

Atomic Register Abstractions for Byzantine-Prone Distributed Systems

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Abstract

The construction of the atomic register abstraction over crash-prone asynchronous message-passing systems has been extensively studied since the founding work of Attiya, Bar-Noy, and Dolev. It has been shown that $t < n/2$ (where t is the maximal number of processes that may be faulty) is a necessary and sufficient requirement to build an atomic register. However, little attention has been paid to systems where faulty processes may exhibit a Byzantine behavior. This paper studies three definitions of linearizable single-writer multi-reader registers encountered in the state of the art: Read/Write registers whose **read** operations return the last written value, Read/Write-Increment registers whose **read** operations return both the last written value and the number of previously written values, and Read/Append registers whose **read** operations return the sequence of all previously written values. More specifically, it compares their computing power and the necessary and sufficient conditions on the maximum ratio t/n which makes it possible to build reductions from one register to another. Namely, we prove that $t < n/3$ is necessary and sufficient to implement a Read/Write-Increment register from Read/Write registers whereas this bound is only $t < n/2$ for a reduction from a Read/Append register to Read/Write-Increment registers. Reduction algorithms meeting these bounds are also provided.

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1 Introduction

Atomic register abstractions. The register abstraction is the basis of the Turing machine’s tape. It provides two basic operations: a write operation that allows defining a new value for the register and a read operation that returns its value. In concurrent architectures such as multi-core systems, the read/write semantics of a register is the cleanest and most easy-to-understand abstraction of shared memory and is extensively used in multi-threaded programs. In such a setting, a register that can be accessed concurrently by several processes represents a communication medium. In a message-passing system where processes may



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experience crash failures, Attiya, Bar-Noy, and Dolev [5] proposed the first emulation of a shared register (called ABD) for which it has been shown that $t < n/2$ (where n is the total number of processes and t is the maximal number of processes that may crash) is a necessary and sufficient requirement. Several algorithms have been proposed in order to enhance space or time efficiency.

According to which process is allowed to read or write a register and the significance of the returned value, several types of registers have been proposed, among which single-writer multi-reader (SWMR) and multi-writer multi-reader (MWMR) registers. Several levels of consistency can also be proposed: atomic, regular, and safe. A register is said to be atomic (or linearizable) if (a) each read or write operation appears as if it has been executed instantaneously at a single point of the timeline, between its start event and its end event, (b) no two operations appear at the same point of the timeline, and (c) a read returns the value written by the closest preceding write operation (or the initial value of the register if there is no preceding write) [17]. Reduction algorithms from one type of register to another (MWMR vs SWMR and atomic vs regular or safe) have been proposed (these registers are thus equivalent from a computability point of view).

Byzantine-prone distributed systems. The implementation of shared registers has been first studied in the crash failure model and then extended to Byzantine failures. A Byzantine process is a process that may deviate from its specification [22]. Byzantine faults gained interest since the work on Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) [9], an implementation of a replicated state machine over a set of servers [23]. More recently, Blockchains made their appearance and a link was quickly made with the BFT approach [2]. Blockchains can be seen as eventually consistent implementations of a ledger data structure that consider in addition the semantic chaining between the different blocks and cryptography is used as a tool. The ledger itself can be seen as a particular register. In this paper, we propose to study register abstractions, the basic data structure, in distributed systems prone to Byzantine faults. Several works have addressed the design of a distributed shared storage in the client/server model prone to Byzantine failures [1, 10, 20]. A set of server processes implements a shared storage abstraction accessed by client processes. The different processes are, thus, separated into two classes and the system is not symmetric. While some servers can be Byzantine, most papers restrict the type of failure allowed to clients. [1] considers clients that can only crash, and [6] considers that clients can be Byzantine but a bounded number of times. On the other hand, [19] considered the use of signatures, and [13, 14] explored the conditions under which one can have fast reads (one-way messages) when servers never communicate with each other. Finally, [3] considers that readers can be Byzantine but not the writer.

In the context of asynchronous message-passing systems where at most t processes out of the n processes of the system can exhibit a Byzantine behavior, only the implementation of atomic SWMR (single-writer multi-reader) registers has been considered due to the fact that a Byzantine process can corrupt any register it can write. As Cohen and Keidar phrase it “In practice, multi-writer multi-reader (MWMR) registers are useless in a Byzantine environment as an adversary that controls the scheduler can prevent any communication between correct processes.” [12]. Differently, the values written to a SWMR (single-writer multi-reader) register associated with a non-Byzantine process cannot be corrupted by a Byzantine process. As a result, [16] and [21] considered implementing an array of n SWMR registers, one per process. If a register is associated with some process p , p is the only process that can write it, while all processes can read it.

Defining Byzantine-tolerant registers. Following the definition of Byzantine linearizability proposed in [12], the most natural way of specifying a register in this context would be to say that if the writer is not Byzantine, the register respects the classical specification of an atomic register, otherwise, a read operation can return any value. This register will be called the *Read/Write register*.


In order to give some significance to the registers associated with Byzantine processes, [16] and [21] give a different specification of a SWMR register. Indeed, while the specification of a register associated with a correct (non-Byzantine) process is identical to that of a classical atomic register, the specification of a register associated with a Byzantine process can be declined in different ways, depending on how the behavior of the Byzantine writer is perceived. In [16], a register keeps track of the sequence of all the values written by the writer (be it Byzantine or not) and this sequence is seen in the same way by all non-Byzantine processes. This register will be called in this paper *Read/Append register*. If the writer is correct, the sequence will correspond to the chronological sequence of values it wrote. If the writer is Byzantine, this sequence depends on the behavior of the writer, in the extreme case, the history will be reduced to the initial state (an empty sequence). In other words, a single-writer Read/Append register can be seen as a single-writer atomic ledger.

Differently, in [21], a register keeps only the last written value together with its sequence number. This will be called the *Read/Write-Increment register*. In the same way, if the writer is Byzantine, the register may be in any state as soon as it is perceived consistently by non-Byzantine processes: two correct processes that read the same register and return the same sequence number will necessarily get the same value even if the writer is Byzantine. At the extreme, the register's state will be stuck to the initial value with sequence number 0.

Why only studying SWMR registers? In addition to the lack of sense of multi-writer Read/Write registers discussed above, this paper only considers single-writer registers because we are only interested in memory abstractions that are equivalent to the atomic register in crash-prone systems. Indeed, when only crashes are considered, any of these register specifications can be implemented on top of any other, because writes cannot be concurrent when there is a single writing process. On the other hand, this is not the case for the multi-writer versions of the three register specifications: even in crash-prone systems, a ledger has the synchronization power of consensus and can implement a state machine; and it is easy to see that multi-writer Read/Write-Increment registers have consensus number 2.

In crash-prone systems, basic registers are used as building blocks to construct safe synchronization algorithms (i.e. consensus, stack, queue, etc.) and the additional power is brought either by temporal properties, special hardware instructions, or by randomization. Studying and understanding the exact relationship between single-writer registers in the Byzantine framework would allow a similar approach. For example, using single-writer registers plus additional properties like randomization could help to implement Byzantine-tolerant ledgers. Although the relation of crash-prone atomic registers is well-studied, this is not the case for the Byzantine case.

