

# One-One Constrained Pseudorandom Functions

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## Abstract

We define and study a new cryptographic primitive, named *One-One Constrained Pseudorandom Functions*. In this model there are two parties, Alice and Bob, that hold a common random string  $K$ , where Alice in addition holds a predicate  $f : [N] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  and Bob in addition holds an input  $x \in [N]$ . We then let Alice generate a key  $K_f$  based on  $f$  and  $K$ , and let Bob evaluate a value  $K_x$  based on  $x$  and  $K$ . We consider a third party that sees the values  $(x, f, K_f)$  and the goal is to allow her to reconstruct  $K_x$  whenever  $f(x) = 1$ , while keeping  $K_x$  pseudorandom whenever  $f(x) = 0$ . This primitive can be viewed as a relaxation of constrained PRFs, such that there is only a single key query and a single evaluation query.

We focus on the information-theoretic setting, where the one-one cPRF has perfect correctness and perfect security. Our main results are as follows.

1. *A Lower Bound.* We show that in the information-theoretic setting, any one-one cPRF for punctured predicates is of exponential complexity (and thus the lower bound meets the upper bound that is given by a trivial construction). This stands in contrast with the well known GGM-based punctured PRF from OWF, which is in particular a one-one cPRF. This also implies a similar lower bound for all NC1.
2. *New Constructions.* On the positive side, we present efficient information-theoretic constructions of one-one cPRFs for a few other predicate families, such as equality predicates, inner-product predicates, and subset predicates. We also show a generic AND composition lemma that preserves complexity.
3. *An Amplification to standard cPRF.* We show that all of our one-one cPRF constructions can be amplified to a standard (single-key) cPRF via any key-homomorphic PRF that supports linear computations. More generally, we suggest a new framework that we call *the double-key model* which allows to construct constrained PRFs via key-homomorphic PRFs.
4. *Relation to CDS.* We show that one-one constrained PRFs imply conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) protocols.

We believe that this simple model can be used to better understand constrained PRFs and related cryptographic primitives, and that further applications of one-one constrained PRFs and our double-key model will be found in the future, in addition to those we show in this paper.

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## 1 Introduction

In this paper we define and study a new cryptographic primitive, named *One-One Constrained Pseudorandom Functions*. In this model there are two parties, Alice and Bob, that hold a common random string  $K$ . In addition, Alice holds a predicate  $f : [N] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  and Bob holds an input  $x \in [N]$ . We then let Alice generate a key  $K_f$  based on  $f$  and  $K$ , and let Bob evaluate a value  $K_x$  based on  $x$  and  $K$ . We consider a third party that sees the values  $(x, f, K_f)$  and the goal is to allow her to reconstruct  $K_x$  whenever  $f(x) = 1$ , while keeping  $K_x$  pseudorandom whenever  $f(x) = 0$ .

This primitive can be viewed as a relaxation of constrained PRFs, such that there is only a single key query and a single evaluation query. In a constrained PRF (first defined in [12, 13, 23]), there is a master secret key  $\text{msk}$  with which it is possible to evaluate the PRF on all inputs  $x$ , and in addition there are constrained keys  $\text{sk}_f$  respective to predicates  $f$ , where  $\text{sk}_f$  is derived from  $\text{msk}$ , such that  $\text{sk}_f$  allows to evaluate the PRF only on inputs  $x$  where  $f(x) = 1$ , but on all points where  $f(x) = 0$  the PRF value remains pseudorandom even given  $\text{sk}_f$ . Through this point of view,  $K$  is the master secret key of the PRF,  $K_x$  is the evaluation of the PRF on an input  $x$  and  $K_f$  is a constrained key for the predicate  $f$ .

We believe that the simplified model of one-one cPRF can be used to better understand constrained PRFs and related cryptographic primitives, and that further applications of one-one constrained PRFs will be found in the future, in addition to those we show in this paper.

**Our Contributions.** Our main focus is on the information-theoretic setting, where we require perfect correctness and perfect security. Our main results are as follows.

1. *A Lower Bound.* We show that in the information-theoretic setting, any one-one cPRF for punctured predicates is of exponential complexity (and thus the lower bound meets the upper bound that is given by a trivial construction). This stands in contrast with the well known GGM-based punctured PRF from OWF, which is in particular a one-one cPRF. This also implies a similar lower bound for all NC1.
2. *New Constructions.* On the positive side, we present efficient information-theoretic constructions of one-one cPRFs for a few other predicate families, such as equality predicates, inner-product predicates, and subset predicates. We also show a generic AND composition lemma that preserves complexity.
3. *An Amplification to cPRF.* We define a special *double-key* model and show that any one-one cPRF in this model, when combined with a key-homomorphic PRF, can support multiple evaluation queries. We then show that all of our constructions can be initialized in the double-key model, which implies that all of our constructions can be amplified to a standard (single-key) cPRF via any key-homomorphic PRF that supports linear computations. More generally, this approach reduces the task of constructing constrained PRFs to the possibly simpler task of constructing one-one constrained PRFs in the double-key model, and we believe that this framework will have more applications in the future.

4. *Relation to CDS.* We show that one-one constrained PRFs imply conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) protocols, a cryptographic primitive that is used to construct secure protocols such as attribute based encryption, symmetrically-private information retrieval protocols, and secret-sharing schemes.
5. *Computational Constructions.* To complete the picture, we also go over existing computational cPRFs in the literature, which are in particular computational one-one cPRFs.

## 2 Technical Overview

### 2.1 A Lower Bound

We begin with describing our lower bound theorem and its proof. Consider the family of punctured predicates  $f_y$  over some field  $\mathbb{F}$ , such that for all  $x, y \in \mathbb{F}$  it holds that  $f_y(x) = 1$  if and only if  $x \neq y$ . We show that any perfect one-one cPRF for this predicate family must have keys  $K_{f_y}$  of size  $\Omega(|\mathbb{F}|)$ . To show that, we first argue that for every  $x \in \mathbb{F}$  it must be that  $K_x$  has at least one bit of entropy, even given all of the values  $\{K_{x'}\}_{x' \neq x}$ . This is due to the correctness and security properties respective to the predicate  $f_x$ , which means that  $K_{f_x}$  allows to reconstruct all  $\{K_{x'}\}_{x' \neq x}$  while keeping  $K_x$  random. Secondly, due to the fact that  $K_{f_y}$  allows to compute  $\{K_x\}_{x \neq y}$  (by correctness), and since each such  $K_x$  has at least one independent bit of entropy (by the previous claim), it must be the case that  $K_{f_y}$  has at least  $|\mathbb{F}| - 1 = \Omega(|\mathbb{F}|)$  bits of entropy.

### 2.2 New Constructions

**A Generic Construction.** We now describe a simple one-one constrained PRF for general functions over some field  $\mathbb{F}$  with complexity  $O(\mathbb{F})$ . In this construction, we choose a random bit  $k_y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$  for every possible input  $y$ , and let the common random string be a concatenation of all of those values  $K = \{k_y\}_{y \in \mathbb{F}}$ . Alice, which holds a predicate  $f$ , returns the values  $K_y$  for all the inputs  $y$  such that  $f(y) = 1$ , and Bob, which holds an input  $x$ , simply returns  $K_x = k_x$ . Security and correctness follow immediately (in fact, this construction is also secure with multiple key queries and evaluation queries). The size of the common random string is therefore at most  $|\mathbb{F}|$ , and for a specific function  $f$ , the size of  $K_f$  is  $|f^{-1}(1)|$ .

**Equality Testing.** Our efficient construction for equality testing over a field  $\mathbb{F}$  is as follows. The common random string  $K$  consists of two random field elements  $k_0, k_1$ . The functions that Alice and Bob compute over their inputs  $x$  and  $f_y$  respectively, where  $f_y(x) = 1$  if and only if  $x = y$ , are identical:  $K_x = k_1x + k_0$  and  $K_{f_y} = k_1y + k_0$ . This is essentially a degree-1 random polynomial computed over two elements, therefore  $K_x$  and  $K_{f_y}$  look independently random as long as  $x \neq y$ . This construction can be generalized to any constant number of evaluation / key queries by using a random polynomial of higher degree.

**Subset Predicates.** Subset predicates are defined with respect to a universe  $[N] = \{1, \dots, N\}$ , where the input space is all subsets  $X \subseteq [N]$  and the predicates  $f_Y$  are characterized by subsets  $Y \subseteq [N]$  such that  $f_Y(X) = 1$  if and only if  $X \subseteq Y$ . Our efficient construction for subset predicates is as follows. For every  $i \in [N]$  there is a random bit  $k_i$  in the common string  $K$ . We then define  $K_X = \bigoplus_{i \in X} k_i$  and  $K_{f_Y} = \{k_i\}_{i \in Y}$ . It is easy to see correctness. In addition, whenever  $X \not\subseteq Y$ , there exists an  $k_i \notin K_{f_Y}$  that completely randomizes  $K_X$ .

**Inner-Product Predicates.** Inner-product predicates for vectors of length  $\ell$  over a field  $\mathbb{F}$  are defined such that for every  $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$  it holds that  $f_{\mathbf{y}}(\mathbf{x}) = 1$  if and only if  $\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = 0$ . We now describe our efficient construction. The common random string  $K$  consists of a random vector  $\mathbf{v}$  and a random field element  $w$ . We then define  $K_{f_{\mathbf{y}}} = w\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{v}$  and  $K_{\mathbf{x}} = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle$ . Correctness holds since whenever  $\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = 0$  it holds that  $\langle K_{f_{\mathbf{y}}}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = K_{\mathbf{x}}$ . Security holds since  $\mathbf{v}$  has one degree of freedom given  $K_{f_{\mathbf{y}}}, \mathbf{y}$  and therefore it completely randomizes  $K_{\mathbf{x}}$ .

### 2.3 Amplification via Key-Homomorphic PRF

We consider one-one cPRFs that satisfy an additional property and show that such one-one cPRFs can be boosted to standard (single-key) cPRFs via key-homomorphic PRFs. We then show that all of our information-theoretic one-one cPRFs satisfy this property, thus receiving new cPRF constructions.

