considered the integrity problem with key rotation.

The naive way to achieve key rotation is to make the client download the encrypted files on the local, decrypt them with the existing key, generate a new fresh key, re-encrypt, and finally outsource back. However, it is a very cumbersome solution for the client. The main task of key rotation is to avoid the complexity of communication and the complexity of treatment on the client side. In practice, AWS and Google deploy a more practical methods based on hybrid encryption: a header $c_{t1} = \text{Enc}_K(eph)$ is formed by encrypting an ephemeral key $eph$ and the rest of the ciphertext $c_{t2} = \text{Enc}_{eph}(pt)$ is formed by encrypting the plaintext $pt$ using $eph$. Key rotation is done by updating the header as $c'_{t1} = \text{Enc}_{K'}(eph)$ but keeping the same ephemeral key so $c'_{t2} = c_{t2}$. This was argued to be a bit cheating with the concept of key rotation as the encryption of data under the same key was remaining in $c_{t2}$.

We tackle the privacy problem differently. Instead of updating a ciphertext to be decryptable with a chosen key, we let ciphertexts unchanged but update the state which is stored by the client$^3$. Naturally, our concern becomes more focused on the storage space on the client side. In our setting, the client stores one state and needs no operation on ciphertexts.

### Instant Messaging

Post-compromise security in instant messaging was formally studied during the last few years [14, 12, 13, 1, 8]. It is addressed by the notion of ratchet. A ratchet consists of updating a key in a one-way manner (for FS) by using some unpredictable randomness (for PCS). Bidirectional secure communication applications can be transformed into self-encryption. In fact, roughly speaking, we can merge both participants into one single device which would encrypt for itself. A ratcheted scheme is normally FS and PCS secure, hence defines an FS and PCS secure self encryption which we call a self-ratchet.

### Our Perspective

In order to study the security of self-encryption, we consider a scheme which generates ciphertexts with the ability to decrypt later, even when the state to decrypt evolves. We define it in a way that it covers the three (and potentially more) applications we described earlier. Furthermore, we are interested in forward security and post-compromise security of these systems. The former captures that the system generates ciphertexts that should remain decryptable for a limited time and that are not going to be decryptable anymore after they “expire” (it could happen either because the settings allow the ciphertexts to stay alive for a limited time or because there is an inherent latency to rotate keys). The ciphertexts that are still decryptable are called active ciphertexts. Making a ciphertext become inactive

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$^3$ We do not mean to pick a fresh key to “rotate” the key and update the header as practiced by AWS.
is a way to have forward security: if the state of the scheme is exposed after a ciphertext becomes inactive, this ciphertext is still safe. The PCS defines what happens to the security after an exposure of a state. When an exposure takes place, the post-compromise secure system should be able to heal the state such that the ciphertexts which are generated after the healing are secure. In many studies, PCS is interchangeably used with healing.

While studying self-ratcheted schemes with PCS guarantees (as well as FS), it was intuitive to expect that the state size of any post-compromise secure self-ratcheted scheme will grow because decryption keys would need to be independent. However, it was not clear why and with what bounds we could achieve it. The first contribution of our work is to show that we cannot achieve post-compromise security better than adding a trivial solution to already existing efficient FS schemes.

As for forward security, AGJ [2] specifically consider the session resumption in TLS 1.3 and they designed solutions for FS and replay attacks without PCS. Their construction is practical. In another study by Günther et al. [10] and Derler et al. [7], the authors consider a solution without any shared secret. In these works, the clients resume connections without having to store any session-specific information on her local. The client keeps only the long-term public key pk of the server. Therefore, they look for forward-secure solutions when the long-term secret key sk evolves throughout time although the associated public key never changes, hence the clients never updates its state. Although it is remarkable that such schemes with forward security exist, both constructions are less practical due to the heavy cryptographic tools they use. Therefore, we rather focus on the FS scheme AGJ to add PCS.

In their seminal paper on PCS, Cohn-Gordon, Cremers, and Garratt [6] focus on Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE). In AKE, the protocol starts with a state and ends when both participants have obtained the exchanged key. The typical exposure threats happen before or after the protocol but not during it because the protocol is rather short. The AKE protocol proposed by Cohn-Gordon et al. [6] requires to store nonces and ephemeral secrets during the execution, which inflate the state. Deflation happens when the protocol is fully complete. In our perspective (and specially about instance messaging), communication is asynchronous and it can take some time before a protocol fully terminates. Hence, there is the case when several protocols run concurrently. This is the case where the state would grow with the number of incomplete sessions, just like in the instance messaging case (which we illustrate on Fig. 15).

**Our Contribution**

In the present work, we start with the definition of a minimal primitive called Self-Encrypted Queue (SEQ) with correctness and one-way (OW) security. It gives the minimal functionality for any PCS construction, more particularly self-encryption schemes. Then, we prove that for every SEQ primitive with states of bounded length, there is an adversary with small complexity and high probability of success to break OW security. More precisely, the probability of success is at least \( \frac{1}{4n^2} 2^{-2\frac{n+\Delta}{n+1}} \) when the state size is bounded by \( \ell \), \( n \) is the number of active ciphertexts, and \( \Delta = 1 \) (or defined below). This result led us to conclude that when self-encryption is post-compromise secure, it must have a state which grows more than linearly in \( n \). This does not provide the practicality we were hoping for. Therefore, we define a refinement which is a relaxed version of post-compromise security. In layman

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4 It grows linearly if we take the key size as a memory unit. (The key size cannot have a constant bit length. Otherwise, exhaustive search breaks it with constant complexity.)
terms, we look into the following case: Maybe the first ciphertext that will be generated after an exposure is not secure, but the system could be designed to heal the security after the generation of $\Delta$ ciphertexts, where $\Delta$ is a constant parameter of our scheme. We call it $\Delta$-PCS. We show that in refined definitions, the state size is super-linear in $\frac{n}{\Delta}$ as opposed to growing super-linear in $n$.

We prove that this impossibility result applies both in self-encryption and in secure messaging. In addition to this, we prove that this result is tight by constructing a simple self-encryption scheme achieving $\Delta$-PCS with a state size matching our bounds.

After our impossibility results, we focus on few applications by borrowing already existing formal interfaces from AGJ [2] in order to add PCS security in the discussed settings. We modify the interface in a way that decryption and puncturing happens with separate function calls in case the puncturing is not always necessary. Later on, we look at secure ratcheted protocols which provides PCS security from the literature. We show that the state of these protocols grows linearly (in terms of number of keys) as they “ratchet” every time a new message is generated, hence falling into the case where $\Delta = 1$. On the other hand, we have two secure communication protocols given by Alwen, Coretti, and Dodis (called ACD and ACD-PK) [1] which model well what Signal is deploying. We observe that the state in both schemes does not grow linearly like other PCS schemes. This is due to the fact that these two protocols do not guarantee $\Delta$-PCS for any constant $\Delta$. In fact, healing happens only when the direction of communication changes.

We conclude that adding PCS to FS-secure systems can be succeeded at the price of a minimal state growth with proven bounds and we cannot hope for better.

Structure of the Paper

In Section 2, we define a basic PCS-secure primitive called SEQ and we prove that its state size must grow super-linearly. In Section 3, we apply this result to self-encryption. We construct a scheme based on AGJ with super-linear growth and PCS security. Finally, in Section 4, we show how to apply our result to instant secure messaging.

2 Impossibility Result

In this section, we first define a minimal primitive called Self Encrypted Queue (SEQ) achieving post-compromise security. This primitive is not meant to have any concrete application. However, we will prove that (examples of) useful primitives imply SEQ, and that SEQ must have a linearly growing state.

2.1 Definition of a Minimal Primitive

We define below a minimal primitive which works in two phases: It iteratively generates a sequence of plaintext/ciphertext pairs $\langle pt, ct \rangle$ by updating its state. Then, it takes the sequence of $ct$ in the same order as generated and recovers the exact sequence of $pt$. The primitive is minimal in the sense that all considered applications which claim PCS must achieve this functionality and even more (such as being able to receive the list of $ct$ in different order, or to have encryption and decryption steps mixed up). We build a limited self-encryption (actually, we build a KEM) which we call a SEQ.

