Model-Theoretic Forcing in Transition Algebra
Abstract
We study Löwenheim-Skolem and Omitting Types theorems in Transition Algebra, a logical system obtained by enhancing many sorted first-order logic with features from dynamic logic. The sentences we consider include compositions, unions, and transitive closures of transition relations, which are treated similarly to actions in dynamic logics to define necessity and possibility operators. We show that Upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, any form of compactness, and joint Robinson consistency property fail due to the expressivity of transitive closures of transitions. In this non-compact many-sorted logical system, we develop a forcing technique method by generalizing the classical method of forcing used by Keisler to prove Omitting Types theorem. Instead of working within a single signature, we work with a directed diagram of signatures, which allows us to establish Downward Löwenheim-Skolem and Omitting Types theorems despite the fact that models interpret sorts as sets, possibly empty. Building on a complete system of proof rules for Transition Algebra, we extend it with additional proof rules to reason about constructor-based and/or finite transition algebras. We then establish the completeness of this extended system for a fragment of Transition Algebra obtained by restricting models to constructor-based and/or finite transition algebras.
Keywords and phrases:
institutional model theory, algebraic specification, transition algebra, forcing, omitting types property, Löwenheim-Skolem properties, completenessCopyright and License:
2012 ACM Subject Classification:
Theory of computation Logic and verificationFunding:
The work presented in this paper has been partially supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, grant number 23K11048.Editors:
Paweł Gawrychowski, Filip Mazowiecki, and Michał SkrzypczakSeries and Publisher:
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
1 Introduction
Transition Algebra [19], abbreviated , offers a logical framework for modeling and reasoning about state transitions in systems, particularly in concurrency theory and computer science. Closely related to modal logics and algebraic specification languages executable by rewriting, it provides a structured approach to describing system evolution based on predefined rules. The key concepts in transition algebra are (a) states, which are characterized using equational theories, and (b) transitions, which are represented as labeled relations between states. Transition algebra can be broadly viewed as an extension of many-sorted first-order logic, incorporating features from dynamic logic. It includes algebraic operators that define how transitions combine, such as (a) Sequential composition (): if a system moves from state to according to transition rule , and then from to under transition rule , this is written as , (b) Choice (): represents nondeterministic choices between transitions. (c) Iteration (): denotes repeated transitions, analogous to the Kleene star in formal language theory. Iteration (), has been employed in the literature to enhance the expressive power of first-order logic, albeit at the expense of compactness. Notably, Fagin’s work on Transitive Closure Logic (TCL) has been extensively studied within the frameworks of finite model theory and descriptive complexity [9, 10]. However, apart from the work on [19], we are not aware of any model-theoretic studies of first-order logic with iteration beyond the scope of finite model theory. Moreover, when sorts – possibly infinitely many – and models interpreting those sorts as sets – possibly empty – are permitted, extending existing techniques to such a framework poses significant challenges and lacks a straightforward solution.
In [19], it is shown that transition algebra possesses an essential property for modularization, known as the satisfaction condition. This condition states that truth remains invariant under changes in notation. Here, a change in notation refers to the translation between local languages constructed from vocabularies, often called signatures. Consequently, transition algebra is formalized as an institution [11], a category-theoretic framework that captures the notion of logic by incorporating its syntax, semantics, and the satisfaction relation between them. Similarly, the logic underlying CafeOBJ [8] satisfies the satisfaction condition for signature morphisms, allowing it to be formalized as an institution. However, its models cannot distinguish between different transitions occurring between the same states, as transitions are represented by preorder relations. In contrast, Rewriting Logic [25] – the foundation of Maude [4] – offers greater expressivity by treating transitions as arrows in a category, where states serve as objects. This expressiveness comes at a cost, as the satisfaction condition does not hold in Rewriting Logic. On the other hand, transition algebra retains the modular properties of the preorder algebras in CafeOBJ due to its institutional structure while achieving the same level of expressivity as Rewriting Logic.
