Limitations to Computing Quadratic Functions on Reed-Solomon Encoded Data
Abstract
We study the problem of low-bandwidth non-linear computation on Reed-Solomon encoded data. Given an Reed-Solomon encoding of a message vector , and a polynomial , a user wishing to evaluate is given local query access to each codeword symbol. The query response is allowed to be the output of an arbitrary function evaluated locally on the codeword symbol, and the userβs aim is to minimize the total information downloaded in order to compute . This problem has been studied before for linear functions ; in this work we initiate the study of non-linear functions by starting with quadratic monomials.
For and distinct , we show that any scheme evaluating the quadratic monomial must download at least bits of information when is an odd prime, and at least bits when . When , our result shows that one cannot do significantly better than the naive bound of bits, which is enough to recover all of . This contrasts sharply with prior work for low-bandwidth evaluation of linear functions over Reed-Solomon encoded data, for which it is possible to substantially improve upon this bound [17, 36, 34, 23, 10].
Some proofs have been omitted from this extended abstract; the full version can be found at [3].
Keywords and phrases:
Distributed computation, Reed-Solomon codesCopyright and License:
2012 ACM Subject Classification:
Theory of computation Error-correcting codesEditor:
Shubhangi SarafSeries and Publisher:
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, Schloss Dagstuhl β Leibniz-Zentrum fΓΌr Informatik
1 Introduction
Suppose that data is encoded with an error correcting code to produce a vector , for some . The problem of low-bandwidth computation on top of the error correction is to compute some function , given access to , with limited bandwidth. That is, for some parameter , given an arbitrary of size , we are allowed to query an arbitrary function of the symbol of for each . The goal is to compute , while minimizing the number of bits queried (that is, ).
Variants of this problem arise organically in many domains, including regenerating codes in distributed storage (e.g., [13, 14]); homomorphic secret sharing (e.g, [1, 5, 7, 16]) and low-bandwidth secret sharing (e.g., [37, 21, 20, 40]) in secret sharing; and coded computation in distributed computing (e.g., [25, 15, 38]); these connections β and implications of our work in these domains β are elaborated in Section 1.4.
We study the case when the error correcting code is a Reed-Solomon (RS) code. In RS codes, the codeword symbols are indexed by evaluation points ; the data is interpreted as a polynomial of degree at most , given by . The corresponding encoding , called a codeword, is indexed by distinct evaluation points , and is given by . Reed-Solomon codes are a classical error correcting code, ubiquitous in both theory and practice. Relevant to the domains mentioned above, RS codes are used in distributed storage (e.g., [19, 11]); in secret sharing as Shamirβs scheme [32]; and for coded computation (e.g., [39, 38]). When the error correcting code is any MDS111MDS, or Maximum Distance Separable codes, are codes of dimension and length with the best possible distance . In particular, in an MDS code, any symbols of the codeword uniquely determine the message. code (including an RS code), the naive approach to compute is to first recover entirely by querying any symbols of the codeword in full; one can then compute for any function . This approach has bandwidth bits.
The natural question is whether one can do better. For RS codes, prior work has shown that the answer is yes when is a linear function. Regenerating codes capture the special case of this problem where is the function for some . A long line of work (e.g., [33, 18, 36, 10]) has established that one can compute for any that appears as an evaluation point in the RS code, using substantially fewer than bits in bandwidth. In certain parameter regimes [36, 10], the bandwidth can even get close to bits, the minimum number of bits required to represent .
For arbitrary linear functions , it is again possible to use asymptotically less than bits, at least in some parameter regimes [34, 23]. [34] showed that, given a full-length RS code of dimension over an extension field and query access to nodes for any , one can evaluation any linear with bandwidth . When are constants, this is a factor of less than the naive bound. The work [23] extends the techniques of [34] to consider linear which are some linear combination of codeword symbols; that is, when for some choice of . For RS codes over , [23] downloads bits, outperforming the naive when and are small.
These results demonstrate that it is possible to improve on the naive scheme when evaluating linear functions . The next natural question is whether this is possible for non-linear functions. That is, our question is:
What is the minimal necessary bandwidth to compute non-linear functions of Reed-Solomon encoded data?
Main Result in a Nutshell
We study the simplest instance of non-linear functions: computing quadratic monomials on top of dimension Reed-Solomon codes. We work over arbitrary finite fields . As discussed above, the data represents a degree polynomial over , and we consider the task of computing a quadratic monomial , for .
In this setting, one might hope to be able to do better than , the number of bits needed to represent both and separately; the goal would be to get closer to , the number of bits needed to represent . However, we show that this is not possible!
Our main result, Theorem 4 below, implies that for all , , any scheme computing must download at least bits when is an odd prime; or bits when .222Note that such a scheme need not compute every quadratic monomial; just being able to compute one such monomial suffices for the lower bound to hold. This is nearly the full bits needed to represent both and separately. While the lower bound holds for all , when this bound implies the impossibility of computing quadratic functions with download bandwidth even a few bits less than the naive bound of .
We view our results β which we state in more detail in Section 1.2 below β as an important first step towards addressing the question above about general nonlinear computation. When , our results have the surprising implication that one cannot meaningfully improve on the naive bound of for quadratic monomials, in contrast with the case for linear functions. As discussed more in Sections 1.2 and 1.4, our results also shed interesting light in related domains, including regenerating codes, low-bandwidth secret sharing, leakage resilience, and homomorphic secret sharing.
1.1 Quadratic Monomial (QM) Recovery
We now formalize our problem. We consider the simplest setting for non-linear evaluation, which is computing quadratic monomials on top of Reed-Solomon codes.
Definition 1 (Reed-Solomon (RS) codes of dimension [31]).
Let denote the finite field of order and let . The corresponding (full length) Reed-Solomon code of dimension is the vector space
A dimension- RS code encodes a message vector as evaluations of the polynomial . For some , we wish to compute . To formalize the model described informally above, we first define a leakage function, which outputs a single bit.
Definition 2 (Leakage Function).
For , the (bit-valued) leakage function is given by
Each server may evaluate any (non-negative) number of leakage functions as part of a scheme to compute . We formalize this as follows.
Definition 3 (Quadratic monomial recovery).
