10 Search Results for "Kutylowski, Miroslaw"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.1
07311 Abstracts Collection – Frontiers of Electronic Voting

Authors: David Chaum, Miroslaw Kutylowski, Ronald L. Rivest, and Peter Y. A. Ryan

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, Frontiers of Electronic Voting (2008)

Abstract
From July the 29th to August the 3th, 2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07311 ``Frontiers of Electronic Voting'' was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
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David Chaum, Miroslaw Kutylowski, Ronald L. Rivest, and Peter Y. A. Ryan. 07311 Abstracts Collection – Frontiers of Electronic Voting. In Frontiers of Electronic Voting. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, pp. 1-16, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{chaum_et_al:DagSemProc.07311.1,
  author =	{Chaum, David and Kutylowski, Miroslaw and Rivest, Ronald L. and Ryan, Peter Y. A.},
  title =	{{07311 Abstracts Collection – Frontiers of Electronic Voting}},
  booktitle =	{Frontiers of Electronic Voting},
  pages =	{1--16},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7311},
  editor =	{David Chaum and Miroslaw Kutylowski and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-13031},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Voting machine, remote voting, verifiability, foundations of voting algorithms, attacks}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.2
07311 Executive Summary – Frontiers of Electronic Voting

Authors: David Chaum, Miroslaw Kutylowski, Ronald L. Rivest, and Peter Y. A. Ryan

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, Frontiers of Electronic Voting (2008)

Abstract
This is a short report on Dagstuhl Seminar 07311 - Frontiers of Electronic Voting, 29.07.07 - 03.08.07, organized in The International Conference and Research Center for Computer Science (IBFI, Schloss Dagstuhl).
Cite as

David Chaum, Miroslaw Kutylowski, Ronald L. Rivest, and Peter Y. A. Ryan. 07311 Executive Summary – Frontiers of Electronic Voting. In Frontiers of Electronic Voting. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, pp. 1-5, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{chaum_et_al:DagSemProc.07311.2,
  author =	{Chaum, David and Kutylowski, Miroslaw and Rivest, Ronald L. and Ryan, Peter Y. A.},
  title =	{{07311 Executive Summary – Frontiers of Electronic Voting}},
  booktitle =	{Frontiers of Electronic Voting},
  pages =	{1--5},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7311},
  editor =	{David Chaum and Miroslaw Kutylowski and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12945},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Voting machine, remote voting, verifiability, foundations of voting algorithms, attacks}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.3
A practical and secure coercion-resistant scheme for remote elections

Authors: Roberto Araujo, Sébastien Foulle, and Jacques Traoré

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, Frontiers of Electronic Voting (2008)

Abstract
Election schemes, coercion-resistance, security Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson (JCJ) proposed at WPES 2005 the first scheme that considers real-world threats and that is more realistic for remote elections. Their scheme, though, has quadratic work factor and thereby is not efficient for large scale elections. Based on the work of JCJ, Smith proposed an efficient scheme that has linear work factor. In this paper we first show that the Smith’s scheme is insecure. Then we present a new coercion-resistant election scheme with linear work factor that overcomes this and other flaws of the Smith’s proposal. Our solution is based on the group signature scheme of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (Crypto 2004).
Cite as

Roberto Araujo, Sébastien Foulle, and Jacques Traoré. A practical and secure coercion-resistant scheme for remote elections. In Frontiers of Electronic Voting. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, pp. 1-6, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{araujo_et_al:DagSemProc.07311.3,
  author =	{Araujo, Roberto and Foulle, S\'{e}bastien and Traor\'{e}, Jacques},
  title =	{{A practical and secure coercion-resistant scheme for remote elections}},
  booktitle =	{Frontiers of Electronic Voting},
  pages =	{1--6},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7311},
  editor =	{David Chaum and Miroslaw Kutylowski and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12951},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: }
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.4
An Information-Theoretic Model of Voting Systems

Authors: Benjamin Hosp and Poorvi Vora

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, Frontiers of Electronic Voting (2008)

Abstract
We present an information-theoretic model of a voting system, consisting of (a) definitions of the desirable qualities of integrity, privacy and verifiability, and (b) quantitative measures of how close a system is to being perfect with respect to each of the qualities. We describe the well-known trade-off between integrity and privacy in this model, and defines a concept of weak privacy, which is traded off with system verifiability. This is an extension of a talk from WOTE 2006, and contains some new applications of the model and arguments for the model's applicability.
Cite as

