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Documents authored by Schiavoni, Valerio

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.27
Where to Place Your TEE? In Search of a Censorship-Resilient Design for Rollup Sequencers

Authors: Andrei Arusoaie, Claudiu-Nicu Bărbieru, Oana-Otilia Captarencu, Pascal Felber, Corentin Libert, Emanuel Onica, Etienne Rivière, Valerio Schiavoni, and Peterson Yuhala

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 361, 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)

Abstract
Ethereum is the dominant blockchain ecosystem capable of executing Turing-complete smart contracts. Rollups gained significant traction as the primary layer 2 (L2) solution meant to bring horizontal scalability to the main Ethereum network (L1). A core component of any rollup is the sequencer, which creates new L2 blocks to be submitted in rollup batches to L1. In most of the current rollup architectures, this component is centralised. As a result, these designs are prone to inconspicuous censorship practices by the sequencer. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) can guarantee the integrity of various sequencer components, which is instrumental in addressing censorship. However, the reaction of the system design to censorship attempts depends on where a TEE is integrated and which components it protects. In particular, this reaction is limited in the case of a monolithic TEE-protected sequencer design. Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is a non-monolithic paradigm adopted on L1, which separates the production of blocks from proposing them for inclusion in the blockchain. Recently, PBS has been considered for integration with L2 sequencers, with an impact on alleviating censorship. In this paper, we explore the design space of TEE-integrating PBS and non-PBS sequencer variants. First, we introduce a formal framework for the censorship actions that captures the specificity of the L2 sequencer. Then, we analyse to what extent the different designs address these censorship actions. Our main contribution is a novel design variation that allows for a precise observation of censored transactions. In the presence of TEEs, in a PBS setting, we demonstrate this precise observability, which is necessary to enable resilience to censorship.
Cite as

Andrei Arusoaie, Claudiu-Nicu Bărbieru, Oana-Otilia Captarencu, Pascal Felber, Corentin Libert, Emanuel Onica, Etienne Rivière, Valerio Schiavoni, and Peterson Yuhala. Where to Place Your TEE? In Search of a Censorship-Resilient Design for Rollup Sequencers. In 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 361, pp. 27:1-27:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{arusoaie_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.27,
  author =	{Arusoaie, Andrei and B\u{a}rbieru, Claudiu-Nicu and Captarencu, Oana-Otilia and Felber, Pascal and Libert, Corentin and Onica, Emanuel and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio and Yuhala, Peterson},
  title =	{{Where to Place Your TEE? In Search of a Censorship-Resilient Design for Rollup Sequencers}},
  booktitle =	{29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)},
  pages =	{27:1--27:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-409-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{361},
  editor =	{Arusoaie, Andrei and Onica, Emanuel and Spear, Michael and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.27},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-252000},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.27},
  annote =	{Keywords: Rollups, Trusted Execution Environments, Censorship}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2025.8
On Real-Time Guarantees in Intel SGX and TDX

Authors: Peterson Yuhala, Christian Göttel, Jämes Ménétrey, Valerio Schiavoni, David Kozhaya, and Pascal Felber

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 335, 37th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2025)

Abstract
Trusted execution environments (TEE) represent a major technological breakthrough that provide strong confidentiality and integrity guarantees for code and data running on potentially vulnerable or untrustworthy computing systems, such as cloud, edge, embedded, mobile, or even blockchain systems. However, the performance overhead associated with TEEs still poses a limitation on the extent to which real-time (RT) sensitive applications can benefit from this technology, e.g., to run on untrusted third-party infrastructures. This work investigates various TEE-based architectures spanning from process-based to virtual-machine-based implementations, for securing RT applications. It offers in addition an in-depth evaluation of these architectures, providing insights into how various TEE deployments influence the temporal compute and communication guarantees of RT systems.
Cite as

