26 Search Results for "Herlihy, Maurice"

Volume

OASIcs, Volume 71

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Tokenomics 2019, May 6-7, 2019, Paris, France

Editors: Vincent Danos, Maurice Herlihy, Maria Potop-Butucaru, Julien Prat, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.13
Presentation and Publication: Loss and Slippage in Networks of Automated Market Makers

Authors: Daniel Engel and Maurice Herlihy

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 97, 3rd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2021)

Abstract
Automated market makers (AMMs) are smart contracts that automatically trade electronic assets according to a mathematical formula. This paper investigates how an AMM’s formula affects the interests of liquidity providers, who endow the AMM with assets, and traders, who exchange one asset for another at the AMM’s rates. Linear slippage measures how a trade’s size affects the trader’s return, angular slippage measures how a trade’s size affects the subsequent market price, divergence loss measures the opportunity cost of providers' investments, and load balances the costs to traders and providers. We give formal definitions for these costs, show that they obey certain conservation laws: these costs can be shifted around but never fully eliminated. We analyze how these costs behave under composition, when simple individual AMMs are linked to form more complex networks of AMMs.
Cite as

Daniel Engel and Maurice Herlihy. Presentation and Publication: Loss and Slippage in Networks of Automated Market Makers. In 3rd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2021). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 97, pp. 13:1-13:23, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{engel_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.13,
  author =	{Engel, Daniel and Herlihy, Maurice},
  title =	{{Presentation and Publication: Loss and Slippage in Networks of Automated Market Makers}},
  booktitle =	{3rd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2021)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:23},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-220-4},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{97},
  editor =	{Gramoli, Vincent and Halaburda, Hanna and Pass, Rafael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-159103},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Decentralized Finance, AMM, Uniswap}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2021.35
VBR: Version Based Reclamation

Authors: Gali Sheffi, Maurice Herlihy, and Erez Petrank

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 209, 35th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2021)

Abstract
Safe lock-free memory reclamation is a difficult problem. Existing solutions follow three basic methods (or their combinations): epoch based reclamation, hazard pointers, and optimistic reclamation. Epoch-based methods are fast, but do not guarantee lock-freedom. Hazard pointer solutions are lock-free but typically do not provide high performance. Optimistic methods are lock-free and fast, but previous optimistic methods did not go all the way. While reads were executed optimistically, writes were protected by hazard pointers. In this work we present a new reclamation scheme called version based reclamation (VBR), which provides a full optimistic solution to lock-free memory reclamation, obtaining lock-freedom and high efficiency. Speculative execution is known as a fundamental tool for improving performance in various areas of computer science, and indeed evaluation with a lock-free linked-list, hash-table and skip-list shows that VBR outperforms state-of-the-art existing solutions.
Cite as

Gali Sheffi, Maurice Herlihy, and Erez Petrank. VBR: Version Based Reclamation. In 35th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 209, pp. 35:1-35:18, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{sheffi_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2021.35,
  author =	{Sheffi, Gali and Herlihy, Maurice and Petrank, Erez},
  title =	{{VBR: Version Based Reclamation}},
  booktitle =	{35th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2021)},
  pages =	{35:1--35:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-210-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{209},
  editor =	{Gilbert, Seth},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2021.35},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-148374},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2021.35},
  annote =	{Keywords: Safe memory reclamation, concurrency, linearizability, lock-freedom}
}
Document
Complete Volume
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019
OASIcs, Vol. 71, Tokenomics 2019, Complete Volume

Authors: Vincent Danos, Maurice Herlihy, Maria Potop-Butucaru, Julien Prat, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
OASIcs, Vol. 71, Tokenomics 2019, Complete Volume
Cite as

Vincent Danos, Maurice Herlihy, Maria Potop-Butucaru, Julien Prat, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. OASIcs, Vol. 71, Tokenomics 2019, Complete Volume. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 1-192, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@Proceedings{danos_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019,
  title =	{{OASIcs, Vol. 71, Tokenomics 2019, Complete Volume}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{1--192},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119634},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019},
  annote =	{Keywords: OASIcs, Vol. 71, Tokenomics 2019, Complete Volume}
}
Document
Front Matter
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.0
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization

Authors: Vincent Danos, Maurice Herlihy, Maria Potop-Butucaru, Julien Prat, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization
Cite as

Vincent Danos, Maurice Herlihy, Maria Potop-Butucaru, Julien Prat, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 0:i-0:xii, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{danos_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.0,
  author =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{0:i--0:xii},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.0},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119640},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.0},
  annote =	{Keywords: Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}
}
Document
Keynote Lecture
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.1
Demystifying Blockchains: Decentralized and Fault-Tolerant Storage for the Future of Big Data? (Keynote Lecture)