Given a set of properties formalized as first-order sentences, practitioners seek to study a restricted class of transition algebras that satisfy these properties. In fields such as formal methods and functional programming – where computation and reasoning rely on abstract data types and term rewriting – many algebraic structures are naturally described using constructor operators, such as numbers with 0 and succ, or lists with nil and cons. Pattern matching on constructors further simplifies function definitions. A related example is Finite Model Theory [24, 12], which focuses on logical structures with a finite domain. This area is particularly relevant to database theory, complexity theory, and various computer science applications. Building on a complete system of proof rules for , such as the one proposed in [19], we extend it with additional proof rules to reason about constructor-based and/or finite transition algebras. We refer the reader to [2, 1, 17] for theoretical foundations of constructor-based models and to [27] for a formal method developed for reasoning about such models. We then establish the completeness of this extended system for the fragment of obtained by restricting the semantics to constructor-based and/or finite transition algebras.
In this work, we use Omitting Types Theorem (OTT) to extend completeness of to a fragment obtained by restricting the semantics to constructor-based transition algebras with finite carrier sets. The OTT states that if a first-order theory does not require a certain type (a set of formulas describing a potential element) to be realized, then there exists a model of that omits this type. This ensures the existence of models that exclude specific unwanted elements. A key challenge arises from the fact that models with potentially empty carrier sets are allowed in . In this model-theoretic framework, extending the initial signature with an infinite number of constants cannot always be achieved while preserving the satisfiability of the underlying theory. To address this, we employ a forcing technique introduced in [19] to prove completeness of . Forcing was originally introduced by Paul Cohen [5, 6] in set theory to show the independence of the continuum hypothesis from the other axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Robinson [28] developed an analogous theory of forcing in model theory. The forcing technique has been studied in institutional model theory at an abstract, category-theoretic level, in works such as [18, 14, 15]. The forcing method proposed in [19] generalizes classical forcing from a single signature to a category of signatures, enabling the dynamic addition of both constants and sentences while preserving satisfiability. Notably, this dynamic forcing method is particularly suited for logical systems that are not compact, such as .
Additionally, we show that theories have some control over the cardinality of their models. The Upward Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem does not hold in general, as there exist theories that uniquely determine a model up to isomorphism, provided that the model’s size is exactly the cardinality of the power of its underlying signature.111The power of a signature is the cardinality of the set of all sentences that can be formed in its language. It is interesting to note that the Downward Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem does hold, as for any model whose size exceeds the power of its underlying signature, one can construct an elementary submodel whose size matches the power of the signature.
2 Transition algebra
In this section, we recall the logic of many-sorted transition algebras [19], or transition algebra (), for short. We present, in order: signatures, models, sentences, and the satisfaction relation.
Signatures.
The signatures we consider are ordinary algebraic signatures endowed with polymorphic transition labels. We denote them by triples of the form , where:
-
is a many-sorted algebraic signature consisting of a set of sorts and a set of function symbols ;
-
is a set whose elements we call transition labels.
Given a function symbol , we refer to as its arity and as its sort. When is the empty arity, we may speak of as a constant of sort .
Throughout the paper, we let , , and range over signatures of the form , , and , respectively.
As usual in institution theory [7, 29], important constructions such as signature extensions with constants as well as open formulae and quantifiers are realized in a multi-signature setting, so moving between signatures is common. A signature morphism consists of a triple , where (a) is a function mapping sorts, (b) maps each function symbol to a function symbol and (c) is a function mapping labels. For convenience, we typically omit the superscripts , and in the notation.
Remark 1.
Signature morphisms compose componentwise. This composition is associative and has identities, forming a category of signatures.
Models.
Given a signature , a -model consists of:
-
an -algebra , where each sort is interpreted by as a set and each function symbol is interpreted by as a function ;
-
an interpretation of each label as a many-sorted transition relation , where and for all sorts . 222In principle, relations of any arity could be defined, and the results presented in this paper would still hold. However, in algebraic specification languages that are executable via rewriting, the only relations considered are transitions, which are defined between pairs of elements of the same sort. Furthermore, the iteration operator () can be applied exclusively to transitions.
A homomorphism over a signature is an algebraic -homomorphism that preserves transitions: for all . It is easy to see that -homomorphisms form a category, which we denote by , under their obvious componentwise composition.