In more detail, we require an alternative algorithm for Alice, that on input  $K, f$  produces a *double-key*  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f)$ . Such double-key should have the property that  $\hat{K}_f$  looks uniformly random even given  $K_f$ , but on the other hand, given both of the key parts  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f)$  it should be possible to reconstruct  $K_x$  for all  $x$  (regardless of  $f(x)$ ).

Recall that in a key-homomorphic PRF, given an evaluation  $\text{PRF}_k(x)$  of the PRF over some input  $x$  and a key  $k$ , it is possible to publicly evaluate a function  $g$  over the key which results in the value  $\text{PRF}_{g(k)}(x)$ . Our construction uses a key-homomorphic PRF to homomorphically evaluate the function that takes a double-key  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f)$  and outputs  $K_x$ . Security relies on the fact that  $\hat{K}_f$  looks uniform even given  $K_f$ , which implies that multiple evaluations of the form  $\text{PRF}_{\hat{K}_f}(x)$  look uniform by the security of the PRF. In the construction we define the cPRF evaluation as  $r_x := \text{PRF}_{K_x}(x)$ . In the security proof we use the homomorphic evaluation procedure to convert  $\text{PRF}_{\hat{K}_f}(x)$  into  $r_x = \text{PRF}_{K_x}(x)$ .

Lastly, we show that all of our information-theoretic constructions can be instantiated in the double-key model, where the required homomorphic computation is linear. In more detail, in the equality testing construction we let  $K_y = k_0 + yk_1$  and  $\hat{K}_y = yk_1$ , in the subset predicates construction we define  $K_Y = \{k_i\}_{i \in Y}$  and  $\hat{K}_Y = \{k_i\}_{i \in [N]/Y}$  and in the inner-product construction we define  $K_{\mathbf{y}} = w\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{v}$  and  $\hat{K}_{\mathbf{y}} = w$ .

### 2.4 One-One Constrained PRFs and CDS Protocols

We study the connection between one-one constrained PRFs and CDS protocols. CDS protocols is a cryptographic primitive, introduced by Gertner et al. [20]. In a CDS protocol, each of two parties, Alice and Bob, holds a private input and sends one message to a referee, which knows the inputs of the parties, and should learn a secret held by the parties if and only if the inputs of the parties satisfy some condition (e.g., if the inputs are equal).

CDS protocols can be easily generalized into multi-party CDS protocols, and they are used to construct attribute based encryption [5, 18, 28], symmetrically-private information retrieval protocols [20], priced oblivious transfer [1], and secret-sharing schemes [2, 3, 8, 9, 24].

We present a transformation from one-one constrained PRFs to CDS protocols. In particular, we show that a one-one constrained PRF implies a CDS protocol for the index predicate. By the reduction of [18] from CDS protocols for general predicates to CDS protocols for the index predicate, we obtain a transformation from one-one constrained PRFs to CDS protocols for general predicates. This transformation preserve complexity, i.e., the message size of the resulting CDS protocol is the complexity of the one-one constrained PRF.

**Private Simultaneous Messages Protocols.** Another similar primitive is private simultaneous messages (PSM) protocols, presented by Feige et al. [16], which is a private case of MPC protocols. In a PSM protocol, each of the parties, Alice and Bob, holds a private input for a two-input function, and each of them sends only one message to a referee, which is based on its input and a common random string, such that the referee should be able to compute the function on the inputs of Alice and Bob using the messages it gets, without learn any additional information about the inputs of the parties. As CDS protocols, PSM protocols can be generalized into multi-party PSM protocols, and they imply some other cryptographic protocols, such as constant round MPC protocols [22], generalized oblivious transfer protocols [22], and zero-information Arthur-Merlin protocols [4].

The best known PSM protocol for general functions  $f : [N] \times [N] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  has message size  $O(\sqrt{N})$  [7], so by our lower bound of  $\Omega(N)$  on the complexity of one-one constrained PRFs, we cannot get a transformation that preserve complexity from PSM protocols to one-one constrained PRFs. There is a transformation that preserve message size from PSM protocols to CDS protocols [7, 20]; the other direction (an existence of transformation from CDS protocols to PSM protocols) is an open problem, and although there is no evidence that shows an equivalence or separation between CDS and PSM protocols, the best known CDS protocols [25] have better message size than the best known PSM protocols [7]. Studying the connections between one-one constrained PRFs and CDS protocols or PSM protocols may help understanding the connection between CDS protocols and PSM protocols and the bounds on the message size of CDS and PSM protocols.

### 3 Preliminaries

**Notations.** For any  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  we use  $[n]$  to denote the set  $\{1, \dots, n\}$ . For any set  $S$  we use  $s \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} S$  to denote a uniformly random sample  $s$  from  $S$ . For any distribution  $X$  we use  $x \leftarrow X$  to denote a value  $x$  that is sampled according to the distribution  $X$ . For any  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  we use  $\mathcal{U}_n$  to denote the uniform distribution over the strings of length  $n$ , and for any set  $S$  we use  $\mathcal{U}_S$  to denote the uniform distribution over the elements in  $S$ .

#### 3.1 Entropy and Indistinguishability

► **Definition 1** (Shannon Entropy). *For a random variable  $X$  and  $x \in \text{sup}(X)$ , the sample entropy of  $x$  with respect to  $X$  is  $H_X(x) = \log(1/\Pr[X = x])$ . The Shannon entropy of  $X$  is then defined as*

$$H(X) = E_{x \leftarrow X}[H_X(x)] .$$

For random variables  $X, Y$ , the Shannon entropy of  $X$  conditioned on  $Y$  is

$$H(X|Y) = H(X, Y) - H(Y) .$$

► **Definition 2** (Statistical Distance). *The statistical distance between two random variables  $X_1, X_2$  over a finite domain  $\mathcal{X}$  is*

$$\Delta(X_1, X_2) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} |\Pr[X_1 = x] - \Pr[X_2 = x]| .$$

We say that  $X_1, X_2$  are  $\delta$ -close if  $\Delta(X_1, X_2) \leq \delta$ .

$X_1, X_2$  are 0-close if and only if  $\Pr[X_1 = x] = \Pr[X_2 = x]$  for all  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , and in that case we say that they are identically distributed.

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A function  $\varepsilon(\cdot)$  is *negligible* if for every positive polynomial  $p(\cdot)$  and all sufficiently large  $n$ 's, it holds that  $\varepsilon(n) < 1/p(n)$ . We define three notions of indistinguishability as follows.

► **Definition 3** (Indistinguishability). *Let  $X = \{X_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}, Y = \{Y_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  be two distribution ensembles.*

1.  $X$  and  $Y$  are perfectly indistinguishable if for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , the random variables  $X_n$  and  $Y_n$  are identically distributed.
2.  $X$  and  $Y$  are statistically indistinguishable if there exists a negligible function  $\varepsilon(\cdot)$  such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $X_n$  and  $Y_n$  are  $\varepsilon(n)$ -close.
3.  $X$  and  $Y$  are computationally indistinguishable if for every non-uniform PPT distinguisher  $D$ , there exists a negligible function  $\varepsilon(\cdot)$  such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,

$$|[\Pr[D(X_n) = 1]] - [\Pr[D(Y_n) = 1]]| < \varepsilon(n) .$$

### 3.2 Notions of Pseudorandom Functions

► **Definition 4** (Constrained PRFs). *A constrained pseudorandom function (cPRF) for a predicate family  $\mathcal{F}$  and an input space  $\mathcal{X}$  is defined by the algorithms (KeyGen, Eval, Con, ConEval) where:*

- KeyGen( $1^\lambda$ ) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a security parameter  $\lambda$  and outputs a master key  $\text{msk}$ .
- Eval( $\text{msk}, x$ ) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the master secret key  $\text{msk}$  and an input  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , and outputs a string  $r_x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ .
- Con( $\text{msk}, f$ ) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the master secret key  $\text{msk}$  and a predicate  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ , and outputs a constrained key  $\text{sk}_f$ .
- ConEval( $\text{sk}_f, x$ ) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a constrained key  $\text{sk}_f$  and an input  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , and outputs a string  $r'_x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ .

**Correctness of Constrained Keys.** *The scheme is correct if for all  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  and  $f \in \mathcal{F}$  for which  $f(x) = 1$ , and for all  $\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ ,  $\text{sk}_f \leftarrow \text{Con}(\text{msk}, f)$ , it holds that*

$$\text{Eval}(\text{msk}, x) = \text{ConEval}(\text{sk}_f, x) .$$

**(Single-Key) Pseudorandomness.** *The security requirement is captured via a game between a challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  and an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  as follows.*

- $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ .
- In an order of her choice,  $\mathcal{A}$  makes an arbitrary number of evaluation queries, a single challenge query and a single key query:
  - Evaluation Query:  $\mathcal{A}$  selects  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  and sends it to  $\mathcal{C}$ . In return,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $r_x \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\text{msk}, x)$  and sends it to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
  - Challenge Query:  $\mathcal{A}$  selects  $x^* \in \mathcal{X}$  and sends it to  $\mathcal{C}$ . In return,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $r_{x^*} \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\text{msk}, x^*)$  and samples a bit  $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ . If  $b = 0$ , it sends  $r_{x^*}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , otherwise it sends to  $\mathcal{A}$  a random value  $u \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|r_{x^*}|}$ .
  - Key Query:  $\mathcal{A}$  selects  $f^* \in \mathcal{F}$  and sends it to  $\mathcal{C}$ . In return,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $\text{sk}_{f^*} \leftarrow \text{Con}(\text{msk}, f^*)$  and sends  $\text{sk}_{f^*}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- $\mathcal{C}$  sends to  $\mathcal{A}$  a bit  $b'$ .