$\blacktriangleright$ Definition 1 (SEQ). A Self Encrypted Queue (SEQ) is a primitive defined by $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow st$ which generates an initial state;

We say that \( a \) security parameter \( n \) and \( \lambda \) are integers

\[
\lambda = \max_{1 \leq m \leq n} \Pr[\mathrm{OW}_{m, \Delta, \lambda}(A) \rightarrow 1]
\]

is a negligible function.

The value of \( \Delta \) represents the time the scheme needs to heal security after an exposure. This means that \( \Delta \) steps after exposing the state, the new state has become safe again and the encryptions to follow will protect confidentiality. In the game, \( st_{m-\Delta} \) is exposed and the goal of the adversary is to decrypt \( ct_m \). Most secure schemes are 1-secure, because security heals after \( \Delta = 1 \) encryption.

It is easy to design a secure SEQ of level \( n \) with a state with \( O(n) \) keys inside. For instance, for any \( n \), the scheme in Fig. 2 is a 1-secure SEQ to level \( n \) with state of size \( n \lambda \), where \( \lambda \) is the security parameter. This SEQ is trivially correct: \( st \) accumulates all \( pt \) in a queue during encryption and releases them during decryption. It is also perfectly secure: \( pt \) is independent from the corresponding \( ct \) and from the previous states. Hence, any \( \mathrm{OW}_{m, \Delta, \lambda} \) adversary has an advantage of \( 2^{-\lambda} \).

Ideally, states should not inflate. For that, one can count on \( ct \) to transport a helper to recover \( pt \) without having to store it in \( st \). However, we prove next that a correct and \( \mathrm{OW} \)-secure SEQ primitive with \( st \) in a space \( ST \) of size \( 2^{o(n \log n)} \) does not exist.

### 2.2 Impossibility Result

**Theorem 3.** There exists a (small) constant \( c \) such that for every probability \( \alpha \in [0, 1] \) and integers \( \lambda, n, \ell, \Delta, k \), for every correct SEQ primitive of level \( n \) as in Def. 1 with \( st \) in a

\[\text{Figure 1} \quad \text{Correctness and OW games for SEQ.}\]

\[\text{Enc}(st) \rightarrow (st', pt, ct) \quad \text{which updates the state and adds to the queue a new message which is pt in clear and ct in encrypted form;}\]

\[\text{Dec}(st, ct) \rightarrow (st', pt / \bot) \quad \text{which updates the state and decrypts ct which leads the queue.}\]

This is deterministic.

We say that SEQ is correct to level-\( n \) if the correctness game in Fig. 1 always return 1.\(^5\)

\[\text{Game } \mathrm{OW}_{m, \Delta, \lambda}(A):\]

1. \( \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow st_0 \)
2. \( \text{for } i = 1 \text{ to } n \text{ do } \triangleright \text{ fill up the queue } \)
3. \( \text{Enc}(st_{i-1}) \rightarrow (st_i, pt_i, ct_i) \)
4. \( \text{end for } \)
5. \( \text{for } i = 1 \text{ to } n \text{ do } \triangleright \text{ empty the queue } \)
6. \( \text{Dec}(st_{i+n-1}, ct_i) \rightarrow (st_{i+n}, pt_i) \)
7. \( \text{if } pt_i \neq pt_i' \text{ then return } 0 \)
8. \( \text{end for } \)
9. \( \text{return } 1 \)

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\(^5\) Throughout this paper, \( 1_P \) denotes a function returning 1 if the predicate \( P \) is true, and 0 otherwise.
Gen(1^\lambda):  
1: st ← (\lambda, [])  
2: return st  

Enc(st):  
3: parse st = (\lambda, L)  
4: pick pt of length \lambda at random  
5: L ← (L, pt)  
6: st ← (\lambda, L)  
7: ct ← ⊥  
8: return (st, pt, ct)

Dec(st, ct):  
9: parse st = (\lambda, L)  
10: parse L = (pt, L')  
11: st ← (\lambda, L')  
12: return (st, pt)

\[ \text{Figure 2} \quad \text{A trivial SEQ.} \]

space \(ST\) of size \(|ST| \leq 2^\ell\), there exist \(m \leq n\) and an OW_{m,\Delta,\lambda} adversary \(A\) of complexity \((n - m + \Delta)T_{\text{Enc}} + mT_{\text{Dec}} + c\), and advantage at least

\[
\Pr[\text{OW}_{m,\Delta,\lambda}(A) \rightarrow 1] > \frac{\alpha}{n} \left(1 - \left(\frac{1}{k} + \frac{k-1}{2}\right)\left\lceil \frac{\lambda}{2^\ell} \right\rceil 2^\ell \right)
\]

where \(T_{\text{Enc}}\) and \(T_{\text{Dec}}\) are the complexities of \(\text{Enc}\) and \(\text{Dec}\).

Interestingly, for \(k = 2\) and \(\alpha = \frac{1}{(n/2^\ell)^4}\), this theorem gives \(\Pr[\text{OW}_{m,\Delta,\lambda}(A) \rightarrow 1] > \frac{\Delta}{n^4}(1 - e^{2\ell - \left\lceil \frac{\lambda}{2^\ell} \right\rceil})\). Thus, it is clear that \(\ell \leq \left\lceil \frac{n}{2^\ell} \right\rceil - 2\) is insecure.

We can be more precise and obtain insecurity when \(\ell \geq \left\lceil \frac{n}{2^\ell} \right\rceil\). Th. 3 with \(\alpha = \frac{\lambda}{2^\ell}\) and \(k = \left\lceil \frac{\lambda}{2^\ell} \right\rceil\) gives the following result:

\[ \text{Corollary 4. There exists a (small) constant } c \text{ such that for every integers } \lambda, n, \ell, \text{ and } \Delta, \text{ for every correct SEQ primitive of level } n \text{ as in Def. 1 with } \text{st in a space } ST \text{ of size } |ST| \leq 2^\ell, \text{ there exist } m \leq n \text{ and an OW}_{m,\Delta,\lambda} \text{ adversary } A \text{ of complexity } (n - m + \Delta)T_{\text{Enc}} + mT_{\text{Dec}} + c, \text{ and advantage at least}
\]

\[
\Pr[\text{OW}_{m,\Delta,\lambda}(A) \rightarrow 1] > \frac{1}{4n^2} 2^{-2\ell \left\lceil \frac{\lambda}{2^\ell} \right\rceil}
\]

where \(T_{\text{Enc}}\) and \(T_{\text{Dec}}\) are the complexities of \(\text{Enc}\) and \(\text{Dec}\).

This means that the state needs a size \(\ell\) such that

\[
\ell > \frac{1}{2} \left\lceil \frac{n}{\Delta} \right\rceil \log_2 \frac{1}{4n\varepsilon} - 1
\]

(1)

to achieve \(\Delta\)-security up to \(n\) encryptions with advantage bounded by \(\varepsilon\). For \(\varepsilon = 2^{-\lambda}\) and \(n = \text{Poly}(\lambda)\), the dominant term is \(\frac{\lambda n}{2\Delta}\).

We can now prove Th. 3:

**Proof.** Let us consider a correct primitive of level \(n\) with \(\text{st}\) in a space \(ST\) such that \(|ST| \leq 2^\ell\). We will show that it is insecure. To do so, we will first express that the state \(\text{st}\) after \(n\) encryptions are constrained. Namely, constraints are that \(\text{st}\) must decrypt the generated sequence of \(\text{ct}\) correctly. The constraints increase with \(n\), and the set of possible \(\text{st}\) values which make decryption correct decreases. The set of constrained states does not decrease exponentially because of the surprising existence of “super states” which are able to
decrypt more than their constraints. Namely, super states can decrypt universally, including 
encryptions from the “future” which have not been generated yet. This is counter-intuitive.
This set of super states is a hard core in the set of constrained states. We show that the set 
of constrained which are non-super states does decrease exponentially. Hence, by taking \( n \) 
large enough, constrained states become all super states: the state after \( n \) encryptions must 
be a super state. We use the property of the super state to mount an attack.