Authors: Amr El Abbadi

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
Bitcoin is a successful and interesting example of a global scale peer-to-peer cryptocurrency that integrates many techniques and protocols from cryptography, distributed systems, and databases. The main underlying data structure is blockchain, a scalable fully replicated structure that is shared among all participants and guarantees a consistent view of all user transactions by all participants in the cryptocurrency system. The novel aspect of Blockchain is that historical data about all transactions is maintained in the absence of any central authority. This property of Blockchain has given rise to the possibility that future applications will transition from centralized databases to a fully decentralized storage based on blockchains. In this talk, we start by developing an understanding of the basic protocols used in blockchain, and elaborate on their main advantages and limitations. To overcome these limitations, we will explore some of the challenges of managing large scale fully replicated ledgers in the context of achieving large scale consensus. Finally, we ponder over recent efforts to use blockchains in diverse applications.
Cite as

Amr El Abbadi. Demystifying Blockchains: Decentralized and Fault-Tolerant Storage for the Future of Big Data? (Keynote Lecture). In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, p. 1:1, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{abbadi:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.1,
  author =	{Abbadi, Amr El},
  title =	{{Demystifying Blockchains: Decentralized and Fault-Tolerant Storage for the Future of Big Data?}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:1},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119658},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: distributed algorithms for databases, distributed storage, blockchains}
}
Document
Keynote Lecture
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.2
Flexible BFT: Separating BFT Protocol Design from the Fault Model (Keynote Lecture)

Authors: Dahlia Malkhi

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols designed for building replicated services collapse if deployed under settings that differ from the fault model they are designed for. For example, in a partial-synchrony model, a known lower bound for BFT is 1/3. Optimal-resilience solutions completely break if the fraction of Byzantine faults exceeds 1/3. The only way we know to achieve > 1/3 resilience is by assuming synchrony, but this requires the protocol to be designed with that assumption. Flexible BFT is a new approach to BFT protocol design that separates between the fault model and the solution. Clients in Flexible BFT specify (i) the adversarial threshold they need to tolerate, and (ii) whether they believe in synchrony (and the presumed bound on transmission delays). We present a Flexible BFT solution that simultaneously supports different clients, who differ simply by the number of messages and/or time the clients are willing to wait for. At an even finer grain, Flexible BFT supports under the same solution high-value and low-value transactions, each tolerating a different threat model.
Cite as

Dahlia Malkhi. Flexible BFT: Separating BFT Protocol Design from the Fault Model (Keynote Lecture). In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, p. 2:1, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{malkhi:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.2,
  author =	{Malkhi, Dahlia},
  title =	{{Flexible BFT: Separating BFT Protocol Design from the Fault Model}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:1},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119660},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Byzantine fault-tolerance, blockchains}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3
A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation

Authors: Aggelos Kiayias, Benjamin Livshits, Andrés Monteoliva Mosteiro, and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
Decentralized content curation is the process through which uploaded posts are ranked and filtered based exclusively on users' feedback. Platforms such as the blockchain-based Steemit employ this type of curation while providing monetary incentives to promote the visibility of high quality posts according to the perception of the participants. Despite the wide adoption of the platform very little is known regarding its performance and resilience characteristics. In this work, we provide a formal model for decentralized content curation that identifies salient complexity and game-theoretic measures of performance and resilience to selfish participants. Armed with our model, we provide a first analysis of Steemit identifying the conditions under which the system can be expected to correctly converge to curation while we demonstrate its susceptibility to selfish participant behaviour. We validate our theoretical results with system simulations in various scenarios.
Cite as

Aggelos Kiayias, Benjamin Livshits, Andrés Monteoliva Mosteiro, and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos. A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 3:1-3:21, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{kiayias_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3,
  author =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Livshits, Benjamin and Monteoliva Mosteiro, Andr\'{e}s and Thyfronitis Litos, Orfeas Stefanos},
  title =	{{A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:21},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119675},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, content curation, decentralized, voting}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.4
An Empirical Study of Speculative Concurrency in Ethereum Smart Contracts

Authors: Vikram Saraph and Maurice Herlihy

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
We use historical data to estimate the potential benefit of speculative techniques for executing Ethereum smart contracts in parallel. We replay transaction traces of sampled blocks from the Ethereum blockchain over time, using a simple speculative execution engine. In this engine, miners attempt to execute all transactions in a block in parallel, rolling back those that cause data conflicts. Aborted transactions are then executed sequentially. Validators execute the same schedule as miners. We find that our speculative technique yields estimated speed-ups starting at about 8-fold in 2016, declining to about 2-fold at the end of 2017, where speed-up is measured using either gas costs or instruction counts. We also observe that a small set of contracts are responsible for many data conflicts resulting from speculative concurrent execution.
Cite as