Remark 2.
Every signature morphism determines a model-reduct functor such that:
-
for every -model , for each sort , for each symbol , and for each label ; and
-
for every -homomorphism , for each .
Moreover, the mapping is functorial.
For any signature morphism , any -model and any -model if , we say that is the -reduct of , and that is a -expansion of . For example, for a many-sorted set (say, of variables) that is disjoint from the set of constants in , consider the inclusion morphism , where is the signature obtained from by adding the elements of to as new constants of appropriate sort. Then an expansion of a -model along can be seen as a pair , where is a valuation of in .
As in many-sorted algebra, there is a special, initial model in , which we denote by , whose elements are ground terms built from function symbols, and whose transitions are all empty. The -model of terms with variables from is defined as the -reduct of ; i.e., .
Sentences.
Given a signature , the set of actions is defined by the following grammar:
where is a transition label. We let denote the set of all actions and extend our notational convention for signature components to their corresponding sets of actions. Specifically, we use: (a) to denote the set of actions over a signature , (b) to denote the set of actions over a signature , and similarly for other variations. Moreover, through a slight abuse of notation, we also denote by the canonical map determined by a signature morphism .
To define sentences, we assume a countably infinite set of variable names . A variable for a signature is a triple , where (a) is a variable name and (b) is a sort in . The third component is used only to ensure that variables are distinct from the constants declared in , which is essential when dealing with quantifiers. The set of sentences over is given by the following grammar:
where (a) and are -terms of the same sort; (b) is any action; (c) and are -terms of the same sort; (d) is a finite set of -sentences; and (e) is a finite block of -variables, that is, is a finite set of variables such that if and then ; and (f) is a -sentence. A sentence is called a transition rule, which can also be written in infix notation . An atomic sentence is a ground equation or a ground transition rule of the form , where is a transition label.
Besides the above core connectives, we also make use of the following convenient (and standard) abbreviations: for finite conjunctions; for falsity; for truth; for implications; and for universally quantified sentences.
Remark 3.
Any signature morphism can be canonically extended to a sentence-translation function given by:
-
;
-
;
-
;
-
; and
-
, where and is the extension of mapping each to .
Moreover, this sentence-translation mapping is functorial in .
For the sake of simplicity, we identify variables only by their name and sort, provided that there is no danger of confusion. Using this convention, each inclusion morphism determines an inclusion function , which corresponds to the approach of classical model theory. This simplifies the presentation greatly. A situation when we cannot apply this convention arises when translating a -sentence along the inclusion .
Satisfaction relation.
Actions are interpreted as binary relations in models. Given a model over a signature , and actions , we have:
-
(i.e., diagrammatic composition of binary relations);
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(the union of binary relations); and
-
(the reflexive and transitive closure of binary relations).
We define the satisfaction relation between models and sentences as follows:
-
iff ;
-
iff ;
-
iff ;
-
iff for some sentence ; and
-
iff for some expansion of to the signature .
Proposition 4 (Satisfaction condition).
For all signature morphisms , all -models and all -sentences we have: .
The satisfaction condition for is given in [19].
Logical framework.
Throughout this paper, we work within a fragment of which is obtained by (a) restricting the category of signatures – without prohibiting signature extensions with constants – and (b) discarding a subset of sentence or/and action operators from the grammar which is used to define sentences in . When there is no danger of confusion we drop (a) the subscript from the notations and , and (b) the subscript from the notation . We denote by the sub-functor of , which maps each signature in to the set of atomic sentences from .
3 Related concepts
We define the necessary concepts and present the existing results for presenting our advancements. We make the following notational conventions:
-
Recall that in any category , the notation refers to the class of objects in .
-
Let denote the large category whose objects are classes and whose morphisms are class functions. 333By contrast, a small category is one in which both the collection of objects and the collection of morphisms form sets, rather than proper classes.
-
Assume a set and a cardinal . Let , the set of all subsets of of cardinality strictly less than . We write if .
Presentations.
Let be a signature, and assume a class of -models and a set of -sentences .
-
We write if for all models .
-
Let , the set of sentences satisfied by all models in .
-
Let , the class of models which satisfy .