We first define notations. We extend the \( \text{Enc} \) and \( \text{Dec} \) functions. First of all, with random 
coins \( \rho \), we write \( \text{Enc}(st; \rho) = (st', pt, ct) \) and consider \( \text{Enc} \) as deterministic with explicit coins.
For \( X \in \{ \text{Enc}, \text{Dec} \} \) and \( y \in \{ st, pt, ct \} \), we denote by \( X_{o-y} \) the generated output of type 
\( y \) by the \( X \) operation: for both \( \text{Enc} \) and \( \text{Dec} \), the output components define subfunctions 
\( \text{Enc}_{o-st}, \text{Enc}_{o-pt}, \text{Enc}_{o-ct}, \text{Dec}_{o-st}, \text{Dec}_{o-pt} \) by

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Enc}(st; \rho) &= (\text{Enc}_{o-st}(st; \rho), \text{Enc}_{o-pt}(st; \rho), \text{Enc}_{o-ct}(st; \rho)) \\
\text{Dec}(st, ct) &= (\text{Dec}_{o-st}(st, ct), \text{Dec}_{o-pt}(st, ct))
\end{align*}
\]

We further extend those functions with a variable number of inputs \( \rho \) or \( ct \). We define

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Enc}_{o-st}(st, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_i) &= \text{Enc}_{o-st}(\text{Enc}_{o-st}(st, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_{i-1}; \rho_i)) \\
\text{Dec}_{o-st}(st, ct_1, \ldots, ct_i) &= \text{Dec}_{o-st}(\text{Dec}_{o-st}(st, ct_1, \ldots, ct_{i-1}, ct_i))
\end{align*}
\]

with the convention that \( \text{Enc}_{o-st}(st) = st \) and \( \text{Dec}_{o-st}(st) = st \), i.e., the functions with 
zero coins do nothing but returning \( st \) unchanged. Next, \( \text{Enc}_{o-pt}(st, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_i) \) is the list of 
generated \( pt \), \( \text{Enc}_{o-ct}(st, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_i) \) is the list of generated \( ct \), and \( \text{Dec}_{o-pt}(st, ct_1, \ldots, ct_i) \) is 
the list of decrypted \( pt \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Enc}_{o-pt}(st, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_i) &= (\text{Enc}_{o-pt}(\text{Enc}_{o-st}(st, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_{j-1}; \rho_j))_{j=1, \ldots, i} \\
\text{Enc}_{o-ct}(st, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_i) &= (\text{Enc}_{o-ct}(\text{Enc}_{o-st}(st, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_{j-1}; \rho_j))_{j=1, \ldots, i} \\
\text{Dec}_{o-pt}(st, ct_1, \ldots, ct_i) &= (\text{Dec}_{o-pt}(\text{Dec}_{o-st}(st, ct_1, \ldots, ct_{j-1}, ct_j))_{j=1, \ldots, i})
\end{align*}
\]

Let \( st_n \) be the state which is obtained after \( n \) encryptions, before starting the decryption 
phase. In order to characterize the constraints on \( st_n \) coming from the first \( i \) encryptions,
we introduce a set \( C[r_i] \) corresponding to (and indexed with) each update operation \( r_i = 
(st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_i) \). Due to correctness, \( st_n \) must decrypt \( \text{Enc}_{o-ct}(r_i) \) to \( \text{Enc}_{o-pt}(r_i) \). Hence, we 
define the set of states which are constrained to \( r_i \) by

\[
C[r_i] = \{ st \in \mathcal{ST}; \text{Dec}_{o-pt}(st, \text{Enc}_{o-ct}(r_i)) = \text{Enc}_{o-pt}(r_i) \}
\]

Clearly, for any \( i \) and any \( st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_n \), we have

\[
\text{Enc}_{o-st}(st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_n) \in C[st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_i]
\]

We note that \( C[r_0] \), where \( r_0 = st_0 \) is the set of states subject to no restriction, hence 
\( C[st_0] = \mathcal{ST} \). Furthermore, we note that

\[
C[r_n] \subseteq \cdots \subseteq C[r_2] \subseteq C[r_1] \subseteq C[r_0] = \mathcal{ST}
\]

A state in \( C[r_{i-\Delta}] \) decrypts well the first \( i - \Delta \) ciphertexts. It may also be element of 
\( C[r_{i-\Delta}, \rho_{i-\Delta+1}, \ldots, \rho_i] \) if it decrypts the next \( \Delta \) ciphertexts which are produced with coins
\( \rho_{i-\Delta+1}, \ldots, \rho_i \). It may also be in \( C[r_{i-\Delta}, \rho_{i-\Delta+1}, \ldots, \rho'_i] \) and decrypt \( \Delta \) ciphertexts produced 
with other coins. With good probability, some state may actually have the “super-power” 
to decrypt ciphertexts produced with \( \Delta \) more random coins. We call those states the super 
states. Intuitively, this is unexpected to happen but we show below that super-states exist 
and an adversary can build some easily.
More concretely, let $\alpha > 0$ be the probability from the statement of the theorem. We define a set of super states for $r_{j-\Delta} = (st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_{j-\Delta})$:

$$S[r_{j-\Delta}] = \left\{ st \in ST; \Pr[p_{j-\Delta+1}, \ldots, p_j | st \in C[r_{j-\Delta}, \rho_{j-\Delta+1}, \ldots, \rho_j]] > \alpha \right\}$$

This set $S[r_{j-\Delta}]$ defines a set of states which are $\alpha$-likely to decrypt a “fork” in the sequence of random coins. (See Fig. 3.)

We note that $S[r_{j-\Delta}] \subseteq C[r_{j-\Delta}]$ since for $st \in S[r_{j-\Delta}]$, there must exist (due to a non-zero probability) $\rho_{j-\Delta+1}, \ldots, \rho_j$ such that

$$st \in C[r_{j-\Delta}, \rho_{j-\Delta+1}, \ldots, \rho_j] \subseteq C[r_{j-\Delta}]$$

We define a union of super states as follows:

$$S[j]|st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_{n-\Delta}] = S[st_0] \cup S[st_0; \rho_1] \cup \cdots \cup S[st_0; \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_{n-\Delta}]$$

Clearly

$$S[j]|r_{n-\Delta}] \supseteq \cdots \supseteq S[j]|r_1] \supseteq S[j]|r_0]$$

The idea of the proof is to show that states with too many constraints tend to become super-states. Namely, we first prove that for $n$ large enough, $C[n]$ is included in $S[j]|r_{n-\Delta}]$ with large probability $p$. This means that after $n$ encryptions, a state becomes a super-state. Hence, this state belongs to some $S[r_{m-\Delta}]$, with a random $m \leq n$. We now take a fixed value of $m$ which is taken with probability at least $\frac{1}{n}$. (It exists, due to the pigeon-hole principle.) We take $n$ encryptions from random coins $st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_m, \rho_{m-\Delta+1}, \ldots, \rho_j$. We deduce that there is a probability at least $\frac{p}{n}$ to get a state $st'_n$ in $S[r_{m-\Delta}]$. If it happens, $st'_n$ decrypts what is generated by the fork $st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_m$ with probability at least $\alpha$ (by definition of the super states). We define an adversary that exploits this fact in Fig. 3. The $m$ encryptions with $st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_m$ are generated by the game, the state $st_{m-\Delta}$ leaks, and the adversary can fork to construct $st'_n$ from it. We obtain the success probability of the adversary in the OW-m,\Delta,\lambda game:

$$\Pr[OW_{m,\Delta,\lambda}(A) \rightarrow 1] > \frac{\alpha p}{n}$$

(2)

In what follows, we show that $p \geq 1 - (\frac{1}{2} + \frac{k-1}{2} \alpha) \frac{1}{2} 2^f$.

