Abstract 1 Introduction 2 Preliminaries 3 Symmetries of restricted parameter regime 4 Proof of Main Theorem References

Limitations to Computing Quadratic Functions on Reed-Solomon Encoded Data

Keller Blackwell Stanford University, CA, USA Mary Wootters Stanford University, CA, USA
Abstract

We study the problem of low-bandwidth non-linear computation on Reed-Solomon encoded data. Given an [n,k] Reed-Solomon encoding of a message vector πŸβˆˆπ”½qk, and a polynomial gβˆˆπ”½q⁒[X1,X2,…,Xk], a user wishing to evaluate g⁒(𝐟) is given local query access to each codeword symbol. The query response is allowed to be the output of an arbitrary function evaluated locally on the codeword symbol, and the user’s aim is to minimize the total information downloaded in order to compute g⁒(𝐟). This problem has been studied before for linear functions g; in this work we initiate the study of non-linear functions by starting with quadratic monomials.

For q=pe and distinct i,j∈[k], we show that any scheme evaluating the quadratic monomial gi,j:=Xi⁒Xj must download at least 2⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’1)βˆ’3 bits of information when p is an odd prime, and at least 2⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’2)βˆ’4 bits when p=2. When k=2, our result shows that one cannot do significantly better than the naive bound of k⁒log2⁑(q) bits, which is enough to recover all of 𝐟. This contrasts sharply with prior work for low-bandwidth evaluation of linear functions g⁒(𝐟) over Reed-Solomon encoded data, for which it is possible to substantially improve upon this bound [17, 36, 34, 23, 10].

Some proofs have been omitted from this extended abstract; the full version can be found at [3].

Keywords and phrases:
Distributed computation, Reed-Solomon codes
Copyright and License:
[Uncaptioned image] © Keller Blackwell and Mary Wootters; licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY 4.0
2012 ACM Subject Classification:
Theory of computation β†’ Error-correcting codes
Related Version:
Full Version: https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.08000 [3]
Editor:
Shubhangi Saraf

1 Introduction

Suppose that data πŸβˆˆπ”½qk is encoded with an error correcting code to produce a vector πœβˆˆπ”½qn, for some n>k. The problem of low-bandwidth computation on top of the error correction is to compute some function g⁒(𝐟), given access to 𝐜, with limited bandwidth. That is, for some parameter sβˆˆβ„€+, given an arbitrary IβŠ†[n] of size |I|=s, we are allowed to query an arbitrary function Ξ»i⁒(ci) of the symbol of ci for each i∈I. The goal is to compute g⁒(𝐟), while minimizing the number of bits queried (that is, βˆ‘i∈Ilog2⁑(|Ξ»i⁒(ci)|)).

Variants of this problem arise organically in many domains, including regenerating codes in distributed storage (e.g., [13, 14]); homomorphic secret sharing (e.g, [1, 5, 7, 16]) and low-bandwidth secret sharing (e.g., [37, 21, 20, 40]) in secret sharing; and coded computation in distributed computing (e.g., [25, 15, 38]); these connections – and implications of our work in these domains – are elaborated in Section 1.4.

We study the case when the error correcting code is a Reed-Solomon (RS) code. In RS codes, the codeword symbols are indexed by n evaluation points Ξ±βˆˆπ”½q; the data πŸβˆˆπ”½qk is interpreted as a polynomial fβˆˆπ”½q⁒[x] of degree at most kβˆ’1, given by f⁒(x)=βˆ‘i=0kβˆ’1fi⁒xi. The corresponding encoding πœβˆˆπ”½qn, called a codeword, is indexed by n distinct evaluation points Ξ±βˆˆπ”½q, and is given by cΞ±=f⁒(Ξ±). Reed-Solomon codes are a classical error correcting code, ubiquitous in both theory and practice. Relevant to the domains mentioned above, RS codes are used in distributed storage (e.g., [19, 11]); in secret sharing as Shamir’s scheme [32]; and for coded computation (e.g., [39, 38]). When the error correcting code is any MDS111MDS, or Maximum Distance Separable codes, are codes of dimension k and length n with the best possible distance nβˆ’k+1. In particular, in an MDS code, any k symbols of the codeword uniquely determine the message. code (including an RS code), the naive approach to compute g⁒(𝐟) is to first recover 𝐟 entirely by querying any k symbols of the codeword in full; one can then compute g⁒(𝐟) for any function g. This approach has bandwidth k⁒log2⁑(q) bits.

The natural question is whether one can do better. For RS codes, prior work has shown that the answer is yes when g:𝔽qk→𝔽q is a linear function. Regenerating codes capture the special case of this problem where g⁒(𝐟) is the function gα⁒(𝐟)=f⁒(Ξ±) for some Ξ±βˆˆπ”½q. A long line of work (e.g., [33, 18, 36, 10]) has established that one can compute gα⁒(𝐟) for any Ξ± that appears as an evaluation point in the RS code, using substantially fewer than k⁒log2⁑(q) bits in bandwidth. In certain parameter regimes [36, 10], the bandwidth can even get close to log2⁑(q) bits, the minimum number of bits required to represent gα⁒(𝐟)βˆˆπ”½q.

For arbitrary linear functions g:𝔽qk→𝔽q, it is again possible to use asymptotically less than k⁒log2⁑(q) bits, at least in some parameter regimes [34, 23]. [34] showed that, given a full-length RS code of dimension k=(1βˆ’Ξ΅)⁒n over an extension field and query access to (1βˆ’Ξ³)⁒n nodes for any Ξ³<Ξ΅, one can evaluation any linear g⁒(𝐟) with bandwidth O⁒(n/(Ξ΅βˆ’Ξ³)). When Ξ΅,Ξ³ are constants, this is a factor of Ω⁒(log⁑n) less than the naive bound. The work [23] extends the techniques of [34] to consider linear g⁒(𝐟) which are some linear combination of ℓ≀k codeword symbols; that is, when g⁒(𝐟)=βˆ‘j=1β„“ΞΊj⁒f⁒(Ξ±ij) for some choice of i1,…,iβ„“βˆˆ[n]. For RS codes over 𝔽q=𝔽pe, [23] downloads O⁒(ℓ⁒peβˆ’1⁒log2⁑(p)) bits, outperforming the naive k⁒log2⁑(q)=k⁒e⁒log2⁑(p) when β„“β‰ͺk and p,e are small.