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Let be the full subcategory of of models which satisfy .
A presentation is a pair consisting of a signature and a set of -sentences . A theory is a presentation such that . A presentation morphism consist of a signature morphism such that . A theory morphism is a presentation morphism between theories.
Substitutions.
Let be a signature, and two -sorted sets of new constants for . A substitution over is a mapping from to . As in case of signature morphisms, a substitution determines
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a sentence functor , which preserves and maps each constant to a term , and
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a reduct functor , which preserves the interpretation of and assigns to each constant the interpretation of the term in the category , that is, for all we have (a) for all sorts in , (b) for all function or transition symbols in , and (c) for all constants .
As in the case of signature morphisms, we use to denote both the substitution and the functor . The following result is a straightforward generalization of [7, Proposition 5.6].
Proposition 5 (Satisfaction condition for substitutions).
For all substitutions , all -models and all -sentences we have: .
4 Compactness and Upward Löwenheim-Skolem Property
is very expressive and its sentences can control the cardinality of all its models under the the following assumptions:
-
Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) holds, that is, for any infinite cardinal number , the next larger cardinal is exactly ; and
-
there are no inaccessible cardinals ().
Theorem 6 (Categoricity).
Assume that . Let be a model defined over a signature . There exists a sort preserving inclusion of signatures and a reachable -expansion of such that any model of is isomorphic to , where .
Theorem 6 is proven assuming . These axioms are consistent relative to – that is, if is consistent, then so is the extended theory. Consequently, Theorem 6 (and its conclusion) cannot be refuted within . This illustrates that certain logical properties cannot be established within from ZFC alone. The following example shows that joint Robinson consistency property fails in .
Example 7 (Robinson Consistency).
Consider a complete (first-order) theory with at least two non-isomorphic models and . Construct a pushout as illustrated on the left side of the diagram below.
Since and , we have . Similarly, since and , we have . However, is not consistent, because any model of , by Theorem 6, would imply that is isomorphic to .
Typically, the cardinality of a model over a signature is defined as the sum of the cardinalities of its carrier sets, that is, . The following example illustrates that the classical Upward Löwenheim-Skolem (ULS) property does not hold when sorts are treated as unary predicates rather than as distinct domains.
Example 8.
Let be a signature with countably infinitely many sorts , where each sort has exactly one constant symbol , and there are no transition labels. Define the set of equations , which asserts that each sort contains exactly one element.
Note that is a first-order signature, and is a set of -sentences that has an infinite model. However, has no models of cardinality greater than , indicating that the ULS property, as traditionally stated, fails to apply in this setting. The following definition of the ULS property applies to many-sorted first-order logic.
Definition 9 (Upward Löwenheim-Skolem Property).
-Upward Löwenheim-Skolem property holds for an infinite cardinal whenever for all signatures , all -models and all sorts such that and there exists an elementary extension of such that .
Recall that -compactness holds whenever for all signatures and all sets of -sentences , has a model iff all subsets have a model. From Theorem 6, one can show that both ULS property and compactness fail.
Corollary 10.
Assume that . Then (a) -ULS fails for all cardinals , and (b) -compactness fails for all infinite cardinals .
Corollary 10 shows that the iteration operator for actions provides enough expressive power to control the cardinality of models. Moreover, compactness fails in all its forms. In this setting, we aim to develop a model construction method that does not rely on compactness, yet still supports the proof of logical properties such as Downward Löwenheim-Skolem (DLS) theorem and OTT. It is worth noting that the results presented in the following sections hold without assuming either GCH or .
5 Forcing
In this section, we present a forcing technique, originally proposed in [19], which extends classical forcing from one signature to a category of signatures in a non-trivial way. To illustrate the motivation behind our approach, we recall Example 28 from [19].
Example 11.
Let be a signature defined as follows: (a) , (b) , and (c) . Let be a set of -sentences which consists of: (a) , and (b) for all , where is a variable of sort .