Let $i$ be an integer. We consider for the moment that $st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_{i-\Delta}$ are fixed. For simplicity, we denote

$$S[i]|st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_{i-\Delta}] = S[i]|st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_{i-2\Delta}]$$

$$C_i(\rho) = C[st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_{i-\Delta}, \rho]$$

for a vector $\rho$ of dimension $\Delta$. We take $k$ independent random $\Delta$-dimensional vectors $\rho_j$, for integers $j = 1, \ldots, k$ and we define $C_{i,j} = C_i(\rho_j)$. ($k$ is defined in the statement of the Lemma.) Given $\rho_j$ fixed and some $st \in C_{i,j} - S[i]$, we have $st \not\in S[i]$ meaning that $st \not\in S[st_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_{i-\Delta}]$, thus

$$\Pr[st \in C_{i,j}] \leq \alpha$$

$$\rho_j$$
We obtain
\[
\bar{\rho}(j) = \sum_{i,j} 1_{\bar{S}^{i,j}_0} \in S[\Delta]\n\]
for any \(\bar{\rho}_j\)' independent vector indexed with \(j' \neq j\), by definition of \(S_i\) and \(C_{i,j'}\). We count
\[
|(C_{i,j'} - S_i^j) \cap (C_{i,j} - S_i^{j'})| = \sum_{x \in C_{i,j} - S_i^{j'}} 1_{x \in C_{i,j} - S_i^{j'}}
\]
We obtain
\[
E_{\bar{\rho}_j'} [|(C_{i,j'} - S_i^j) \cap (C_{i,j} - S_i^{j'})|] \leq \alpha |C_{i,j} - S_i^{j'}| \leq \alpha |C_{i-\Delta} - S_i^{j'}|
\]
for any \(j, j'\), and \(\bar{\rho}_j\) with \(j \neq j'\). This is illustrated in Fig. 4. Clearly, we can then randomize \(\bar{\rho}_j\) and obtain
\[
E_{\bar{\rho}_j} [|(C_{i,j} - S_i^j) \cap (C_{i,j'} - S_i^{j'})|] \leq \alpha |C_{i-\Delta} - S_i^{j'}|
\]
for any \(j\) and \(j'\) with \(j \neq j'\).

Let \(A_j = C_{i,j} - S_i^{j'}\). This denotes one of the \(k\) subsets of \(A = C_{i-\Delta} - S_i^{j'}\). We have
\[
\sum_{j=1}^{k} |A_j| \leq |A| + \sum_{1 \leq j < j' \leq k} |A_j \cap A_{j'}|
\]
Indeed, any element \(x\) of \(A\) occurring in exactly \(m\) subsets \(A_j\) is counted \(m\) times on the left-hand side and \(1 + \frac{m(m-1)}{2}\) times on the right-hand side. However, \(m \leq 1 + \frac{m(m-1)}{2}\) for
We can now randomize on \( m \) and obtain
\[
\Pr[|C(st_0, \ldots, \rho_n) - S^*|st_0, m, \ldots, \rho_n-\Delta| = 0] \leq \left( \frac{1}{k} + \frac{k-1}{2} \alpha \right)^{\frac{\Delta}{2}} \frac{2^l}{2^t}
\]

By assumption on the size of \( ST \), for \( n \) large enough, we obtain that the set difference \( C[st_0, \ldots, \rho_n] - S^*[st_0, \ldots, \rho_n-\Delta] \) is likely to be empty which means that the states in \( C[st_0, \ldots, \rho_n] \) are super states. By the definition of \( C[r_n] \), \( Enc_{\omega_{st}}(st_0; \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_n) \in C[st_0, \ldots, \rho_n] \). Hence, \( Enc_{\omega_{st}}(st_0; \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_n) \) is likely to be in \( S^*[st_0, \ldots, \rho_n-\Delta] \). More precisely,
\[
\Pr[Enc_{\omega_{st}}(st_0; \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_n) \notin S^*[st_0, \ldots, \rho_n-\Delta]] \leq \left( \frac{1}{k} + \frac{k-1}{2} \alpha \right)^{\frac{\Delta}{2}} \frac{2^l}{2^t}
\]

If \( Enc_{\omega_{st}}(st_0; \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_n) \in S^*[st_0, \ldots, \rho_n-\Delta] \), it means there exists (at least) one \( m \leq n \) such that
\[
\Pr_{\rho'}[Enc_{\omega_{st}}(st_0; \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_n) \in C(st_0, \ldots, \rho_m-\Delta, \rho') > \alpha
\]

Therefore, we obtain the success probability in the OW_{m,\Delta,\lambda} game (from Eq. (2)):
\[
\Pr[OW_{m,\Delta,\lambda}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] > \frac{\alpha}{n} \left( 1 - \left( \frac{1}{k} + \frac{k-1}{2} \alpha \right)^{\frac{\Delta}{2}} \frac{2^l}{2^t} \right)
\]

The complexity of \( \mathcal{A} \) is \( n - m + \Delta \) encryptions and \( m \) decryptions.

**Uniform Impossibility Result**

Our Th. 3 and Cor. 4 are *non-uniform* in the sense that the parameter \( m \) depends on \( \lambda \) in an unknown manner. However, \( \mathcal{A} \) is constructed in a polynomially bounded manner based on \( m \). Thus, by guessing \( m \), we obtain a uniform result with advantage divided by \( n \).

### 3 Self-Ratchet

#### 3.1 Definitions

Consider a self-ratchet scheme \( SR = (\text{ig}, \text{Init}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Punc}) \) with the following syntax:
In our settings, there exists a device following a protocol which produces some pt/ct for itself so that it can eventually decrypt ct to recover pt in the future. Encryption is stateful. The protocol makes sure that when the device should no longer be able to decrypt ct and should be secure against any future state exposure, it can “puncture” the state. This means that the state st which can decrypt ct is replaced by a new (punctured) state st′ so that ct is not decryptable by st′. With this notion, we aim at forward security and PCS.

Definition 5 (SR). A self-ratcheted scheme (SR) of level n is a primitive SR = (Init, Enc, Dec, Punc) which is n-correct in the sense that for any sequence sched, the game in Fig. 5 never returns 1. Here, sched is a sequence of scheduled instructions which can be of three different types: (“Enc”, pt) (encrypt plaintext pt), (“Dec”, j) (decrypt the j-th produced ciphertext), and (“Punc”, j) (puncture the j-th produced ciphertext).

The correctness notion must consider any order of Enc/Dec/Punc instructions. This is what sched is modeling. We describe what should happen when this sequence of instructions is sched. Actually, we declare in Lct the ciphertexts which are “active” and we put in Lpt how they are expected to decrypt.

This definition assumes that the number of “active” ciphertexts remains bounded by a parameter n (line number 5).

Compared to SEQ, an SR does not update the state during decryption (this is rather done by a separate function) and decryption can be done in any order of the ciphertexts (i.e., not only in the order they have been created). As applications will show, SR appears to be a most wanted primitive.

Application to Cloud Storage

SR schemes can be used for cloud storage where a client wants to store her files on the cloud in an encrypted form. Ideally, a single file is encrypted with SR.Enc to obtain a ct. For retrieval, the SR.Dec is run to decrypt the file. Eventually, when the client wants to remove the file from the cloud, the protocol will puncture her state for ct. The first desired security is that after a client erases an encrypted file, even though a copy was illegally kept and the state of the client later leaks, the file is unrecoverable. This is forward security. With SR, it is achieved by puncturing. The second desired security is that after the state of a client has leaked, if the client wants to store a new file in the cloud, this file should be safe, as long as no exposure occurs during the activity time of this file. This is post-compromise security. It is achieved by what we call self-ratchet.