Let and . We say that there exists a -bit, -server Quadratic Monomial recovery scheme (QM) for and RS codes of dimension if for every choice of with , there exists
-
a sequence of , not necessarily distinct;
-
leakage functions , ;
-
and a reconstructing function ,
such that for all , . Given a -bit, -server QM scheme, we call the parameter the download bandwidth of the scheme.
1.2 Our Results
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 4 (Main Theorem).
Let and fix , . Fix ; let , and suppose there exists a -bit, -server QM scheme (Definition 3) for and RS codes of dimension over . Then the download bandwidth satisfies
| (1) |
As noted above, this result shows that computing the quadratic monomial requires download bandwidth nearly equal to the cost of representing both separately. When , Theorem 4 shows that naive polynomial interpolation is essentially optimal for the problem of computing quadratic monomials.
Additionally, we establish an even stronger lower bound for leakage functions that are linear over the base field . This is notable because prior work on computing linear functions often crucially relies on -linear leakage functions [18, 36, 34, 23].333We note that the method used to aggregate the leakage functions may be non-linear, and so it is not trivial that the leakage functions must be non-linear to compute a non-linear function.
Theorem 5 (Informal; see Theorem 64 in [3]).
Let and denote an arbitrary extension field of order where . Suppose each server is restricted to evaluating -linear functions on their codeword symbols. Then there does not exist any -bit, -server QM scheme for and RS codes of dimension with download bandwidth satisfying bits.
The formal statement, proof of Theorem 5 is given in Section 6 of the full version [3]. When , Theorem 5 implies that no scheme with linear leakage functions can perform even one bit better than the naive strategy of recovering all of . As mentioned above, we view our results as an important step towards understanding the bandwidth cost of general non-linear computation. But the quadratic monomial case is already interesting in the context of prior work across many domains. We discuss these connections more in Section 1.4. Highlights include:
-
Our work contrasts with work on low-bandwidth secret sharing. It is known to be possible to recover a secret shared with standard Shamir sharing with non-trivial bandwidth [21, 20]; our work implies that, for a natural multiplicative variant of Shamir sharing, no deterministic low-bandwidth recovery is possible.
Unfortunately, this does not imply that βmultiplicative Shamir sharingβ is leakage resilient in the information-theoretic sense, as we demonstrated in Appendix A of the full version of this paper [3].
1.3 Technical Overview
We now overview the proof Theorem 4, which we prove in Section 4.3. First, we observe that it suffices to prove Theorem 4 in the case where and , . At a high level, this follows from the fact that for arbitrary and distinct , any -bit, -server QM scheme computing is a -bit, -server QM scheme over a two-dimensional subspace containing all , where , and are the standard basis vectors. If can compute with strictly fewer bits downloaded than required by Theorem 4, then we may reduce it to a , , instance of the problem, noting that . For more detail, see Section 4.3.
We thus assume , , and for the rest of this discussion. We begin with a sketch, before elaborating on each step. We first bound the bandwidth of any QM solution by the round complexity of an iterative algorithm, which partitions all the lines into buckets determined by their coefficient product . More precisely, for each , we partition the lines into buckets
| (2) |
We then imagine receiving bits from the leakage functions sequentially, one per round; each round, we βpruneβ away all of the lines disagreeing with the leakage bit. The algorithm terminates when only one non-empty bucket remains, corresponding to the correct coefficient product . If an instance of QM has bandwidth , then the corresponding instance of this algorithm must halt within steps. Thus, the round complexity of the iterative algorithm yields a lower bound on the bandwidth .
Analyzing how these buckets of lines evolve as we prune them seems challenging, so our second step restricts both the sets of possible servers and of possible coefficient products in order to introduce symmetry aiding our analysis. In more detail, we demand that the coefficient product belongs to a specially structured set of size about . (When is odd is the set of quadratic residues, and when is even it is the even powers of a specially chosen primitive element.) We similarly restrict queries to servers indexed by . This assumption is without loss of generality: restricting the value of makes the QM problem easier, and thus makes impossibility results stronger; furthermore, restricting the set of servers is allowed because in Definition 3, the client must be able to query any set of servers.
The set is designed so that restricting to this special case introduces useful symmetry in the buckets described above. In our third step, we use this symmetry to carefully βprojectβ each bucket of lines onto a subset of , in a way that the higher dimensional characteristics of lines are sufficiently represented in the lower dimensional projection. In particular, we show that when one runs an analogous algorithm on the projected buckets (iteratively pruning out projections of lines that are inconsistent with the leaked bits), then it remains the case that the round complexity of the projected algorithm is a lower bound on the bandwidth of QM.
The fourth and final step is to bound the round complexity of the projected algorithm. This problem turns out to be more tractable than the original problem of differentiating buckets of lines, and via the logic above, it implies Theorem 4.
Next, we expand slightly upon each of these steps.
Step 1: Algorithmic View of QM
Let be given by Equation (2), and suppose there exists a -bit, -server QM scheme for as in Definition 3. For a fixed set of servers, denote the leakage functions of the QM by . Consider the following algorithm for recovering given the leakage bits , .
Algorithmic view of QM.
-
1.
Initialize a set for each .
-
2.
For each round :
-
(a)
Learn by querying the server indexed by .
-
(b)
For each , remove from all such that ; call this pruned set .
-
(c)
If there is only one so that that is non-empty, return.
-
(a)
After rounds, the correctness of the QM implies that for all but one value . In particular, the bandwidth of the QM is bounded below by the number of iterations that the algorithm above runs for before returning.
Step 2: Restricting to a special set
We show that restricting both the coefficient products and the evaluation points to a subset of the multiplicative subgroup introduces exploitable symmetry in .
-
When field characteristic is , we let be the quadratic residue subgroup.
-
When field characteristic is , we let be the set for some primitive element .
Note that in both cases, consists of quadratic residues;444Indeed, every element of a binary extension field is a quadratic residue. in particular, for any , we may define an element such that . Observe that
Fix ; one may then rewrite as
and observe that in fact . This correspondence between sets of lines extends to a correspondence between their images under evaluation at a given point :
When we further restrict to also be in , we show that the following symmetry holds, allowing QM to be simplified considerably.
Lemma 6 (Informal; see Lemma 19).
Let be field elements whose squares are , respectively. Then .
Given this symmetry, we consider the sub-case of QM wherein we are guaranteed that is in , and the user is restricted to querying servers holding where is also in . As noted previously, this restriction is without loss of generality for the purpose of proving a lower bound on the bandwidth of QMs.