The first sentence asserts that there is a transition from to in a finite number of steps. For each natural number , the sentence states that if the sort is not empty then there is no transition from to in exactly steps. Classical model construction techniques typically involve introducing an infinite number of constants for each sort – commonly referred to as Henkin constants – followed by the application of quantifier elimination methods that select witnesses for existentially quantified variables. Let be a collection of Henkin constants, that is, newly introduced constants such that each is countably infinite for all . Although the original theory is satisfiable, its extension becomes unsatisfiable upon the addition of these constants. This discrepancy highlights the limitations of classical approaches and motivates the need for a novel method to handle the introduction of Henkin constants effectively.
Definition 12 (Forcing property).
A forcing property is a tuple , where:
-
1.
is a partially ordered set with a least element .
The elements of are traditionally called conditions.
-
2.
is a functor, which maps each arrow to an inclusion .
-
3.
is a functor from the small category to the category of sets such that is a natural transformation, that is: (a) for all conditions , and (b) for all relations .
-
4.
If then for some , for all atomic sentences .
A classical forcing property is a particular case of forcing property such that for all conditions . As usual, forcing properties determine suitable relations between conditions and sentences.
Definition 13 (Forcing relation).
Let be a forcing property. The forcing relation between conditions and sentences from is defined by induction on the structure of sentences, as follows:
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if , for all atomic sentences .
-
if and for some .
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if or .
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if for some natural number .
-
if there is no such that .
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if for some .
-
if for some substitution .
The relation in , is read as forces .
A few basic properties of forcing are presented below.
Lemma 14 (Forcing properties [19]).
Let be a forcing property. For all conditions and all sentences we have:
-
1.
iff for each there is a condition such that .
-
2.
If and then .
-
3.
If then .
-
4.
We can not have both and .
The second property stated in the above lemma shows that the forcing relation is preserved along inclusions of conditions. The fourth property shows that the forcing relation is consistent, that is, a condition cannot force all sentences. The remaining conditions are about negation.
Definition 15 (Generic set).
Let be a forcing property. A non-empty subset of conditions is generic if
-
1.
is an ideal, that is: (a) , (b) for all and all we have , and (c) for all there exists such that and ; and
-
2.
for all conditions and all sentences there exists a condition such that and either or holds.
We write if for some .
A generic set describes a reachable model which satisfies all sentences forced by the conditions in .
Remark 16.
Since is a directed diagram of signature inclusions, one can construct a co-limit of the functor such that is an inclusion for all . 444Note that refers both to the vertex of the colimit of the diagram , and the constant functor from the poset to the category , which maps every object in to the signature .
The results which leads to DLS and OTT are developed over a signature such as the one described in Remark 16.
Definition 17 (Generic model).
Let be a forcing property and a generic set. A model defined over is a generic model for iff for every sentence , we have .
The notion of generic model is the semantic counterpart of the definition of generic set. The following result shows that every generic set has a generic model.
Theorem 18 (Generic Model Theorem [19]).
Let be a forcing property and a generic set. Then there is a generic model for which is reachable.
6 Semantic Forcing
As an example of forcing property, we introduce semantic forcing and study its properties. Let us fix an arbitrary signature and let be the power of . Consider an -sorted set of new constants such that for all sorts . These constants, traditionally known as Henkin constants, are used in the construction of models. Throughout this section we assume the following:
-
1.
a partially ordered set with a least element ;
-
2.
a signature functor which maps (a) to , (b) each element to a signature , where is a subset of with cardinality strictly less than , that is, , and (c) each relation to an inclusion of signatures ;
-
3.
a model functor such that the following hold: 555 is the opposite category of , which means: (a) it has the same objects as , that is, classes, but (b) morphisms are reversed, that is, a morphism in corresponds to a class function in .
-
(a)
is a natural transformation, that is, (a) for all elements , and (b) for all relations ;
-
(b)
Assume an element , a model and a set of constants . For all expansions of to , there exists such that and .
-
(a)
The condition 3(b) implies that all sets of constants from appear in some signature from the image of .
Example 19.
Let be a model defined over a signature .
-
1.
, and
iff and ;
-
2.
is the forgetful functor mapping each to ;
-
3.
is the model functor which maps each to .
Example 19 shows that can have a more complex structure than .
Example 20.
Let be any set of sentences defined over a signature .