One problem specific to cloud storage is that files are typically big and SR should handle them in encryption, decryption, and puncturing. One common approach is to use a domain expander based on a hybrid construction. Like the KEM/DEM hybrid cryptosystems, we can use SR to encrypt an ephemeral key K and symmetrically encrypt the plaintext with K.

We could also add key rotation, if required, by using SR to encrypt the encryption key: to encrypt a file pt, we pick a random key k (in the key domain of the key rotation scheme) and we run ct1 ← SR.Enc(st, k). Then, we encrypt pt with k following the key rotation scheme and obtain a header ct2 and a ciphertext ct3. The final ciphertext is ct = (ct1, ct2, ct3). To
we add specific instructions for post-compromise security. We define the
there is no formal definition of correctness for 0-RTT session resumption in Aviram et al. [2].
schemes can be used for 0-RTT session resumption. Essentially, a server having a secure
Figure 5 Correctness game for SR of level n.
rotate the key k, we puncture st with ct1, run the key rotation scheme on (ct2, ct3) to get a
new key k′ and new (ct′2, ct′3), and run ct′1 ← SR.Enc(st, k′) to form ct′ = (ct′1, ct′2, ct′3).

Application to 0-RTT Session Resumption

SR schemes can be used for 0-RTT session resumption. Essentially, a server having a secure
connection with a client using a key K would use SR.Enc(st, K) to issue a ticket ct and send
ct to the client. To resume a session, the client, who kept K and ct, would resend ct to the
server who would use SR.Dec to recover K. The server might also immediately puncture it
to avoid any replay of the ticket ct and for forward security.

Previous Work on 0-RTT Session Resumption

Def. 5 is more general than the definition of 0-RTT session resumption [2]. The differences
are as follows:
- the notations for 0-RTT session resumption are Setup, TicketGen, and ServerRes instead
  of Init, Enc, Dec;
- SR separates SR.Dec and SR.Punc instead of having both functionalities in ServerRes.
There is no formal definition of correctness for 0-RTT session resumption in Aviram et al. [2].
However, we can fairly assume it is the same as our notion of correctness in Def. 5, but when
sequences sched are limited such that every decryption is followed by puncturing: for all i and
j, if schedi = (“Dec”, j) then schedi+1 = (“Punc”, j). In 0-RTT session resumption, it makes
sense to merge SR.Dec with SR.Punc as one of the security goal is precisely to prevent a ct
to be replayed. For cloud storage, the client may need to decrypt the same ct several times
before she removes the file from the cloud. Hence, we keep SR.Dec and SR.Punc separate.

We adapt the security definition of 0-RTT session resumption with our notations to which
we add specific instructions for post-compromise security. We define the IND$^{SR, opt}_{b,n,\Delta, \lambda}(A)$ game
in Fig. 6. We also generalize it to adaptive security. In the AGJ security model, the game
Post-Compromise Security in Self-Encryption

starts with many OEnc and only after that, the adversary can play with oracles except OEnc (it is somehow non-adaptive). The AGJ model uses \( \text{opt} = \{\text{noPCS, replay}\} \) and it is formalized for key establishment rather than encryption. (This means that there is a Test oracle to test a decryption instead of a Challenge oracle to get an encryption challenge.)

**Definition 6 (SR security).** Let \( n(\lambda) \) and \( \Delta(\lambda) \) be polynomially bounded positive integer functions of a security parameter \( \lambda \). The option set \( \text{opt} \) specifies some variants in the game in Fig. 6. The advantage is

\[
Adv_{n,\Delta,\lambda}^{\text{IND-SR,\text{opt}}}(\mathcal{A}) = \left| \Pr_{S R} [\text{IND}_{1,n,\Delta,\lambda}^{\text{SR,\text{opt}}}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr_{\text{OPunc}} [\text{IND}_{0,n,\Delta,\lambda}^{\text{SR,\text{opt}}}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] \right|
\]

We say that SR is IND-opt secure at level \( n \) with delay \( \Delta \) if for any PPT adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), \( \lambda \mapsto Adv_{n,\Delta,\lambda}^{\text{IND-SR,\text{opt}}}(\mathcal{A}) \) is a negligible function.

When "replay" \( \in \text{opt} \), the security notion aims to address replay attacks. It enforces puncturing after decryption. Hence, decryption must puncture, as well. When "noPCS" \( \in \text{opt} \), the security notion aims to capture forward security without post-compromise security. Absence of noPCS in \( \text{opt} \) is a stronger security notion as it captures FS and PCS together.

**Figure 6** Indistinguishability game for self-ratchet.
\[ \text{Figure 7} \text{ SEQ from SR.} \]

\[ \text{Figure 8} \text{ Adversary against SR based on an adversary for SEQ.} \]

### 3.2 Impossibility Result

**Theorem 7.** For every integer \( n, \ell, \Delta > 0 \) and any \( n \)-correct self-ratcheted scheme \( \text{SR} \) following Def. 5, and such that \( \text{st} \) belongs to a space of size bounded by \( 2^\ell \), there exist a (small) constant \( c \) and an adversary of complexity bounded by \( (n + \Delta)(T_{\text{Enc}} + T_{\text{Dec}} + T_{\text{Punc}} + 1) + c \) having advantage

\[
\text{Adv}_{n,\Delta,\lambda}^{\text{IND}_{\text{SR},\text{opt}}} (\mathcal{A}) > \frac{1}{4n^2} 2^{-2^{\frac{\ell+1}{\ell+2} \frac{n}{\ell + 2}}} - 2^{-l(\lambda)}
\]

for \( \text{opt} = \bot \) and \( \text{opt} = \text{replay} \), and where \( T_k \) is the complexity to pick an element of \( \{0,1\}^{l(\lambda)} \) at random and \( T_{\text{Enc}}, T_{\text{Dec}} \) and \( T_{\text{Punc}} \) are the complexities of \( \text{Enc}, \text{Dec} \) and \( \text{Punc} \).

**Proof.** We construct a SEQ from a self-ratcheted protocol \( \text{SR} \) in Fig. 7. Clearly, the \( n \)-correctness of \( \text{SR} \) implies the \( n \)-correctness of \( S \) for any \( n \). The SEQ scheme only imposes ciphertexts to be received in the same order as they have been produced.

Due to Cor. 4, there exists \( m \) and an OW\(_{m,\Delta,\lambda} \) adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) such that \( \Pr[\text{OW}_{m,\Delta,\lambda} \rightarrow 1] = p > 2^{-2^{\frac{\ell+1}{\ell+2} \frac{n}{\ell + 2}}} \). \( \mathcal{B} \) is constructed uniformly from \( m \). Then, we can construct an \( \text{IND}_{\text{SR},\text{opt}}^{\text{IND}_{\text{SR},\text{opt}}} \) adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) who guesses \( m \) as in Fig. 8.

The Challenge oracle encrypts \( pt_m \) which is either \( pt_m \) or random. Since \( \mathcal{A} \) simulates well the OW\(_{m,\Delta,\lambda} \) game, we have \( \Pr[z = pt_m] \geq \frac{p}{n} \). Hence, \( \Pr[\text{IND}^{\text{IND}_{\text{SR},\text{opt}}}_{1,n,\Delta} \rightarrow 1] = \frac{p}{n} \) and \( \Pr[\text{IND}^{\text{IND}_{\text{SR},\text{opt}}} _{0,n,\Delta} \rightarrow 1] = 2^{-l(\lambda)} \). Hence, the advantage is \( \frac{p}{n} - 2^{-l(\lambda)} \).

The adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) picks \( m \) plaintexts and issues \( m - 1 \) \( \text{OEnc} \) queries, one \( \text{OExp} \) query and one \( \text{Challenge} \) query, and then simulates an OW\(_{m,\Delta,\lambda} \) adversary \( \mathcal{B} \). The complexity of \( \mathcal{B} \) is the complexity of \( n - m + \Delta \) encryptions and \( m \) decryptions, and the complexities of \( S_{\text{Enc}} \) and \( S_{\text{Dec}} \) are respectively \( T_{\text{Enc}} + T_{\text{B}} \) and \( T_{\text{Dec}} + T_{\text{Punc}} \). The complexity of \( \mathcal{A} \) therefore is \( n - m + \Delta \) encryptions, \( m \) decryptions, \( m \) punctuations, \( m + 1 \) oracle calls and \( (n + \Delta) \) random selections.
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We provide a generic construction $\text{SR}$ from an $\text{FSSR}$ scheme\(^6\) providing forward security. For every $\Delta$, we create a new structure with forward security and store it. Given a scheme $\text{FSSR}$ offering only forward security, we construct $\text{SR}$ as in Fig. 9.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{minipage}{0.8\textwidth}
\begin{algorithmic}
\State $\text{SR}.\text{Init}(1^\lambda)$:
\State 1: $\text{st} \leftarrow (0, \emptyset)$ \Comment{a counter set to 0 and an empty list}
\State 2: return $\text{st}$
\State $\text{SR}.\text{Dec}(\text{st}, \text{ct})$:
\State 3: parse $\text{st} = (c, L)$ and $\text{ct} = (i, ct_0)$
\State 4: $\text{FSSR}.\text{Dec}(L[i], ct_0) \rightarrow \text{pt}$
\State 5: return $\text{pt}$
\State $\text{SR}.\text{Punc}(\text{st}, \text{ct})$:
\State 6: parse $\text{st} = (c, L)$ and $\text{ct} = (i, ct_0)$
\State 7: $\text{FSSR}.\text{Punc}(L[i], ct_0) \rightarrow L[i]$ \Comment{$L[i]$ is updated}
\State 8: $\text{st} \leftarrow (c, L)$
\State 9: return $\text{st}$
\State $\text{SR}.\text{Enc}(\text{st}, \text{pt})$:
\State 10: parse $\text{st} = (c, L)$
\State 11: if $c = 0$ then
\State 12: $c \leftarrow \Delta$
\State 13: $\text{FSSR}.\text{Init}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow s$
\State 14: $L \leftarrow (L, s)$ \Comment{add a new $\text{FSSR}$ state in $L$}
\State 15: end if
\State 16: $c \leftarrow c - 1$
\State 17: set $\ell$ to the length of $L$
\State 18: $\text{FSSR}.\text{Enc}(L[\ell], \text{pt}) \rightarrow (L[\ell], ct_0)$ \Comment{$L[\ell]$ is updated}
\State 19: $\text{st} \leftarrow (c, L)$
\State 20: $\text{ct} \leftarrow (\ell, ct_0)$
\State 21: return $(\text{st}, \text{ct})$
\end{algorithmic}
\end{minipage}
\caption{Post-compromise secure self-ratchet from forward secure self-ratchet.}
\end{figure}

\subsection{Constructions}

We provide a generic construction $\text{SR}$ from an $\text{FSSR}$ scheme\(^6\) providing forward security. For every $\Delta$, we create a new structure with forward security and store it. Given a scheme $\text{FSSR}$ offering only forward security, we construct $\text{SR}$ as in Fig. 9.

\begin{theorem}
Let $n(\lambda)$ and $\Delta(\lambda)$ be polynomially bounded positive integer functions of a security parameter $\lambda$. Let $\text{opt}$ be either $\perp$ or \{\text{replay}\}. Let $\text{FSSR}$ be a self-ratcheted scheme which is $\text{IND-(opt }\cup\{\text{noPCS}\})$ secure at level $\Delta$. Then, $\text{SR}$ (in Fig. 9, with parameter $\Delta$) is a self-ratcheted scheme which is $\text{IND-opt}$ secure at level $n$ with delay $\Delta$.
\end{theorem}

\begin{proof}
Let $\text{opt}$ be either $\perp$ or \{\text{replay}\} and $B$ be an $\text{IND-opt}$ adversary against $\text{SR}$ with delay $\Delta$. Assume that $B$ queries at most $q$ encryption and challenge queries. Then, we can construct an $\text{IND-(opt }\cup\{\text{noPCS}\})$ adversary $A$ against $\text{FSSR}$ at level $\Delta$ as shown on Fig. 10.

By the construction, $\text{SR}$ generates a new state of $\text{FSSR}$ for each $\Delta$ encryptions. The adversary $A$ therefore simulates the $\text{IND-opt}$ security game with delay $\Delta$ while trying to replace $\Delta$ ciphertexts by the ciphertexts that the adversary is challenging. If the oracle $\text{Challenge}^c$ does not abort the game, the adversary $A$ can correctly guess $b$ if $B$ can correctly guess it. The probability that the game is not aborted by $\text{Challenge}^c$ is about $\Delta/q$. Then, the advantage of $A$ is

$$\text{Adv}_{\Delta, \lambda}^{\text{IND-SSR, (opt }\cup\{\text{noPCS}\})} (A) = \frac{1}{\lceil q/\Delta \rceil} \text{Adv}_{n, \Delta, \lambda}^{\text{IND-SSR-opt}} (B)$$

Since $q$ is polynomially bounded and $\Delta \geq 1$, if $\text{Adv}_{\Delta, \lambda}^{\text{IND-SSR, (opt }\cup\{\text{noPCS}\})} (A)$ is negligible, then $\text{Adv}_{n, \Delta, \lambda}^{\text{IND-SSR-opt}} (B)$ is negligible too. Hence, $\text{SR}$ is $\text{IND-opt}$ secure at level $n$ with delay $\Delta$ if $\text{FSSR}$ is $\text{IND-(opt }\cup\{\text{noPCS}\})$ secure at level $\Delta$.
\end{proof}

\footnote{FSSR means $\text{FS-secure self-ratcheted scheme}$.}
with recent policies of session resumption: a session which is too old cannot be resumed. This implies to erase all first erased. (after checking that decryption works). Then, when the counter becomes 0, L[i] can be erased.

Another convenient optimization holds when the application wants to operate bulk puncturing of too old ciphertexts. This implies to erase all first L[i]. It is quite compatible with recent policies of session resumption: a session which is too old cannot be resumed.

\[ A^{OEnc, ODec, Challenge, OPunc, OExp} \]

1: idx \( \triangleleft \{ 1, \ldots, [q/\Delta] \} \)
2: SR.Init(\( 1^\lambda \)) \( \rightarrow \) st
3: Active, Revealed \( \leftarrow \) \( \emptyset \)
4: challenged \( \leftarrow \) false
5: AfterExp \( \leftarrow \Delta \)
6: \( B^{OEnc', ODec', Challenge', OPunc', OExp'}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow b' \)
7: return \( b' \)

Subroutine OEnc'(pt):
8: if \( |Active| \geq n \) then return \( \perp \)
9: SR.Enc(st, pt) \( \rightarrow \) (st, ct)
10: parse ct \( = (\ell, ct_0) \)
11: if \( \ell = \text{idx} \) then
12: \( \text{OEnc}(pt) \rightarrow ct_0 \)
13: end if
14: ct \( \leftarrow (\ell, ct_0) \)
15: Active \( \leftarrow \) Active \( \cup \) \{ct\}
16: Revealed \( \leftarrow \) Revealed \( \cup \) \{ct\}
17: AfterExp \( \leftarrow \) AfterExp + 1
18: return \( ct \)

Subroutine ODek'(ct):
19: if ct \( \in \) Active \( - \) Revealed then
20: return \( \perp \)
21: end if
22: parse ct \( = (\ell, ct_0) \)
23: if \( \ell = \text{idx} \) then
24: \( \text{ODec}(ct_0) \rightarrow pt \)
25: else
26: \( \text{SR.Dec}(st, ct) \rightarrow \text{st, pt} \)
27: end if
28: if “replay” \( \in \) opt then OPunc' (ct)
29: return \( pt \)

Subroutine OPunc' (ct):
30: parse ct \( = (\ell, ct_0) \)
31: if \( \ell = \text{idx} \) then
32: \( \text{OPunc}(ct_0) \)
33: else
34: \( \text{SR.Punc}(st, ct) \rightarrow st \)
35: end if
36: Active \( \leftarrow \) Active \( - \) \{ct\}
37: Revealed \( \leftarrow \) Revealed \( - \) \{ct\}
38: return