Step 3: Reduction to distinguishing subsets of
When , we show that the correspondence in Lemma 6 can be leveraged to βprojectβ each to a set of points , where . This reduces the problem of finding which contains to that of finding which contains some distinguished point .
In Definition 27 and Theorem 28, we show explicitly how to map a leakage function to a set so that if the line has , then a distinguished point lies in . Thus, given our QM with leakage functions , we obtain a list of corresponding sets which can be used to iteratively prune the sets until only one (say, ) remains nonempty. Assembling these insights yields the following algorithm, analogous to the one above, except that we now iteratively prune the projected sets .
Algorithmic view of the projected QM.
-
1.
Initialize a set for each .
-
2.
For each such round :
-
(a)
For each , prune by the and call the pruned set ; that is, .
-
(b)
If there is at most one so that is non-empty, return.
-
(a)
We call this algorithm βprojection QMβ, or pQM for short. The version here is simplified to convey the main gist; see Algorithm 2 and Section 4 for a formal description.
We show that, as with our algorithm on buckets of lines, if the projected algorithm is allowed to run for all rounds, then the correctness of the original QM implies that there will be at most one so that is non-empty. This implies that the round complexity of this projected algorithm is again a lower bound on the bandwidth of the original QM. The round complexity of this projected algorithm is much easier to analyze, leading to our final step.
Step 4: Analyzing the projected algorithm
The key to our analysis is to show that, when the projected algorithm terminates, most elements of have been removed from consideration.
Theorem 7 (Informal; see Theorem 37).
Suppose that the projected QM algorithm above terminates after rounds. Then if the field characteristic satisfies , and if the field characteristic satisfies .
The intuition is to observe that each set has size that is half the field, and there are such sets, each indexed by some . As a result, the sets must overlap with each other significantly. Any field element is held by many other , where are distinct elements of . Hence, distinguishing a unique among these will require most elements of the entire field to have been removed from consideration.
With Theorem 7 established, the bound of Theorem 4 follows in Section 4.3.2 by considering βadversarial but honestβ servers who always reply to queries with the bit that prunes the fewest elements; that is, at most half of the set. Since the projected algorithm cannot terminate unless there are two or fewer elements remaining among all sets , we see that in the worst case, it takes about rounds for the algorithm to terminate. The exact expression seen in Theorem 4 follows from a more precise accounting.
1.4 Related Work
In this section we summarize related work across several domains.
1.4.1 Computing linear functions: Regenerating codes and beyond
We begin by work on low-bandwidth computation of linear functions on top of RS encoding.
Regenerating Codes
Existing work has considered our model in the case when is linear. Regenerating codes focus on a particular subset of linear functions. Regenerating codes (e.g., [13, 14]) are error correcting codes equipped with algorithms to efficiently repair a single erased codeword symbol in a distributed storage system. In more detail, some data is encoded as a codeword , and each symbol is sent to a different server. If one server becomes unavailable, the goal is to compute using as little information as possible from a subset of surviving nodes. Repair is a special case of our model where the function to compute is , whose linearity follows from the linearity of the code. A long line of work has established constructions of optimal regenerating codes in many parameter regimes; most relevant to our work is the study of Reed-Solomon codes as regenerating codes, initiated by [33]. By now, it is known that RS codes can be optimal or near-optimal regenerating codes in many parameter regimes. For example, [18, 12] show that full-length RS codes (that is, with ) of rate can achieve bandwidth bandwidth , and that this is nearly optimal for linear repair schemes. For constant , this is an improvement over the naive bound of . When is much larger than , it is possible to do better: Work by [36] provides repair schemes for RS codes achieving the cut-set bound [13]. In our language, this gives bandwidth bits, where is the number of surviving servers the scheme contacts. As gets large relative to , this can approach , the number of bits needed to write down . In particular, this is also significantly less than the naive bound of .
All the constructions discussed above use linear repair schemes over extension fields , meaning that the local computation functions , and the function used to aggregate them, are linear over . The work [10] studies the problem over prime order fields, where there are no non-trivial subfields and hence no linear repair schemes. For , [10] construct non-linear repair schemes which asymptotically converge to the cut-set bound over prime order fields as .
Computing general linear functions
The work [34] generalized the regenerating code model to consider the case when is an arbitrary linear function. Given a length Reed-Solomon code of dimension over an extension field of constant characteristic, [34] constructs a scheme which recovers for any linear function given access to any servers, with download bandwidth . When is constant, this is a factor of improvement over the naive bound of bits.
In follow-up work, [23] considered reconstructing -sparse linear combinations of codeword symbols, for . When has non-trivial extension degree over , they give a low-bandwidth scheme for evaluating , which downloads bits, where . When are carefully chosen and , their construction can outperform the naive download bandwidth.
It is interesting to compare the results for computing linear functions to our results on computing quadratic monomials in the setting. We first note that we cannot directly compare our results to those of [34, 23]: While those works show that the naive bound of can be significantly beaten for linear functions in some parameter regimes, the results are not meaningful for .555In more detail, the focus of [34] is on high-rate codes, while the results of [23] require to be large enough that the sparsity can be much smaller than . However, we can compare our results to the results of [36] and [10]. Given a message polynomial , these papers together show that it is possible to compute certain666For , it may look like the problem of computing is the same as computing arbitrary linear functions, as all linear functions (up to normalization) of look like for some . However, these are not the same problem when the set of evaluation points for the RS code is not the entire field. The regenerating code constructions in [36, 10] have , so those works do not immediately give a scheme for computing general linear functions, even when . linear functions of the form with bandwidth approaching as the number of contacted servers is sufficiently large and , over both prime fields [10]; and over extension fields for suitably large [36]. Our result works for both prime order fields and extension fields, and when is arbitrarily large (noting that without loss of generality we have ). Thus, in parameter regimes where these results overlap, we see that recovering the linear function , for any evaluation point in the RS codes considered by [10] or [36], requires substantially less bandwidth than recovering the quadratic function .
