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Documents authored by Luna, Carlos

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.TYPES.2020.3
Towards a Certified Reference Monitor of the Android 10 Permission System

Authors: Guido De Luca and Carlos Luna

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 188, 26th International Conference on Types for Proofs and Programs (TYPES 2020)

Abstract
Android is a platform for mobile devices that captures more than 85% of the total market share [International Data Corporation (IDC), 2020]. Currently, mobile devices allow people to develop multiple tasks in different areas. Regrettably, the benefits of using mobile devices are counteracted by increasing security risks. The important and critical role of these systems makes them a prime target for formal verification. In our previous work [Betarte et al., 2018], we exhibited a formal specification of an idealized formulation of the permission model of version 6 of Android. In this paper we present an enhanced version of the model in the proof assistant Coq, including the most relevant changes concerning the permission system introduced in versions Nougat, Oreo, Pie and 10. The properties that we had proved earlier for the security model have been either revalidated or refuted, and new ones have been formulated and proved. Additionally, we make observations on the security of the most recent versions of Android. Using the programming language of Coq we have developed a functional implementation of a reference validation mechanism and certified its correctness. The formal development is about 23k LOC of Coq, including proofs.
Cite as

Guido De Luca and Carlos Luna. Towards a Certified Reference Monitor of the Android 10 Permission System. In 26th International Conference on Types for Proofs and Programs (TYPES 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 188, pp. 3:1-3:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{deluca_et_al:LIPIcs.TYPES.2020.3,
  author =	{De Luca, Guido and Luna, Carlos},
  title =	{{Towards a Certified Reference Monitor of the Android 10 Permission System}},
  booktitle =	{26th International Conference on Types for Proofs and Programs (TYPES 2020)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-182-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{188},
  editor =	{de'Liguoro, Ugo and Berardi, Stefano and Altenkirch, Thorsten},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.TYPES.2020.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-138821},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.TYPES.2020.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Android, Permission model, Formal idealized model, Reference monitor, Formal proofs, Certified implementation, Coq}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.TYPES.2013.45
Formally Verified Implementation of an Idealized Model of Virtualization

Authors: Gilles Barthe, Gustavo Betarte, Juan Diego Campo, Jesús Mauricio Chimento, and Carlos Luna

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 26, 19th International Conference on Types for Proofs and Programs (TYPES 2013)

Abstract
VirtualCert is a machine-checked model of virtualization that can be used to reason about isolation between operating systems in presence of cache-based side-channels. In contrast to most prominent projects on operating systems verification, where such guarantees are proved directly on concrete implementations of hypervisors, VirtualCert abstracts away most implementations issues and specifies the effects of hypervisor actions axiomatically, in terms of preconditions and postconditions. Unfortunately, seemingly innocuous implementation issues are often relevant for security. Incorporating the treatment of errors into VirtualCert is therefore an important step towards strengthening the isolation theorems proved in earlier work. In this paper, we extend our earlier model with errors, and prove that isolation theorems still apply. In addition, we provide an executable specification of the hypervisor, and prove that it correctly implements the axiomatic model. The executable specification constitutes a first step towards a more realistic implementation of a hypervisor, and provides a useful tool for validating the axiomatic semantics developed in previous work.
Cite as

Gilles Barthe, Gustavo Betarte, Juan Diego Campo, Jesús Mauricio Chimento, and Carlos Luna. Formally Verified Implementation of an Idealized Model of Virtualization. In 19th International Conference on Types for Proofs and Programs (TYPES 2013). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 26, pp. 45-63, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2014)

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@InProceedings{barthe_et_al:LIPIcs.TYPES.2013.45,
  author =	{Barthe, Gilles and Betarte, Gustavo and Campo, Juan Diego and Chimento, Jes\'{u}s Mauricio and Luna, Carlos},
  title =	{{Formally Verified Implementation of an Idealized Model of Virtualization}},
  booktitle =	{19th International Conference on Types for Proofs and Programs (TYPES 2013)},
  pages =	{45--63},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-72-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2014},
  volume =	{26},
  editor =	{Matthes, Ralph and Schubert, Aleksy},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.TYPES.2013.45},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-46254},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.TYPES.2013.45},
  annote =	{Keywords: virtualization, Cache and TLB, Executable specification, Error management, Isolation}
}
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