These results demonstrate that it is possible to improve on the naive scheme when evaluating linear functions g⁒(𝐟). The next natural question is whether this is possible for non-linear functions. That is, our question is:

What is the minimal necessary bandwidth to compute non-linear functions g:𝔽qk→𝔽q of Reed-Solomon encoded data?

Main Result in a Nutshell

We study the simplest instance of non-linear functions: computing quadratic monomials g on top of dimension k Reed-Solomon codes. We work over arbitrary finite fields 𝔽q=𝔽pe. As discussed above, the data 𝐟=(f0,f1,…,fkβˆ’1) represents a degree deg⁑(f)≀kβˆ’1 polynomial over 𝔽q, and we consider the task of computing a quadratic monomial gi,j⁒(𝐟):=fi⁒fj, for i,j∈[0,kβˆ’1].

In this setting, one might hope to be able to do better than 2⁒log2⁑(q), the number of bits needed to represent both fi and fj separately; the goal would be to get closer to log2⁑(q), the number of bits needed to represent fiβ‹…fj. However, we show that this is not possible!

Our main result, Theorem 4 below, implies that for all i,j∈[0,kβˆ’1], iβ‰ j, any scheme computing gi,j⁒(𝐟)=fi⁒fj must download at least 2⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’1)βˆ’3 bits when p is an odd prime; or 2⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’2)βˆ’4 bits when p=2.222Note that such a scheme need not compute every quadratic monomial; just being able to compute one such monomial suffices for the lower bound to hold. This is nearly the full 2⁒log2⁑(q) bits needed to represent both fi and fj separately. While the lower bound holds for all k, when k=2 this bound implies the impossibility of computing quadratic functions with download bandwidth even a few bits less than the naive bound of k⁒log2⁑(q).

We view our results – which we state in more detail in Section 1.2 below – as an important first step towards addressing the question above about general nonlinear computation. When k=2, our results have the surprising implication that one cannot meaningfully improve on the naive bound of k⁒log2⁑(q) for quadratic monomials, in contrast with the case for linear functions. As discussed more in Sections 1.2 and 1.4, our results also shed interesting light in related domains, including regenerating codes, low-bandwidth secret sharing, leakage resilience, and homomorphic secret sharing.

1.1 Quadratic Monomial (QM) Recovery

We now formalize our problem. We consider the simplest setting for non-linear evaluation, which is computing quadratic monomials on top of Reed-Solomon codes.

Definition 1 (Reed-Solomon (RS) codes of dimension k [31]).

Let 𝔽q denote the finite field of order q and let n=q. The corresponding (full length) Reed-Solomon code of dimension k is the vector space

RSq⁒[n,k]:={⟨f⁒(Ξ±)βŸ©Ξ±βˆˆπ”½q:fβˆˆπ”½q⁒[x],deg⁑(f)<k}.

A dimension-k RS code encodes a message vector 𝐟=(f0,f1,…,fkβˆ’1) as evaluations of the polynomial f⁒(x)=βˆ‘i=0kβˆ’1fi⁒xi. For some i,j∈[0,kβˆ’1], we wish to compute gi,j⁒(𝐟):=fi⁒fj. To formalize the model described informally above, we first define a leakage function, which outputs a single bit.

Definition 2 (Leakage Function).

For AβŠ†π”½q, the (bit-valued) leakage function Ξ»=λ⁒(A):𝔽qβ†’{0,1} is given by λ⁒(x)={0x∈A1else.

Each server may evaluate any (non-negative) number of leakage functions as part of a scheme to compute gi,j⁒(𝐟). We formalize this as follows.

Definition 3 (Quadratic monomial recovery).

Let t,s,kβˆˆβ„€+ and i,j∈[0,kβˆ’1]. We say that there exists a t-bit, s-server Quadratic Monomial recovery scheme (QM) for gi,j and RS codes of dimension k if for every choice of SβŠ†π”½q with |S|=s, there exists

  • β– 

    a sequence of Ξ±1,…,Ξ±t∈S, not necessarily distinct;

  • β– 

    leakage functions Ξ»z:𝔽qβ†’{0,1}, z∈[t];

  • β– 

    and a reconstructing function Rec:{0,1}t→𝔽q,

such that Rec(Ξ»z(f(Ξ±z)):z∈[t])=gi,j(𝐟) for all fβˆˆπ”½q⁒[x], deg⁑(f)≀kβˆ’1. Given a t-bit, s-server QM scheme, we call the parameter t the download bandwidth of the scheme.

1.2 Our Results

Our main result is the following.

Theorem 4 (Main Theorem).

Let kβ‰₯2 and fix i,j∈[0,kβˆ’1], iβ‰ j. Fix 𝔽q=𝔽pe; let sβ‰₯3, and suppose there exists a t-bit, s-server QM scheme (Definition 3) for gi,j and RS codes of dimension k over 𝔽q. Then the download bandwidth satisfies

tβ‰₯{2⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’1)βˆ’3p>22⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’2)βˆ’4p=2. (1)

As noted above, this result shows that computing the quadratic monomial gi,j=fi⁒fj requires download bandwidth nearly equal to the cost of representing both fi,fjβˆˆπ”½q separately. When k=2, Theorem 4 shows that naive polynomial interpolation is essentially optimal for the problem of computing quadratic monomials.

Additionally, we establish an even stronger lower bound for leakage functions that are linear over the base field 𝔽p. This is notable because prior work on computing linear functions g often crucially relies on 𝔽p-linear leakage functions [18, 36, 34, 23].333We note that the method used to aggregate the leakage functions may be non-linear, and so it is not trivial that the leakage functions must be non-linear to compute a non-linear function.

Theorem 5 (Informal; see Theorem 64 in [3]).

Let kβ‰₯2 and i,j∈[0,kβˆ’1] 𝔽q denote an arbitrary extension field of order pe where eβ‰₯2. Suppose each server is restricted to evaluating 𝔽p-linear functions gi:𝔽q→𝔽p on their codeword symbols. Then there does not exist any t-bit, s-server QM scheme for gi,j and RS codes of dimension k with download bandwidth t satisfying t<2⁒log2⁑(q) bits.

The formal statement, proof of Theorem 5 is given in Section 6 of the full version [3]. When k=2, Theorem 5 implies that no scheme with linear leakage functions can perform even one bit better than the naive strategy of recovering all of 𝐟. As mentioned above, we view our results as an important step towards understanding the bandwidth cost of general non-linear computation. But the quadratic monomial case is already interesting in the context of prior work across many domains. We discuss these connections more in Section 1.4. Highlights include:

  • β– 

    Combined with existing work on regenerating codes [36, 10], our work implies that for k=2, there are many linear functions f1⁒α+f0 that can be computed with substantially less bandwidth than the quadratic monomial f0β‹…f1.