-
1.
, and iff ;
-
2.
is the forgetful functor mapping each to ;
-
3.
is the functor which maps each to , the class of -models which satisfy .
Definition 21 (Semantic Forcing Property).
The semantic forcing property is defined as follows:
-
1.
A condition is a pair , where and such that , that is, there exists at least one model in which satisfies .
-
2.
iff and , for all conditions .
-
3.
is the functor mapping each condition to .
-
4.
Let , for all conditions . In other words, is the set of atomic sentences satisfied by all models of from .
From a category theory perspective, several observations are worth noting.
Remark 22.
Definition 21 describe the following mathematical structures:
-
, defined by for all , is a monotone function such that .
-
, defined by for all , is a functor such that the inclusion is a natural transformation, that is:
-
1.
for all conditions , and
-
2.
for all relations .
-
1.
Let be a condition.
-
1.
We let denote , the class of models in satisfying .
-
2.
We write iff is satisfied by all models in , in symbols, .
The perspective of category theory can be disregarded if the reader is not familiar with it. However, Remark 22 lays the groundwork for a generalization to an abstract level, as defined by the notion of institution [11].
We define a notion of distance between conditions, which provides a principled method for regulating the addition of Henkin constants from to the starting signature .
Definition 23 (Distance & weak forcing).
The distance between two conditions and , with , is defined as the number of constants and sentences that must be added to to obtain , that is, . A condition weakly forces , in symbols, , if for all there exists such that and .
Using Lemma 14 (2) and the reflexivity of , it is not difficult to show that implies . In the classical setting, weak forcing does not involve any notion of distance: if and only if, for all , there exists such that ; and this, in turn, holds if and only if . The notion of distance is introduced in this paper to extend the applicability of the results to all signatures – including those of singular cardinality – by controlling the number of constants introduced during the construction of the generic sets.
Theorem 24 (Semantic Forcing Theorem).
For all conditions and all sentences , we have: (a) iff (b)
7 Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem
Consider a semantic forcing property such that the functors and are defined as in Example 19. We use to give a proof of Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. The key to proving any result based on forcing is the construction of a generic set for a given condition .
Lemma 25 (Existence).
Let be a semantic forcing property such that the functors and are defined as in Example 19. Any condition belongs to a generic set .
Proof.
Let be any bijection such that for all ordinals if then . For any condition , let be an enumeration of the sentences in .
First, we define an increasing chain of conditions with the following property: for all ordinals there exists such that .666When is a singular cardinal, the entire set of constants may be used along a chain with . To avoid this uncontrolled increase in the size, we use the distance measure . We proceed by induction on ordinals .
- ()
-
Let .
- ()
-
Let . Notice that , which means is already defined. Condition is obtained by adding a finite set of constants from and a finite set of sentences to , according to a case distinction detailed below:
- ( for some )
- ( for every )
-
Let . In this case, .
- ( is a limit ordinal)
-
At this point, for all we have defined , where and is an expansion of to .
-
Let and and . Since for all , we get . Similarly, .
-
A model , where , can be regarded as a pair , consisting of the model and an interpretation of the constants in into the elements of given by the function . Define , let and .
-
Let . By its definition, for all . Since for all , by satisfaction condition, . Hence, is well-defined. Since for all there exists such that , we get .
-
Secondly, one can easily show that is a generic set.
Theorem 26 (Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem).
Let be a model over a signature of power such that for some sort . Then there exists an elementary submodel of such that .
8 Omitting Types Theorem
Consider a semantic forcing property such that and are defined as in Example 20. We use to give a proof of Omitting Types Theorem in .
Definition 27 (Types).
A type for a signature of power is a set of sentences defined over , where is a block of variables for such that . A -model realizes if for some expansion of to . omits if does not realize .
For all infinite cardinals we have , where is the cofinality of . Consequently, the condition implies that . The converse also holds under the assumption of GCH. The inequality ensures that the number of mappings from to the set of ground terms – that is, substitutions – does not exceed . Note that if is the cardinality of real numbers and is countable then holds.
Definition 28 (Isolated types).