*The advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  in the game is  $\Pr[b = b'] - \frac{1}{2}$  where the probability is over the coins of  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{A}$ . The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is admissible if  $f^*(x^*) = 0$  and  $x^*$  does not appear in any of the evaluation queries. The scheme is computationally secure if for any PPT admissible adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , her advantage in the game is  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ .*

*We define key-selective pseudorandomness identically to the definition above, except that  $\mathcal{A}$  is forced to make the key query first.*

► **Definition 5** (Key-Homomorphic PRFs). A key-homomorphic pseudorandom function (khPRF) for an input space  $\mathcal{X}$ , a key space  $\mathcal{K}$ , and a function family  $\mathcal{G} = \{g_n : \mathcal{K}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{K}\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ , is defined by the algorithms (KeyGen, Eval, HomKeyEval) where:

- KeyGen( $1^\lambda$ ) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a security parameter  $\lambda$  and outputs a key  $\text{sk} \in \mathcal{K}$  and possibly public parameters  $\text{pp}$ .
- Eval( $\text{sk}, x$ ) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a key  $\text{sk} \in \mathcal{K}$  and an input  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , and outputs  $r_x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ .
- HomKeyEval( $g, r_x$ ) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a function  $g \in \mathcal{G}$  and a value  $r_x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , and outputs a value  $\hat{r}_x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ .

**Correctness of Homomorphic Key Evaluation.** The scheme is correct if for all  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , all  $g \in \mathcal{G}$  where  $g : \mathcal{K}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$ , and all  $\{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in [n]} \in \mathcal{K}$ , it holds that

$$\text{HomKeyEval}(g, \text{Eval}(\text{sk}_1, x), \dots, \text{Eval}(\text{sk}_n, x)) = \text{Eval}(g(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n), x) .$$

**Pseudorandomness.** The security requirement is captured via a game between a challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  and an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  as follows.

- $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $\text{sk} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ .
- In an order of her choice,  $\mathcal{A}$  makes an arbitrary number of evaluation queries and a single challenge query:
  - Evaluation Query:  $\mathcal{A}$  selects  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  and sends it to  $\mathcal{C}$ . In return,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $r_x \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\text{sk}, x)$  and sends it to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
  - Challenge Query:  $\mathcal{A}$  selects  $x^* \in \mathcal{X}$  and sends it to  $\mathcal{C}$ . In return,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $r_{x^*} \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\text{sk}, x^*)$  and samples a bit  $b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$ . If  $b = 0$ , it sends  $r_{x^*}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , otherwise it sends to  $\mathcal{A}$  a random value  $u \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|r_{x^*}|}$ .
- $\mathcal{C}$  sends to  $\mathcal{A}$  a bit  $b'$ .

The advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  in the game is  $\Pr[b = b'] - \frac{1}{2}$  where the probability is over the coins of  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{A}$ . The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is admissible if  $x^*$  does not appear in any of the evaluation queries. The scheme is computationally secure if for any PPT admissible adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , her advantage in the game is  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ .

#### 4 Definition of One-One Constrained PRFs

► **Definition 6** (One-One Constrained PRFs). A One-One Constrained Pseudorandom Function for a predicate family  $\mathcal{F}$  and an input space  $\mathcal{X}$  is a tuple of algorithms (Setup, A, B, Rec) with the following syntax.

- Setup( $1^\lambda$ )  $\rightarrow K$  is a PPT algorithm that (possibly) takes a security parameter  $\lambda$  and outputs a common random string  $K$ .
- A( $K, f$ )  $\rightarrow K_f$  is a PPT algorithm that takes a common random string  $K$  and a predicate  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ . It outputs a key  $K_f$ .
- B( $K, x$ )  $\rightarrow K_x$  is a deterministic algorithm that takes a common random string  $K$  and an input  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ . It outputs a value  $K_x$ .
- Rec( $x, f, K_f$ )  $\rightarrow K'_x$  is a deterministic algorithm that takes an input  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , a predicate  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ , and a key  $K_f$ . It outputs a value  $K'_x$ .

**Complexity.** We say that the scheme is of complexity  $p(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$  if for every  $(\lambda, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{F})$ , for every  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  and  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ , for every  $K, K_f, K_x$  where  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ ,  $K_f \leftarrow \text{A}(K, f)$ , and  $K_x \leftarrow \text{B}(K, x)$ , the size of  $(K, K_f, K_x)$  is  $O(p(\lambda, |\mathcal{X}|, |\mathcal{F}|))$ .

**Correctness.** A one-one constrained PRF is correct if for all  $f \in \mathcal{F}$  and  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  for which  $f(x) = 1$ , for all  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ , and for all coins of  $\mathcal{A}$ , it holds that

$$\text{Rec}(x, f, \mathcal{A}(K, f)) = \mathcal{B}(K, x) .$$

**Security.** The security requirement is captured via a game between a challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  and an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  as follows.

- $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ .
- In an order of her choice,  $\mathcal{A}$  makes two queries:
  - Challenge Query:  $\mathcal{A}$  selects  $x^* \in \mathcal{X}$  and sends it to  $\mathcal{C}$ . In return,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $K_{x^*} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(K, x^*)$  and samples a bit  $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ . If  $b = 0$ , it sends  $K_{x^*}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , otherwise it sends to  $\mathcal{A}$  a random value  $u \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|K_{x^*}|}$ .
  - Key Query:  $\mathcal{A}$  selects  $f^* \in \mathcal{F}$  and sends it to  $\mathcal{C}$ . In return,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $K_{f^*} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(K, f^*)$  and sends  $K_{f^*}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- $\mathcal{A}$  sends to  $\mathcal{C}$  a bit  $b'$ .

The advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  in the game is  $\Pr[b = b'] - \frac{1}{2}$  where the probability is over the coins of  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{A}$ . The scheme is perfectly ( /statistically /computationally) secure if for any unbounded ( /unbounded /PPT) adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that selects  $x^*, f^*$  for which  $f^*(x^*) = 0$ , her advantage in the game is 0 ( /negl( $\lambda$ ) /negl( $\lambda$ )).

We define key-selective (resp. input-selective) security identically to the definition above, except that  $\mathcal{A}$  is forced to make the key query (resp. challenge query) first.

**Indistinguishability Based Perfect Security.** In the perfect setting, we can omit the security parameter and selective security implies full security, therefore the following definition is equivalent to the one above:

A one-one constrained PRF is perfectly secure if for all  $f^* \in \mathcal{F}$  and  $x^* \in \mathcal{X}$  for which  $f^*(x^*) = 0$ , the following distributions are identical:

$$(f^*, x^*, K_{f^*}, K_{x^*}) \equiv (f^*, x^*, K_{f^*}, u)$$

where  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$ ,  $K_{f^*} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(K, f^*)$ ,  $K_{x^*} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(K, x^*)$ ,  $u \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|K_{x^*}|}$ .

**Note.** This is essentially a constrained PRF secure against one constrained key and one evaluation query. Related primitives: constrained PRFs, conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS), function secret-sharing.

## 5 A Lower Bound

We now show that for inequality predicates, the upper bound that we show in Theorem 10 is tight, i.e., it is not possible to do better than the trivial construction. This means we cannot hope to achieve efficient information-theoretic constructions for NC1.

► **Theorem 7.** Let  $\mathcal{F} = \{f_{\neq y}\}_{y \in \mathbb{F}}$  be the family of punctured predicates over some field  $\mathbb{F}$ , i.e., for any fixed  $y \in \mathbb{F}$ ,  $f_{\neq y} : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  where  $f_{\neq y}(x) = 1$  if and only if  $x \neq y$ . Then, for any field  $\mathbb{F}$ , any one-one constrained PRF for  $\mathcal{F}$  with perfect correctness and perfect security is of complexity  $\Omega(|\mathbb{F}|)$ .

We now prove Theorem 7. Denote  $N = |\mathbb{F}|$  and consider all of the field elements  $x_1, \dots, x_N$  according to some fixed order. Consider the random variable  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$  and for all  $i \in [N]$  consider the random variables  $K_i$  and  $K_{\neq i}$  defined as:

$$K_i \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(K, x_i), \quad K_{\neq i} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(K, f_{\neq x_i}) .$$



▷ Claim 8. For all  $i \in [N]$ , it holds that  $H(K_i | K_1, \dots, K_{i-1}) \geq 1$ .

Proof. Fix an  $i \in [N]$ . By the perfect security it holds that  $(K_{\neq i}, K_i) \equiv (K_{\neq i}, u)$  where  $u \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|K_{\neq i}|}$ . Since  $H(u | K_{\neq i}) \geq 1$ , it follows that

$$H(K_i | K_{\neq i}) \geq 1 . \tag{1}$$

By the perfect correctness,  $K_{\neq i}$  uniquely determines all of the values  $\{K_j\}_{j \neq i}$ . That is,

$$H(\{K_j\}_{j \neq i} | K_{\neq i}) = 0 ,$$

i.e., (by Definition 1)

$$H(\{K_j\}_{j \neq i}, K_{\neq i}) = H(K_{\neq i}) ,$$

and therefore

$$H(K_{\neq i}) \geq H(\{K_j\}_{j \neq i}) .$$

Since  $\{K_1, \dots, K_{i-1}\} \subseteq \{K_j\}_{j \neq i}$ , it follows that

$$H(K_{\neq i}) \geq H(K_1, \dots, K_{i-1}) . \tag{2}$$

Lastly, equations (1) and (2) imply that

$$H(K_i | K_1, \dots, K_{i-1}) \geq H(K_i | K_{\neq i}) \geq 1 . \quad \triangleleft$$

▷ Claim 9. For any subset  $I \subseteq [N]$ , it holds that  $H(\{K_i\}_{i \in I}) \geq |I|$ .