Hence, this work sheds new light on the construction of Byzantine-prone asynchronous atomic registers. When one wants to implement these SWMR registers over an asynchronous Byzantine message-passing distributed system, $t < n/3$ is necessary and sufficient for all three variants [16]. This is intuitive since the three register specifications differ only in the way they deal with Byzantine writers: Moreover, it is known that in order to implement an atomic register on top of an asynchronous message-passing system prone to process crashes, readers have to write [4, 5]. So even if we only consider non-Byzantine writers, the values



■ **Figure 1** Conditions for implementing Byzantine-tolerant single-writer multi-reader registers.

they write will be relayed by readers which may be Byzantine. Therefore, the correct readers must be able to distinguish the values relayed by Byzantine processes from others hence the ratio $t < n/3$.

Contribution. This paper investigates the relationship between the three register specifications stated above in the presence of Byzantine failures and studies under which condition one type of register can be built from another as shown in figure 1. Whereas the reduction from a Read/Write register to a Read/Write-Increment one and from a Read/Write-Increment register to a Read/Append register is straightforward by their respective definitions, it is important to note that a Read/Write-Increment register can be implemented from Read/Write registers only if $t < n/3$ and surprisingly, a Read/Append register can be reduced to a Read/Write-Increment register as soon as $t < n/2$. This shows that the sequence number mechanism in the R/WI registers is actually quite powerful, but does not close the gap with the R/A registers. This suggests that some aspects of the bad behavior of Byzantine processes are already captured by Read/Write-Increment registers and can benefit upper-layer constructions. The proposed bounds are tight, we prove on the one side that the proposed bounds are necessary, and we propose constructions that allow these reductions.

Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the considered distributed model. Then we investigate the relationships, on the one hand, between Read/Write registers and Read/Write-Increment registers (Section 3) and on the other hand, between Read/Write-Increment registers and Read/Append registers (Section 4). Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.

2 Computing Model

We consider the classical Byzantine-prone asynchronous shared-memory model.

Computing entities. The system is made up of n sequential processes, denoted p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n . These processes are asynchronous in the sense that each process progresses at its own speed, which can be arbitrary and may vary along any execution, and remains always unknown to the other processes. Each process p_i has access to its own identifier i it can use in the code.

Failure model. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily [18, 22]: it may start in an arbitrary state, stop executing at any time (this behavior is called a crash), perform arbitrary state transitions, attempt to communicate arbitrary or different values to different processes, etc. Among the n processes of the system, it is supposed that at most t can exhibit a Byzantine behavior in any given execution. A Byzantine process is also called a *faulty* process and a process that commits no failure (i.e., a non-Byzantine process) is also called a *correct* process.

Communication model. The processes communicate by invoking operations on a collection of shared objects. Since efficiency is not a central issue of this paper, we consider that processes have access to as many shared objects as necessary. We consider only linearizable

(atomic) t -resilient shared objects, as defined thereafter. t -resiliency is a classical liveness condition stating that all operations invoked by correct processes terminate provided there are at most t faulty processes [7].

Following [12], Definition 1 defines Byzantine linearizability in terms of admitted distributed histories, depending on a given object defined by a sequential specification (in our case, the register specifications already discussed). A distributed history (or simply history when it is clear from context) is an abstraction of a distributed execution, composed of a sequence of atomic steps taken by the processes. The steps taken by correct processes can be either 1) the invocation and response events of the operations specified by a given algorithm, 2) executions of atomic operations on shared objects of the underlying model, or 3) local computations. We only accept well-formed histories, in which correct processes alternate invocation and response events. In other words, a correct process cannot return from an operation it has not yet invoked, and cannot invoke an operation before it has returned from its previous invoked operation.

More precisely, Byzantine linearizability is defined as an extension of linearizability [15], such that only the operations of correct processes must be correctly specified, whereas the histories of Byzantine processes can be re-interpreted into any local history, so that the full history respects the specification of the object. In particular, operations correctly performed by Byzantine processes may be either recognized, ignored or reinterpreted as a different correct operation by the correct processes. A consequence of this definition is that no process can alter the semantics of an operation invoked on a shared object. A Byzantine process can invoke or not an operation independently from its code. However, if Byzantine processes attempt to alter the internal implementation of the object, correct processes will agree on some sequence of operations that were invoked, and the effect of these operations will conform to the specification of the object. This notion of linearizability is close to the one defined in [11] for the special case of the ledger data structure.

► **Definition 1** (Byzantine Linearizability). *A history H is linearizable with respect to an object O if there exists a sequential history H' (called a linearization of H) such that (1) after removing some pending operations from H and completing others by adding matching responses, it contains the same invocations and responses as H , (2) if an operation o returns before an operation o' starts in H , then o appears before o' in H' , and (3) H' satisfies O 's sequential specification.*

A history H is Byzantine linearizable with respect to an object O if there exists a history H' linearizable with respect to O , such that $H'|_{\text{correct}} = H|_{\text{correct}}$ (where $H|_{\text{correct}}$ denotes the history H where only the operations done by correct processes are considered).

We say that an object is Byzantine linearizable, or simply linearizable if all of its executions are Byzantine linearizable.

The three register abstractions. This paper considers three variations of the classical SWMR register, whose sequential specification is defined below and illustrated on Figure 2:

Read/Write (R/W) registers offer two operations: a **write** operation, only accessible to the writing process, that does not return any value, and a **read** operation accessible to all processes, that returns the last written value, or the initial value \perp if no value was written.

Read/Write-Increment (R/WI) registers offer two operations: a **write-incr** operation, only accessible to the writing process, that does not return any value, and a **read** operation accessible to all processes, that returns a pair $x = \langle x.\text{value}, x.\text{count} \rangle$, such that

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$x.value$ is the last written value (similar to R/W registers), and $x.count$ is the number of times the operation `write-incr` was called by the writer. If no value was ever written, the `read` operation returns $\langle \perp, 0 \rangle$.

Remark that the definition of Byzantine linearizability implies that, if two correct processes read the same `count` field, then they must read the same `value` field as well.

Read/Append (R/A) registers offer two operations: an `append` operation, only accessible to the writing process, that does not return any value, and a `read` operation accessible to all processes, that returns the ordered sequence of all written values on that register since the beginning of the execution.

The initial empty sequence is denoted by ε , and the concatenation of a sequence l and a value v is denoted by $l \oplus v$. Given a sequence l and an index $s \in \mathbb{N}$, let us denote by $l[s-1]$ the s^{th} value in l (i.e. the first index is 0). Given two sequences l and l' , let $l \subseteq l'$ denote the fact that l is a prefix of l' .

Thanks to Byzantine linearizability, the sequences returned to different reads must be consistent, i.e. one must be a prefix of the other.

```

1 initial state is
2   | value  $\leftarrow \perp$ ;
3 operation write ( $v$ ) invoked by  $p_i$  is
4   | value  $\leftarrow v$ ;
5 operation read () invoked by any  $p_j$  is
6   | return value;

```

(a) Read/write register REG[i].

```

1 initial state is
2   | value  $\leftarrow \perp$ ;
3   | count  $\leftarrow 0$ ;
4 operation write-incr( $v$ ) invoked by  $p_i$  is
5   | value  $\leftarrow v$ ;
6   | count  $\leftarrow$  count + 1;
7 operation read() invoked by any  $p_j$  is
8   | return  $\langle$ value, count $\rangle$ ;

```

(b) Read/write-inc register REG[i].

```

1 initial state is
2   | log  $\leftarrow \varepsilon$ .
3 operation append( $v$ ) invoked by  $p_i$  is
4   | log  $\leftarrow$  log  $\oplus v$ .
5 operation read() invoked by any  $p_j$  is
6   | return log.