Let be a signature of power . A set of sentences is said to isolate a type iff there exist:
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an -sorted set of new constants for with ,
-
a set with and such that is satisfiable over , and
-
a substitution ,
such that . We say that locally omits if does not isolate .
Our definitions for type, realization, and isolation align with those provided in [16], with one key difference: we do not restrict the block of variables to be finite. Definition 28 is similar to the definition of locally omitting types for first-order logic without equality from [22]. If the fragment of is closed under Boolean operators and first-order quantifiers, the above definition coincides with the classical one for isolated types.
Lemma 29.
Assume that (a) is semantically closed under Boolean operators and first-order quantifiers, and (b) is compact or . Then isolates a type iff there exists a set of sentences such that is satisfiable over and .
The proof is conceptually identical with the proof of [16, Lemma 45].
Definition 30 (Omitting Types Property).
Let be an infinite cardinal. The fragment has -Omitting Types Property (-OTP) whenever
-
1.
for all signatures of power ,
-
2.
all satisfiable sets of sentences , and
-
3.
all families of types ,
such that locally omits for all , there exists a -model of which omits for all . If then we say that has OTP rather than has -OTP.
Theorem 31 (Omitting Types Theorem).
Let be a signature of power . If then we assume that fragment is compact. Then has -OTP.
Any fragment obtained from by (a) discarding a subset of sentence or/and action operators, and (b) restricting the category of signatures – without prohibiting signature extensions with constants – has -OTP. Any star-free fragment of is compact and therefore has -OTP for all cardinals cardinal . In particular, many-sorted first-order logic has -OTP for all cardinals cardinal .
Lemma 32.
Assume that is closed under Boolean operators and first-order quantifiers. Let be a signature, where and .
-
Let be a -sentence, where , where is a variable of sort , and are variables of sort . Note that states that if there exists an element of sort then there exists at least elements of sort .
-
Let be a type with one variable of sort , expressing that there are infinitely many elements of sort .
Then locally omits .
Let , and be as defined in Lemma 32. Recall that the set of Henkin constants is , where for all . Note that is a satisfiable first-order presentation that does not involve the transitive closure operator , as it contains no relation symbols. By Lemma 32, locally omits . By Theorem 31, there exists a model for which omits . Since every model of realizes , the model must be constructed over a proper subset of , in contrast to the classical first-order logic approach, where results are developed over the entire . Consequently, the OTT as presented in [23, 3, 21, 14, 16] does not apply in this context.
Lemma 33.
Let be a signature such that and , where denotes the set of real numbers. Let be a type with a countably infinite number of variables from . Then locally omits , where is any countable and satisfiable set of -sentences.
By Theorem 31, there exists a model of which omits . Consequently, the number of elements in that are not denotations of real numbers – considered unwanted elements – is finite and may therefore be regarded as negligible. Lemma 33 demonstrates that types involving infinitely many variables are not difficult to construct and can naturally arise in applications.
9 -Completeness
Although a transition algebra may satisfy a given set of sentences, it may not be relevant to the intended semantics. In many cases, formal methods practitioners are interested in the properties of a restricted class of transition algebras, such as: (a) those reachable through a set of constructor operators, (b) those with a finite number of elements, or (c) those satisfying both conditions. Using Omitting Types Theorem we can extend the completeness result in [19] to fragments obtained from by restricting the semantics to the aforementioned transition algebras. Concretely, given a sound and complete proof system for , we introduce additional proof rules so that the resulting system remains sound and complete for fragments of obtained by restricting the class of transition algebras to those of interest.
Definition 34 (Entailment relation).
An entailment relation is a family of binary relations between sets of sentences with the following properties:
| where |
An entailment relation is sound (complete) if ().
Completeness fails when is closed under and includes uncountable signatures [19, Proposition 15]. Therefore, throughout this section, we assume that the fragment has only countable signatures if it is closed under . Additionally, we assume that is semantically closed under Boolean operators.
Constructor-based algebras.
Many algebraic structures can be naturally described using a set of constructor operators. For instance, numbers can be defined using a constant and a unary function symbol , while lists can be defined using a constant and a binary function symbol .
Definition 35 (Constructor-based algebras).