1.4.2 Secret Sharing
In a secret-sharing scheme, a secret is shared among parties. One goal is that any of the parties should be able to combine their shares to recover the secret, while any parties together learn nothing about the secret. The secret sharing scheme most relevant to our work is Shamirβs scheme [32]. In Shamirβs scheme, secret is shared by sampling , , uniformly at random and considering . The parties are indexed by elements , and their shares are given by . That is, each party holds a symbol of a RS codeword. It is not hard to see that this scheme has the desired access and security requirements.
There are several questions in secret sharing relevant to our work. We discuss them below.
Low-Bandwidth Secret Sharing
In low-bandwidth secret sharing [37, 40, 21, 20, 30], the goal is for any subset of enough parties to be able to reconstruct the secret in a communication-efficient way. When the secret sharing scheme is Shamir, this is again a special case of our problem, where is the function . (The difference between this setting and regenerating codes is that we only need to be able recover , rather than for any ). In this setting, [21] shows that the cut-set bound is still the limit on the bandwidth (for any secret sharing scheme); but it is possible to attain this with a smaller alphabet size than needed for regenerating codes [20].
Our work on the problem of QM may be viewed in the context of low-bandwidth secret sharing by considering a βmultiplicativeβ variant of Shamir secret sharing. In more detail, in the standard Shamir sharing with , a slope is drawn at random and the shares correspond to the function , where is the secret. In the multiplicative variant, and are chosen at random so that the secret is . This is a special case of QM, when is restricted to be nonzero. In particular, our results imply that there do not exist non-trivially low-bandwidth secret sharing schemes for βmultiplicative Shamir sharingβ with , even though such schemes do exist for standard Shamir sharing.
Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing
The work [2] considers a threat model in which an adversary has βlocal leakage accessβ to more than shares. In this model, an adversary can apply an arbitrary function of bounded output length to each share locally. Concretely, we may think of this model as an adversary extracting a few bits of local information from each shareholder. Under this view, for Shamir sharing, the adversary may be considered as a repair scheme wishing to recover the codeword symbol . A code is local leakage resilient if the adversary has negligible advantage learning the secret .
For sufficiently large code length and prime field order , [2] show that Reed-Solomon codes over are local leakage resilient when dimension for some constant . As a concrete example, they show that if the adversary is allowed to leak 1 bit from each share, then for sufficiently large, it suffices to take . Extensive follow-up work (e.g., [29, 28, 24, 22]) has progressively lowered the threshold for 1-bit leakage resilience, with [22] most recently improving the bound to . On the other hand, [10, 9] show that for low-degree RS codes (with ), non-trivial leakage is possible over prime fields.
Given the discussion above about the βmultiplicativeβ version of Shamir sharing, one may hope that our results imply that multiplicative Shamir sharing is leakage resilient. Unfortunately, this seems not to be the case for dimension Reed-Solomon codes. First, at least over some fields, itβs possible to learn the entire secret from strictly less than leaked bits, so there is some amount of non-trivial leakage that completely reveals the secret.777In this case, since the secret must be non-zero, the naive bound is rather than . As an example, we show in Appendix A of the full version [3] that βmultiplicative Shamirβ instantiated over admits a reconstruction algorithm that downloads only bits, as compared to the bits one might expect in the naive case. In fact, with this scheme, we show that leaking even one bit from a server allows an adversary to learn information about the multiplicative Shamir secret; see [3] for details.
Homomorphic Secret Sharing Schemes
In (single-client) homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) [1, 5, 7], a secret is shared as above, and a referee subsequently wishes to compute a function of the secret. Each party is allowed to do some local computation and send a message to the referee. In some applications, it is desirable to reduce the download bandwidth of the scheme. For example, in applications of HSS to Private Information Retrieval (PIR), the download bandwidth corresponds to the download cost of the PIR scheme (see [4, 16]). Our problem of low-bandwidth function evaluation is related to HSS where we want to minimize the download bandwidth, and where we want information-theoretic security.888We note that for some applications of HSS, the reconstruction should be additive; and/or the messages sent by the parties donβt leak any information about the secret beyond . Neither of these are necessarily the case in low-bandwidth function evaluation.
The work [16] gives multi-client HSS schemes for Shamir sharing, where the refereeβs function is a low-degree polynomial. At first glance this seems at odds with our result (which says that computing low-degree polynomials on top of Shamir sharing with non-trivial bandwidth is impossible). However, the model for multi-client HSS is different than the one we consider, as the function is evaluated on multiple secrets, which are independently secret-shared. For example, [16] applies to a setting where a user wishing to compute the monomial on inputs and assumes that are shared separately with lines and ; this task is distinct from computing .
Our results for quadratic monomials do have implications for low-bandwidth, single-client secret sharing. For example, consider the secret sharing scheme that shares a secret via evaluations of a polynomial , where the are chosen randomly. This is a natural extension of Shamirβs scheme to multiple secrets. Our work implies that computing requires a download bandwidth of nearly bits, twice as much as we might hope for.
1.4.3 Coded Computation
In coded computation (e.g., [25, 15, 38] or see [26] for a survey), the goal is to compute a function of some data , distributed among worker nodes. The concern is that some worker nodes may unpredictable be stragglers (slow or non-responsive), and we would like to carry on the computation without them. The idea is to encode as a codeword , so that can be computed even if a the computation on a few symbols of are unavailable.
This is similar in spirit to our model, but there are a few differences. First, coded computation is often studied over , rather than finite fields β it is an interesting question whether a version of our result holds over . Second, in our model the leakage functions are allowed to depend on the set of queried servers, which is not generally the case in coded computation. However, we note that our lower bound would apply to coded computation leakage function model as well, as the problem of QM is harder if the leakage functions cannot depend on . Thus, while coded computation is similar in spirit to our model, extensions to our work (to the reals and to computations larger than the product of two field elements) would be needed to give meaningful bounds in this setting.
1.5 Open Questions
-
It would be interesting to extend our results to higher degree monomials. Our results show that about bits are necessary for computing quadratic monomials on RS-encoded data. For monomials of degree , one conjecture is that about bits are needed. Is this conjecture true?
-
It would also be interesting to know if our lower bound is achievable. That is, is it possible to evaluate quadratic monomials on top of Reed-Solomon codes of dimension , with bandwidth approaching ? For , this can be done by naive polynomial evaluation. For , there are RS codes over that admit repair of individual codeword symbols with download bandwidth converging to bits [35]. If a similar result holds for message symbols, this would provide an algorithm for evaluating quadratic monomials with bandwidth approaching our lower bound. We are not aware of such a result (for message symbols) in the regenerating codes literature; does such a result hold, or are there other algorithms for computing quadratic monomials with about bits?