```

(c) Read/append register REG[i].

■ **Figure 2** Specification of the different registers.

► **Remark.** If a correct process is supposed to write only once in its register, a Byzantine process p_w can write a first value that will be read by some correct processes p_i and then write a second value before some other correct processes p_j reads the register. If the Byzantine process uses a R/W register, p_i and p_j may read different values. If the considered register is a R/WI one, p_j knows that the writing process is Byzantine because the value it reads is associated with a `count` = 2. Finally, if one uses a R/A register, all sequences read by correct processes will contain the very same first value even though the Byzantine process appended other values. It is clear that the different registers offer different information on the behavior of Byzantine processes.

Notation. Let R denote a type of SWMR register through which processes can communicate. The acronym $\mathcal{BASM}_{n,t}[R]$ is used to denote the n -process asynchronous system where up to t processes may exhibit Byzantine behavior and communication is through as many instances of R as necessary. $\mathcal{BASM}_{n,t}[R, C]$ denotes $\mathcal{BASM}_{n,t}[R]$ enriched with the condition C on t and n .

A characterization of Byzantine linearizability for Read/Append registers. In order to simplify the proofs of subsequent algorithms, Proposition 2 defines four properties that characterize linearizable R/A registers. Clearly, these properties are verified by any linearizable R/A register.

► **Proposition 2** (Linearizability for Read/Append registers). *Let H be a distributed history of a Read/Append register object that verifies the following properties.*

Validity: *If a read operation performed by a correct process returns \log , and if the writing process is correct, then for all $s \in \{1, \dots, |\log|\}$, $\log[s-1]$ is the s^{th} value written. (By indistinguishability with the scenario where the writer crashes before the end of the read, this implies that the s^{th} write started before the read completed).*

Read after write: *if a read done by a correct process starts after the s^{th} write of a correct process completes, then the read cannot return a sequence containing less than s values.*

Inclusion: *let r_i and r_j be two read operations, done by correct processes, that return respectively \log_i and \log_j . Then \log_i is a prefix of \log_j , or \log_j is a prefix of \log_i .*

Read after read: *let r_i and r_j be two read operations, done by correct processes, that return respectively \log_i and \log_j . If r_i completes before r_j starts, then \log_i is a prefix of \log_j .*

Then H is Byzantine linearizable with respect to the Read/Append register.

Proof.

Proof when the writing process is correct. Let us consider the history $H' = H|_{\text{correct}}$, i.e. H' is H in which the reads of Byzantine processes were removed. Clearly, $H'|_{\text{correct}} = H|_{\text{correct}}$. We will prove that H' is linearizable.

For each operation o of H' , we define the timestamp $ts(o)$ of o as follows. If o is the s^{th} write operation, then $ts(o) = s$. If o is a read operation that returns \log , then $ts(o) = |\log|$. We also define the binary relation \rightarrow between operations as $o_1 \rightarrow o_2$ if either 1) o_1 returned before o_2 was started (denoted by $o_1 \rightarrow_1 o_2$), or 2) $ts(o_1) < ts(o_2)$ (denoted by $o_1 \rightarrow_2 o_2$), or 3) o_1 is a write, o_2 is a read, and $ts(o_1) = ts(o_2)$ (denoted by $o_1 \rightarrow_3 o_2$).

Let us prove that \rightarrow is cycle-free. Indeed, suppose there is a cycle $o_1 \rightarrow o_2 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow o_k = o_1$. Since none of the cases contains reflexivity, the cycle contains at least two different operations. Moreover, let us notice that $o_1 \rightarrow o_2$ implies $ts(o_1) \leq ts(o_2)$: this is true by definition for \rightarrow_2 and \rightarrow_3 , and this is implied by the Validity, Read after read and Read after Writes properties for \rightarrow_1 . Hence, all operations in the cycle have the same timestamp,

and they are not compared by \rightarrow_2 . Since \rightarrow_1 itself is a partial order, it means there is a write operation w and a read operation r such that $w \rightarrow_3 r$. Consequently, there is a write operation w' and a read operation r' such that $r' \rightarrow w'$, which is only possible if $r' \rightarrow_1 w'$. In other words, a read returns a value that has not yet been written, which is prevented by the Validity property.

Finally, the reflexive and transitive closure of \rightarrow can be extended into a total order \prec that respects real time thanks to \rightarrow_1 , and that respects the sequential specification of the Read/Append register: by \rightarrow_2 , the **read** operations are ordered by size of the returned sequences, hence by inclusion by the Inclusion property, and the sequences are composed of written values by the Validity property; **append** operations are ordered before the **read** operations that include their values in their return sequence by \rightarrow_1 , and after the others by \rightarrow_2 . Hence, H' is linearizable, so H is Byzantine linearizable, which concludes the proof when the writer is correct.

Proof when the writing process is Byzantine. Let us consider the history $H' = H|_{correct}$, i.e. H' only contains the reads done by the correct processes in H . As is the case of a correct writer, we define the binary relation \rightarrow between two read operations o_1 and o_2 , that return respectively log_1 and log_2 , as $o_1 \rightarrow o_2$ if either 1) o_1 was terminated before o_2 was started (denoted by $o_1 \rightarrow_1 o_2$), or 2) log_1 is a strict prefix of log_2 (denoted by $o_1 \rightarrow_2 o_2$). The Read after read property implies that \rightarrow is cycle-free, so it can be extended into a total order \prec .

Thanks to the Inclusion property and the definition of \rightarrow_2 , for all operations o_1 and o_2 that return respectively log_1 and log_2 , if $o_1 \prec o_2$, then log_1 is a prefix of log_2 . Since \prec contains \rightarrow_2 , it is possible to build a linearizable extension H'' of H' by adding write operations corresponding to the read values, in the order in which they are read, and just before the time where they were read first. Hence, H'' is linearizable and $H''|_{correct} = H|_{correct}$, so H is Byzantine linearizable, which concludes the proof. \blacktriangleleft

3 From R/W registers to R/WI registers

This section shows that the hypothesis $t < \frac{n}{3}$ is necessary, and sufficient, to implement a R/WI register on top of R/W registers. More precisely, Section 3.1 proves that $t < \frac{n}{3}$ is an upper bound on the number Byzantine tolerated by any such reduction algorithm, and then Section 3.2 presents an algorithm whose resilience is optimal.


3.1 An upper bound on resilience

This section proves that the maximal resilience of any implementation of a linearizable Read/Write-Increment register in a system where processes communicate only through Read/Write registers, is at most $t \geq \frac{n}{3}$.


► **Theorem 3.** *It is impossible to implement a linearizable Read/Write-Increment register in the model $BASM_{n,t}[R/W]$, when $n \geq 3$ and $t \geq \frac{n}{3}$.*

Proof. Let us assume that there exists an algorithm, A , which implements linearizable R/WI registers using a collection of R/W registers, even when $t \geq \frac{n}{3}$. We are going to show (proof by contradiction) that there exists an execution allowed by A and that is not linearizable.

Let us consider a system made up of $n \geq 3$ processes, and let $t \geq \frac{n}{3}$. We can partition the set of processes into three non-empty sub-sets W , I and J , whose size is at most t . Let us pick three processes $p_w \in W$ (the writing process), $p_i \in I$ and $p_j \in J$ (two reading processes), and let us consider three situations in which A is used to implement a R/WI register x that can be written by p_w only. These situations are represented in Figure 3 and described thereafter.