Benjamin Hosp and Poorvi Vora. An Information-Theoretic Model of Voting Systems. In Frontiers of Electronic Voting. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, pp. 1-11, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{hosp_et_al:DagSemProc.07311.4,
  author =	{Hosp, Benjamin and Vora, Poorvi},
  title =	{{An Information-Theoretic Model of Voting Systems}},
  booktitle =	{Frontiers of Electronic Voting},
  pages =	{1--11},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7311},
  editor =	{David Chaum and Miroslaw Kutylowski and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12982},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Information-Theory, Elections, Measurement, Integrity, Privacy, Verifiability}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.5
Civitas: A Secure Remote Voting System

Authors: Michael Clarkson, Stephen Chong, and Andrew Myers

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, Frontiers of Electronic Voting (2008)

Abstract
Civitas is the first implementation of a coercion-resistant, universally verifiable, remote voting scheme. This paper describes the design of Civitas, details the cryptographic protocols used in its construction, and illustrates how language-enforced information-flow security policies yield assurance in the implementation. The performance of Civitas scales well in the number of voters and offers reasonable tradeoffs between time, cost, and security. These results suggest that secure electronic voting is achievable. The name of this system as presented at Dagstuhl was CIVS. In August 2007, the name was changed to Civitas. For more information, see the Civitas website at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/projects/civitas.
Cite as

Michael Clarkson, Stephen Chong, and Andrew Myers. Civitas: A Secure Remote Voting System. In Frontiers of Electronic Voting. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, pp. 1-47, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{clarkson_et_al:DagSemProc.07311.5,
  author =	{Clarkson, Michael and Chong, Stephen and Myers, Andrew},
  title =	{{Civitas: A Secure Remote Voting System}},
  booktitle =	{Frontiers of Electronic Voting},
  pages =	{1--47},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7311},
  editor =	{David Chaum and Miroslaw Kutylowski and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12960},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Electronic voting, coercion resistance, voter registration, secure bulletin boards, cryptographic protocols}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.6
CodeVoting: protecting against malicious vote manipulation at the voter's PC

Authors: Rui Joaquim and Carlos Ribeiro

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, Frontiers of Electronic Voting (2008)

Abstract
Voting in uncontrolled environments, such as the Internet comes with a price, the price of having to trust in uncontrolled machines the collection of voter's vote. An uncontrolled machine, e.g. the voter's PC, may be infected with a virus or other malicious program that may try to change the voter's vote without her knowledge. Here we present CodeVoting, a technique to create a secure communication channel to a smart card that prevents vote manipulation by the voter's PC, while at the same time allows the use of any cryptographic voting protocol to cast the vote.
Cite as

Rui Joaquim and Carlos Ribeiro. CodeVoting: protecting against malicious vote manipulation at the voter's PC. In Frontiers of Electronic Voting. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, pp. 1-7, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{joaquim_et_al:DagSemProc.07311.6,
  author =	{Joaquim, Rui and Ribeiro, Carlos},
  title =	{{CodeVoting: protecting against malicious vote manipulation at the voter's PC}},
  booktitle =	{Frontiers of Electronic Voting},
  pages =	{1--7},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7311},
  editor =	{David Chaum and Miroslaw Kutylowski and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12997},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Internet voting, vote manipulation}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.7
Component Based Electronic Voting Systems

Authors: David Lundin

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, Frontiers of Electronic Voting (2008)

Abstract
An electronic voting system may be said to be composed by a number of components, each of which has a number of properties. One of the most attractive effects of this way of thinking is that each component may have an attached in-depth threat analysis and verification strategy. Furthermore, the need to include the full system when making changes to a component is minimised and a model at this level can be turned into a lower-level implementation model where changes made can cascade to as few parts of the actual implementation as possible.
Cite as

David Lundin. Component Based Electronic Voting Systems. In Frontiers of Electronic Voting. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, pp. 1-6, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{lundin:DagSemProc.07311.7,
  author =	{Lundin, David},
  title =	{{Component Based Electronic Voting Systems}},
  booktitle =	{Frontiers of Electronic Voting},
  pages =	{1--6},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7311},
  editor =	{David Chaum and Miroslaw Kutylowski and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-13004},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Component based electronic voting systems}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.8
Simulation-based analysis of E2E voting systems