-
Finally, it would be interesting to extend our results to arbitrary quadratic functions, not just quadratic monomials. It is not hard to see that at least bits are required to recover an arbitrary quadratic function (even an arbitrary linear function [34]). When is large, this implies that a stronger bound should hold; what is the correct bound?
2 Preliminaries
We now set notation and establish an algorithmic view of QM. Denote by the finite field of elements, where is prime. For any positive integer , we denote by the sequence of integers . Given integers , we denote by the sequence of integers . For any , we may interpret any as a vector of coefficients : . For any , we write .
Our analysis throughout primarily focuses on the problem of finding the products of coefficients of linear polynomials; explicitly, this is the setting where and , . We then generalize this to the full statement of Theorem 4 in Section 4.3. Thus, until then we make the following assumption:
Assumption 8.
Until Section 4.3, we assume that , so , and that .
2.1 Algorithmic View
Definition 9 (-Bucket).
Given some , we define a -bucket as
| (3) |
Definition 10 (-Bucket Evaluation).
Given , let be the set of all evaluations for .
In other words, is the image of the evaluation map , on a set of lines . We now show that any -bit, -server QM is equivalent to an instance of Algorithm 1.
Observation 11.
Proof.
The reverse direction is true by definition, so it suffices to consider the forward direction. Suppose there exists a -bit, -server QM for and . Fix a set of servers. Let be the leakage functions guaranteed by Definition 3. Define for all , and let For an arbitrary of degree at most , set . Let be the inputs to Algorithm 1. The algorithm initializes a dictionary, denoted , whose value at key is the -bucket (Definition 9). In each iteration of the main loop, the algorithm considers the th bit of , which denotes whether or ; the algorithm removes all lines that are inconsistent with this leakage bit.
Since we assumed a QM exists, by Definition 3, all consistent with satisfy , which implies that all lines that remain in some bucket must in fact all reside in the unique bucket . This guarantees that Algorithm 1 will terminate and correctly output , as desired.
2.2 Restricted Parameter Regime for QM
In Section 2.1, we established that determining the optimal download bandwidth incurred by an instance of QM is equivalent to bounding the round complexity of the corresponding instance of Algorithm 1. Rather than directly analyzing Algorithm 1, we pursue an alternate strategy: within the scope of all parameter regimes for which QM must succeed, we find a subset whose corresponding algorithmic view can be greatly simplified. Instead of tracking the number of lines in each set , consider an alternate implementation of Algorithm 1 that tracks the size of for any . It turns out that we can construct such a correspondence between linear functions and their evaluations which, within a restricted parameter regime, yields a simpler but equivalent algorithm. To state this restricted parameter regime, we first give the following definition.
Definition 12 (Quadratic Residues).
Given a field , let denote the quadratic residue subgroup of .
When where , exactly half of lies in , while the other half lies in . We state this formally below.
Claim 13 (e.g., [41]).
If is a field with characteristic , then .
Note that is the image of under the map ; when , the map is the Frobenius automorphism, implying . Since the quadratic residues do not yield an interesting subset of the multiplicative subgroup in binary extension fields, we consider an alternative construction. First, we recall the definition of the field trace.
Definition 14.
For prime and , the field trace is the -linear function given by
The following result999This result holds in considerably more generality: given any finite extension field and a field trace from to a subfield - not necessarily the base field - there exists a primitive element whose trace for arbitrary . Note that is primitive if and only if is primitive. See [27], Theorem 3.75. ([8, 27]) shows that, in all binary extension fields of order at least , there always exists a generator of the multiplicative subgroup whose inverse lies in the kernel of the field trace.
Definition 16.
Let and ; given a primitive element satisfying , we denote
Since such a primitive element is guaranteed to exist by Theorem 15, we will assume that there is a canonical choice of for each field order ; we may thus drop the argument and simply write .
We may now state our restricted parameter regime.
Definition 17 (Restricted Parameter Regime).
Fix a QM for and as in Definition 3. We consider the following restricted parameter regime. Let for prime satisfying ; or and . Define
-
1.
We only consider lines such that , and
-
2.
during any round , we only contact servers indexed by some .
3 Symmetries of restricted parameter regime
The primary goal of this section is to apply the restricted parameter regime (Definition 17) towards constructing a simplified version of Algorithm 1 whose round complexity will under-bound that of the general case.
3.1 Evaluation Map Images
We describe the algebraic structure of when both (the coefficient product; see Definition 9) and (the evaluation parameter; see Definition 10) are restricted to . Consider the case where , so that
| (5) |
It turns out that, up to scaling, describes all for . To express the exact scaling factor, we first define a notion of square roots over . Note this is possible since for all prime powers , with exceptions101010These exceptions do not affect the main result of Theorem 4, since the bound is trivial over . Indeed, when . only when .
Definition 18 (Square Roots in ).
For , let . Since if and only if , we may fix111111The results of Section 3, along with the accompanying discussion, hold for any arbitrary choice of square root representative for each . In Section 4, we employ a specific choice of such representatives which eases a counting argument in the proof of Theorem 37, a key ingredient for the full result of Theorem 4. The explicit construction of such a choice of square roots, along with their combinatorial properties, is given in Section 4 of the full version [3]. a canonical representative of for each ; we denote such a choice of representative .
Our goal is to understand in terms of . We have the following lemma, whose proof is deferred to [3].
Lemma 19.
For all , .
Such a multiplicative relationship between two images and allows us to work entirely over scalar multiples of . The following observation gives the size of ; we defer the proof to [3].
Observation 20.
Let where is odd; or and . Then
3.2 Scalar Representatives of Lines
Let so that for every . Note that every element of is then fully specified by some and .
Observation 21.
For all , specifying , there exists a unique such that . Furthermore, is given by .
The observation follows trivially from , but its significance is that we need only consider , since any line is simply a multiple of .
Observation 22.
For all , , and ,
| (6) |
Hence, we can check whether any line , evaluated at , is in a set just by considering whether is in a multiple of . We show that multiplying an evaluation map image by some scalar is equivalent to a permutation of .
Definition 23 (-Relabeling function).
For all , define the mapping by . Explicitly,
| (7) |
Given , we call its image the -relabel of .