  • β– 

    Our work contrasts with work on low-bandwidth secret sharing. It is known to be possible to recover a secret shared with standard Shamir sharing with non-trivial bandwidth [21, 20]; our work implies that, for a natural multiplicative variant of Shamir sharing, no deterministic low-bandwidth recovery is possible.

    Unfortunately, this does not imply that β€œmultiplicative Shamir sharing” is leakage resilient in the information-theoretic sense, as we demonstrated in Appendix A of the full version of this paper [3].

  • β– 

    Our work provides lower bounds on the download bandwidth single-client homomorphic secret sharing [6, 7], for multiplication of two secrets with a natural multi-secret version of Shamir sharing.

1.3 Technical Overview

We now overview the proof Theorem 4, which we prove in Section 4.3. First, we observe that it suffices to prove Theorem 4 in the case where k=2 and i=0, j=1. At a high level, this follows from the fact that for arbitrary k and distinct i,j∈[0,kβˆ’1], any t-bit, s-server QM scheme Ξ¦ computing gi,j⁒(𝐟) is a t-bit, s-server QM scheme over a two-dimensional subspace π’ž containing all 𝐟=ci⁒ei+cj⁒ej, where ci,cjβˆˆπ”½q, and ei,ejβˆˆπ”½qk are the standard basis vectors. If Ξ¦ can compute gi,j⁒(𝐟) with strictly fewer bits downloaded than required by Theorem 4, then we may reduce it to a k=2, i=0, j=1 instance of the problem, noting that π’žβ‰ƒRSq⁒[n,2]. For more detail, see Section 4.3.

We thus assume k=2, i=0, and j=1 for the rest of this discussion. We begin with a sketch, before elaborating on each step. We first bound the bandwidth of any QM solution by the round complexity of an iterative algorithm, which partitions all the lines f⁒(x)=m⁒x+b into buckets determined by their coefficient product g⁒(𝐟):=g0,1⁒(𝐟)=m⁒b. More precisely, for each Ξ³βˆˆπ”½q, we partition the lines into buckets

BΞ³:={f⁒(x)βˆˆπ”½q⁒[x]:deg⁑(f)≀1,g⁒(𝐟)=Ξ³}. (2)

We then imagine receiving bits from the leakage functions sequentially, one per round; each round, we β€œprune” away all of the lines f⁒(x) disagreeing with the leakage bit. The algorithm terminates when only one non-empty bucket BΞ³ remains, corresponding to the correct coefficient product Ξ³. If an instance of QM has bandwidth t, then the corresponding instance of this algorithm must halt within t steps. Thus, the round complexity of the iterative algorithm yields a lower bound on the bandwidth t.

Analyzing how these buckets of lines evolve as we prune them seems challenging, so our second step restricts both the sets of possible servers and of possible coefficient products in order to introduce symmetry aiding our analysis. In more detail, we demand that the coefficient product g⁒(𝐟) belongs to a specially structured set Ξ©qβŠ†π”½q of size about q/2. (When q is odd Ξ©q is the set of quadratic residues, and when q is even it is the even powers of a specially chosen primitive element.) We similarly restrict queries to servers indexed by Ξ©q. This assumption is without loss of generality: restricting the value of g⁒(𝐟) makes the QM problem easier, and thus makes impossibility results stronger; furthermore, restricting the set of servers is allowed because in Definition 3, the client must be able to query any set of s servers.

The set Ξ©q is designed so that restricting to this special case introduces useful symmetry in the buckets BΞ³ described above. In our third step, we use this symmetry to carefully β€œproject” each bucket BΞ³βŠ†π”½q⁒[x] of lines onto a subset of 𝔽q, in a way that the higher dimensional characteristics of lines are sufficiently represented in the lower dimensional projection. In particular, we show that when one runs an analogous algorithm on the projected buckets (iteratively pruning out projections of lines that are inconsistent with the leaked bits), then it remains the case that the round complexity of the projected algorithm is a lower bound on the bandwidth of QM.

The fourth and final step is to bound the round complexity of the projected algorithm. This problem turns out to be more tractable than the original problem of differentiating buckets of lines, and via the logic above, it implies Theorem 4.

Next, we expand slightly upon each of these steps.

Step 1: Algorithmic View of QM

Let Bγ be given by Equation (2), and suppose there exists a t-bit, s-server QM scheme for g⁒(𝐟):=gi,j⁒(𝐟) as in Definition 3. For a fixed set S of s servers, denote the leakage functions of the QM by {λi}. Consider the following algorithm for recovering g⁒(𝐟) given the leakage bits λi⁒(f⁒(αi)), i∈[t].

Algorithmic view of QM.
  1. 1.

    Initialize a set BΞ³0:=BΞ³ for each Ξ³βˆˆπ”½q.

  2. 2.

    For each round i=1,2,…,t:

    1. (a)

      Learn λi⁒(f⁒(αi)) by querying the server indexed by αi.

    2. (b)

      For each Ξ³, remove from BΞ³iβˆ’1 all f~⁒(x)∈BΞ³iβˆ’1 such that Ξ»i⁒(f~⁒(Ξ±i))β‰ Ξ»i⁒(f⁒(Ξ±i)); call this pruned set BΞ³i.

    3. (c)

      If there is only one Ξ³ so that BΞ³i that is non-empty, return.

After t rounds, the correctness of the QM implies that BΞ³t=βˆ… for all but one value Ξ³=g⁒(𝐟). In particular, the bandwidth t of the QM is bounded below by the number of iterations that the algorithm above runs for before returning.

Step 2: Restricting to a special set

We show that restricting both the coefficient products and the evaluation points to a subset Ξ©qβŠ†π”½qβˆ— of the multiplicative subgroup introduces exploitable symmetry in BΞ³.

  • β– 

    When field characteristic is p>2, we let Ξ©q be the quadratic residue subgroup.

  • β– 

    When field characteristic is p=2, we let Ξ©q be the set {Ο‰i:i⁒ even} for some primitive element Ο‰βˆˆπ”½qβˆ—.