(a) Situation S_1 : p_j is Byzantine, but does nothing to prevent p_i from reading $\langle a, 1 \rangle$. (b) Situation S_2 : p_i is Byzantine, but cannot prevent p_j from reading $\langle b, 1 \rangle$.



(c) Situation S_3 : p_w is Byzantine, and can force p_i and p_j to read different values.

■ **Figure 3** Illustration of the scenarios from the proof of Theorem 3, with $n = 3$ and $t = 1$.

S_1 : In the first scenario (Figure 3a), the processes in J are Byzantine and do not take any step during the execution. All other processes are correct. Initially, Process p_w writes a in x . The `write-incr` terminates because $|J| \leq t$ processes are Byzantine. Then, Process p_i reads x . Similarly, the `read` terminates, and returns $\langle a, 1 \rangle$ because x is linearizable.

S_2 : In the second scenario (Figure 3b), only the processes of I are Byzantine. At first, Byzantine processes are not quiet, but they simulate their behavior in S_1 . At this point, all shared registers in which processes of I can write are the same as after the reading of $\langle a, 1 \rangle$ by p_i . In a second stage, Byzantine processes become quiet and p_w writes b in x . As previously, the `write-incr` must terminate because $|I| \leq t$ processes are Byzantine. In a third stage, p_j reads x . The `read` terminates and returns $\langle b, 1 \rangle$ because x is linearizable and the correct process p_w indeed only wrote one value, which was b .

S_3 : In the last scenario (Figure 3c), processes of W are Byzantine, and the processes of J are initially slow. Initially, p_w behaves correctly and writes a in x , then Process p_i reads x . So far, the situation is the same as S_1 , so p_i gets $\langle a, 1 \rangle$ as the result of its read. For the rest of the executions, processes in I become too slow to play any role.

Then, all processes in W write, in their respective registers, the values that were contained in their registers in S_2 after p_w wrote b , and keep simulating the behavior they had in S_2 . Finally, p_j reads x . Notice that, at this point, S_3 and S_2 are indistinguishable to all processes in J : in both situations, all registers written by processes in W contain the value resulting from a write of b , all registers written by processes in I contain the value resulting from a write of a , all processes in W respond accordingly to a write of b , and all processes in I are quiet. Therefore, p_j must return $\langle b, 1 \rangle$.

Remark that, in S_3 , two correct processes p_i and p_j have read respectively $\langle a, 1 \rangle$ and $\langle b, 1 \rangle$ in x . This violates linearizability, so A cannot exist. ◀

3.2 A resilience-optimal algorithm

Algorithm 1 presents an implementation of a R/A register in the model $\mathcal{BASM}_{n,t}[\text{R/W}, t < \frac{n}{3}]$. Since R/WI registers can be trivially implemented from R/A registers, this proves that R/WI registers can be implemented in $\mathcal{BASM}_{n,t}[\text{R/W}, t < \frac{n}{3}]$ as well. The writing process is denoted by p_w .

Shared memory and local variables. The n processes share three variables called ENDORSE, APPROVE and CONFIRM, defined as follows.

- ENDORSE[0...][1.. n] is an infinite array of arrays of n SWMR atomic R/W registers such that, for any $s \in \mathbb{N}$ and $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, ENDORSE[s][i] can only be written by p_i , is initialized to a value \perp that cannot be appended to the R/A register and eventually contains p_i 's opinion on what the s^{th} value appended is.
- Similarly, APPROVE[0...][1.. n] is an infinite array of arrays of n SWMR atomic R/W registers, initialized to \perp as well. A correct process p_i only writes, in APPROVE[s][i], a value that it has previously read in more than $\frac{n+t}{2}$ cells of ENDORSE[s].
- CONFIRM[1.. n] is an array of n SWMR atomic R/W registers such that for any $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, CONFIRM[i] can only be written by p_i and contains sequences of appended values that have already been read by p_i in more than $2t$ cells of APPROVE[s].

Besides these three shared variables, each process p_i maintains five local variables:

- log_i is a sequence that represents the current state of the shared R/A register seen by p_i ;
- $count_i$ is an integer that represents the number of appended values;
- $endorse_i[1..n]$ is an array of size n , that stores a local copy of ENDORSE[log_i] by p_i ;
- $approve_i[1..n]$ is an array of size n , that stores a local copy of APPROVE[log_i] by p_i ;
- $confirm_i[1..n]$ is an array of size n , that stores a local copy of CONFIRM[log_i] by p_i .

■ **Algorithm 1** Implementation of a R/A register in the model $\mathcal{BASM}_{n,t}[\text{R/W}, t < \frac{n}{3}]$.

```

operation append( $v$ ) invoked by  $p_w$  is
1  |    $count_w \leftarrow |log_w|$ ;
2  |   ENDORSE[ $count_w$ ][ $w$ ].write( $v$ );
3  |   while  $|log_w| \leq count_w$  do synch();

operation read() invoked by any  $p_i$  is
4  |   synch();
5  |    $count_i \leftarrow \max\{c \in \mathbb{N} : |\{j : |confirm_i[j]| \geq c\}| > t\}$ ;
6  |   while  $|log_i| < count_i$  do synch();
7  |   return  $log_i$ ;

background task  $T()$  repeatedly executed by all  $p_i$  is
8  |   synch();

procedure synch() invoked by any  $p_i$  is
9  |   for  $j$  from 1 to  $n$  do  $endorse_i[j] \leftarrow$  ENDORSE[ $log_i$ ][ $j$ ].read();
10 |   for  $j$  from 1 to  $n$  do  $approve_i[j] \leftarrow$  APPROVE[ $log_i$ ][ $j$ ].read();
11 |   for  $j$  from 1 to  $n$  do  $confirm_i[j] \leftarrow$  CONFIRM[ $j$ ].read();
12 |   if  $endorse_i[i] = \perp \wedge \exists v \neq \perp : endorse_i[w] = v$  then ENDORSE[ $log_i$ ][ $i$ ].write( $v$ );
13 |   if  $approve_i[i] = \perp$  then
14 |     |   if  $\exists v \neq \perp : |\{j : endorse_i[j] = v\}| > \frac{n+t}{2}$  then APPROVE[ $log_i$ ][ $i$ ].write( $v$ );
15 |     |   if  $\exists v \neq \perp : |\{j : approve_i[j] = v\}| > t$  then APPROVE[ $log_i$ ][ $i$ ].write( $v$ );
16 |   else if  $confirm_i[i] = log_i$  then
17 |     |   if  $\exists v \neq \perp : |\{j : approve_i[j] = v\}| > 2t$  then CONFIRM[ $i$ ].write( $log_i \oplus v$ );
18 |     |   else if  $\exists v \neq \perp : |\{j : confirm_i[j] \supseteq log_i \oplus v\}| > 2t$  then  $log_i \leftarrow log_i \oplus v$ ;

```

Notations. Let v be a value, l a sequence of values, and $s \in \mathbb{N}$. We say that a process p_i *endorses* v as the $(s + 1)^{\text{th}}$ value (or simply *endorses* v when s is immaterial) if p_i writes v in $\text{ENDORSE}[s][i]$. Similarly, we say that p_i *approves* v as the $(s + 1)^{\text{th}}$ value (or simply *approves* v) if p_i writes v in $\text{APPROVE}[s][i]$, and that p_i *confirms* l if p_i writes l in $\text{CONFIRM}[i]$. We also say that p_i *confirms* v as the $(s + 1)^{\text{th}}$ value (or simply *confirms* v) if there exists a sequence l of size s such that p_i confirms $l \oplus v$. Finally, we say that p_i *logs* v as the $(s + 1)^{\text{th}}$ value (or simply *logs* v) when p_i executes $\text{log}_i \leftarrow \text{log}_i \oplus v$ in Line 18, with $|\text{log}_i| = s$.

