Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 250, 42nd IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2022)
Vijay V. Vazirani. New Characterizations of Core Imputations of Matching and b-Matching Games. In 42nd IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 250, pp. 28:1-28:13, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)
@InProceedings{vazirani:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2022.28, author = {Vazirani, Vijay V.}, title = {{New Characterizations of Core Imputations of Matching and b-Matching Games}}, booktitle = {42nd IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2022)}, pages = {28:1--28:13}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-261-7}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2022}, volume = {250}, editor = {Dawar, Anuj and Guruswami, Venkatesan}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2022.28}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-174207}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2022.28}, annote = {Keywords: LP-duality theory, cooperative game theory, core of a game, assignment game, general graph matching game, bipartite b-matching game} }
Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, Fair Division (2007)
Hervé Moulin. Efficient cost sharing with a cheap residual claimant. In Fair Division. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, pp. 1-7, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)
@InProceedings{moulin:DagSemProc.07261.7, author = {Moulin, Herv\'{e}}, title = {{Efficient cost sharing with a cheap residual claimant}}, booktitle = {Fair Division}, pages = {1--7}, series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)}, ISSN = {1862-4405}, year = {2007}, volume = {7261}, editor = {Steven Brams and Kirk Pruhs and Gerhard Woeginger}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.7}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12312}, doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.7}, annote = {Keywords: Assignment, cost sharing, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, competitive analysis} }
Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)
Hervé Moulin. Strategy-proof assignment with a vanishing budget surplus. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-12, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)
@InProceedings{moulin:DagSemProc.07271.16, author = {Moulin, Herv\'{e}}, title = {{Strategy-proof assignment with a vanishing budget surplus}}, booktitle = {Computational Social Systems and the Internet}, pages = {1--12}, series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)}, ISSN = {1862-4405}, year = {2007}, volume = {7271}, editor = {Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.16}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11608}, doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.16}, annote = {Keywords: VCG mechanisms, assignment, asymptotic budget balance, worst case analysis} }
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