Let be a signature and a subset of constructor operators. We let denote the signature of constructors . The constructors create a partition of the set of sorts .
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1.
A sort that has a constructor – i.e., there exists a constructor – is called constrained. We denote the set of all constrained sorts by .
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2.
A sort that is not constrained is called loose. We denote the set of all loose sorts by .
A constructor-based transition algebra is a transition algebra for which there exist (a) a set of loose variable and (b) an expansion of to , such that is reachable.
Example 36 (Lists).
Let be an algebraic signature such that (a) and (b) . Let be a set of constructors.
-
is a loose sort while is a constrained sort.
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Let be a constructor-based algebra obtained from by interpreting as follows: (a) , and (b) for all lists of natural numbers and all natural numbers .
By refining the syntax with a subset of constructor operators and restricting the semantics to constructor-based transition algebras, we obtain a new logic from . This restriction in semantics alters the satisfaction relation between sets of sentences: means that all constructor-based transition algebras of are models of . Consequently, there may exist non-restricted models of that do not satisfy . In order to obtain an institution, we need to restrict the class of signature morphisms such that the reduct of a constructor-based algebra is again a constructor-based algebra [17, 13, 2]. So, the category of signatures of has
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1.
objects of the form , where is a signature in , and
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2.
signature morphisms of the form , where (a) is a signature morphism in , (b) constructors are preserved, that is, , and (c) constructors are reflected, that is, for all there exists such that .
Finite algebras.
Computer science applications often focus on properties that hold in finite structures. Therefore, we refine the fragment defined above to include constructor-based transition algebras, where certain distinguished sorts are interpreted as finite sets. Let be a fragment of obtained by (a) refining the syntax with a subset of sorts of finite domains, and (b) by restricting constructor-based models such that the sorts for finite domains are interpreted as finite sets. This means that the category of signatures in has
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1.
objects of the form , where is a signature in , and
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2.
arrows of the form such that (a) is a signature morphism in , and (b) the finite sorts are preserved, that is, .
Definition 37.
Let be an entailment relation for . The entailment relation for is the least entailment relation that includes and it is closed under the following proof rules:
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1.
, where (a) is a variable of constrained sort, (b) is a -sorted block of variables such that for all loose sorts , and (c) is the set of all variables occuring in .
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2.
, where
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(a)
and is an enumeration of ,
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(b)
denotes the set of sentences for all tuples , where
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is the natural number in position from , for all tuples and all ;
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denotes the sentence , for all natural numbers , all sorts and all variables of sort .
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Note that states that the sort has at most elements. If then , which is satisfied only by transition algebras whose carrier set for the sort is empty.
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(a)
asserts that to prove the property for an arbitrary element , it suffices to establish for all constructor terms in . should be disregarded if the base logic is not closed under first-order quantification. states that the number of elements of any sort in is finite. It is straightforward to show that is sound for provided that is sound for . Establishing completeness is generally more challenging, but it can be achieved with the help of the OTP.
Theorem 38 (Completeness).
The entailment relation is complete for if is complete for and has OTP.
10 Conclusions
In this contribution, we focused on two main aspects of . First, we examined its model-theoretic properties, including the Löwenheim-Skolem and Omitting Types properties. Due to its increased expressivity, TA does not possess the Löwenheim-Skolem property. We then developed a semantic forcing property based on recent developments from [19], which enabled us to prove the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem and the Omitting Types Theorem. Given that the full expressivity of is not required in many practical case studies, our study was conducted on a fragment of TA that restricts the syntax while preserving the semantics.
Secondly, we explored applications of the Omitting Types Theorem to formal methods. Software engineers often seek a restricted class of models for a given theory, such as constructor-based and/or finite models. We extended the system of proof rules proposed in [19] with new rules that are sound for these models of interest, ensuring that completeness is maintained. This approach provides sound and complete proof rules for fragments of TA obtained by restricting the syntax and/or the semantics.
An interesting future research direction involves developing specification and verification methodologies based on the proof rules we have defined for the fragments of . Additionally, we aim to propose a notion of Horn clauses for , which could make specifications defined in executable through rewriting or narrowing.
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