Authors: Olivier de Marneffe, Olivier Pereira, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, Frontiers of Electronic Voting (2008)

Abstract
End-to-end auditable voting systems are expected to guarantee very interesting, and often sophisticated security properties, including correctness, privacy, fairness, receipt-freeness, dots However, for many well-known protocols, these properties have never been analyzed in a systematic way. In this paper, we investigate the use of techniques from the simulation-based security tradition for the analysis of these protocols, through a case-study on the ThreeBallot protocol. Our analysis shows that the ThreeBallot protocol fails to emulate some natural voting functionality, reflecting the lack of election fairness guarantee from this protocol. Guided by the reasons that make our security proof fail, we propose a simple variant of the ThreeBallot protocol and show that this variant emulates our functionality.
Cite as

Olivier de Marneffe, Olivier Pereira, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. Simulation-based analysis of E2E voting systems. In Frontiers of Electronic Voting. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{demarneffe_et_al:DagSemProc.07311.8,
  author =	{de Marneffe, Olivier and Pereira, Olivier and Quisquater, Jean-Jacques},
  title =	{{Simulation-based analysis of E2E voting systems}},
  booktitle =	{Frontiers of Electronic Voting},
  pages =	{1--14},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7311},
  editor =	{David Chaum and Miroslaw Kutylowski and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12970},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: UC framework, simulatability, security proof, ThreeBallot}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.9
Weighted Voronoi Region Algorithms for Political Districting

Authors: Bruno Simeone, Federica Ricca, and Andrea Scozzari

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, Frontiers of Electronic Voting (2008)

Abstract
Automated political districting shares with electronic voting the aim of preventing electoral manipulation and pursuing an impartial electoral mechanism. Political districting can be modelled as multiobjective partitioning of a graph into connected components, where population equality and compactness must hold if a majority voting rule is adopted. This leads to the formulation of combinatorial optimization problems that are extremely hard to solve exactly. We propose a class of heuristics, based on discrete weighted Voronoi regions, for obtaining compact and balanced districts, and discuss some formal properties of these algorithms. Their performance has been tested on randomly generated rectangular grids, as well as on real-life benchmarks; for the latter instances the resulting district maps are compared with the institutional ones adopted in the Italian political elections from 1994 to 2001.
Cite as

Bruno Simeone, Federica Ricca, and Andrea Scozzari. Weighted Voronoi Region Algorithms for Political Districting. In Frontiers of Electronic Voting. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{simeone_et_al:DagSemProc.07311.9,
  author =	{Simeone, Bruno and Ricca, Federica and Scozzari, Andrea},
  title =	{{Weighted Voronoi Region Algorithms for Political Districting}},
  booktitle =	{Frontiers of Electronic Voting},
  pages =	{1--15},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7311},
  editor =	{David Chaum and Miroslaw Kutylowski and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-13024},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Political districting, weighted Voronoi regions, graph partitioning, heuristics}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06111.7
Fault Jumping Attacks against Shrinking Generator

Authors: Marcin Gomulkiewicz, Miroslaw Kutylowski, and Pawel Wlaz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6111, Complexity of Boolean Functions (2006)

Abstract
In this paper we outline two new cryptoanalytic attacks against hardware implementation of the shrinking generator by Coppersmith et al., a classic design in low-cost, simple-design pseudorandom bitstream generator. This is a report on work on progress, since implementation and careful adjusting the attack strategy in order to optimize the atatck is still not completed.
Cite as

Marcin Gomulkiewicz, Miroslaw Kutylowski, and Pawel Wlaz. Fault Jumping Attacks against Shrinking Generator. In Complexity of Boolean Functions. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6111, pp. 1-6, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2006)

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@InProceedings{gomulkiewicz_et_al:DagSemProc.06111.7,
  author =	{Gomulkiewicz, Marcin and Kutylowski, Miroslaw and Wlaz, Pawel},
  title =	{{Fault Jumping Attacks against Shrinking Generator}},
  booktitle =	{Complexity of Boolean Functions},
  pages =	{1--6},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2006},
  volume =	{6111},
  editor =	{Matthias Krause and Pavel Pudl\'{a}k and R\"{u}diger Reischuk and Dieter van Melkebeek},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06111.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-6117},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06111.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Pseudorandom generator, shrinking generator, fault cryptanalysis}
}
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