Note that in both cases, Ξ©q consists of quadratic residues;444Indeed, every element of a binary extension field is a quadratic residue. in particular, for any α∈Ωq, we may define an element Ξ±βˆˆπ”½q such that (Ξ±)2=Ξ±. Observe that

B1={mβˆ’1⁒x+m:mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ—}.

Fix γ∈Ωq; one may then rewrite Bγ as

BΞ³={γ⁒mβˆ’1⁒x+γ⁒m:mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ—}βŠ†π”½q⁒[x]

and observe that in fact BΞ³=Ξ³β‹…B1. This correspondence between sets of lines extends to a correspondence between their images under evaluation at a given point Ξ±βˆˆπ”½qβˆ—:

Bγ⁒(Ξ±):={γ⁒mβˆ’1⁒α+γ⁒m}=Ξ³β‹…B1⁒(Ξ±).

When we further restrict Ξ± to also be in Ξ©q, we show that the following symmetry holds, allowing QM to be simplified considerably.

Lemma 6 (Informal; see Lemma 19).

Let Ξ³,Ξ±βˆˆπ”½qβˆ— be field elements whose squares are Ξ³,Ξ±, respectively. Then Bγ⁒(Ξ±)=(Ξ³)⁒(Ξ±)β‹…B1⁒(1).

Given this symmetry, we consider the sub-case of QM wherein we are guaranteed that g⁒(𝐟)βˆˆπ”½qβˆ— is in Ξ©q, and the user is restricted to querying servers holding f⁒(Ξ±) where Ξ±βˆˆπ”½qβˆ— is also in Ξ©q. As noted previously, this restriction is without loss of generality for the purpose of proving a lower bound on the bandwidth of QMs.

Step 3: Reduction to distinguishing subsets of 𝔽𝒒

When γ∈Ωq, we show that the correspondence in Lemma 6 can be leveraged to β€œproject” each BΞ³βŠ†π”½q⁒[x] to a set of points SΞ³:=Ργ⁒B1⁒(1)βŠ†π”½q, where Ξ΅Ξ³βˆˆπ”½qβˆ—. This reduces the problem of finding which BΞ³ contains f⁒(x) to that of finding which SΞ³ contains some distinguished point ΞΆβˆˆπ”½q.

In Definition 27 and Theorem 28, we show explicitly how to map a leakage function Ξ» to a set VβŠ†π”½q so that if the line f⁒(X) has λ⁒(f⁒(Ξ±i))=1, then a distinguished point ΞΆ lies in V. Thus, given our QM with leakage functions T1,…,Tt, we obtain a list of corresponding sets V1,…,Vt which can be used to iteratively prune the sets SΞ³ until only one (say, SΞ΄) remains nonempty. Assembling these insights yields the following algorithm, analogous to the one above, except that we now iteratively prune the projected sets SΞ³βŠ†π”½q.

Algorithmic view of the projected QM.
  1. 1.

    Initialize a set Sγ0:=Sγ for each γ∈Ωq.

  2. 2.

    For each such round i=1,2,…,t:

    1. (a)

      For each Ξ³, prune SΞ³iβˆ’1 by the Vi and call the pruned set SΞ³i; that is, SΞ³i:=SΞ³iβˆ’1βˆ–Vi.

    2. (b)

      If there is at most one Ξ³ so that SΞ³i is non-empty, return.

We call this algorithm β€œprojection QM”, or pQM for short. The version here is simplified to convey the main gist; see Algorithm 2 and Section 4 for a formal description.

We show that, as with our algorithm on buckets of lines, if the projected algorithm is allowed to run for all t rounds, then the correctness of the original QM implies that there will be at most one Ξ΄ so that SΞ΄t is non-empty. This implies that the round complexity of this projected algorithm is again a lower bound on the bandwidth of the original QM. The round complexity of this projected algorithm is much easier to analyze, leading to our final step.

Step 4: Analyzing the projected algorithm

The key to our analysis is to show that, when the projected algorithm terminates, most elements of SΞ΄ have been removed from consideration.

Theorem 7 (Informal; see Theorem 37).

Suppose that the projected QM algorithm above terminates after β„“ rounds. Then |SΞ΄β„“|≀2 if the field characteristic satisfies p>2, and |SΞ΄β„“|≀3 if the field characteristic satisfies p=2.

The intuition is to observe that each set SΞ³0 has size |SΞ³0|β‰ˆq/2 that is half the field, and there are β‰ˆq/2 such sets, each indexed by some γ∈Ωq. As a result, the sets SΞ³0 must overlap with each other significantly. Any field element α∈SΞ³0 is held by many other SΞ³β€²0, where Ξ³β€²β‰ Ξ³ are distinct elements of Ξ©q. Hence, distinguishing a unique SΞ΄ among these will require most elements of the entire field to have been removed from consideration.

With Theorem 7 established, the bound of Theorem 4 follows in Section 4.3.2 by considering β€œadversarial but honest” servers who always reply to queries with the bit that prunes the fewest elements; that is, at most half of the set. Since the projected algorithm cannot terminate unless there are two or fewer elements remaining among all sets SΞ³i, we see that in the worst case, it takes about log2⁑(q2) rounds for the algorithm to terminate. The exact expression seen in Theorem 4 follows from a more precise accounting.

1.4 Related Work

In this section we summarize related work across several domains.

1.4.1 Computing linear functions: Regenerating codes and beyond

We begin by work on low-bandwidth computation of linear functions on top of RS encoding.

Regenerating Codes

Existing work has considered our model in the case when g⁒(𝐟) is linear. Regenerating codes focus on a particular subset of linear functions. Regenerating codes (e.g., [13, 14]) are error correcting codes equipped with algorithms to efficiently repair a single erased codeword symbol in a distributed storage system. In more detail, some data 𝐟 is encoded as a codeword 𝐜, and each symbol ci is sent to a different server. If one server iβˆ— becomes unavailable, the goal is to compute ciβˆ— using as little information as possible from a subset of s surviving nodes. Repair is a special case of our model where the function to compute is g⁒(𝐟)=ciβˆ—, whose linearity follows from the linearity of the code. A long line of work has established constructions of optimal regenerating codes in many parameter regimes; most relevant to our work is the study of Reed-Solomon codes as regenerating codes, initiated by [33]. By now, it is known that RS codes can be optimal or near-optimal regenerating codes in many parameter regimes. For example, [18, 12] show that full-length RS codes (that is, with q=n) of rate 1βˆ’Ο΅ can achieve bandwidth bandwidth (nβˆ’1)⁒log⁑(1/Ξ΅), and that this is nearly optimal for linear repair schemes. For constant Ξ΅, this is an Ω⁒(log⁑n) improvement over the naive bound of k⁒log⁑q. When q is much larger than n, it is possible to do better: Work by [36] provides repair schemes for RS codes achieving the cut-set bound [13]. In our language, this gives bandwidth s⁒log2⁑(q)/(sβˆ’k+1) bits, where s is the number of surviving servers the scheme contacts. As s gets large relative to k, this can approach log2⁑q, the number of bits needed to write down g⁒(𝐟). In particular, this is also significantly less than the naive bound of k⁒log2⁑q.