Note that is mapping one line in to another line also in . The following observation shows why we have chosen to call it a relabeling; the proof follows from the fact that for any , the map is a permutation of , and that each element corresponds to a distinct element .
Observation 24.
For all , is a permutation of .
Given some and , we denote by the evaluation of the -relabel of at an evaluation point . We show that the multiplicative relationship between lines in and lines in (Observation 21) is preserved by this relabeling.
Theorem 25.
Let and . Then .
The proof is deferred to [3]. We extend Theorem 25 with the following corollary, whose proof is immediate. This is the -relabel analogue of Observation 22, and it is the tool we will need to reduce a subset of QM to a simpler algorithm in the following section.
Corollary 26.
For all , , and ,
| (8) |
3.3 Reinterpreting Leakage Functions
We now map the sets (defining bit-valued leakage functions; see Algorithm 1) to our new, relabeled setting. Suppose a round is associated with a server indexed by (i.e., the server holding the evaluation ). A candidate is deemed inconsistent with the th leakage bit (hence, eliminated as a candidate for ) if and , or if and .
Definition 27.
Given some round associated with and , define
| (9) |
Furthermore, define .
Theorem 28.
As per Definition 17, consider an instance of QM restricted to coefficient products and Reed-Solomon evaluation points that both lie in . During a QM round indexed by , let , ; then
| (10) |
Proof of Theorem 28.
Suppose that we query a server indexed by holding , whose th leakage bit is inconsistent with some candidate for the underlying Reed-Solomon message polynomial . Assume without loss of generality that . Then removing from consideration occurs precisely when . By the construction of ,
| (11) |
By Theorem 25, we rewrite
| (12) |
which, substituted into (11), yields the desired result.
4 Proof of Main Theorem
In this section, we use the tools from Section 3 to prove Theorem 4. We begin in Section 4.1 by proving the result for the subcase of QM under the restrictions of 17. Then we extend it to prove Theorem 4 in Section 4.3.
4.1 mQM: βmini QMβ
We start by defining the restricted version of our problem that we will solve first.
Definition 29 (mQM).
In particular, Definition 17 restricts us to only considering lines satisfying ; accordingly, we need only distinguish among leakage transcripts corresponding to lines with quadratic residue coefficient products.
Definition 30 (Leakage transcript validity).
Given some and fixed sequence of leakage sets , we say that a -bit leakage transcript is valid if there exists some , satisfying such that
| (13) |
for all .
Since need only distinguish between coefficient products lying in rather than all of , we adjust the notion of success accordingly.
Definition 31 ( validity).
We say that an instance of is -valid if for any choice of size sized subset , there exists some fixed and fixed sequence of leakage sets such that returns βSuccess!β for every -bit valid leakage transcript .
Definition 32.
We say that -server has round complexity if, for all -valid schemes, .
4.2 pQM: βprojection QMβ
We now define an algorithm121212So-called as it βprojectsβ subsets onto . , analogous to Algorithm 1, presented as Algorithm 2. Our main objective in the section is to show that a valid scheme implies a successful scheme, which is established in Theorem 34. To that end we define a notion of validity similar to that of Definition 31.
Definition 33.
We say that an instance of is -valid if there exists some sequence of leakage sets such that succeeds for all . We say that has round complexity if, for all -valid schemes, .
We may now formally state the key theorem that will allow us to analyze the round complexity of to derive a lower bound on that of - and by extension, itself.
Theorem 34.
Let and suppose there exists an -valid instance of . Then there exists an -valid instance of , for some positive integer .
Proof.
Fix some server schedule supported on distinct server labels in . Suppose that is a sequence of leakage sets defining an -valid mQM scheme; then for any valid -bit leakage transcript , returns βSuccess!β, implying that at the end of its execution, for all but one value ; denote this unique value .
Let . Then for each there exists some round such that precisely one of
| (14) |
holds, otherwise would never be removed from and ; take to be the least such value. Assume that ; the case is verbatim. From , construct the length sequence of leakage sets by applying Definition 27 to each entry of , . Then by Theorem 28, (14) holding in some round implies
| (15) |
Consider an instance . By (15), implies at the conclusion of every round , . Since every , is removed in some round of , it follows that every , will be removed no later than the same round of . Hence, implies for all . It follows that there exists at most one value, namely , satisfying ; accordingly, will return βSuccess!β, as desired, in at most rounds.
4.3 Round Complexity of pQM, and Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 34 shows that any under bound on the round complexity of pQM (Algorithm 2) is an under bound on the round complexity of mQM, which in turn is a sub-case of QM (Algorithm 1). With this relation established, we now focus on the task of under bounding the round complexity of pQM. We will show the following theorem.
Theorem 35.
Fix for prime and ; or and . Then any -valid pQM scheme over must satisfy
We will prove Theorem 35 later, as it relies on Theorem 37 in the next section. For now, we observe that Theorem 35, along with the above reasoning, implies Theorem 4. We will do so in two steps:
- 1.
- 2.
Theorem 36 (Theorem 4, restricted to ).
Fix ; let , , and suppose there exists a -bit, -server QM scheme for and RS codes of dimension (Definition 3) over . Then its download bandwidth must satisfy
Proof.
First, any lower bound on the bandwidth of mQMs implies the same lower bound for QMs; we argue that the restrictions in Definition 17 are without loss of generality. Once we have assumed that , Definition 17 restricts the mQM coefficient product and requires all queries to be made to servers indexed by some . The former is strictly a sub-problem of QM. The latter restriction is without loss of generality: the client may query any servers but must download at least one bit per query, so the bound of Theorem 4 is relevant only when in the characteristic 2 case, or in the odd characteristic case. On the other hand, the order of is at least , which is always greater than for all prime powers .
Now Theorems 34 and 35, along with the fact noted above that lower bounds for mQMs imply the same lower bounds for QMs, implies Theorem 4 in all cases except when . However, for such values of , Theorem 4 is vacuously true.
Theorem 4 (Main Theorem). [Restated, see original statement.]
Let and fix , . Fix ; let , and suppose there exists a -bit, -server QM scheme (Definition 3) for and RS codes of dimension over . Then the download bandwidth satisfies
| (1) |
Proof.