Subroutine Challenge'(pt):
39: if \( |Active| \geq n \) or AfterExp \( < \Delta \) then
40: return \( \perp \)
41: end if
42: parse st \( = (c, L) \)
43: if \( c \neq 0 \) or \( |L| \neq \text{idx} - 1 \) and \( c = 0 \) or \( |L| \neq \text{idx} \) then
44: abort the game
45: end if
46: SR.Enc(st, pt) \( \rightarrow \) (st, ct)
47: Challenge(pt) \( \rightarrow \) ct
48: Active \( \leftarrow \) Active \( \cup \) \{ct\}
49: AfterExp \( \leftarrow \) AfterExp + 1
50: challenged \( \leftarrow \) true
51: return \( ct \)

Subroutine OExp'():
52: parse st \( = (c, L) \)
53: if \( |L| \geq \text{idx} \) then
54: \( \text{OExp}() \rightarrow st' \)
55: if \( st' = \perp \) then return \( \perp \)
56: \( L[\text{idx}] \leftarrow st' \)
57: end if
58: AfterExp \( \leftarrow 0 \)
59: return \( (c, L) \)

\[ \text{Figure 10} \] FS adversary for FSSR based on an adversary for SR.

**Optimization**

Our SR scheme can obviously be optimized for storage. For each state \( L[i] \), we can add a counter of active ciphertexts with \( L[i] \) which is incremented by \( \text{Enc} \) and decremented by \( \text{Punc} \) (after checking that decryption works). Then, when the counter becomes 0, \( L[i] \) can be erased.
Post-Compromise Security in Self-Encryption

We can see that within a factor close to 2 to the lower bound.

The only change is the separation between Dec and Punc.

3.4 FS-Secure Self-Ratcheted Scheme (from AGJ)

We adapt the generic construction from Aviram et al. [2] based on a puncturable PRF denoted as PPRF. We use authenticated encryption with associated data AEAD = (Gen, Enc, Dec). (In our notation, the second input to Enc and Dec is the associated data i.e. the header to be authenticated.) The construction is in Fig. 11.

AGJ presented two possible PPRF constructions. One is based on the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya RSA accumulator [5]. The other is based on a tree structure.

RSA-based PPRF

The RSA-based construction uses a PPRF key of linear size in terms of the number of encryptions and can only handle a polynomial number of encryptions. This is the total number of encryptions, i.e. not only the ones remaining active. We give the construction in Fig. 12, using a random oracle \( H \) and the list of first odd primes \( (p_1, \ldots, p_m) \). In the original paper [2], the authors have shown that the above construction is a secure PPRF in the random oracle model, under the strong RSA assumption. The PPRF key is of size \( 2\lambda + m \). However, the \( N \) part of the key can be set as a domain parameter which is common to many keys.

In our construction, the device only needs to encrypt \( \Delta \) messages per PPRF key. Hence, we can set \( m = \Delta \) in the above PPRF, meaning that the FSSR has states of size \( \lambda + \Delta + \log_2 \Delta \) plus \( \lambda \) bits of common parameter \( N \). Finally, our SR has states of size

\[
\ell = \frac{n}{\Delta} (\lambda + \Delta + \log_2 \Delta) + \log_2 \Delta + \lambda
\]

We can see that \( \frac{\Delta}{n} \) is at least linear in \( \lambda \), hence super-logarithmic. Compared to (1), we are within a factor close to 2 to the lower bound.

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\( n \) The only change is the separation between Dec and Punc.
We instantiate an 128 GB of RAM by using the SageMath version 8.7. We picked a common which is larger than with the we did it which we extend to functions 3.5 Experimental Results SR

The tree-based constructions is formed with two functions $G_0$ and $G_1$ from $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$ to itself, which we extend to functions $G_z$ for every binary word $z$ by $G_{xy}(L) = G_y(G_x(L))$. Then, the PPRF defines a binary tree of depth $d$ which is partially labeled. The PPRF key is a set of $(x, L)$ pairs where $x$ is a binary word (hence a node in the binary tree) and $L$ is its label in $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$. Initially, the key consists of the label of the root $ε$. To evaluate on $x$, one should find a labeled node $(y, L)$ such that $y$ is a prefix of $x$, write $x = yz$, and return $G_z(L)$. The interface of the PPRF only takes $d$-bit input $x$ (i.e. leaves), but our evaluation is defined for every node. To puncture a leaf $x$, one should find this $y$ again and replace $(y, L)$ from the key by the list of $(x', L')$ with $x' = yz_1 \cdots z_{i-1} \bar{z}_i$ and $L'$ being the evaluation on $x'$, where $z_1 \cdots z_{i-1}$ is the binary expansion of $z$ and $\bar{z}_i$ is the bit complement of $z_i$. Hence, a PPRF key is an anti-chain with no siblings. In the worst case, it could inflate by $d$ pairs at every puncture, but the maximum length is of $2^{d-1}$ pairs.

Same as the RSA construction, one only needs to evaluate $2^d = \Delta$ leaves. In the worst case, a PPRF key has length $2^{d-1} \times d\lambda$ which is $\frac{1}{2} \lambda \Delta \log_2 \Delta$. Hence, the FS-secure self-ratcheted scheme has states of size bounded by $\frac{1}{2} \lambda \Delta \log_2 \Delta + \log_2 \Delta$. Finally, our secure self-ratcheted scheme has states of size

$$\ell = \frac{n}{\Delta} \left( \frac{1}{2} \lambda \Delta \log_2 \Delta + \log_2 \Delta \right) + \log_2 \Delta$$

which is larger than with the RSA-based method.

### 3.5 Experimental Results

We instantiate an SR based on FSSR with the RSA-based PPRF. We assumed that the same RSA modulus is used for all PPRF keys, the RSA modulus so is precomputed and given as a parameter to SR. Hence, the cost of setting up the RSA modulus is not covered in our analysis. For $H$ and AEAD, we used SHA-256 and AES-GCM.

Our experiment was done on a machine with the AMD Opteron 8354 processor and 128 GB of RAM by using the SageMath version 8.7. We picked a common 2048-bit RSA modulus.

We tried many values for $\Delta$ from $\Delta = 100$ to $\Delta = 10000$ by steps of 100. We measured the worst case complexity of an $\text{SR.Enc}$ encryption, which is actually the very first one when nothing is punctured and which includes FSSR.Init, as well as the best case complexity of $\text{SR.Enc}$, which is the very last one after all other values have been punctured. For accuracy, we did it 1000 times for each $\Delta$ and took the average. The results are plotted in Fig. 13.
On the plot, we added the total state size divided by the total number \( n \) of encryptions as it goes to infinity. This is essentially \( \frac{\ell}{n} \) with \( \ell \) given by Eq.(3). As we can see, the execution time grows linearly with \( \Delta \) while \( \frac{\ell}{n} - 1 \) is inverse proportional to \( \Delta \).

**Figure 13** The execution time of SR.Enc in the worst/best case and the state size divided by the number of encryptions with 2048-bit RSA modulus.

### 4 Bipartite Ratcheted Communication

#### 4.1 Definitions

We consider a ratcheted scheme \( S = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) following the syntax

- \( S.\text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \to (\text{st}_A, \text{st}_B) \) (generate a pair of states)
- \( S.\text{Enc}(\text{st}) \to (\text{st}', \text{pt}, \text{ct}) \) (update the state while producing a pt/ct pair)
- \( S.\text{Dec}(\text{st}, \text{ct}) \to (\text{st}', \text{pt}) \) (update the state while decrypting ct)

To avoid defining a general correctness and security for ratcheted schemes, which is quite lengthy and complicated, we only adopt a definition matching a particular case of our interest. This is the case when one participant Alice desperately tries to reach her counterpart Bob by consistently sending messages without receiving any response, while Bob actually acknowledges for the receipt of every message from Alice but his acknowledgments somehow never make it through. (See Fig. 15.)