Peterson Yuhala, Christian Göttel, Jämes Ménétrey, Valerio Schiavoni, David Kozhaya, and Pascal Felber. On Real-Time Guarantees in Intel SGX and TDX. In 37th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 335, pp. 8:1-8:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{yuhala_et_al:LIPIcs.ECRTS.2025.8,
  author =	{Yuhala, Peterson and G\"{o}ttel, Christian and M\'{e}n\'{e}trey, J\"{a}mes and Schiavoni, Valerio and Kozhaya, David and Felber, Pascal},
  title =	{{On Real-Time Guarantees in Intel SGX and TDX}},
  booktitle =	{37th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2025)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-377-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{335},
  editor =	{Mancuso, Renato},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2025.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-235865},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2025.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Trusted execution environments, Real-time systems, Intel SGX, Intel TDX, WebAssembly}
}
Document
Complete Volume
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024
LIPIcs, Volume 324, OPODIS 2024, Complete Volume

Authors: Silvia Bonomi, Letterio Galletta, Etienne Rivière, and Valerio Schiavoni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 324, 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)

Abstract
LIPIcs, Volume 324, OPODIS 2024, Complete Volume
Cite as

28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 324, pp. 1-772, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@Proceedings{bonomi_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024,
  title =	{{LIPIcs, Volume 324, OPODIS 2024, Complete Volume}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)},
  pages =	{1--772},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-360-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{324},
  editor =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-227373},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024},
  annote =	{Keywords: LIPIcs, Volume 324, OPODIS 2024, Complete Volume}
}
Document
Front Matter
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.0
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization

Authors: Silvia Bonomi, Letterio Galletta, Etienne Rivière, and Valerio Schiavoni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 324, 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)

Abstract
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization
Cite as

28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 324, pp. 0:i-0:xvi, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{bonomi_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.0,
  author =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  title =	{{Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)},
  pages =	{0:i--0:xvi},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-360-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{324},
  editor =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.0},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-227360},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.0},
  annote =	{Keywords: Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.23
A Holistic Approach for Trustworthy Distributed Systems with WebAssembly and TEEs

Authors: Jämes Ménétrey, Aeneas Grüter, Peterson Yuhala, Julius Oeftiger, Pascal Felber, Marcelo Pasin, and Valerio Schiavoni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 286, 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023)

Abstract
Publish/subscribe systems play a key role in enabling communication between numerous devices in distributed and large-scale architectures. While widely adopted, securing such systems often trades portability for additional integrity and attestation guarantees. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) offer a potential solution with enclaves to enhance security and trust. However, application development for TEEs is complex, and many existing solutions are tied to specific TEE architectures, limiting adaptability. Current communication protocols also inadequately manage attestation proofs or expose essential attestation information. This paper introduces a novel approach using WebAssembly to address these issues, a key enabling technology nowadays capturing academia and industry attention. We present the design of a portable and fully attested publish/subscribe middleware system as a holistic approach for trustworthy and distributed communication between various systems. Based on this proposal, we have implemented and evaluated in-depth a fully-fledged publish/subscribe broker running within Intel SGX, compiled in WebAssembly, and built on top of industry-battled frameworks and standards, i.e., MQTT and TLS protocols. Our extended TLS protocol preserves the privacy of attestation information, among other benefits. Our experimental results showcase most overheads, revealing a 1.55× decrease in message throughput when using a trusted broker. We open-source the contributions of this work to the research community to facilitate experimental reproducibility.
Cite as

Jämes Ménétrey, Aeneas Grüter, Peterson Yuhala, Julius Oeftiger, Pascal Felber, Marcelo Pasin, and Valerio Schiavoni. A Holistic Approach for Trustworthy Distributed Systems with WebAssembly and TEEs. In 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 286, pp. 23:1-23:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{menetrey_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.23,
  author =	{M\'{e}n\'{e}trey, J\"{a}mes and Gr\"{u}ter, Aeneas and Yuhala, Peterson and Oeftiger, Julius and Felber, Pascal and Pasin, Marcelo and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  title =	{{A Holistic Approach for Trustworthy Distributed Systems with WebAssembly and TEEs}},
  booktitle =	{27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-308-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{286},
  editor =	{Bessani, Alysson and D\'{e}fago, Xavier and Nakamura, Junya and Wada, Koichi and Yamauchi, Yukiko},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-195132},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: Publish/Subscribe, WebAssembly, Attestation, TLS, Trusted Execution Environment, Cloud-Edge Continuum}
}
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