Let denote the right-side term of the inequality in (1). For , distinct with , , and , suppose exists a -bit, -server QM over computing for all . Consider the dimension subspace of given by where denote the th, th standard basis vectors, respectively. Since , we know is trivially a -bit, -server QM for . For any , each server indexed by locally holds the codeword symbol . Each server may also locally scale their codeword symbol by to recover .
Thus, up to local rescaling, each server indexed by some holds an evaluation point of the form for some and . Each server may then locally re-index by ; after such a re-indexing, each server labeled by some holds a linear evaluation . Let be the set of server labels and ; then is a Reed-Solomon codeword in . Importantly, need not be full-length131313If divides , not all evaluation points may be available; that is, only certain may appear, corresponding to the image of the map over . over . Nonetheless, any bandwidth lower bound for QM over a full-length RS code must hold for QM over any subset of codeword positions; otherwise, a client could lower download bandwidth in the former case by querying a subset of available servers.
Thus, recovering is equivalent to recovering for . Since Theorem 36 implies that any QM scheme for full-length RS codes recovering must download at least bits, the same requirement holds for our RS code after the relabeling of evaluation points. We see that must incur a download at least , as desired.
4.3.1 Size of pQM final states
We now focus exclusively on pQM as presented in Algorithm 2, placing aside the problem of coefficient product recovery altogether. We show that, if pQM succeeds, then it must have removed nearly all points from consideration. We state the result below. Due to space constraints, the proof is omitted, and available in [3].
Theorem 37.
Fix for prime and . Let be some sequence of leakage sets , defining an -valid (Algorithm 2).
Suppose for some there exists a unique such that at the conclusion of . Then
4.3.2 Lower-bounding Round Complexity
We conclude this section with the proof of Theorem 35. We construct a game that is equivalent to pQM, but in an βadversarialβ context.
Proof of Theorem 35.
Consider a round-based game played between Alice and an (adversarial but honest) Eve. For all , Alice initializes the sets . For each round ,
-
1.
Alice chooses an arbitrary , and denotes , .
-
2.
Eve computes
(16) -
3.
Alice updates the sets , according to Eveβs choice of ; concretely, for all , Alice sets
(17)
By observation, the above game is equivalent to pQM where the leakage set and leakage bit are determined round-to-round by Alice and Eve, respectively. Eveβs choice of ensures that at most half of all points still under consideration are removed for each . By Theorem 37, if Alice wishes to win in rounds, then must satisfy:
-
If for an odd prime : then and
-
If , for : then and
This completes the proof of Theorem 35, and hence the proof of Theorem 4.
References
- [1] Josh Cohen Benaloh. Secret sharing homomorphisms: Keeping shares of A secret sharing. In Andrew M. Odlyzko, editor, CRYPTO β86, pages 251β260, 1986. doi:10.1007/3-540-47721-7_19.
- [2] Fabrice Benhamouda, Akshay Degwekar, Yuval Ishai, and Tal Rabin. On the local leakage resilience of linear secret sharing schemes. In Hovav Shacham and Alexandra Boldyreva, editors, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2018 - 38th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 19-23, 2018, Proceedings, Part I, volume 10991 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 531β561. Springer, 2018. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-96884-1_18.
- [3] Keller Blackwell and Mary Wootters. Limitations to computing quadratic functions on reed-solomon encoded data, 2025. doi:10.48550/arXiv.2505.08000.
- [4] Elette Boyle, Geoffroy Couteau, Niv Gilboa, Yuval Ishai, and Michele OrrΓΉ. Homomorphic secret sharing: optimizations and applications. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 2105β2122, 2017. doi:10.1145/3133956.3134107.
- [5] Elette Boyle, Niv Gilboa, and Yuval Ishai. Breaking the circuit size barrier for secure computation under DDH. In Matthew Robshaw and Jonathan Katz, editors, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2016 - 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 14-18, 2016, Proceedings, Part I, volume 9814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 509β539. Springer, 2016. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_19.
- [6] Elette Boyle, Niv Gilboa, and Yuval Ishai. Function secret sharing: Improvements and extensions. In Edgar R. Weippl, Stefan Katzenbeisser, Christopher Kruegel, Andrew C. Myers, and Shai Halevi, editors, Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Vienna, Austria, October 24-28, 2016, pages 1292β1303. ACM, 2016. doi:10.1145/2976749.2978429.
- [7] Elette Boyle, Niv Gilboa, Yuval Ishai, Huijia Lin, and Stefano Tessaro. Foundations of homomorphic secret sharing. In Anna R. Karlin, editor, 9th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, ITCS 2018, January 11-14, 2018, Cambridge, MA, USA, volume 94 of LIPIcs, pages 21:1β21:21. Schloss Dagstuhl β Leibniz-Zentrum fΓΌr Informatik, 2018. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2018.21.
- [8] Stephen D. Cohen. Primitive elements and polynomials with arbitrary trace. Discrete Mathematics, 83(1):1β7, 1990. doi:10.1016/0012-365X(90)90215-4.
- [9] Roni Con, Noah Shutty, Itzhak Tamo, and Mary Wootters. Repairing reed-solomon codes over prime fields via exponential sums. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 2024.
- [10] Roni Con and Itzhak Tamo. Nonlinear repair of reed-solomon codes. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 68(8):5165β5177, 2022. doi:10.1109/TIT.2022.3167615.
- [11] Ceph Authors And Contributors. Ceph erasure code documentation. https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/rados/operations/erasure-code/, 2016. Last accessed: 2025.
- [12] Son Hoang Dau, Thi Xinh Dinh, Han Mao Kiah, Tran Thi Luong, and Olgica Milenkovic. Repairing reed-solomon codes via subspace polynomials. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 67(10):6395β6407, 2021. doi:10.1109/TIT.2021.3071878.
- [13] Alexandros G. Dimakis, P. Brighten Godfrey, Yunnan Wu, Martin J. Wainwright, and Kannan Ramchandran. Network coding for distributed storage systems. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 56(9):4539β4551, 2010. doi:10.1109/TIT.2010.2054295.
- [14] Alexandros G Dimakis, Kannan Ramchandran, Yunnan Wu, and Changho Suh. A survey on network codes for distributed storage. Proceedings of the IEEE, 99(3):476β489, 2011. doi:10.1109/JPROC.2010.2096170.