Description of the algorithm. Algorithm 1 implements a confirmation mechanism similar to the protocol for reliable broadcast proposed by Bracha and Toueg in 1985 [8]. In order to write its $(s + 1)^{\text{th}}$ value v , the writing process p_w writes v in $\text{ENDORSE}[s][w]$ (Line 2) and then waits until it has logged v as its $(s + 1)^{\text{th}}$ value, which will happen after enough correct processes have confirmed the write by calling the procedure $\text{synch}()$ (which they do regularly thanks to Line 8).

When any process p_i invokes $\text{synch}()$, it first updates its local copy of the shared variables CONFIRM , APPROVE and ENDORSE (Lines 9–11), and then it checks the five following conditions to help progress on an agreement on the written values.

- The first time p_i reads a non- \perp value in $\text{ENDORSE}[s][w]$, it endorses this value by writing it to $\text{ENDORSE}[s][i]$ (Line 12).
- If some value v has been endorsed by more than $\frac{n+t}{2}$ processes, i.e. by a majority of the correct processes, p_i approves this value by writing it to $\text{APPROVE}[s][i]$ (Line 14).

Remark that two correct processes cannot approve different values. However, at this stage, it is still possible that some correct process approves a value, and other correct processes do not approve any value.

- If some value v has been approved by at least $t + 1$ different processes, i.e. by at least one correct process, p_i trusts this correct process and approves the value as well (Line 15).
- If some value v has been approved by at least $2t + 1$ processes, i.e. at least $t + 1$ correct processes, p_i confirms the value by appending it at the end of $\text{CONFIRM}[i]$ (Line 17).

Remark that if the condition of Line 17 is true for some process, then the condition of Line 15 will always remain true (for the same s) even if t Byzantine processes change their approved value. Hence, all correct processes will eventually confirm the value.

- If some value v has been confirmed by more than $2t$ different processes (correct or not), p_i logs v (Line 18). Recall that $l \supseteq l'$ denotes the fact that l' is a prefix of l .

When any process p_i reads the Read/Append register, it first invokes $\text{synch}()$ to update its local copies of the shared variables (Line 4), then it computes the number count_i of values that have been confirmed by more than t processes (Line 5) and waits until all these values have been confirmed by at least $2t$ processes (Line 6). This ensures the predicate $\text{AIC}(\text{log}_i)$ defined by Definition 4: all these values have been confirmed by at least $t + 1$ correct processes, which will remain true in the future even if t Byzantine processes change their mind. Then, p_i returns the sequence composed of these values (Line 7) knowing that these values will also be returned by all subsequent reads.

► **Definition 4 (Add In Confirm).** For all sequences of values l , let us define the predicate $\text{AIC}(l)$ as follows: $\text{AIC}(l)$ is verified if, and only if, there exists at least $t + 1$ correct processes p_j such that l is a prefix of $\text{CONFIRM}[j]$.

3.3 Correctness of the Algorithm

We now prove the correctness of Algorithm 1.

► **Lemma 5** (Approved value). *Two correct processes cannot approve different s^{th} values.*

Proof. Suppose some correct processes p_i (resp. p_j) writes v_i (resp. v_j) in APPROVE[s], for some s . Since this can happen on Line 15 only if p_i (resp. p_j) has read v_i (resp. v_j) from a correct process in APPROVE[s], some correct process wrote v_i (resp. v_j) in APPROVE[s] on Line 14. By the condition on Line 14, more than $\frac{n+t}{2}$ processes endorsed v_i (resp. v_j). Therefore, at least $t + 1$ processes endorsed both values on Line 12, among which there is one correct process. This contradicts the condition $\text{endorse}_i[i] = \perp$ of Line 12. ◀

► **Lemma 6** (Confirmed value). *If a correct process p_i logs v on Line 18, then it confirmed $\log_i \oplus v$.*

Proof. Suppose a correct process p_i writes $\log_i \oplus v$ on Line 18. The condition on Line 16 was false, so p_i wrote $\log_i \oplus v'$ to CONFIRM[i] on Line 17, for some v' that was approved by a correct process. By the condition on Line 18, some correct process confirmed v on Line 17, so some correct process approved v . Since v and v' were both approved by a correct process, $v = v'$ by Lemma 5. ◀

► **Lemma 7** (Logged value). *If the writing process p_w is correct and some correct process p_i logs v as its s^{th} value, then v is the s^{th} value written by p_w .*

Proof. When p_i logs v as its s^{th} value (Line 18), $\log_i \oplus v$ has already been confirmed by at least $2t + 1$ processes, hence by some correct process in Line 17. Therefore, v was approved by at least $2t + 1$ processes, on Line 14 or 15. Remark that the first correct process that approved v could not have done so on Line 15 because, at that moment, it was approved by at most t Byzantine processes. Hence, some correct process approved v on Line 14, after v had been endorsed by more than $\frac{n+t}{2} \geq 2t$ processes. Some correct process among them endorsed v on Line 12. By Line 12, v' is the value v that p_w wrote on Line 2 during its s^{th} invocation of `append`. ◀

► **Lemma 8** (Stability of AIC). *If $\text{AIC}(l)$ is true for some l at some time, then it remains true forever.*

Proof. Suppose that l is a prefix of CONFIRM[i] for some correct process p_i . If CONFIRM[i] is a prefix of \log_i , then it will remain true because p_i only appends values at the end of \log_i , to overwrite either \log_i or CONFIRM[i]. Otherwise, p_i already executed Line 17, but not yet Line 18, and by Lemma 6, it can only write CONFIRM[i] in \log_i . Hence, l remains a prefix of CONFIRM[i] forever, and the same is true for all correct processes. ◀

► **Lemma 9** (Inclusion for AIC). *If there exist l and l' such that the condition $\text{AIC}(l)$ is true at some time, and $\text{AIC}(l')$ is true at some time, then l is a prefix of l' or l' is a prefix of l .*

Proof. By Lemma 8, $\text{AIC}(l)$ and $\text{AIC}(l')$ remain true forever after some point. Then, some correct processes p_i and p_j confirmed l and l' , respectively. Suppose (by contradiction) that the lemma is false, and let us consider the longest common prefix \log of l and l' , as well as the first value $v_i \neq v_j$ by which l and l' differ. As correct processes append values one by one on Line 17, p_i (resp. p_j) confirmed $\log \oplus v_i$ (resp. $\log \oplus v_j$). By the condition of Line 17, some correct process approved v_i (resp. v_j), which contradicts Lemma 5. ◀

► **Lemma 10** (Log and AIC). *If p_i is a correct process, $AIC(log_i)$ holds at all times.*

Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on $|log_i|$. Initially, $AIC(\varepsilon)$ holds. Suppose $AIC(log_i)$ holds for some log_i , and let us suppose p_i logs v on Line 18. By the condition of that line, $log_i \oplus v$ was confirmed by at least $2t + 1$ processes, hence by at least $t + 1$ correct processes. Therefore, $AIC(log_i \oplus v)$ holds at that time, and by Lemma 8, $AIC(log_i \oplus v)$ remains true forever afterward. ◀

► **Lemma 11** (Reads and AIC). *Let l be a sequence such that $AIC(l)$ is true when a correct process p_i invokes a `read()` operation. Then l is a prefix of the sequence returned to p_i .*

Proof. By Line 5, $|l| \leq count_i$, so by Line 6, $|l| \leq |log_i|$. Moreover, $AIC(log_i)$ holds by Lemma 10. Since $AIC(l)$ and $AIC(log_i)$ are satisfied, Lemma 9 implies that l is a prefix of log_i . ◀

► **Lemma 12** (Linearizability). *Let H be a distributed history admitted by Algorithm 1. Then H is Byzantine linearizable with respect to the Read/Append register.*

Proof. Following the characterization of Proposition 2, we prove the four properties that imply Byzantine linearizability.