All the constructions discussed above use linear repair schemes over extension fields 𝔽pe, meaning that the local computation functions gi, and the function used to aggregate them, are linear over 𝔽p. The work [10] studies the problem over prime order fields, where there are no non-trivial subfields and hence no linear repair schemes. For k=2, [10] construct non-linear repair schemes which asymptotically converge to the cut-set bound over prime order fields 𝔽p as pβ†’βˆž.

Computing general linear functions

The work [34] generalized the regenerating code model to consider the case when g:𝔽qk→𝔽q is an arbitrary linear function. Given a length n=q Reed-Solomon code of dimension k=(1βˆ’Ξ΅)⁒n over an extension field of constant characteristic, [34] constructs a scheme which recovers g⁒(𝐟) for any linear function given access to any s=n⁒(1βˆ’Ξ³) servers, with download bandwidth O⁒(n/(Ξ΅βˆ’Ξ³)). When Ξ΅ is constant, this is a factor of Ω⁒(log⁑n) improvement over the naive bound of k⁒log⁑q bits.

In follow-up work, [23] considered reconstructing β„“-sparse linear combinations of codeword symbols, for ℓ≀k. When 𝔽q=𝔽pe has non-trivial extension degree eβ‰₯2 over 𝔽p, they give a low-bandwidth scheme for evaluating g, which downloads d⁒log2⁑(p) bits, where dβ‰₯ℓ⁒peβˆ’1βˆ’β„“+k. When p,e are carefully chosen and β„“β‰ͺk, their construction can outperform the naive k⁒e⁒log2⁑(p) download bandwidth.

It is interesting to compare the results for computing linear functions to our results on computing quadratic monomials in the k=2 setting. We first note that we cannot directly compare our results to those of [34, 23]: While those works show that the naive bound of k⁒log2⁑(q) can be significantly beaten for linear functions in some parameter regimes, the results are not meaningful for k=2.555In more detail, the focus of [34] is on high-rate codes, while the results of [23] require k to be large enough that the sparsity β„“ can be much smaller than k. However, we can compare our results to the results of [36] and [10]. Given a message polynomial f⁒(x)=m⁒x+b, these papers together show that it is possible to compute certain666For k=2, it may look like the problem of computing g⁒(𝐟)=f⁒(Ξ±) is the same as computing arbitrary linear functions, as all linear functions (up to normalization) of (b,m) look like b+α⁒m for some Ξ±. However, these are not the same problem when the set of evaluation points for the RS code is not the entire field. The regenerating code constructions in [36, 10] have nβ‰ͺq, so those works do not immediately give a scheme for computing general linear functions, even when k=2. linear functions of the form m⁒α+b with bandwidth approaching log2⁑q as the number of contacted servers sβ†’βˆž is sufficiently large and |𝔽|β†’βˆž, over both prime fields 𝔽p [10]; and over extension fields 𝔽pe for suitably large e [36]. Our result works for both prime order fields and extension fields, and when s is arbitrarily large (noting that without loss of generality we have s≀k⁒log2⁑q). Thus, in parameter regimes where these results overlap, we see that recovering the linear function m⁒α+b, for any evaluation point Ξ± in the RS codes considered by [10] or [36], requires substantially less bandwidth than recovering the quadratic function mβ‹…b.

1.4.2 Secret Sharing

In a secret-sharing scheme, a secret sβˆˆπ”½q is shared among n parties. One goal is that any k of the parties should be able to combine their shares to recover the secret, while any kβˆ’1 parties together learn nothing about the secret. The secret sharing scheme most relevant to our work is Shamir’s scheme [32]. In Shamir’s scheme, secret sβˆˆπ”½q is shared by sampling fi←𝔽q, i∈{1,…,kβˆ’1}, uniformly at random and considering f⁒(x)=s+βˆ‘i=1kβˆ’1fi⁒xi. The parties are indexed by elements Ξ±βˆˆπ”½qβˆ—, and their shares are given by f⁒(Ξ±). That is, each party holds a symbol of a RS codeword. It is not hard to see that this scheme has the desired access and security requirements.

There are several questions in secret sharing relevant to our work. We discuss them below.

Low-Bandwidth Secret Sharing

In low-bandwidth secret sharing [37, 40, 21, 20, 30], the goal is for any subset of enough parties to be able to reconstruct the secret in a communication-efficient way. When the secret sharing scheme is Shamir, this is again a special case of our problem, where g⁒(𝐟) is the function g0⁒(𝐟)=f⁒(0). (The difference between this setting and regenerating codes is that we only need to be able recover f⁒(0), rather than f⁒(α) for any α). In this setting, [21] shows that the cut-set bound is still the limit on the bandwidth (for any secret sharing scheme); but it is possible to attain this with a smaller alphabet size than needed for regenerating codes [20].

Our work on the problem of QM may be viewed in the context of low-bandwidth secret sharing by considering a β€œmultiplicative” variant of Shamir secret sharing. In more detail, in the standard Shamir sharing with k=2, a slope m is drawn at random and the shares correspond to the function f⁒(x)=m⁒x+s, where s is the secret. In the multiplicative variant, m and b are chosen at random so that the secret is s=mβ‹…b. This is a special case of QM, when g0,1⁒(𝐟) is restricted to be nonzero. In particular, our results imply that there do not exist non-trivially low-bandwidth secret sharing schemes for β€œmultiplicative Shamir sharing” with k=2, even though such schemes do exist for standard Shamir sharing.

Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing

The work [2] considers a threat model in which an adversary has β€œlocal leakage access” to more than k shares. In this model, an adversary can apply an arbitrary function of bounded output length to each share locally. Concretely, we may think of this model as an adversary extracting a few bits of local information from each shareholder. Under this view, for Shamir sharing, the adversary may be considered as a repair scheme wishing to recover the codeword symbol f⁒(0). A code is local leakage resilient if the adversary has negligible advantage learning the secret s.