Proof. Fix a subset  $I \subseteq [N]$  and denote  $I = \{i_1, \dots, i_{|I|}\}$  such that  $i_1 < i_2 < \dots < i_{|I|}$ . By Claim 8, for all  $j = 1, \dots, |I|$  it holds that

$$H(K_{i_j} | K_{i_1}, \dots, K_{i_{j-1}}) \geq H(K_{i_j} | K_1, \dots, K_{i_{j-1}}) \geq 1 ,$$

i.e., (by Definition 1)

$$H(K_{i_j}, K_{i_1}, \dots, K_{i_{j-1}}) - H(K_{i_1}, \dots, K_{i_{j-1}}) \geq 1 ,$$

i.e.,

$$H(K_{i_j}, K_{i_1}, \dots, K_{i_{j-1}}) \geq 1 + H(K_{i_1}, \dots, K_{i_{j-1}}) .$$

Since this is true for all  $j = 1, \dots, |I|$ , it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} H(\{K_i\}_{i \in I}) &= H(K_{i_{|I|}}, K_{i_1}, \dots, K_{i_{|I|-1}}) \\ &\geq 1 + H(K_{i_1}, \dots, K_{i_{|I|-1}}) \\ &\geq 1 + 1 + H(K_{i_1}, \dots, K_{i_{|I|-2}}) \\ &\dots \\ &\geq |I| . \end{aligned} \quad \triangleleft$$

Consider now an arbitrary  $i \in [N]$ . From Claim 9 it holds that  $H(\{K_j\}_{j \neq i}) \geq N - 1$ . Since  $H(K_{\neq i}) \geq H(\{K_j\}_{j \neq i})$  (see the proof of Claim 8), it follows that  $H(K_{\neq i}) \geq N - 1$ . Hence, for any  $i \in [N]$  the size of  $K_{\neq i}$  is at least  $N - 1$ , which completes the proof. ◀

## 6 Information-Theoretic Constructions

In this section we consider one-one constrained PRFs with perfect correctness and security. We begin in Section 6.1 with a generic construction for all predicates over a field  $\mathbb{F}$ , which is of complexity  $O(|\mathbb{F}|)$ . We then present more efficient constructions for specific predicate families; We begin in Section 6.2 with a complexity-preserving composition lemma for the AND operator. That is, we show that given a one-one cPRF for predicate families  $\mathcal{F}^1$  and  $\mathcal{F}^2$ , there is a one-one cPRF for the predicate family  $\mathcal{F}^1 \wedge \mathcal{F}^2$  of proportional complexity. In Section 6.3 we show a construction for the equality predicate over a field  $\mathbb{F}$  with complexity  $O(\log |\mathbb{F}|)$ , which extends to a  $\ell$ -vector-equality construction of complexity  $O(\ell \cdot \log |\mathbb{F}|)$  via the generic AND composition. In Section 6.4 we show a construction for the subset relation with complexity  $O(N)$ , where  $N$  is the maximal size of sets, which extends to  $t$ -CNFs with complexity  $O(\binom{\ell}{t} \cdot |\mathbb{F}|^t \cdot \log |\mathbb{F}|)$  as pointed out by [15,27]. In Section 6.5 we construct a one-one cPRF for inner-product predicates for vectors in  $\mathbb{F}^\ell$  with complexity  $O(\ell \cdot \log |\mathbb{F}|)$ , which can be extended to polynomials via embedding of polynomial zero testing as inner-product.

### 6.1 Generic Predicates

► **Theorem 10.** *Let  $\mathcal{F}$  be the family of all predicates over some field  $\mathbb{F}$ , i.e., any  $f \in \mathcal{F}$  is of the form  $f : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ . Then, there is a one-one constrained PRF for  $\mathcal{F}$  with perfect correctness, perfect security, and complexity  $O(|\mathbb{F}|)$ .*

**Proof.** The construction is as follows.

- **Setup():** For any  $y \in \mathbb{F}$  sample  $k_y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ . Output  $K = \{k_y\}_{y \in \mathbb{F}}$ .
- **A( $K, f$ ):** Parse  $K = \{k_y\}_{y \in \mathbb{F}}$  and output  $K_f = \{k_y : f(y) = 1\}_{y \in \mathbb{F}}$ .
- **B( $K, x$ ):** Parse  $K = \{k_y\}_{y \in \mathbb{F}}$  and output  $K_x = k_x$ .
- **Rec( $x, f, K_f$ ):** Parse  $K_f = \{k_y : f(y) = 1\}_{y \in \mathbb{F}}$ . If  $f(x) = 1$  then output  $k_x$ , otherwise output  $\perp$ .

**Correctness.** If  $f(x) = 1$  then  $k_x \in K_f$ .

**Security.** Consider  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$ ,  $K_f \leftarrow \text{A}(K, f)$ ,  $K_x \leftarrow \text{B}(K, x)$ ,  $u \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ . If  $f(x) = 0$  then  $k_x \notin K_f$ . Since  $k_x$  is a uniformly sampled bit and  $H(k_x | K_f) = H(k_x)$ , it holds that

$$(f, x, K_f, K_x) \equiv (f, x, K_f, u) . \quad \blacktriangleleft$$

### 6.2 AND Composition

► **Lemma 11.** *Let  $(\text{Setup}^1, \text{A}^1, \text{B}^1, \text{Rec}^1)$  and  $(\text{Setup}^2, \text{A}^2, \text{B}^2, \text{Rec}^2)$  be perfect one-one constrained PRFs for some predicate families  $\mathcal{F}^1 = \{f^1 : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\}$  and  $\mathcal{F}^2 = \{f^2 : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\}$  respectively for some field  $\mathbb{F}$ , with complexity bounded by some functions  $P^1$  and  $P^2$  respectively. Then, there is a perfect one-one constrained PRF for the predicate family  $\mathcal{F}^1 \wedge \mathcal{F}^2 = \{f^1 \wedge f^2 : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\}_{f^1 \in \mathcal{F}^1, f^2 \in \mathcal{F}^2}$  with complexity bounded by  $P^1 + P^2$ .*

**Proof.** For simplicity we assume that for all  $x$  it holds that  $|K_x^1| = |K_x^2|$ . This can always be enforced because it is possible to ignore some of the bits of  $K_x$  without compromising correctness and security. The construction is as follows.

- **Setup():** Compute  $K^1 \leftarrow \text{Setup}^1()$  and  $K^2 \leftarrow \text{Setup}^2()$ , output  $K = (K^1, K^2)$ .
- **A( $K, f$ ):** Parse  $K = (K^1, K^2)$  and  $f = f^1 \wedge f^2$ . Compute  $K_{f^1}^1 \leftarrow \text{A}^1(K^1, f^1)$  and  $K_{f^2}^2 \leftarrow \text{A}^2(K^2, f^2)$ . Output  $K_f = (K_{f^1}^1, K_{f^2}^2)$ .
- **B( $K, x$ ):** Parse  $K = (K^1, K^2)$ . Compute  $K_x^1 \leftarrow \text{B}^1(K^1, x)$  and  $K_x^2 \leftarrow \text{B}^2(K^2, x)$ . Output  $K_x = K_x^1 + K_x^2$ .

- $\text{Rec}(x, f, K_f)$ : Parse  $K_f = (K_{f_1}^1, K_{f_2}^2)$ . Compute  $R_x^1 \leftarrow \text{Rec}^1(x, f^1, K_{f_1}^1)$  and  $R_x^2 \leftarrow \text{Rec}^2(x, f^2, K_{f_2}^2)$ , output  $R_x = R_x^1 + R_x^2$ .

**Correctness.** If  $f(x) = 1$  then  $f^1(x) = 1 \wedge f^2(x) = 1$ , therefore by the correctness of the underlying constructions  $R_x^1 = K_x^1$  and  $R_x^2 = K_x^2$ , thus  $R_x = K_x$ .

**Security.** Consider  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$ ,  $K_f \leftarrow \mathbf{A}(K, f)$ ,  $K_x \leftarrow \mathbf{B}(K, x)$ ,  $u \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|K_x|}$  where  $K = (K^1, K^2)$ ,  $f = f^1 \wedge f^2$ ,  $K_f = (K_{f_1}^1, K_{f_2}^2)$  and  $K_x = K_x^1 + K_x^2$ . If  $f(x) = 0$  then there exists  $i \in \{1, 2\}$  for which  $f^i(x) = 0$ . By the security of the underlying constructions it holds that

$$(f^i, x, K_{f_i}^i, K_x^i) \equiv (f^i, x, K_{f_i}^i, u^i).$$

where  $K^i \leftarrow \text{Setup}^i()$ ,  $K_{f_i}^i \leftarrow \mathbf{A}^i(K^i, f^i)$ ,  $K_x^i \leftarrow \mathbf{B}^i(K^i, x)$ ,  $u^i \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|K_x^i|}$ . Since the two instances of the underlying constructions are independent (i.e.,  $H(K^1|K^2) = H(K^1)$  and  $H(K^2|K^1) = H(K^2)$ ), and in particular  $K_x^i$  is independent of  $(K_{f_3-i}^{3-i}, K_x^{3-i})$ , it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} (f, x, K_f, K_x) &= (f, x, (K_{f_1}^1, K_{f_2}^2), K_x^1 + K_x^2) \\ &\equiv (f, x, (K_{f_1}^1, K_{f_2}^2), K_x^{3-i} + u^i) \\ &\equiv (f, x, (K_{f_1}^1, K_{f_2}^2), u) \\ &= (f, x, K_f, u). \end{aligned} \quad \blacktriangleleft$$

### 6.3 Equality Testing

► **Theorem 12.** Let  $\mathcal{F} = \{f_y\}_{y \in \mathbb{F}}$  be the family of point predicates over some field  $\mathbb{F}$ , i.e., for any fixed  $y \in \mathbb{F}$ ,  $f_y : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  where  $f_y(x) = 1$  if and only if  $x = y$ . Then, there is a one-one constrained PRF for  $\mathcal{F}$  with perfect correctness, perfect security, and complexity  $O(\log |\mathbb{F}|)$ .

**Proof.** The construction is as follows.

- $\text{Setup}()$ : Sample  $k_0, k_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}$  and output  $K = (k_0, k_1)$ .
- $\mathbf{A}(K, f_y)$ : Parse  $K = (k_0, k_1)$  and output  $K_{f_y} = k_0 + yk_1$ .
- $\mathbf{B}(K, x)$ : Parse  $K = (k_0, k_1)$  and output  $K_x = k_0 + xk_1$ .
- $\text{Rec}(x, f_y, K_{f_y})$ : If  $x = y$  then output  $K_{f_y}$ , otherwise output  $\perp$ .