**Definition 9.** A *simple ratcheted scheme* is a primitive \( S \) defined by \( S = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) which is \( n \)-*correct* in the sense that the game in Fig. 14 never returns 1.

In this communication pattern, protocols such as PR [14], JS [12], JMM [13], and DV [8] have growing states. We can clearly see it on the implementation results by Caforio et al. [4]. Protocols such as Signal [15] or ACD [1] keep constant-size states but offer no post-compromise security in our communication pattern. In fact, in ACD, Alice keeps sending messages in the same “epoch” (following the terminology of ACD [1]) using the forward secure scheme called FS in ACD, while Bob receives those messages from an old epoch (for him) and keeps sending messages in his own epoch, using FS as well. Since the FS scheme is deterministic, it
1: $S._{\text{Gen}}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (st^A_0, st^B_0)$
2: for $i = 1$ to $n$ do
3: $S._{\text{Enc}}(st^A_{i-1}) \rightarrow (st^A_i, pt'_i, ct'_i)$
4: $S._{\text{Dec}}(st^B_{i-1}, ct'_i) \rightarrow (x, pt'_i)$
5: $S._{\text{Enc}}(x) \rightarrow (st^B_i, pt_i, ct_i)$
6: end for
7: $x \leftarrow st^A_n$
8: for $i = 1$ to $n$ do
9: $S._{\text{Dec}}(x, ct_i) \rightarrow (x, pt_i)$
10: if $pt_i \neq pt'_i$ then return 1
11: end for
12: return 0

Figure 14 Correctness game for a simple ratcheted scheme of level-$n$.

Figure 15 Simulation of the level-$n$ correctness game.

offers no post-compromise security. In ACD-PK, there is an extra public-key encryption but the decryption key remains constant within the same epoch. Hence, exposing $st^A_1$ is enough to decrypt all ciphertexts in both ACD and ACD-PK.

Post-compromise security should make impossible to decrypt $ct_m$ which was released after having ratcheted $\Delta$ times both participants after the last state exposure which revealed $st^A_{m-\Delta}$ and $st^B_{m-\Delta}$. For instance, with $\Delta = 1$ and $m = 2$, it should be impossible on Fig. 15 to compute $pt_2$ from $(st^A_1, st^B_1, ct_1, ct_2)$. This is formalized by the following definition.

Definition 10. Let $n(\lambda)$ and $\Delta(\lambda)$ be polynomially bounded positive integer functions of a security parameter $\lambda$. For a simple ratcheted scheme $S$ which is $n$-correct, we define the game in Fig. 16 with parameters $m \leq n$ and $\Delta > 0$: We say that $S$ with level $n$ is $\Delta$-secure if for any PPT adversary $A$, $\lambda \mapsto \max_{1 \leq m \leq n} \Pr[\text{OW}_{m,\Delta,\lambda}(A) \rightarrow 1]$ is a negligible function.

4.2 Impossibility Result

Theorem 11. For every integer $n$, $\ell$, $\Delta > 0$ and any $n$-correct simple ratcheted scheme $S$ following Def. 9, and such that $(st_A, st_B)$ belongs to a space of size bounded by $2^\ell$, there exists an adversary of low complexity having advantage

$$\Pr[\text{OW}_{m,\Delta,\lambda}(A) \rightarrow 1] > \frac{1}{4m^2}2^{-2\ell + \ell(\ell+1)/2}$$

in the security game of Def. 10.

Proof. We construct a SEQ protocol $P$ as shown in Fig. 17. If $S$ is $n$-correct (in the sense of Def. 9), then this new scheme $P$ is correct to level $n$ (in the sense of Def. 1). This comes
Post-Compromise Security in Self-Encryption

We defined a self-encryption mechanism involving a device which encrypts a secret message with a weaker notion of post-compromise security (PCS) to investigate weaker notions in self-encryption applications such as cloud storage or messaging. We started giving some examples where self-ratcheting finds applications in cloud storage, when a client encrypts files to be stored, and in 0-RTT session resumption, when a server encrypts a resumption key to be kept by the client. Unlike previous works which focused on forward security and resistance to replay attacks, we studied how to add post-compromise security, as well.

We first proved that post-compromise security implies a super-linear state size in terms of the number of ciphertexts which can still be decrypted by the state. We then give formal definitions of self-ratchet. We finally showed how to design a secure scheme satisfying our definitions of self-ratchet. Furthermore, we showed that our results on the growth of state size matches with existing secure bidirectional secure messaging applications. Given the fact that the messaging applications provide different level of PCS, we observed that there exist some protocols such as ACD without growing state size. It is due to the fact that the protocol is secure with a weaker notion of PCS which could allow constant-size states. It would be interesting to investigate weaker PCS notions in self-encryption applications such as cloud storage or 0-RTT.

5 Conclusion

from a direct translation of definitions. Furthermore, any uniform adversary against \( P \) (in the sense of Def. 2) translates into an adversary against \( S \) in the sense of Def. 10: guess \( m \) then given \( (\text{st}_{m-\Delta}^A, \text{st}_{m-\Delta}^B) \) the adversary decrypts \( ct_m \). We conclude by applying Cor. 4. ▪

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{OW}_{m,\Delta,\lambda}: & \quad 1: S.\text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \to (\text{st}_0^A, \text{st}_0^B) \\
& \quad 2: \text{for } i = 1 \text{ to } m \text{ do} \\
& \quad 3: \quad S.\text{Enc}(\text{st}_{i-1}^A) \to (\text{st}_i^A, \text{pt}_i^A, \text{ct}_i^A) \\
& \quad 4: \quad S.\text{Dec}(\text{pt}_{i-1}^B, \text{ct}_i^A) \to (x, \text{pt}_i^B) \\
& \quad 5: \quad S.\text{Enc}(x) \to (\text{st}_i^B, \text{pt}_i, \text{ct}_i) \\
& \quad 6: \text{end for} \\
& \quad 7: \quad A(1^\lambda, \text{st}_{m-\Delta}^A, \text{st}_{m-\Delta}^B, \text{ct}_1, \ldots \text{ct}_m) \to x \\
& \quad 8: \text{return } 1_{x=\text{pt}_m} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{align*}
P.\text{Gen}(1^\lambda) & \to \text{st}: \\
1: & \quad P.\text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \to (\text{st}_A, \text{st}_B) \\
2: & \quad \text{st} \leftarrow (\text{st}_A, \text{st}_B) \\
3: & \quad \text{return } \text{st} \\
\end{align*}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{align*}
P.\text{Dec}(\text{st}, \text{ct}) & \to (\text{st}', \text{pt}): \\
4: & \quad \text{parse st} = (\text{st}_A, \text{st}_B) \\
5: & \quad S.\text{Dec}(\text{st}_A, \text{ct}) \to (\text{st}'_A, \text{pt}) \\
6: & \quad \text{st}' \leftarrow (\text{st}'_A, \text{st}_B) \\
7: & \quad \text{return } (\text{st}', \text{pt}) \\
\end{align*}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{align*}
P.\text{Enc}(\text{st}) & \to (\text{st}', \text{pt}, \text{ct}): \\
8: & \quad \text{parse st} = (\text{st}_A, \text{st}_B) \\
9: & \quad S.\text{Enc}(\text{st}_A) \to (\text{st}'_A, \text{pt}', \text{ct}') \\
10: & \quad S.\text{Dec}(\text{st}_B, \text{ct'}) \to (\text{st}'_B, \text{pt''}) \\
11: & \quad S.\text{Enc}(\text{st}'_B) \to (\text{pt''}, \text{pt}, \text{ct}) \\
12: & \quad \text{st}' \leftarrow (\text{st}'_A, \text{st}'_B) \\
13: & \quad \text{return } (\text{st}', \text{pt}, \text{ct}) \\
\end{align*}
\end{figure}
References