For sufficiently large code length n and prime field order p, [2] show that Reed-Solomon codes over 𝔽p are local leakage resilient when dimension kβ‰₯β⁒n for some constant Ξ². As a concrete example, they show that if the adversary is allowed to leak 1 bit from each share, then for n sufficiently large, it suffices to take Ξ²β‰₯0.92. Extensive follow-up work (e.g., [29, 28, 24, 22]) has progressively lowered the threshold for 1-bit leakage resilience, with [22] most recently improving the bound to Ξ²β‰₯0.668. On the other hand, [10, 9] show that for low-degree RS codes (with k=o⁒(n)), non-trivial leakage is possible over prime fields.

Given the discussion above about the β€œmultiplicative” version of Shamir sharing, one may hope that our results imply that multiplicative Shamir sharing is leakage resilient. Unfortunately, this seems not to be the case for dimension k=2 Reed-Solomon codes. First, at least over some fields, it’s possible to learn the entire secret from strictly less than k⁒⌈log2⁑(qβˆ’1)βŒ‰ leaked bits, so there is some amount of non-trivial leakage that completely reveals the secret.777In this case, since the secret must be non-zero, the naive bound is k⁒⌈log2⁑(qβˆ’1)βŒ‰ rather than ⌈k⁒log2⁑(q)βŒ‰. As an example, we show in Appendix A of the full version [3] that β€œmultiplicative Shamir” instantiated over 𝔽7βˆ— admits a reconstruction algorithm that downloads only 5 bits, as compared to the 2⁒⌈log2⁑(6)βŒ‰=6 bits one might expect in the naive case. In fact, with this scheme, we show that leaking even one bit from a server allows an adversary to learn information about the multiplicative Shamir secret; see [3] for details.

Homomorphic Secret Sharing Schemes

In (single-client) homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) [1, 5, 7], a secret s is shared as above, and a referee subsequently wishes to compute a function g⁒(s) of the secret. Each party is allowed to do some local computation and send a message to the referee. In some applications, it is desirable to reduce the download bandwidth of the scheme. For example, in applications of HSS to Private Information Retrieval (PIR), the download bandwidth corresponds to the download cost of the PIR scheme (see [4, 16]). Our problem of low-bandwidth function evaluation is related to HSS where we want to minimize the download bandwidth, and where we want information-theoretic security.888We note that for some applications of HSS, the reconstruction should be additive; and/or the messages sent by the parties don’t leak any information about the secret beyond g⁒(s). Neither of these are necessarily the case in low-bandwidth function evaluation.

The work [16] gives multi-client HSS schemes for Shamir sharing, where the referee’s function g is a low-degree polynomial. At first glance this seems at odds with our result (which says that computing low-degree polynomials on top of Shamir sharing with non-trivial bandwidth is impossible). However, the model for multi-client HSS is different than the one we consider, as the function g is evaluated on multiple secrets, which are independently secret-shared. For example, [16] applies to a setting where a user wishing to compute the monomial g⁒(x,y)=x⁒y on inputs x=s1 and y=s2 assumes that s1,s2 are shared separately with lines f1⁒(x)=s1+m1⁒x and f2⁒(x)=s2+m2⁒x; this task is distinct from computing siβ‹…mi.

Our results for quadratic monomials do have implications for low-bandwidth, single-client secret sharing. For example, consider the secret sharing scheme that shares a secret (a,b)βˆˆπ”½q2 via evaluations f⁒(Ξ±) of a polynomial f⁒(x)=a+b⁒x+βˆ‘j=2kβˆ’1cj⁒xj, where the ci are chosen randomly. This is a natural extension of Shamir’s scheme to multiple secrets. Our work implies that computing aβ‹…b requires a download bandwidth of nearly 2⁒log⁑q bits, twice as much as we might hope for.

1.4.3 Coded Computation

In coded computation (e.g., [25, 15, 38] or see [26] for a survey), the goal is to compute a function g of some data 𝐟, distributed among n worker nodes. The concern is that some worker nodes may unpredictable be stragglers (slow or non-responsive), and we would like to carry on the computation without them. The idea is to encode 𝐟 as a codeword cβ†’, so that g⁒(𝐟) can be computed even if a the computation on a few symbols of cβ†’ are unavailable.

This is similar in spirit to our model, but there are a few differences. First, coded computation is often studied over ℝ, rather than finite fields – it is an interesting question whether a version of our result holds over ℝ. Second, in our model the leakage functions are allowed to depend on the set S of queried servers, which is not generally the case in coded computation. However, we note that our lower bound would apply to coded computation leakage function model as well, as the problem of QM is harder if the leakage functions cannot depend on S. Thus, while coded computation is similar in spirit to our model, extensions to our work (to the reals and to computations larger than the product of two field elements) would be needed to give meaningful bounds in this setting.

1.5 Open Questions

  • β– 

    It would be interesting to extend our results to higher degree monomials. Our results show that about 2⁒log2⁑(q) bits are necessary for computing quadratic monomials g on RS-encoded data. For monomials of degree d>2, one conjecture is that about d⁒log2⁑(q) bits are needed. Is this conjecture true?

  • β– 

    It would also be interesting to know if our lower bound is achievable. That is, is it possible to evaluate quadratic monomials on top of Reed-Solomon codes of dimension k>2, with bandwidth approaching 2⁒log2⁑q? For k=2, this can be done by naive polynomial evaluation. For k>2, there are RS codes over 𝔽q that admit repair of individual codeword symbols with download bandwidth converging to log2⁑(q) bits [35]. If a similar result holds for message symbols, this would provide an algorithm for evaluating quadratic monomials with bandwidth approaching our lower bound. We are not aware of such a result (for message symbols) in the regenerating codes literature; does such a result hold, or are there other algorithms for computing quadratic monomials with about 2⁒log2⁑q bits?

  • β– 

    Finally, it would be interesting to extend our results to arbitrary quadratic functions, not just quadratic monomials. It is not hard to see that at least k bits are required to recover an arbitrary quadratic function (even an arbitrary linear function [34]). When k is large, this implies that a stronger bound should hold; what is the correct bound?