Proof of the Validity property. Correct processes p_i return log_i on Line 7, which is composed of logged values that have been written by p_w according to Lemma 7.

Proof of the Read after Write property. Let us suppose p_w is correct and completed its s^{th} append operation (of some value v) before a correct process p_i starts reading. By Lemma 10, $AIC(log_w)$ holds on Line 3, with $|log_w| \geq s$. By Lemma 8, $AIC(log_w)$ is still true when p_i starts its read, so by Lemma 11, log_w is a prefix of the sequence returned by p_i , of size at least s .

Proof of the Inclusion property. Let us consider two reads r_i and r_j , done by two processes p_i and p_j , that return respectively l_i and l_j . By Lemma 10, we have $AIC(l_i)$ (resp. $AIC(l_j)$) when p_i (resp. p_j) executes Line 7, which implies the inclusion property by Lemma 9.

Proof of the Read after read property. Let r_i and r_j be two read operations done by correct processes p_i and p_j , that return respectively l_i and l_j , such that r_i completes before r_j starts. By Lemmas 8, 10, and 11, $AIC(l_i)$ is verified when p_i returns, then when p_j starts its read, so l_i is a prefix of l_j . ◀

► **Lemma 13** (Liveness). *If some correct process p_i confirms a sequence of size s , all correct processes eventually log a s^{th} value.*

Proof. Suppose some correct process p_i confirms a sequence of size s , and some process p_j never writes a sequence of size s in log_j . Since p_j appends values one by one in log_j , this means that $|log_j|$ plateaus at a size $s' < s$ after some point in time. Without loss of generality, let us assume that s' is minimal, i.e. $|log_k|$ reaches at least s' for all correct process p_k . By Lemma 6 and the condition on Line 17, when $|log_i|$ reaches $s' + 1$, at least $t + 1$ approved $s' + 1$ values.

Since all correct processes p_j repeatedly execute `synch()` thanks to Line 8, all processes eventually read v at least $t + 1$ times in `APPROVE[s']` (and only v , by Lemma 5) and approve it (Line 15). This eventually satisfies the condition on Line 17, and then the condition on Line 18. Hence, $|log_j|$ reaches $s' + 1$. A contradiction. ◀

► **Lemma 14** (t -resilience). *Algorithm 1 is t -resilient.*

Proof.

Termination of the append operation. Suppose a correct process p_w invokes `append` (v) to write its s^{th} value, and let l_w be log_w on Line 1. By Lemma 10 $AIC(l_w)$ holds at the beginning of the execution. Hence, some correct process p_i writes l_w in $CONFIRM[i]$, and by Lemma 13, each correct process p_i eventually reach a state where $|log_i| = |l_w|$.

Since all correct processes repeatedly execute `synch()` thanks to Line 8, all processes eventually read v in $ENDORSE[l_w][w]$ (Line 9) and write it in $ENDORSE[l_w][i]$ (Line 12). Since there are at least $n - t > \frac{2n}{3} > \frac{n+t}{2}$ correct processes, eventually, all of them write v in $APPROVE[l_w]$ (Line 15). Since there are at least $n - t > \frac{2n}{3} > 2t$ correct processes, eventually, each of them appends v at the end of $CONFIRM$ (Line 17). Then, p_w can read v in the end of $CONFIRM[j]$ (Line 11) for more than $2t$ different j , and appends it to log_w (Line 18) and terminates its while loop (Line 3).

Termination of the read operation. Suppose a correct process p_i invokes `read()`, and let us study its loop on Line 6. By Line 5, at least one correct p_j process wrote a log containing at least $count_i$ values in $CONFIRM[j]$. By Lemma 13, p_i eventually writes at least $count_i$ values in log_i and complete its `read` operation. ◀

► **Theorem 15** (Correctness of Algorithm 1). *Algorithm 1 implements a t -resilient linearizable SWRM Read/Append register in the model $BASM_{n,t}[R/W, t < \frac{n}{3}]$.*

Proof. By Lemma 12, Algorithm 1 is linearizable. By Lemma 14, Algorithm 1 is t -resilient. ◀

4 From R/WI registers to R/A registers

This section shows that the hypothesis $t < \frac{n}{2}$ is necessary, and sufficient, to implement a R/A register on top of R/WI registers. More precisely, Section 4.1 proves that any such reduction algorithm has a resilience $t < \frac{n}{2}$ as an upper bound, and then Section 4.2 presents an algorithm with an optimal resilience.


4.1 An upper bound on resilience

This section proves that for any implementation of a linearizable Read/Append register in a system where processes communicating only through Read/Write-Increment registers, the maximal resilience is at most $t < \frac{n}{2}$.

► **Theorem 16.** *It is impossible to implement a linearizable Read/Append register in the model $BASM_{n,t}[R/WI]$, when $n \geq 4$ and $t \geq \frac{n}{2}$.*

Proof. Similarly to Section 3.1, suppose there is an Algorithm A implementing a R/A register from a collection of R/WI registers in a system made up of $n \geq 4$ processes, from which $t \geq \frac{n}{2}$ maybe Byzantine. We will prove, by contradiction, that A allows a run that is not linearizable. Since $n \geq 4$, processes can be divided into four non-empty subsets W , I , J and K , each having a size not exceeding $\frac{t}{2}$ processes. Let us pick four processes $p_w \in W$ (the writing process), $p_i \in I$, $p_j \in J$ and $p_k \in K$ (three reading processes). We will consider the four situations represented in Figure 4 and described thereafter.

S1: In this first scenario, all processes of the sets J are Byzantine whereas W , I and K consist of correct processes. Processes of K are too slow to participate. Process p_w appends a to x . The write terminates because $|J| \leq t$ processes are Byzantine. Then p_i reads x and obtains $[a]$ because x is linearizable. After that, the Byzantine processes in J will simulate the steps they would have taken in a read of x by p_j , if p_w had appended b instead of a .



■ **Figure 4** Illustration of the scenarios from the proof of Theorem 16, with $n = 4$ and $t = 2$.

S2: In the second scenario, the processes of I are byzantine while the others are correct.

Processes of K are still slow. Process p_w appends b to x , then the Byzantine processes of I simulate the steps they would take in a read of x by p_i if the written value were a . Finally, the correct process p_j reads the contents of x and gets $[b]$ as a result because x is linearizable.

For all R/WI registers x , let $x.\text{count}_1$ (resp $x.\text{count}_2$) the value of $x.\text{count}_1$ at the end of S_1 (resp. S_2). The two remaining scenarios are built as extensions of S_1 and S_2 , except that processes of W are Byzantine as well, although p_w appends its value (a in S_3 and b in S_4) by following A properly.