**Correctness.** If  $f_y(x) = 1$ , i.e.,  $x = y$ , then  $K_{f_y} = K_x$ .

**Security.** Consider  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$ ,  $K_{f_y} \leftarrow \mathbf{A}(K, f_y)$ ,  $K_x \leftarrow \mathbf{B}(K, x)$ ,  $u \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}$ . If  $f_y(x) = 0$ , i.e.,  $x \neq y$ , then  $(K_{f_y}, K_x) = (k_0 + yk_1, k_0 + xk_1)$  are two distinct points on a random linear function defined by  $(k_0, k_1)$ . Since for every possible value of the uniformly sampled  $u \in \mathbb{F}$  there is a unique  $(k'_0, k'_1) \in \mathbb{F}^2$  such that  $k'_0 + yk'_1 = k_0 + yk_1 = K_{f_y}$  and  $k'_0 + xk'_1 = u$ , it holds that  $(f_y, x, K_{f_y}, K_x)$  and  $(f_y, x, K_{f_y}, u)$  are identically distributed. ◀

**Extensions.** The construction above can be extended to other notions as follows.

- The predicates family of equality testing of *vectors* over some field  $\mathbb{F}$ , i.e., the family  $\mathcal{F} = \{f_{\mathbf{y}}\}_{\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^\ell}$  where for any fixed  $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$ ,  $f_{\mathbf{y}} : \mathbb{F}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  such that  $f_{\mathbf{y}}(\mathbf{x}) = 1$  if and only if  $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{y}$ . The construction is derived via the AND composition lemma (see Lemma 11) and is of complexity  $O(\ell \cdot \log |\mathbb{F}|)$ .

## 13:12 One-One Constrained Pseudorandom Functions

- A 1-key  $t$ -queries variant, i.e., a construction where for any  $f_y \in \mathcal{F}$  and any  $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{F}/y$  of size  $|\mathcal{X}| < t$ , it holds that

$$(f_y, x, K_{f_y}, \{K_x\}_{x \in \mathcal{X}}) \equiv (f_y, x, K_{f_y}, \{u_x\}_{x \in \mathcal{X}})$$

where  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$ ,  $K_{f_y} \leftarrow \text{A}(K, f_y)$ ,  $K_x \leftarrow \text{B}(K, x)$ ,  $u_x \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|K_x|}$ . In the construction, sample a random polynomial  $p$  of degree  $t$  as the common random string  $K$  and compute  $K_x = p(x)$ ,  $K_{f_y} = p(y)$ . The complexity is  $O(t \cdot \log |\mathbb{F}|)$ .

### 6.4 Subset Predicates

► **Theorem 13.** Let  $\mathcal{F} = \{f_Y\}_{Y \subseteq [N]}$  be the family of subset predicate over the set  $[N]$ , i.e., for any fixed subset  $Y \subseteq [N]$ ,  $f_Y : 2^{[N]} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  and  $f_Y(X) = 1$  if and only if  $X \subseteq Y$ . Then, there is a one-one constrained PRF for  $\mathcal{F}$  with perfect correctness, perfect security, and complexity  $O(N)$ .

**Proof.** The construction is as follows.

- **Setup():** For any  $i \in [N]$  sample  $k_i \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$ . Output  $K = \{k_i\}_{i \in [N]}$ .
- **A( $K, f_Y$ ):** Parse  $K = \{k_i\}_{i \in [N]}$  and output  $K_{f_Y} = \{k_i\}_{i \in Y}$ .
- **B( $K, X$ ):** Parse  $K = \{k_i\}_{i \in [N]}$  and output  $K_X = \bigoplus_{i \in X} k_i$ .
- **Rec( $X, f_Y, K_{f_Y}$ ):** Parse  $K_{f_Y} = \{k_i\}_{i \in Y}$ . If  $X \subseteq Y$  then compute and output  $K'_X = \bigoplus_{i \in X} k_i$ , otherwise output  $\perp$ .

**Correctness.** If  $f_Y(X) = 1$ , i.e.,  $X \subseteq Y$ , then  $K'_X = K_X$ .

**Security.** If  $f_Y(X) = 0$ , i.e.,  $X \not\subseteq Y$ , then there exists an index  $i^* \in X$  such that  $i^* \notin Y$ , therefore

$$(f_Y, X, \{k_i\}_{i \in Y}, k_{i^*}) \equiv (f, x, \{k_i\}_{i \in Y}, u)$$

and thus

$$(f_Y, X, \{k_i\}_{i \in Y}, \bigoplus_{i \in X} k_i) \equiv (f_Y, X, \{k_i\}_{i \in Y}, u)$$

and thus

$$(f_Y, X, K_{f_Y}, K_X) \equiv (f_Y, X, K_{f_Y}, u)$$

where  $\{k_i\}_{i \in [N]} = K \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$ ,  $K_{f_Y} \leftarrow \text{A}(K, f_Y)$ ,  $K_X \leftarrow \text{B}(K, X)$ ,  $u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$ . ◀

**Extensions.** Using techniques similar to [15, 27], the construction above implies a one-one constrained PRF for the class of  $t$ -CNF predicates with inputs of length  $\ell$  over some field  $\mathbb{F}$ , where the construction is of complexity  $O(\binom{\ell}{t} \cdot |\mathbb{F}|^t \cdot \log |\mathbb{F}|)$ .

### 6.5 Inner-Product Predicates

► **Theorem 14.** Let  $\mathcal{F} = \{f_{\mathbf{y}}\}_{\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^\ell}$  be the family of inner-product predicates of length- $\ell$  vectors over some field  $\mathbb{F}$ , i.e., for any fixed  $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$ ,  $f_{\mathbf{y}} : \mathbb{F}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  where  $f_{\mathbf{y}}(\mathbf{x}) = 1$  if and only if  $\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = 0$ . Then, there is a one-one constrained PRF for  $\mathcal{F}$  with perfect correctness, perfect security, and complexity  $O(\ell \cdot \log |\mathbb{F}|)$ .

**Proof.** The construction is as follows.

- $\text{Setup}()$ : Sample  $\mathbf{v} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}^\ell$  and  $w \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}$ . Output  $K = (\mathbf{v}, w)$ .
- $\text{A}(K, f_y)$ : Parse  $K = (\mathbf{v}, w)$  and output  $K_{f_y} = w\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{v}$ .
- $\text{B}(K, \mathbf{x})$ : Parse  $K = (\mathbf{v}, w)$  and output  $K_x = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle$ .
- $\text{Rec}(\mathbf{x}, f_y, K_{f_y})$ : Output  $\langle K_{f_y}, \mathbf{x} \rangle$ .

**Correctness.** If  $f_y(\mathbf{x}) = 1$ , i.e.,  $\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = 0$ , then

$$\langle K_{f_y}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = \langle w\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = \underbrace{w\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \rangle}_0 + \underbrace{\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle}_{K_x}.$$

**Security.** If  $f_y(\mathbf{x}) = 0$ , i.e.,  $\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \rangle \neq 0$ , then

$$(f_y, \mathbf{x}, K_{f_y}, K_x) = (f_y, \mathbf{x}, w\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{v}, \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle) \equiv (f_y, \mathbf{x}, w\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{v}, u) = (f_y, \mathbf{x}, K_{f_y}, u)$$

where  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$ ,  $K_{f_y} \leftarrow \text{A}(K, f_y)$ ,  $K_x \leftarrow \text{B}(K, \mathbf{x})$ ,  $u \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}$ .

To see that, fix some values  $(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}, u)$ . Sample a random  $\mathbf{v}$  under the constraint that  $\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = u$ , then sample  $w$  and output  $(f_y, \mathbf{x}, w\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{v}, u)$ . ◀

## 7 Removing the One-One Restriction via Key-Homomorphic PRF

In this section we consider one-one cPRFs that satisfy an additional property and show that such one-one cPRFs can be boosted to standard cPRFs via key-homomorphic PRFs. We then show that all of our information-theoretic one-one cPRFs satisfy this property, thus receiving new cPRF constructions.

In more detail, we require an alternative algorithm for Alice,  $\text{dkA}(K, f)$ , that produces a *double-key*  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f)$ . Such double-key should have the property that  $\hat{K}_f$  looks uniformly random even given  $K_f$ , but on the other hand, given both of the key parts  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f)$  it should be possible to compute  $K_x$  for all  $x$  (regardless of  $f(x)$ ). We now formally define this additional property.

► **Definition 15.** A one-one constrained pseudorandom function for a predicate family  $\mathcal{F}$  and an input space  $\mathcal{X}$  is in the double-key model, if in addition to the algorithms  $(\text{Setup}, \text{B}, \text{Rec})$  as in Definition 6, there exists algorithms  $\text{dkA}$  and  $\text{dkRec}$  with the following syntax.

- $\text{dkA}(K, f) \rightarrow (K_f, \hat{K}_f)$  is a PPT algorithm that takes a common random string  $K$  and a predicate  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ . It outputs a pair of keys  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f)$ .
- $\text{dkRec}(x, f, K_f, \hat{K}_f) \rightarrow K'_x$  is a deterministic algorithm that takes an input  $x$ , a predicate  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ , and a pair of keys  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f)$ . It outputs a value  $K'_x$ .

**(Standard) Correctness.** A one-one constrained PRF is correct if it satisfies standard correctness (as in Definition 6) with respect to the keys  $K_f$ . That is, for all  $f \in \mathcal{F}$  and  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  for which  $f(x) = 1$ , for all  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ , and for all  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f) \leftarrow \text{dkA}(K, f)$ , it holds that  $\text{Rec}(x, f, K_f) = \text{B}(K, x)$ .

**Correctness of Double-Keys.** A one-one constrained PRF has correct double-key if for all  $f \in \mathcal{F}$  and  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  for which  $f(x) = 0$ , for all  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ , and for all  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f) \leftarrow \text{dkA}(K, f)$ , it holds that  $\text{dkRec}(x, f, K_f, \hat{K}_f) = \text{B}(K, x)$ .

**Security of Double-Keys.** The scheme has perfect ( /statistical /computational) double-key security if for any  $f \in \mathcal{F}$  and any unbounded ( /unbounded /PPT) distinguisher, the following distributions are identical ( /statistically close /computationally indistinguishable).

$$(f, K_f, \hat{K}_f) \equiv (f, K_f, u)$$

where  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ ,  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f) \leftarrow \text{dkA}(K, f)$ ,  $u \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|\hat{K}_f|}$ .