2 Preliminaries

We now set notation and establish an algorithmic view of QM. Denote by 𝔽q the finite field of q=pe elements, where p is prime. For any positive integer nβˆˆβ„€+, we denote by [n] the sequence of integers (1,2,3,…,n). Given integers i<j, we denote by [i,j]βŠ†β„€ the sequence of integers (i,i+1,…,j). For any β„±βŠ†π”½q⁒[x]deg≀kβˆ’1, we may interpret any fβˆˆβ„± as a vector of coefficients 𝐟=(fi)i∈[0,kβˆ’1]βˆˆπ”½qk: f⁒(x)=βˆ‘i=0kβˆ’1fi⁒xi. For any i,j∈[0,kβˆ’1], we write gi,j⁒(𝐟):=fi⁒fj.

Our analysis throughout primarily focuses on the problem of finding the products of coefficients of linear polynomials; explicitly, this is the setting where k=2 and i=0, j=1. We then generalize this to the full statement of Theorem 4 in Section 4.3. Thus, until then we make the following assumption:

Assumption 8.

Until Section 4.3, we assume that k=2, so f⁒(x)=m⁒x+b, and that g⁒(𝐟)=g0,1⁒(𝐟)=mβ‹…b.

2.1 Algorithmic View

We now give an algorithmic characterization of QMs (Definition 3), in light of Assumption 8.

Definition 9 (Ξ³-Bucket).

Given some Ξ³βˆˆπ”½q, we define a Ξ³-bucket as

BΞ³={fβˆˆπ”½q⁒[x]:deg⁑(f)≀1⁒ and ⁒g⁒(𝐟)=Ξ³}βŠ†π”½q⁒[x] (3)
Definition 10 (Ξ³-Bucket Evaluation).

Given Ξ±,Ξ³βˆˆπ”½q, let Bγ⁒(Ξ±):={f⁒(Ξ±):f∈BΞ³} be the set of all evaluations f⁒(Ξ±) for f∈BΞ³.

In other words, Bγ⁒(Ξ±) is the image of the evaluation map evΞ±:𝔽q⁒[x]→𝔽q, f↦f⁒(Ξ±) on a set of lines BΞ³. We now show that any t-bit, s-server QM is equivalent to an instance of Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1 QM⁒(𝜢,𝐓,𝐛).
Observation 11.

There exists a t-bit, s-server QM for g0,1 and for k=2 (Definition 3) if and only if, for every choice of SβŠ†π”½q, |S|=s, there exists some 𝛂=(Ξ±1,…,Ξ±t)∈St and a collection of subsets TiβŠ†π”½q, i∈[t] defining

Ξ»i:𝔽qβ†’{0,1},x↦{0x∈Ti1else (4)

such that Algorithm 1 succeeds and outputs g⁒(𝐟), given any input 𝐛=(Ξ»i(f(ui)):i∈[t])∈{0,1}t for all fβˆˆπ”½q⁒[x], deg⁑(f)≀1.

Proof.

The reverse direction is true by definition, so it suffices to consider the forward direction. Suppose there exists a t-bit, s-server QM for g0,1 and k=2. Fix a set SβŠ†π”½q of s servers. Let Ξ»1,…,Ξ»t be the leakage functions guaranteed by Definition 3. Define Ti=Ξ»iβˆ’1⁒(0)βŠ†π”½q for all i∈[t], and let 𝐓=(T1,…,Tt). For an arbitrary f⁒(x)βˆˆπ”½q⁒[x] of degree at most 1, set 𝐛(f)=(Ξ»i(f(Ξ±i)):i∈[t]). Let 𝜢,𝐓,𝐛⁒(f) be the inputs to Algorithm 1. The algorithm initializes a dictionary, denoted 𝐁, whose value at key Ξ³βˆˆπ”½q is the Ξ³-bucket BΞ³ (Definition 9). In each iteration i∈[t] of the main loop, the algorithm considers the ith bit of 𝐛⁒(f), which denotes whether f⁒(Ξ±i)∈Ti or f⁒(Ξ±i)βˆˆπ”½qβˆ–Ti; the algorithm removes all lines g that are inconsistent with this leakage bit.

Since we assumed a QM exists, by Definition 3, all hβˆˆπ”½q⁒[x]deg≀1 consistent with 𝐛⁒(f) satisfy g⁒(𝐑)=g⁒(𝐟)=Ξ³, which implies that all lines h that remain in some bucket must in fact all reside in the unique bucket 𝐁⁒(Ξ³). This guarantees that Algorithm 1 will terminate and correctly output Ξ³=g⁒(𝐟), as desired. β—€

Given the equivalence established by Observation 11, the minimal download bandwidth incurred by any QM is equivalent to the minimal round complexity of Algorithm 1, subject to the constraint that Algorithm 1 outputs the correct coefficient product given any leakage transcript.

2.2 Restricted Parameter Regime for QM

In Section 2.1, we established that determining the optimal download bandwidth incurred by an instance of QM is equivalent to bounding the round complexity of the corresponding instance of Algorithm 1. Rather than directly analyzing Algorithm 1, we pursue an alternate strategy: within the scope of all parameter regimes for which QM must succeed, we find a subset whose corresponding algorithmic view can be greatly simplified. Instead of tracking the number of lines in each set 𝐁⁒(Ξ³), consider an alternate implementation of Algorithm 1 that tracks the size of evα⁒(𝐁⁒(Ξ³))={f⁒(Ξ±):f∈𝐁⁒(Ξ³)}βŠ†π”½q for any Ξ±βˆˆπ”½qβˆ—. It turns out that we can construct such a correspondence between linear functions and their evaluations which, within a restricted parameter regime, yields a simpler but equivalent algorithm. To state this restricted parameter regime, we first give the following definition.

Definition 12 (Quadratic Residues).

Given a field 𝔽q, let QRq:={Ξ±2:Ξ±βˆˆπ”½qβˆ—} denote the quadratic residue subgroup of 𝔽qβˆ—.

When q=pe where p>2, exactly half of 𝔽qβˆ— lies in QRq, while the other half lies in 𝔽qβˆ–QRq. We state this formally below.

Claim 13 (e.g., [41]).

If 𝔽q is a field with characteristic p>2, then |QRq|=(qβˆ’1)/2.

Note that QRq is the image of 𝔽qβˆ— under the map x↦x2; when q=2e, the map x↦x2 is the Frobenius automorphism, implying QR2e=𝔽2eβˆ—. Since the quadratic residues do not yield an interesting subset of the multiplicative subgroup in binary extension fields, we consider an alternative construction. First, we recall the definition of the field trace.

Definition 14.