S3: After p_i and p_j finish their read in S_1 , all processes $p'_w \in W$ follow the following strategy to confuse correct processes. For all R/WI registers x on which p'_w can write, and such that $x.\text{count}_1 + x.\text{count}_2 \neq 0$, p'_w calls `write-incr(\perp)` on x until the value of x is $\langle \perp, \max(x.\text{count}_1, x.\text{count}_2) + 1 \rangle$.

Then, process p_k reads the contents of x . Since the correct process p_i already read $[a]$, p_k is forced to return a sequence whose first value is a , because x is linearizable.

S4: Processes $p'_w \in W$ continue S_2 with the same strategy. For all R/WI registers x p'_w can write such that $x.\text{count}_1 + x.\text{count}_2 \neq 0$, p'_w calls `write-incr(\perp)` on x until the value of x is $\langle \perp, \max(x.\text{count}_1, x.\text{count}_2) + 1 \rangle$.

Then, process p_k reads a sequence starting with b in x , because x is linearizable and the correct process p_j already read $[b]$.

The contradiction comes from the fact that the scenarios S_3 and S_4 are indistinguishable to process p_k during its last read: all the registers that can be written by processes of W are in the same state that exposes no relevant information, all processes of I pretend they have read a , and all processes of J pretend they have read b . Therefore, it is impossible for p_k to return a different value in S_3 and S_4 , which means A cannot exist. ◀

4.2 A resilience-optimal algorithm

Algorithm 2 presents an implementation of a R/A register in the model $\mathcal{BASM}_{n,t}[\text{R/WI}, t < \frac{n}{2}]$. The writing process is denoted by p_w .

Shared memory and local variables. The n processes share two variables called `ENDORSE` and `COUNTER`, defined as follows.

■ **Algorithm 2** Implementation of a R/A register in the model $\mathcal{BASM}_{n,t}[\text{R/WI}, t < \frac{n}{2}]$.

```

operation append( $v$ ) invoked by  $p_w$  is
1  |    $count_w \leftarrow |log_w|$ ;
2  |   ENDORSE[ $count_w$ ][ $w$ ].write-incr( $v$ );
3  |   COUNTER.write-incr( $\perp$ );
4  |   while  $|log_w| \leq count_w$  do synch();

operation read() invoked by any  $p_i$  is
5  |    $count_i \leftarrow$  COUNTER.read().count;
6  |   do  $old_i \leftarrow log_i$ ; synch(); while  $|log_i| < count_i \wedge old_i \neq log_i$ ;
7  |   return  $log_i$ ;

background task  $T()$  repeatedly executed by all  $p_i$  is
8  |   synch()

procedure synch() invoked by any  $p_i$  is
9  |   if COUNTER.read().count  $\leq |log_i|$  then return;
10 |   for  $j$  from 1 to  $n$  do  $endorse_i[j] \leftarrow$  ENDORSE[ $|log_i|$ ][ $j$ ].read() ;
11 |   if  $endorse_i[i].count = 0 \wedge endorse_i[w].count = 1$  then
12 |   |   ENDORSE[ $|log_i|$ ][ $i$ ].write-incr( $endorse_i[w].value$ )
13 |   if  $\exists v : |\{j : endorse_i[j] = \langle v, 1 \rangle \vee endorse_i[j].count > 1\}| > t$  then
14 |   |    $log_i \leftarrow log_i \oplus v$ ;

```

- ENDORSE[0...][1.. n] plays the same role as in Algorithm 1: it is an infinite array of arrays of n SWMR atomic R/WI registers such that, for any $s \in \mathbb{N}$ and $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, ENDORSE[s][i] is initialized to $\langle \perp, 0 \rangle$, can only be written by p_i , and eventually contains p_i 's opinion on what the s^{th} appended value is.

Each process p_i is only supposed to write once in ENDORSE[s][i], for each s . Hence, a Byzantine process can erase a value that it has already written in ENDORSE[s][i], but doing so passes the count field to 2, which informs the other processes that it is faulty and its values cannot be trusted.

- COUNTER is an SWMR atomic R/WI register, initialized to $\langle \perp, 0 \rangle$ as well, and can only be written by the writing process p_w . Only the field count of COUNTER is used to represent the number of appended values, so p_w only writes a dummy value \perp in it.

Besides these two shared variables, each process p_i maintains four local variables:

- log_i is a sequence that represents the current state of the shared R/A register seen by p_i .
- old_i is a local copy of log_i , used to detect when the value of log_i changes locally.
- $count_i$ is an integer that represents the number of appended values.
- $endorse_i[1..n]$ is an array of size n , that stores a local copy of ENDORSE[$|log_i|$] by p_i .

Notations. Let v be a value and $s \in \mathbb{N}$. We say that a process p_i *endorses* v as the $(s + 1)^{\text{th}}$ value (or simply *endorses* v when s is immaterial) if the first value p_i writes in ENDORSE[s][i] is v . Similarly, we say that p_i *logs* v as the $(s + 1)^{\text{th}}$ value (or simply *logs* v) when p_i executes $log_i \leftarrow log_i \oplus v$ in Line 18, with $|log_i| = s$.

Description of the algorithm. Similarly to Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 implements a confirmation mechanism to ensure that a read value can never be lost. In order to write its $(s + 1)^{\text{th}}$ value v , the writing process p_w writes v in ENDORSE[s][w] (Line 2), then increments

the count field of COUNTER (Line 3) by calling `write-incr(\perp)`, and then waits until it has logged at s values. This happens eventually after enough correct processes have endorsed v as their $(s + 1)^{\text{th}}$ value by calling the procedure `synch()` (which they do regularly on Line 8).

When any process p_i invokes `synch()`, it first checks whether a new value was appended by comparing the count field of COUNTER, to the length of its log_i variable (Line 9), and it updates its local copy of the shared variable ENDORSE (Line 10). Then on Lines 11–12, p_i endorses the value $endorse_i[w].value$ as its $(|log_i| + 1)^{\text{th}}$ value if 1) it has not done so yet (i.e. $endorse_i[i].count = 1$), and 2) p_w has endorsed this value and has not overwritten it (i.e. $endorse_i[w].count = 1$).

Finally, p_i logs v if enough correct processes have endorsed the same value v to ensure its persistence (Lines 13–14). The condition for persistence, captured by the predicate $AIH(|log_i|, v)$ in Definition 17, is similar to the condition of Line 13, and has two important properties:

- It can only be true if v was endorsed by some correct process, hence if v was endorsed by the writer itself. Therefore, only one value v can ever satisfy this property
- Once this property is true at the same process, it cannot be falsified at another process later.

When any process p_i reads the Read/Append register, it first sets its local variable $count_i$ to the count field of COUNTER, which indicates the number of written values if the writer is correct, and a bound on the complexity of the operation otherwise. Then, it invokes `synch()` repeatedly until either 1) it has read $count_i$ values, or 2) its value for log_i does not change during one iteration (which indicates that a Byzantine writer incremented COUNTER without updating ENDORSE properly). Then, p_i returns its local value for log_i .

► **Definition 17** (Add In History). *For all $s \in \mathbb{N}$ and all values v , let $AIH(s, v)$, be the predicate $AIH_1(s, v) \wedge AIH_2(s, v)$ defined as follows:*

- $AIH_1(s, v) \triangleq COUNTER.count > s$,
- $AIH_2(s, v) \triangleq |\{i : ENDORSE[s][i] = \langle v, 1 \rangle \vee ENDORSE[s][i].count > 1\}| > t$.