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Given the new definition in hand, we now state the main theorem.

► **Theorem 16.** *Let  $(\text{KeyGen}, \text{Eval}, \text{HomKeyEval})$  be a key-homomorphic PRF for an input space  $\mathcal{X}_\alpha$ , a key space  $\mathcal{K}$ , and a function family  $\mathcal{G} = \{\mathcal{G}_n : \mathcal{K}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{K}\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ , and let  $(\text{Setup}, \text{dkA}, \text{B}, \text{Rec}, \text{dkRec})$  be a one-one cPRF in the double-key model (as in Definition 15) for an input space  $\mathcal{X}_\beta$  and a predicate family  $\mathcal{F}$ , such that:*

- *The key space  $\mathcal{K}$  is some field  $\mathbb{F}$  and the algorithm  $\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$  outputs a random value  $\text{sk} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}$ .*
- *For all  $x \in \mathcal{X}_\beta$  and all  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  it holds that  $K_x \in \mathbb{F}$  where  $K_x \leftarrow \text{B}(K, x)$  and  $\mathbb{F}$  is the same field as above.*
- *For all  $f \in \mathcal{F}$  there exists  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  such that for all  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  it holds that  $\hat{K}_f \in \mathbb{F}^n$ , where  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f) \leftarrow \text{dkA}(K, f)$  and  $\mathbb{F}$  is the same field as above.*
- *For all  $x \in \mathcal{X}_\beta$  and  $f \in \mathcal{F}$  such that  $f(x) = 0$ , and all  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f) \leftarrow \text{dkA}(K, f)$  where  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ , let  $\text{dkRec}_{x,f,K_f} : \mathbb{F}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  denote the algorithm  $\text{dkRec}$  with the hard-coded inputs  $(x, f, K_f)$ , i.e.,  $\text{dkRec}_{x,f,K_f}(\cdot) = \text{dkRec}(x, f, K_f, \cdot)$ . Then:*
  - *$\text{dkRec}_{x,f,K_f}(\cdot)$  can be homomorphically evaluated over keys of the key-homomorphic scheme, i.e.,  $\text{dkRec}_{x,f,K_f}(\cdot) \in \mathcal{G}$ .*
  - *$\text{dkRec}_{x,f,K_f}(\cdot)$  preserves uniformity, i.e., the distributions  $\text{dkRec}_{x,f,K_f}(\mathcal{U}_{\mathbb{F}^n})$  and  $\mathcal{U}_{\mathbb{F}}$  are identical.*

*Then, there exists a key-selective secure single-key constrained PRF for the predicate family  $\mathcal{F}$  and the input space  $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{X}_\alpha \cap \mathcal{X}_\beta$ .*

### 7.1 The Reduction

We proceed to the proof of Theorem 16. Assuming a key-homomorphic PRF and a one-one constrained PRF as described in the theorem, the constrained PRF is defined as follows.

► **Construction 17.** *Define:*

- $\text{CPRF.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ : *Compute  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and output  $\text{msk} = K$ .*
- $\text{CPRF.Eval}(\text{msk}, x)$ : *Parse  $\text{msk} = K$ . Compute  $K_x := \text{B}(K, x)$  and output  $r_x := \text{Eval}_{K_x}(x)$ .*
- $\text{CPRF.Con}(\text{msk}, f)$ : *Parse  $\text{msk} = K$ . Compute  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f) \leftarrow \text{dkA}(K, f)$  and output  $\text{sk}_f = (f, K_f)$ .*
- $\text{CPRF.ConEval}(\text{sk}_f, x)$ : *Parse  $\text{sk}_f = (f, K_f)$ . Compute  $K'_x := \text{Rec}(x, f, K_f)$  and output  $r'_x := \text{Eval}_{K'_x}(x)$ .*

**Correctness of Constrained Keys.** Fix  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  and  $f \in \mathcal{F}$  for which  $f(x) = 1$ , and  $\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{CPRF.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ ,  $\text{sk}_f \leftarrow \text{CPRF.Con}(\text{msk}, f)$ . Then  $\text{msk} = K$  and  $\text{sk}_f = (f, K_f)$  where  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f) \leftarrow \text{dkA}(K, f)$ . Consider  $\text{CPRF.ConEval}(\text{sk}_f, x)$  and in particular  $K'_x = \text{Rec}(x, f, K_f)$ , then by the standard correctness of the one-one cPRF, since  $f(x) = 1$  it holds that  $K'_x = K_x$  and therefore  $\text{Eval}_{K'_x}(x) = \text{Eval}_{K_x}(x)$ .

**Pseudorandomness.** We now prove that Construction 17 is a single-key key-selective secure constrained PRF as in Definition 4. The proof goes via a sequence of hybrids.

**Proof. Hybrid  $H_0$ .** This is the real security game as in Definition 4. Note that this is the selective-key game, i.e., the key query for  $f$  happens before any other queries. Explicitly,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and then immediately answers the key query:

- *Key Query:* Upon receiving  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f) \leftarrow \text{dkA}(K, f)$  and sends  $K_f$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

In the rest of the game  $\mathcal{C}$  answers queries made by  $\mathcal{A}$  as follows.

- *Evaluation Query*: Upon receiving  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $K_x := \mathbf{B}(K, x)$  and  $r_x := \text{Eval}_{K_x}(x)$ .  
It sends  $r_x$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- *Challenge Query*: Upon receiving  $x^* \in \mathcal{X}$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $K_{x^*} := \mathbf{B}(K, x^*)$  and  $r_{x^*} := \text{Eval}_{K_{x^*}}(x^*)$ .  
It samples a bit  $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ . If  $b = 0$ , it sends  $r_{x^*}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , otherwise it sends to  $\mathcal{A}$  a random value  $u \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|r_{x^*}|}$ .

**Hybrid  $H_1$ .** In this hybrid we change the way that  $\mathcal{C}$  evaluates  $K_x$  when it answers evaluation queries and the challenge query. Instead of using the common random string  $K$ , it will use the double-key  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f)$ . That is, upon receiving  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , instead of computing  $K_x := \mathbf{B}(K, x)$  it computes

$$K_x := \begin{cases} \text{Rec}(x, f, K_f) & f(x) = 1 \\ \text{dkRec}(x, f, K_f, \hat{K}_f) & f(x) = 0 \end{cases}$$

and then proceeds as in the previous hybrid. Due to the perfect standard correctness and correctness of double-keys, the distributions that  $\mathcal{C}$  outputs in Hybrids  $H_0$  and  $H_1$  are identical.

**Hybrid  $H_2$ .** Note that  $\mathcal{C}$  does not use  $K$  anymore except of when it first generates  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f)$ . In this hybrid we change  $\hat{K}_f$  to uniform. That is, after computing  $(K_f, \hat{K}_f) \leftarrow \text{dkA}(K, f)$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  samples a random value  $u \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|\hat{K}_f|}$  and overrides the value of  $\hat{K}_f$  such that  $\hat{K}_f := u$ . By the perfect ( /statistical /computational) security of double-keys, the distributions that  $\mathcal{C}$  outputs in hybrids  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  are identical ( /statistically close /computationally indistinguishable).

**Hybrid  $H_3$ .** In this hybrid we change the way that  $\mathcal{C}$  evaluates  $r_x$  when it answers evaluation queries and the challenge query, whenever  $f(x) = 0$ . Recall that in the previous hybrid it computes  $r_x := \text{Eval}_{K_x}(x)$  where  $K_x := \text{dkRec}(x, f, K_f, \hat{K}_f)$ , and recall that by assumption,  $\text{dkRec}_{x,f,K_f}(\cdot) = \text{dkRec}(x, f, K_f, \cdot)$  can be homomorphically evaluated over the PRF key-space using  $\text{HomKeyEval}$ . Moreover, by our assumption it holds that  $\hat{K}_f \in \mathbb{F}^n$  for some  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ . Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} r_x &= \text{Eval}_{K_x}(x) \\ &= \text{Eval}_{\text{dkRec}(x,f,K_f,\hat{K}_f)}(x) \\ &= \text{Eval}_{\text{dkRec}_{x,f,K_f}(\hat{K}_f)}(x) \\ &= \text{HomKeyEval} \left( \text{dkRec}_{x,f,K_f}, \text{Eval}_{\hat{K}_f^1}(x), \dots, \text{Eval}_{\hat{K}_f^n}(x) \right) \end{aligned}$$

where  $\hat{K}_f = (\hat{K}_f^1, \dots, \hat{K}_f^n)$ . In this hybrid,  $\mathcal{C}$  first computes  $s_x^i := \text{Eval}_{\hat{K}_f^i}(x)$  for all  $i \in [n]$ , and then

$$r_x := \text{HomKeyEval} \left( \text{dkRec}_{x,f,K_f}, s_x^1, \dots, s_x^n \right).$$

By the perfect correctness of homomorphic key evaluation, the distributions that  $\mathcal{C}$  outputs in hybrids  $H_2$  and  $H_3$  are identical.

**Hybrid  $H_4$ .** In this hybrid we change the way that  $\mathcal{C}$  evaluates  $s_x^1, \dots, s_x^n$  whenever  $f(x) = 0$ . Note that in Hybrid  $H_3$  the value  $\hat{K}_f$ , which is uniformly random in  $\mathbb{F}^n$ , is only used when computing  $s_x^i := \text{Eval}_{\hat{K}_f^i}(x)$  for all  $i \in [n]$ . Thus, we can replace the values  $s_x^1, \dots, s_x^n$  with uniformly random strings. That is, whenever a query is made for an  $x$  such that  $f(x) = 0$ ,

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$\mathcal{C}$  samples  $s_x^1, \dots, s_x^n \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^*$  of appropriate size and then proceeds as in the previous hybrid. By the pseudorandomness of the key-homomorphic PRF respective to the keys  $\hat{K}_f^1, \dots, \hat{K}_f^n$ , the distributions that  $\mathcal{C}$  outputs in hybrids  $H_3$  and  $H_4$  are computationally indistinguishable.