- [15] Sanghamitra Dutta, Viveck Cadambe, and Pulkit Grover. βshort-dotβ: Computing large linear transforms distributedly using coded short dot products. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 65(10):6171β6193, 2019. doi:10.1109/TIT.2019.2927558.
- [16] Ingerid Fosli, Yuval Ishai, Victor I Kolobov, and Mary Wootters. On the download rate of homomorphic secret sharing. In 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022). Schloss Dagstuhl β Leibniz-Zentrum fΓΌr Informatik, 2022. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.71.
- [17] Venkatesan Guruswami and Mary Wootters. Repairing reed-solomon codes. In Daniel Wichs and Yishay Mansour, editors, Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2016, Cambridge, MA, USA, June 18-21, 2016, pages 216β226. ACM, 2016. doi:10.1145/2897518.2897525.
- [18] Venkatesan Guruswami and Mary Wootters. Repairing Reed-Solomon codes. IEEE transactions on Information Theory, 63(9):5684β5698, 2017. doi:10.1109/TIT.2017.2702660.
- [19] Apache Hadoop. HDFS erasure coding documentation. https://hadoop.apache.org/docs/current/hadoop-project-dist/hadoop-hdfs/HDFSErasureCoding.html, 2015. Last accessed: 2025.
- [20] Wentao Huang and Jehoshua Bruck. Secret sharing with optimal decoding and repair bandwidth. In 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2017, Aachen, Germany, June 25-30, 2017, pages 1813β1817. IEEE, 2017. doi:10.1109/ISIT.2017.8006842.
- [21] Wentao Huang, Michael Langberg, Joerg Kliewer, and Jehoshua Bruck. Communication efficient secret sharing. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 62(12):7195β7206, 2016. doi:10.1109/TIT.2016.2616144.
- [22] Dustin Kasser. An improvement upon theΒ bounds forΒ theΒ local leakage resilience ofΒ shamirβs secret sharing scheme. In Elette Boyle and Mohammad Mahmoody, editors, Theory of Cryptography, pages 395β422, Cham, 2025. Springer Nature Switzerland.
- [23] Han Mao Kiah, Wilton Kim, Stanislav Kruglik, San Ling, and Huaxiong Wang. Explicit low-bandwidth evaluation schemes for weighted sums of reed-solomon-coded symbols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 2024.
- [24] Ohad Klein and Ilan Komargodski. New bounds on the local leakage resilience of shamirβs secret sharing scheme. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/805, 2023. URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/805.
- [25] Kangwook Lee, Maximilian Lam, Ramtin Pedarsani, Dimitris Papailiopoulos, and Kannan Ramchandran. Speeding up distributed machine learning using codes. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 64(3):1514β1529, 2017. doi:10.1109/TIT.2017.2736066.
- [26] Songze Li and Salman Avestimehr. Coded Computing: Mitigating Fundamental Bottlenecks in Large-scale Distributed Computing and Machine Learning. Now Foundations and Trends, 2020.
- [27] Rudolf Lidl and Harald Niederreiter. Finite Fields, volume 20 of Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Applications. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2 edition, 1997.
- [28] Hemanta K. Maji, Hai H. Nguyen, Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky, and Mingyuan Wang. Improved bound on the local leakage-resilience of shamirβs secret sharing. In 2022 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pages 2678β2683, 2022. doi:10.1109/ISIT50566.2022.9834695.
- [29] Hemanta K. Maji, Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky, Tom Suad, and Mingyuan Wang. Constructing locally leakage-resilient linear secret-sharing schemes. In Tal Malkin and Chris Peikert, editors, Advances in Cryptology β CRYPTO 2021, pages 779β808, Cham, 2021. Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_26.
- [30] Ankit Singh Rawat, Onur Ozan Koyluoglu, and Sriram Vishwanath. Centralized repair of multiple node failures with applications to communication efficient secret sharing. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 64(12):7529β7550, 2018. doi:10.1109/TIT.2018.2871451.
- [31] I. S. Reed and G. Solomon. Polynomial codes over certain finite fields. Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 8(2):300β304, 1960. doi:10.1137/0108018.
- [32] Adi Shamir. How to share a secret. Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery, 1979.
- [33] Karthikeyan Shanmugam, Dimitris S Papailiopoulos, Alexandros G Dimakis, and Giuseppe Caire. A repair framework for scalar mds codes. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 32(5):998β1007, 2014. doi:10.1109/JSAC.2014.140519.
- [34] Noah Shutty and Mary Wootters. Low-bandwidth recovery of linear functions of reed-solomon-encoded data. arXiv preprint arXiv:2107.11847, 2021. arXiv:2107.11847.
- [35] Itzhak Tamo, Min Ye, and Alexander Barg. Optimal repair of reed-solomon codes: Achieving the cut-set bound. In Chris Umans, editor, 58th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2017, Berkeley, CA, USA, October 15-17, 2017, pages 216β227. IEEE Computer Society, 2017. doi:10.1109/FOCS.2017.28.
- [36] Itzhak Tamo, Min Ye, and Alexander Barg. The repair problem for reedβsolomon codes: Optimal repair of single and multiple erasures with almost optimal node size. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 65(5):2673β2695, 2018. doi:10.1109/TIT.2018.2884075.
- [37] Huaxiong Wang and Duncan S. Wong. On secret reconstruction in secret sharing schemes. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 54:473β480, 2008. doi:10.1109/TIT.2007.911179.
- [38] Qian Yu, Songze Li, Netanel Raviv, Seyed Mohammadreza Mousavi Kalan, Mahdi Soltanolkotabi, and Salman A Avestimehr. Lagrange coded computing: Optimal design for resiliency, security, and privacy. In The 22nd International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, pages 1215β1225. PMLR, 2019.
- [39] Qian Yu, Mohammad Ali Maddah-Ali, and A Salman Avestimehr. Polynomial codes: an optimal design for high-dimensional coded matrix multiplication. In Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 4406β4416, 2017.
- [40] Zhifang Zhang, Yeow Meng Chee, San Ling, Mulan Liu, and Huaxiong Wang. Threshold changeable secret sharing schemes revisited. Theoretical Computer Science, 418:106β115, 2012. doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2011.09.027.
- [41] ETH Zurich. Quadratic residues. Lecture notes, 2007. URL: https://ti.inf.ethz.ch/ew/lehre/extremal07/recitation2.pdf.