Vikram Saraph and Maurice Herlihy. An Empirical Study of Speculative Concurrency in Ethereum Smart Contracts. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 4:1-4:15, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{saraph_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.4,
  author =	{Saraph, Vikram and Herlihy, Maurice},
  title =	{{An Empirical Study of Speculative Concurrency in Ethereum Smart Contracts}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:15},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119684},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchains, Smart Contracts}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.5
Atomic Appends: Selling Cars and Coordinating Armies with Multiple Distributed Ledgers

Authors: Antonio Fernández Anta, Chryssis Georgiou, and Nicolas Nicolaou

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
The various applications using Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) or blockchains, have led to the introduction of a new "marketplace" where multiple types of digital assets may be exchanged. As each blockchain is designed to support specific types of assets and transactions, and no blockchain will prevail, the need to perform interblockchain transactions is already pressing. In this work we examine the fundamental problem of interoperable and interconnected blockchains. In particular, we begin by introducing the Multi-Distributed Ledger Objects (MDLO), which is the result of aggregating multiple Distributed Ledger Objects - DLO (a DLO is a formalization of the blockchain) and that supports append and get operations of records (e.g., transactions) in them from multiple clients concurrently. Next we define the AtomicAppends problem, which emerges when the exchange of digital assets between multiple clients may involve appending records in more than one DLO. Specifically, AtomicAppend requires that either all records will be appended on the involved DLOs or none. We examine the solvability of this problem assuming rational and risk-averse clients that may fail by crashing, and under different client utility and append models, timing models, and client failure scenarios. We show that for some cases the existence of an intermediary is necessary for the problem solution. We propose the implementation of such intermediary over a specialized blockchain, we term Smart DLO (SDLO), and we show how this can be used to solve the AtomicAppends problem even in an asynchronous, client competitive environment, where all the clients may crash.
Cite as

Antonio Fernández Anta, Chryssis Georgiou, and Nicolas Nicolaou. Atomic Appends: Selling Cars and Coordinating Armies with Multiple Distributed Ledgers. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 5:1-5:16, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{fernandezanta_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.5,
  author =	{Fern\'{a}ndez Anta, Antonio and Georgiou, Chryssis and Nicolaou, Nicolas},
  title =	{{Atomic Appends: Selling Cars and Coordinating Armies with Multiple Distributed Ledgers}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:16},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119695},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: DLO, Interoperability, Atomic Appends, Rational Clients, Fault-tolerance}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.6
A Smart Contract Oracle for Approximating Real-World, Real Number Values

Authors: William George and Clément Lesaege

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
A key challenge of smart contract systems is the fact that many useful contracts require access to information that does not natively live on the blockchain. While miners can verify the value of a hash or the validity of a digital signature, they cannot determine who won an election, whether there is a flood in Paris, or even what is the price of ether in US dollars, even though this information might be necessary to execute prediction market, insurance, or financial contracts respectively. A number of promising projects and research developments have provided a better understanding of how one might construct a decentralized, binary oracle - namely an oracle that can respond by one of two possibilities, typically "yes" or "no", even while not requiring the interaction of a trusted third party. In this work, we extend these ideas to construct a general-purpose, decentralized oracle that can estimate the value of a real-world quantity that is in a dense totally ordered set, such as R. In particular, this proposal can be used to estimate real number valued quantities, such as required for a price oracle. We will establish a number of desirable properties about this proposal. Particularly, we will see that the precision of the output is tunable to users' needs.
Cite as

William George and Clément Lesaege. A Smart Contract Oracle for Approximating Real-World, Real Number Values. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 6:1-6:15, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{george_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.6,
  author =	{George, William and Lesaege, Cl\'{e}ment},
  title =	{{A Smart Contract Oracle for Approximating Real-World, Real Number Values}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:15},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119705},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: price oracle, Ethereum, blockchain}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7
Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach

Authors: Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, and Dionysis Zindros

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
Since the invention of Bitcoin one decade ago, numerous cryptocurrencies have sprung into existence. Among these, proof-of-work is the most common mechanism for achieving consensus, whilst a number of coins have adopted "ASIC-resistance" as a desirable property, claiming to be more "egalitarian," where egalitarianism refers to the power of each coin to participate in the creation of new coins. While proof-of-work consensus dominates the space, several new cryptocurrencies employ alternative consensus, such as proof-of-stake in which block minting opportunities are based on monetary ownership. A core criticism of proof-of-stake revolves around it being less egalitarian by making the rich richer, as opposed to proof-of-work in which everyone can contribute equally according to their computational power. In this paper, we give the first quantitative definition of a cryptocurrency’s egalitarianism. Based on our definition, we measure the egalitarianism of popular cryptocurrencies that (may or may not) employ ASIC-resistance, among them Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Monero. Our simulations show, as expected, that ASIC-resistance increases a cryptocurrency’s egalitarianism. We also measure the egalitarianism of a stake-based protocol, Ouroboros, and a hybrid proof-of-stake/proof-of-work cryptocurrency, Decred. We show that stake-based cryptocurrencies, under correctly selected parameters, can be perfectly egalitarian, perhaps contradicting folklore belief.
Cite as

Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, and Dionysis Zindros. Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 7:1-7:21, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{karakostas_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7,
  author =	{Karakostas, Dimitris and Kiayias, Aggelos and Nasikas, Christos and Zindros, Dionysis},
  title =	{{Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:21},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119715},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, egalitarianism, cryptocurrency, economics, proof-of-work, proof-of-stake}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.8
The Stability and the Security of the Tangle

Authors: Quentin Bramas

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
In this paper we study the stability and the security of the distributed data structure at the base of the IOTA protocol, called the Tangle. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we present a simple model to analyze the Tangle and give the first discrete time formal analyzes of the average number of unconfirmed transactions and the average confirmation time of a transaction. Then, we define the notion of assiduous honest majority that captures the fact that the honest nodes have more hashing power than the adversarial nodes and that all this hashing power is constantly used to create transactions. This notion is important because we prove that it is a necessary assumption to protect the Tangle against double-spending attacks, and this is true for any tip selection algorithm (which is a fundamental building block of the protocol) that verifies some reasonable assumptions. In particular, the same is true with the Markov Chain Monte Carlo selection tip algorithm currently used in the IOTA protocol. Our work shows that either all the honest nodes must constantly use all their hashing power to validate the main chain (similarly to the Bitcoin protocol) or some kind of authority must be provided to avoid this kind of attack (like in the current version of the IOTA where a coordinator is used). The work presented here constitute a theoretical analysis and cannot be used to attack the current IOTA implementation. The goal of this paper is to present a formalization of the protocol and, as a starting point, to prove that some assumptions are necessary in order to defend the system again double-spending attacks. We hope that it will be used to improve the current protocol with a more formal approach.
Cite as

Quentin Bramas. The Stability and the Security of the Tangle. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 8:1-8:15, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{bramas:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.8,
  author =	{Bramas, Quentin},
  title =	{{The Stability and the Security of the Tangle}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:15},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119725},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Distributed Ledger Technology, Security, Stability}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9
The Impact of Ethereum Throughput and Fees on Transaction Latency During ICOs

Authors: Michael Spain, Sean Foley, and Vincent Gramoli

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
The Ethereum blockchain has gained popularity for its ability to implement Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), whereby a buyer enters a market order agreement with a seller in order to purchase cryptographic tokens at an agreed price. The popularity of ICOs in 2017 has created an increasingly adversarial environment among potential buyers, who compete for what is often a fixed supply of tokens offered for a limited period of time. We study the impact of a series of ICOs in order to understand the relationship between transaction fees, throughput and latency in Ethereum. Our analysis considers the effects on both Ethereum’s service providers, known as miners, and users who issue transactions in the network. Our results show that while buyers incentivise miners generously to include their transactions during ICOs, the latency of these transactions is predominantly determined by the levels of supply and demand in the network.
Cite as

Michael Spain, Sean Foley, and Vincent Gramoli. The Impact of Ethereum Throughput and Fees on Transaction Latency During ICOs. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 9:1-9:15, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{spain_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9,
  author =	{Spain, Michael and Foley, Sean and Gramoli, Vincent},
  title =	{{The Impact of Ethereum Throughput and Fees on Transaction Latency During ICOs}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:15},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119735},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: ICO, Gas, Ethereum, Transaction Fee, Latency, Fairness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.10
F1 Fee Distribution

Authors: Dev Ojha and Christopher Goes

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
In a proof of stake blockchain, validators need to split the rewards gained from transaction fees each block. Furthermore, these fees must be fairly distributed to each of a validator’s constituent delegators. Delegators accrue this reward throughout the entire time which they are delegated, and they have a special operation to withdraw accrued rewards. The F1 fee distribution scheme works for any algorithm to split fees and inflation between validators each block, with minimal iteration, and the only approximations being due to finite decimal precision. Per block there is a single iteration over the validator set, to enable reward algorithms that differ by validator. No iteration is required to delegate or to withdraw. The state usage is one state update per validator per block and one state entry per active delegation. F1 can optionally handle arbitrary inflation schemes, auto-bonding of rewards, and varying validator commission rates.
Cite as

Dev Ojha and Christopher Goes. F1 Fee Distribution. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 10:1-10:6, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{ojha_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.10,
  author =	{Ojha, Dev and Goes, Christopher},
  title =	{{F1 Fee Distribution}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:6},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119749},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Proof of Stake, Fee Distribution, Cosmos}
}
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