**Hybrid  $H_5$ .** We change again the way that  $\mathcal{C}$  evaluates  $r_x$  whenever  $f(x) = 0$ . In this hybrid the values  $r_x$  are replaced with uniformly sampled strings. Indistinguishability will follow immediately from the next lemma, since  $s_x^1, \dots, s_x^n$  are random values and  $\text{dkRec}_{x,f,K_f}(\cdot)$  preserves uniformity.  $\blacktriangleleft$

► **Lemma 18.** *Let  $(\text{KeyGen}, \text{Eval}, \text{HomKeyEval})$  be a secure key-homomorphic PRF for a key space  $\mathcal{K}$  and a function family  $\mathcal{G} = \{g_n : \mathcal{K}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{K}\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ , where valid keys are samples from  $\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{K}}$  and the output space is  $\mathcal{O}$ . Let  $g \in \mathcal{G}_n$  be a function such that  $g(\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{K}^n})$  and  $\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{K}}$  are computationally indistinguishable. Then, the distribution  $\text{HomKeyEval}(g, \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{O}^n})$  is computationally indistinguishable from  $\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{O}}$ .*

**Proof.** Via hybrids:

1. The distribution  $\text{HomKeyEval}(g, \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{O}^n})$ .
2. The distribution  $\text{HomKeyEval}(g, \text{Eval}_{\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{K}}}(0), \dots, \text{Eval}_{\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{K}}}(0))$  (Ind. by the pseudorandomness). Note that the distribution  $\text{Eval}_{\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{K}}}(0)$  is concatenated  $n$  times and that the PRF input 0 was chosen arbitrarily.
3. The distribution  $\text{Eval}_{g(\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{K}^n})}(0)$  (Ind. by the correctness of homomorphic key evaluation).
4. The distribution  $\text{Eval}_{\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{K}}}(0)$  (Ind. by the assumption about  $g$ ).
5. The distribution  $\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{O}}$  (Ind. by the pseudorandomness).  $\blacktriangleleft$

## 7.2 Constructions of One-One cPRFs in the Double-Key Model

We now show that all of our information-theoretic constructions (see Section 6) have a *double-key* variant (see Definition 15) of the same complexity. Moreover, in all of those double-key constructions, the corresponding function  $\text{dkRec}_{x,f,K_f}$  (see Theorem 16 for definition) is linear and preserves uniformity. Due to the similarity to the constructions in Section 6, we provide here an overview.

**Generic Predicates.** For an input space  $\mathbb{F}$  and any predicate family  $\mathcal{F}$ , the common random string  $K = \{k_y\}_{y \in \mathbb{F}}$  consists of random bits  $k_y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$  for every element in the field. The value  $K_x$  is then simply  $k_x$ . The double-key for a predicate  $f$  splits  $K$  into a set of authorized inputs  $K_f = \{k_y : f(y) = 1\}_{y \in \mathbb{F}}$  and a set of unauthorized inputs  $\hat{K}_f = \{k_y : f(y) = 0\}_{y \in \mathbb{F}}$ . Clearly,  $\hat{K}_f$  is uniformly distributed even given  $K_f$ , and recovering a value  $k_x$  from  $\hat{K}_f$  is a linear function.

**AND Composition.** Consider two perfect one-one cPRFs in the double-key model for some predicate families  $\mathcal{F}^1 = \{f^1\}$  and  $\mathcal{F}^2 = \{f^2\}$ . In the construction for the predicate family  $\mathcal{F}^1 \wedge \mathcal{F}^2 = \{f^1 \wedge f^2\}_{f^1 \in \mathcal{F}^1, f^2 \in \mathcal{F}^2}$ , there is one instance of each of the underlying constructions. The common random string  $K = (K^1, K^2)$  and double-keys  $K_f = (K_{f^1}^1, K_{f^2}^2)$  and  $\hat{K}_f = (\hat{K}_{f^1}^1, \hat{K}_{f^2}^2)$  where  $f = f^1 \wedge f^2$  are a concatenation of the corresponding values in the underlying schemes. The values  $K_x = K_x^1 + K_x^2$  are the *sum* of the corresponding values in the underlying schemes. Since the two instances are secure and generated independently, uniformity of  $\hat{K}_f$  given  $K_f$  follows immediately. Moreover, the algorithm  $\text{dkRec}(x, f, K_f, \hat{K}_f)$  that computes and outputs  $\text{dkRec}^1(x, f^1, K_{f^1}^1, \hat{K}_{f^1}^1) + \text{dkRec}^2(x, f^2, K_{f^2}^2, \hat{K}_{f^2}^2)$  is clearly correct, linear in  $\hat{K}_f$ , and preserves uniformity if the underlying schemes are correct, linear in  $\hat{K}_{f^1}^1$  and  $\hat{K}_{f^2}^2$ , and preserve uniformity.



**Equality Testing.** Consider equality testing over some field  $\mathbb{F}$ . The common random string  $K = (k_0, k_1)$  consists of two random elements in the field  $k_0, k_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}$ , and we define  $K_x = k_0 + xk_1$ . The double-key for some value  $y$  is defined as  $K_{f_y} = k_0 + yk_1$  and  $\hat{K}_{f_y} = yk_1$ . Note that by the uniformity of  $k_0$  and  $k_1$ , for all  $y \neq 0$  the key part  $\hat{K}_{f_y}$  is distributed uniformly in  $\mathbb{F}$  even given  $K_{f_y}$ . To reconstruct  $K_x$  for some  $x \neq y$ , compute

$$\text{dkRec}(x, y, K_{f_y}, \hat{K}_{f_y}) = \frac{x-y}{y} \hat{K}_{f_y} + K_{f_y} = (x-y)k_1 + k_0 + yk_1 = k_0 + xk_1 = K_x ,$$

which is correct and linear in  $\hat{K}_{f_y}$ .

**Subset Predicates.** Recall that we consider all subsets  $X \subseteq [N]$  as the input space and all subsets  $Y \subseteq [N]$  as the predicate family, such that  $f_Y(X) = 1$  if and only if  $X \subseteq Y$ . The common random string  $K = \{k_i\}_{i \in [N]}$  consists of random bits  $k_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$  for every element in the set  $[N]$ . The value  $K_X$  is then set to  $K_X = \bigoplus_{i \in X} k_i$ . The double-key for a predicate  $f_Y$  splits  $K$  into a set of authorized elements  $K_{f_Y} = \{k_i\}_{i \in Y}$  and a set of unauthorized elements  $\hat{K}_{f_Y} = \{k_i\}_{i \in [N]/Y}$ . Clearly,  $\hat{K}_{f_Y}$  is uniformly distributed even given  $K_{f_Y}$ , and recovering a value  $k_i$  from  $(K_{f_Y}, \hat{K}_{f_Y})$  is a linear function that preserves uniformity.

**Inner-Product Predicates.** Consider inner-product testing of vectors of length  $\ell$  over some field  $\mathbb{F}$ . The common random string  $K = (\mathbf{v}, w)$  consists of a random vector  $\mathbf{v} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}^\ell$  and a random field element  $w \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}$ . We define  $K_{\mathbf{x}} = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle$ . The double-key for a vector predicate  $\mathbf{y}$  is defined as  $K_{f_{\mathbf{y}}} = w\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{v}$  and  $\hat{K}_{f_{\mathbf{y}}} = w$ . Note that by the uniformity of  $\mathbf{v}$  and  $w$ , the key part  $\hat{K}_{f_{\mathbf{y}}}$  is distributed uniformly in  $\mathbb{F}$  even given  $K_{f_{\mathbf{y}}}$ . To reconstruct  $K_{\mathbf{x}}$  for some  $\mathbf{x}$ , compute

$$\text{dkRec}(\mathbf{x}, f_{\mathbf{y}}, K_{f_{\mathbf{y}}}, \hat{K}_{f_{\mathbf{y}}}) = \langle K_{f_{\mathbf{y}}}, \mathbf{x} \rangle - \hat{K}_{f_{\mathbf{y}}} \langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = \langle w\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle - w \langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = K_{\mathbf{x}} ,$$

which is correct, linear in  $\hat{K}_{f_{\mathbf{y}}}$ , and preserves uniformity.

## 8 One-One Constrained PRF and CDS Protocols

In this section we study the connection between one-one constrained PRFs and conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) protocols, a cryptographic primitive used to construct many secure protocols (see discussion in the introduction). In CDS protocols, Alice and Bob hold a secret and a common random string, and each of them holds a private input for some two-input predicate. Then, each of the parties sends one message to a referee, which is based on its private input, the secret, and the common random string. The referee, knowing the inputs of the parties, should learn the secret if and only if the inputs of the parties satisfy the predicate. We next provide a formal definition of CDS protocols, originally presented in [20].

► **Definition 19** (Conditional Disclosure of Secrets Protocols). *Let  $f : X \times Y \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  be a predicate. A conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) protocol  $\mathcal{P}$  for  $f$  with domain of secrets  $S$ , domain of common random strings  $R$ , and finite message domains  $M_A, M_B$  consists of two deterministic message computation functions  $\text{Enc}_A, \text{Enc}_B$ , where  $\text{Enc}_A : X \times S \times R \rightarrow M_A$  and  $\text{Enc}_B : Y \times S \times R \rightarrow M_B$ , and a deterministic reconstruction function  $\text{Dec} : X \times Y \times M_A \times M_B \rightarrow S$ . We say that  $\mathcal{P}$  is a CDS protocol for  $f$  if it satisfies the following requirements.*

**Correctness.** *For every inputs  $x \in X$  and  $y \in Y$  for which  $f(x, y) = 1$ , every secret  $s \in S$ , and every common random string  $r \in R$ ,*

$$\text{Dec}(x, y, \text{Enc}_A(x, s, r), \text{Enc}_B(y, s, r)) = s .$$

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**Security.** For every inputs  $x \in X$  and  $y \in Y$  for which  $f(x, y) = 0$  and every secret  $s \in S$ ,

$$(x, y, \text{Enc}_A(x, s, r), \text{Enc}_B(y, s, r), s) \equiv (x, y, \text{Enc}_A(x, s, r), \text{Enc}_B(y, s, r), u)$$

where  $r \xleftarrow{\$} R$  and  $u \xleftarrow{\$} S$ .