4.3 Correctness of the Algorithm

We now prove the correctness of Algorithm 2.

► **Lemma 18** (Stability of AIH). *If the condition $AIH(s, v)$ is true at a given time for some pair (s, v) , it can never become false afterward.*

Proof.

Proof for aih_1 . COUNTER.count cannot decrease by the definition of write-increment.

Proof for aih_2 . Let p_i be a process such that $ENDORSE[s][i] = \langle v, 1 \rangle \vee ENDORSE[s][i].count > 1$. If p_i does not overwrite $ENDORSE[s][i]$, $ENDORSE[s][i]$ keeps its value because it is a SWMR register, and if p_i writes in $ENDORSE[s][i]$ afterwards, it remains true that $ENDORSE[s][i].count > 1$. ◀

► **Lemma 19** (Safety of AIH). *Suppose the condition $AIH(s, v)$ is true at a given time for some pair (s, v) . Then at some point in the execution, $ENDORSE[s][w] = \langle v, 1 \rangle$.*

Proof. For $AIH_2(s)$ to be true, at least $t + 1$ processes p_i must have written in $ENDORSE[s][i]$. Among them, some process p_j must be correct. If p_j is the writer p_w , then the write happened on Line 2, and after that $ENDORSE[s][w] = \langle v, 1 \rangle$. Otherwise, the write happened on Line 12. By the condition on Line 11, p_j read $\langle v, 1 \rangle$ in $ENDORSE[s][w]$ on Line 10, which concludes the proof. ◀

► **Lemma 20** (Update of \log_i). *Let us consider a call of $\text{synch}()$ by any correct process p_i , let s be $|\log_i|$ at the moment of the invocation, and let v be any value. Then:*

- *if $\text{AIH}(s, v)$ when p_i invokes $\text{synch}()$, then p_i appends v on Line 14;*
- *if p_i appends v on Line 14, then $\text{AIH}(s, v)$ is true when p_i returns from $\text{synch}()$.*

Proof. Suppose $\text{AIH}(s, v)$ when p_i invokes $\text{synch}()$. Then p_i does not return on Line 9 by $\text{AIH}_1(s, v)$, and $\text{AIH}_2(s, v)$ is true when p_i executed Line 10, so the condition on Line 13 is true.

Suppose p_i appends v on Line 14. Then $\text{AIH}_1(s, v)$ was true when p_i executed Line 9, and $\text{AIH}_2(s, v)$ was true after Line 10. Hence, Lemma 18 concludes the proof. ◀

► **Lemma 21** (Linearizability). *Let H be a distributed history admitted by Algorithm 2. Then H is Byzantine linearizable with respect to the Read/Append register.*

Proof. Following the characterization of Proposition 2, we prove the four properties that imply Byzantine linearizability.

Proof of the Validity property. Suppose the writing process p_w is correct, let us consider the sequence \log_i returned by the read of a correct process p_i on Line 7, let $s \in \{1, \dots, |\log|\}$, and let $v = \log[s - 1]$. By Lemma 20, $\text{AIH}(s - 1, v)$ is true after p_i appended v to \log , so by Lemma 19, $\text{ENDORSE}[s - 1][w] = \langle v, 1 \rangle$. Since p_w is correct, p_w executed Line 2 when it wrote v as its s^{th} value.

Proof of the Read after Write property. Let us suppose p_w is correct and completed its s^{th} write (of some value v) before a correct process p_i starts reading. By Line 4, the write can only stop when $|\log_w| = s$, so by Lemma 20, $\text{AIH}(s - 1, v)$ is true at the end of the write. By Lemma 18, $\text{AIH}(s - 1, v)$ is still true at the beginning of the read. By the same reasoning for previous writes (that have been completed as well), $\text{AIH}(s', _)$ is true for all $s' < s$. By $\text{AIH}_1(s - 1, v)$, $\text{count}_i \geq s - 1$ after Line 5, and by Lemma 20, some value is appended to \log_i each time $\text{synch}()$ is called on Line 6 when $|\log_i| < s$. Hence, $|\log_i| \geq s$ when Line 6 completes.

Proof of the Inclusion property. The sequence returned by a correct process is the content of its variable \log_i . By Lemmas 20 and 19, all processes update their \log_i value by appending the same values in the same order.

Proof of the Read after read property. Let r_i and r_j be two read operations done by correct processes p_i and p_j , that return respectively \log_i and \log_j , such that r_i completes before r_j starts. By Lemma 20, $\text{AIH}(s', _)$ is true for all $s' < |\log_i|$ at the end of r_i . Hence, applying the same reasoning as for the Read after write property, $|\log_j| \geq |\log_i|$. Finally, the Inclusion property implies that \log_i is a prefix of \log_j . ◀

► **Lemma 22** (t -resilience). *Algorithm 1 is t -resilient.*

Proof.

Termination of the append operation. Suppose a correct process p_w invokes $\text{append}(v)$ to write its $(s + 1)^{\text{th}}$ value. In particular, p_w completed all previous writes, by Lemma 20, $\text{AIH}(s', _)$ is true for all $s' < s$, and $\text{AIH}_1(s, v)$ is true by Line 3.

All correct processes repeatedly execute $\text{synch}()$ thanks to Line 8, hence by Lemma 20 again, for all correct processes p_i , eventually $|\log_i| = s - 1$. The next time p_i executes $\text{synch}()$, it reads v in $\text{ENDORSE}[s - 1][w]$ (Line 10) and writes it in $\text{ENDORSE}[s - 1][i]$ (Line 12), which is enough to satisfy $\text{AIH}_2(s, v)$ and allow p_w to complete its write.

Termination of the read operation. Suppose a correct process p_i invokes `read()`. Since log_i can only be updated by appending values at its end (Line 14), at each iteration of the loop Line 6, either log_i remains unchanged which stops the loop, or the length of log_i grows, until it reaches $count_i$ which stops the loop as well. ◀

► **Theorem 23** (Correctness of Algorithm 2). *Algorithm 2 implements a t -resilient linearizable SWRM R/A register in the model $\mathcal{BASM}_{n,t}[R/WI, t < \frac{n}{2}]$.*

Proof. This is a direct consequence of lemmas 21 and 22. ◀

5 Conclusion

The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationships between three register specifications: the Read/Write register, whose `read` operation returns the last written value, the Read/Write-Increment register, whose `read` operation returns a pair composed of the last written value and the total number of values written, and the Read/Append register, whose `read` operation returns the sequence of all written values. We identified necessary and sufficient bounds on the number of Byzantine failures that can be tolerated in algorithms that build one from another. More precisely, a Read/Write-Increment register can be implemented on top of Read/Write registers if, and only if, $t < \frac{n}{3}$. Differently, a Read/Append register can be implemented on top of Read/Write-increment registers at the condition that $t < \frac{n}{2}$.

In order to prove that Read/Write-Increment registers can be implemented on top of Read/Write registers when $t < \frac{n}{3}$, Algorithm 1 actually provides an implementation of a Read/Append register. This is correct for computability reasons because Read/Write-Increment registers can be trivially obtained from Read/Append registers. However, this poses the question of the memory complexity of such algorithms: it is expected that a Read/Append register needs to keep the entire sequence of written values because of its specification, but is it possible to only keep track of the current value and a sequence number in a Read/Write-Increment register implementation?

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