Brief Announcement: Accountability and Reconfiguration – Self-Healing Lattice Agreement

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Abstract

An accountable distributed system provides means to detect deviations of system components from their expected behavior. It is natural to complement fault detection with a reconfiguration mechanism, so that the system could heal itself, by replacing malfunctioning parts with new ones. In this paper, we describe a framework that can be used to implement a large class of accountable and reconfigurable replicated services. We build atop the fundamental lattice agreement abstraction lying at the core of storage systems and cryptocurrencies.

Our asynchronous implementation of accountable lattice agreement ensures that every violation of consistency is followed by an undeniable evidence of misbehavior of a faulty replica. The system can then be seamlessly reconfigured by evicting faulty replicas, adding new ones and merging inconsistent states. We believe that this paper opens a direction towards asynchronous “self-healing” systems that combine accountability and reconfiguration.

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1 Introduction

There are two major ways to deal with failures in distributed computing:

Fault-tolerance: we anticipate failures by investing into replication and synchronization, so that the system’s correctness is not affected by faulty components.

Accountability: we detect failures a posteriori and raise undeniable evidences against faulty components.

Accountability in computing has been proposed for generic distributed systems [13,14] as a mechanism to detect deviations of system nodes from the algorithms they are assigned with. It has been shown that a large class of deviations of a given process from a given deterministic algorithm can be detected by maintaining a set of witnesses that keep track of all observable actions of the process and check them against the algorithm [15].

The generic approach can be, however, very expensive in practice and one may look for a more tractable application-specific accountability mechanism. Indeed, instead of pursuing the ambitious goal of detecting deviations from the assigned algorithm, we might want to only care about deviations that violate the specification of the problem the algorithm is trying to solve.
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Application-specific accountability. The idea has been successfully employed in the context of Byzantine Consensus [6]. The accountable version of consensus guarantees correctness as long as the number of faulty processes does not exceed some fixed $f$. But if correctness is violated, e.g., honest processes take different decisions, then at least $f+1$ Byzantine processes are presented with undeniable evidences of misbehavior. This is not surprising: a decision in a typical $f$-resilient consensus protocol must receive acknowledgements from a quorum of processes, and any two quorums must have at least $f+1$ processes in common [20]. The fact that two processes took different decisions implies that at least $f+1$ processes in the intersection of the corresponding quorums equivocated, i.e., acknowledged conflicting decision values. Assuming that every decision is provided with a cryptographic certificate containing the set of signed acknowledgements from a quorum of processes, we can immediately construct a desired evidence. Polygraph [6,7], a recent accountable Byzantine Consensus protocol, naturally builds upon the classical PBFT protocol [5]. One may ask – okay, we have detected a faulty process, but what should we do next? Ideally, we would like to reconfigure the system by evicting the faulty process and reinitializing the system state.

Reconfigurable replicated systems [11,12,16,22] allow the users to dynamically update the set of replicas. It has been recently shown that reconfiguration can be implemented in purely asynchronous environments [1,2,11,16,17,22]. The idea was first applied to (read-write) storage systems [1,2,11], and then extended to max-registers [16,22] and more general lattice data types, first in the crash-fault context [17] and then for Byzantine failures [18].

Contribution. In this paper, we propose a framework that can be used to implement a large class of replicated services that are both accountable and reconfigurable. Following recent work on reconfiguration [16–18], we build atop the fundamental lattice agreement abstraction. Lattice agreement [3,9] takes arbitrary inputs in a lattice (a partially ordered set equipped with a join operator) and returns outputs that are (1) joins of the inputs, and (2) ordered with respect to the lattice partial order. Lattice agreement is weaker than consensus and can be implemented in an asynchronous system.

Lattice agreement (LA) appears to be a perfect match for both desired features: accountability and reconfiguration. Indeed, a quorum-based LA implementation enables detection of misbehaving parties: as soon as two correct users learn two incomparable values, they also obtain a proof of misbehavior of all replicas that signed both values. Furthermore, the very process of reconfiguration can be represented as agreement defined on a lattice of configurations [16,17]. These two observations inspire the design of our system.

We propose an accountable and reconfigurable implementation that reaches agreement on a joint lattice: an object lattice (defining the current state of the replicated object) and a configuration lattice (defining the current configuration of the replicas). Assuming that the number of failures is less than half of the system size, our implementation is alive. It is also safe if only benign (crash) failures occur. Once safety is violated, i.e., two correct users learn two incomparable object states, some Byzantine replicas are inevitably confronted with an undeniable proof of misbehavior. The system is then seamlessly reconfigured by evicting the detected replicas, adding new ones and merging inconsistent states. Once the state is merged, the system comes back to providing safety and liveness, as long as no new replicas exhibits Byzantine behavior. Eventually all Byzantine replicas are detected and the system maintains liveness and safety.
Outdated configurations are harmless. Our system prevents users from accessing outdated configurations with the use of forward-secure digital signature scheme \[4,8\]. A member of each new configuration is assigned a new secret key. Furthermore, honest members of an old configuration are expected to destroy their old keys before moving to a new one. Thus, if they are later compromised, they will not be able to serve clients’ requests, and the remaining Byzantine replicas will not constitute a quorum.

On Byzantine clients. Our solution assumes that service replicas are subject to Byzantine failures, but clients are benign: they can only fail by crashing. This hypothesis has already been done in designs of fault-tolerant storage systems \[19\]. In our case, this assumption precludes the cases when a Byzantine client brings the system into a compromised configuration or slows down the system by issuing excessive reconfiguration requests. In the full version of this paper \[10\], we also describe a one-shot version of accountable lattice agreement, without reconfiguration, in which both clients and replicas can be Byzantine. Marrying reconfiguration and accountability in a long-lived service that can be accessed by Byzantine clients remains an important challenge.

Message. Altogether, we believe that this paper opens a new area of asynchronous “self-healing” systems that combine accountability and reconfiguration. Such a system either preserves safety and liveness or preserves liveness and compensates safety violations with eventual detection of Byzantine replicas. It also exports a reconfiguration interface that allows the clients to replace compromised replicas with new, correct ones. In this paper, we show that both mechanisms, accountability and reconfiguration, can be implemented in a purely asynchronous (in the modern parlance – responsive) way.

2 Reconfigurable and Accountable Lattice Agreement

A reconfigurable accountable (long-lived) lattice agreement (RALA) abstraction must ensure, among others, the following properties:

- **Completeness.** If a correct client learns a value that is incomparable with a value learnt by another correct client then it eventually accuses some new replicas.
- **Liveness.** If the system reconfigures only finitely many times, every value proposed by a correct client is eventually included in the value learned by every correct client.

The properties above imply that either the safety property of the implemented object holds (the values learnt by correct processes are comparable) or some new Byzantine replicas are eventually detected. If from some point on, no more Byzantine faults take place, we ensure that all new learnt values are comparable. Our requirement of finite number of reconfigurations is standard in the corresponding literature \[2,17,22\] and, in fact, can be shown to be necessary \[21\]. In practice, we ensure liveness in “sufficiently long” time intervals without reconfiguration.

Notice that the choice of new configurations to propose is left entirely to the clients, as long as one condition is satisfied: if the system is in a configuration which is not eventually replaced, than this configuration must contain a majority of correct replicas. It is important to emphasize that the system does not allow the accused replicas to affect the system’s safety and liveness. Please refer to the full version \[10\] for the complete specification and the matching implementation.
References