**Message Size.** The message size of a CDS protocol  $\mathcal{P}$  is defined as the sizes of the messages sent by the parties, i.e.,  $\log |M_A| + \log |M_B|$ .

We consider the index predicate, which gets as inputs an  $N$ -bit string (or a database)  $D$  and an index  $i \in [N]$ , and returns the  $i$ th bit in  $D$ , denoted by  $D_i$ .

► **Definition 20 (The Index Function).** The index predicate is the predicate  $f_{\text{index}} : \{0, 1\}^N \times [N] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ , where  $f_{\text{index}}(D, i) = D_i$ .

We next show a transformation that preserves complexity from one-one constrained PRFs to CDS protocols for the index predicate.

► **Theorem 21.** Let  $f_{\text{index}} : \{0, 1\}^N \times [N] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  be the index predicate, and assume that for every predicate  $f : [N] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  there is a one-one constrained PRF for  $f$  with complexity  $c(N)$ . Then, there is a CDS protocol for  $f_{\text{index}}$  with message size  $c(N)$ .

**Proof.** We consider a one-one constrained PRF scheme, when Alice holds a predicate  $f : [N] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ , Bob holds an input  $x \in [N]$ , and both hold a common random string  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ , where  $K_f \leftarrow \text{A}(K, f)$  and  $K_x \leftarrow \text{B}(K, x)$ . By the correctness requirement of the one-one constrained PRF, if  $f(x) = 1$  then there exist a deterministic function  $\text{Rec}$  such that  $\text{Rec}(x, f, K_f) = K_x$ , and by security requirement, if  $f(x) = 0$  then  $(f, x, K_f, K_x) \equiv (f, x, K_f, u)$ , where  $u \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|K_x|}$ .

We show a construction of a CDS protocol for the index predicate  $f_{\text{index}}$ , which is based on the above one-one constrained PRF. The construction is as follows.

- Inputs: Alice holds  $D \in \{0, 1\}^N$  and Bob holds  $i \in [N]$ . We represent  $D$  as the predicate  $f_D : [N] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ , where  $f_D(j) = f_{\text{index}}(D, j) = D_j$ .
- The secret: A string  $s$  of size at most  $|\text{B}(K, i)|$ .
- The common random string: An element  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ .
- $\text{Enc}_A(D, K)$ : Alice computes and sends the message  $\text{Enc}_A(D, K) = \text{A}(K, f_D) = K_{f_D}$ .
- $\text{Enc}_B(i, K)$ : Bob computes and sends the message  $\text{Enc}_B(i, K) = \text{B}(K, i) \oplus s' = K_i \oplus s'$ , where  $s' = 0^t \circ s$  such that  $|s'| = |\text{B}(K, i)|$ .
- $\text{Dec}(D, i, \text{Enc}_A(D, K), \text{Enc}_B(i, K))$ : If  $f_{\text{index}}(D, i) = 1$ , the referee computes

$$\text{Rec}(i, f_D, \text{Enc}_A(D, K)) \oplus \text{Enc}_B(i, K).$$

**Correctness.** If  $f_{\text{index}}(D, i) = 1$ , i.e.,  $f_D(i) = 1$ , then the referee computes

$$\text{Rec}(i, f_D, \text{Enc}_A(D, K)) \oplus \text{Enc}_B(i, K) = \text{Rec}(i, f_D, K_{f_D}) \oplus K_i \oplus s' = K_i \oplus K_i \oplus s' = s'$$

where the second equality follows from the correctness of the one-one constrained PRF.

Hence, the referee learns  $s'$  and so the secret  $s$ .

**Security.** If  $f_{\text{index}}(D, i) = 0$ , i.e.,  $f_D(i) = 0$ , then by the security of the one-one constrained PRF,

$$(f_D, i, \text{A}(K, f_D), \text{B}(K, i)) \equiv (f_D, i, \text{A}(K, f_D), u)$$

where  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and  $u \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|\text{B}(K, i)|}$ . Then, since  $s' = \text{Enc}_B(i, K) \oplus \text{B}(K, i)$  we get that

$$(D, i, \text{Enc}_A(D, K), \text{Enc}_B(i, K), s') \equiv (D, i, \text{Enc}_A(D, K), \text{Enc}_B(i, K), u)$$

where  $K \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and  $u \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_{|s'|}$ .

**Message size.** The message size of this CDS protocol is equal to the complexity of the one-one constrained PRF, which is  $c(N)$ . ◀

Using the above result and the reduction that appears in [18], from CDS protocols for general predicates to CDS protocols for the index predicate, we get a transformation from one-one constrained PRF to CDS protocols for general predicates.

► **Corollary 22.** *Let  $g : [N] \times [N] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  be a predicate, and assume that for every predicate  $f : [N] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  there is a one-one constrained PRF for  $f$  with complexity  $c(N)$ . Then, there is a CDS protocol for  $g$  with message size  $c(N)$ .*

Note the best known CDS protocol for general predicates  $g : [N] \times [N] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  has message size  $2^{O(\sqrt{\log N \log \log N})}$  [25]. Thus, by the above lower bound of  $\Omega(N)$  on the complexity of one-one constrained PRFs of Theorem 7, we cannot get a similar transformation that preserve complexity in the other direction (i.e., a transformation from CDS protocols to one-one constrained PRFs).

## 9 Computational Constructions

Every single-key constrained PRF is in particular a one-one constrained PRF under the same security notion (which is either adaptive, key selective or challenge selective, see Definition 6). For completeness, we now go over some of the known computational constructions in the literature of single-key constrained PRFs.

### 9.1 Constructions from OWFs

**Punctured Predicates.** As was shown in [12, 13, 23], the OWF-based PRF of [21] is in fact puncturable. Using our previous terminology, it supports punctured predicates over the input space  $\{0, 1\}^n$  as defined in Theorem 7. The complexity of the construction is  $O(\lambda \cdot n)$  where  $\lambda$  is the security parameter. Furthermore, [17] showed that the aforementioned construction satisfies *adaptive* security with a security loss exponential in the number of queries. Since we focus on the single-query scenario, we can use their proof strategy to claim adaptive security on the implied one-one cPRF.

► **Theorem 23.** *Let  $\mathcal{F} = \{f_y\}_{y \in \{0, 1\}^n}$  be the family of punctured predicates over the set of  $n$ -bit strings, i.e., for any fixed  $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $f_{\neq y} : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  where  $f_{\neq y}(x) = 1$  if and only if  $x \neq y$ . Then, for every security parameter  $\lambda$ , there is a one-one constrained PRF for  $\mathcal{F}$  with perfect correctness, computational adaptive security, and complexity  $O(\lambda \cdot n)$ .*

**One-Dimensional Interval Predicates.** [23] showed how to further generalized the [21] approach in order to support (one-dimensional) interval predicates without compromising the complexity. Such predicates allow to compute the PRF on all inputs  $x$  that are within some range  $[a, b]$ , i.e., all  $x$  such that  $a \leq x \leq b$ , where the key size is  $O(\lambda \cdot \log |b - a|)$ . Due to the similarity to the construction for punctured predicates, the adaptive security proof strategy of [17] can also be applied here.

► **Theorem 24.** *Let  $\mathcal{F} = \{f_{[a, b]}\}_{a, b \in \{0, 1\}^n}$  be the family of one-dimensional interval predicates over the set of  $n$ -bit strings, i.e., for any fixed  $a, b \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $f_{[a, b]} : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  where  $f_{[a, b]}(x) = 1$  if and only if  $a \leq x \leq b$ . Then, for every security parameter  $\lambda$ , there is a one-one constrained PRF for  $\mathcal{F}$  with perfect correctness, computational adaptive security, and complexity  $O(\lambda \cdot n)$ .*

**Multi-Dimensional Interval Predicates.** We now consider multi-dimensional interval predicates (that were previously studied in [11, 19, 26]). Such predicates are characterized by  $d$  intervals  $\{[a_i, b_i]\}_{i \in [d]}$ , and the input space is  $(\{0, 1\}^n)^d$ . An input  $X = (x_1, \dots, x_d) \in (\{0, 1\}^n)^d$  is authorized by the multi-dimensional predicate  $f_{[a_i, b_i]_{i \in [d]}}$  if and only if  $a_i \leq x_i \leq b_i$  for all  $i \in [d]$ . Each interval  $[a_i, b_i]$  can be verified by checking the  $n$  bits of the input corresponding to  $x_i$ . In particular, in order to verify that the  $i$ th dimension of  $X$  (i.e.,  $x_i$ ) is within the  $i$ th range  $[a_i, b_i]$ , we have to check whether the  $i$ th block of  $n$  bits of  $X$  is within the range  $[a_i, b_i]$ . To do so, we will use the AND composition lemma (that is, Lemma 11) sequentially  $d - 1$  times on  $d$  independent instances of one-one cPRFs for one-dimensional interval predicates over inputs of length  $n$  (as in Theorem 24), where each instance  $i$  handles the  $i$ th block of  $X$ .

► **Theorem 25.** *Let  $\mathcal{F} = \{f_{[a_i, b_i]_{i \in [d]}}\}_{a_i, b_i \in \{0, 1\}^n, i \in [d]}$  be the family of  $d$ -dimensional interval predicates over the set of  $n$ -bit strings, i.e., for any fixed  $a_i, b_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$  for all  $i \in [d]$ ,  $f_{[a_i, b_i]_{i \in [d]}} : (\{0, 1\}^n)^d \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  where  $f_{[a_i, b_i]_{i \in [d]}}(x_1, \dots, x_d) = 1$  if and only if  $a_i \leq x_i \leq b_i$  for all  $i \in [d]$ . Then, for every security parameter  $\lambda$ , there is a one-one constrained PRF for  $\mathcal{F}_n$  with perfect correctness, computational adaptive security, and complexity  $O(d \cdot \lambda \cdot n)$ .*

## 9.2 Additional Constructions

**Lattice Assumptions.** [10] construct a selectively-secure single-key cPRF for all circuits from LWE. [14] construct an adaptively-secure single-key cPRF for NC1 from LWE.

**Group Assumptions.** [6] construct a selectively-secure single-key bit-fixing cPRF from DDH.

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