For prime p and q=pe, the field trace Tr:𝔽q→𝔽p is the 𝔽p-linear function given by

Tr⁒(x)=x+xp+xp2+β‹―+xpeβˆ’1=βˆ‘i=0eβˆ’1xpi.

The following result999This result holds in considerably more generality: given any finite extension field E and a field trace from E to a subfield F - not necessarily the base field - there exists a primitive element Ο‰βˆˆEβˆ— whose trace Tr⁒(Ο‰)=Tr⁒(Ο‰βˆ’1)=α∈F for arbitrary α∈F. Note that Ο‰ is primitive if and only if Ο‰βˆ’1 is primitive. See [27], Theorem 3.75. ([8, 27]) shows that, in all binary extension fields of order at least 2eβ‰₯8, there always exists a generator of the multiplicative subgroup whose inverse lies in the kernel of the field trace.

Theorem 15 ([8, 27]).

For any integer eβ‰₯3, there exists a primitive element Ο‰βˆˆπ”½2eβˆ— such that Tr⁒(1/Ο‰)=0.

Definition 16.

Let eβ‰₯3 and q=2e; given a primitive element Ο‰βˆˆπ”½qβˆ— satisfying Tr⁒(1/Ο‰)=0, we denote

Wq⁒(Ο‰):={Ο‰2⁒i:i=0,1,…,2eβˆ’1βˆ’2}

Since such a primitive element Ο‰ is guaranteed to exist by Theorem 15, we will assume that there is a canonical choice of Ο‰ for each field order q=2e; we may thus drop the argument and simply write Wq.

We may now state our restricted parameter regime.

Definition 17 (Restricted Parameter Regime).

Fix a QM for g0,1 and k=2 as in Definition 3. We consider the following restricted parameter regime. Let q=pe for prime p satisfying p>2; or p=2 and eβ‰₯3. Define

Ξ©q:={QRqp>2Wqp=2,eβ‰₯3.
  1. 1.

    We only consider lines fβˆˆπ”½q⁒[x] such that g⁒(𝐟)∈Ωq, and

  2. 2.

    during any round i∈[t], we only contact servers indexed by some αi∈Ωq.

As discussed in the introduction and formalized in Section 4.3, restricting to this parameter regime is without loss of generality. That is, any impossibility result for the restricted parameter regime in Definition 17 implies an impossibility result for QM in general.

3 Symmetries of restricted parameter regime

The primary goal of this section is to apply the restricted parameter regime (Definition 17) towards constructing a simplified version of Algorithm 1 whose round complexity will under-bound that of the general case.

3.1 Evaluation Map Images

We describe the algebraic structure of Bγ⁒(α) when both γ (the coefficient product; see Definition 9) and α (the evaluation parameter; see Definition 10) are restricted to α,γ∈Ωq. Consider the case where γ=1, so that

B1={1m⁒x+m:mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ—}βŠ†π”½q⁒[x]andB1⁒(1)={1m+m:mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ—}βŠ†π”½q. (5)

It turns out that, up to scaling, B1⁒(1) describes all Bγ⁒(Ξ±) for Ξ³,α∈Ωq. To express the exact scaling factor, we first define a notion of square roots over Ξ©q. Note this is possible since Ξ©qβŠ†QRq for all prime powers q, with exceptions101010These exceptions do not affect the main result of Theorem 4, since the bound is trivial over 𝔽2,𝔽4. Indeed, 2⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’2)βˆ’4≀0 when q=2,4. only when q=2,4.

Definition 18 (Square Roots in Ξ©q).

For α∈Ωq, let rΞ±:={Ξ²βˆˆπ”½qβˆ—:Ξ²2=Ξ±}βŠ†π”½qβˆ—. Since rΞ±=rΞ³ if and only if Ξ±=Ξ³, we may fix111111The results of Section 3, along with the accompanying discussion, hold for any arbitrary choice of square root representative for each α∈Ωq. In Section 4, we employ a specific choice of such representatives which eases a counting argument in the proof of Theorem 37, a key ingredient for the full result of Theorem 4. The explicit construction of such a choice of square roots, along with their combinatorial properties, is given in Section 4 of the full version [3]. a canonical representative of rΞ± for each α∈Ωq; we denote such a choice of representative α∈rΞ±.

Our goal is to understand Bγ⁒(α) in terms of B1⁒(1). We have the following lemma, whose proof is deferred to [3].

Lemma 19.

For all Ξ±,γ∈Ωq, Bγ⁒(Ξ±)=γ⁒α⋅B1⁒(1).

Such a multiplicative relationship between two images Bγ⁒(Ξ±) and B1⁒(1) allows us to work entirely over scalar multiples of B1⁒(1)βŠ†π”½q. The following observation gives the size of B1⁒(1); we defer the proof to [3].

Observation 20.

Let 𝔽q=𝔽pe where p is odd; or p=2 and eβ‰₯3. Then

|B1⁒(1)|={(q+1)/2p⁒ oddq/2p=2,eβ‰₯3.

3.2 Scalar Representatives of Lines

Let hmΞ³:=mβˆ’1⁒γ⁒x+m⁒γ so that BΞ³={hmΞ³:mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ—} for every γ∈Ωq. Note that every element of BΞ³ is then fully specified by some mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ— and γ∈Ωq.

Observation 21.

For all mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ—, γ∈Ωq specifying hmγ∈BΞ³, there exists a unique gm∈B1 such that hmΞ³=γ⁒gm. Furthermore, gm is given by gm:=hm1.

The observation follows trivially from hmΞ³=Ξ³β‹…hm1, but its significance is that we need only consider B1βŠ†π”½q⁒[x], since any line hmγ∈BΞ³ is simply a multiple of gm∈B1.

Observation 22.

For all mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ—, Ξ±,γ∈Ωq, and TβŠ†π”½q,

hmγ⁒(Ξ±)∈T⇔gm⁒(Ξ±)∈1γ⁒T. (6)

Hence, we can check whether any line hmΞ³, evaluated at Ξ±βˆˆπ”½q, is in a set T just by considering whether gm⁒(Ξ±)∈B1⁒(Ξ±) is in a multiple of T. We show that multiplying an evaluation map image Bγ⁒(Ξ±)βŠ†π”½q by some scalar is equivalent to a permutation of BΞ³βŠ†π”½q⁒[x].

Definition 23 (Ξ±-Relabeling function).

For all Ξ±,γ∈Ωq, define the mapping ϕαγ:BΞ³β†’BΞ³ by hmγ↦hm⁒αγ. Explicitly,

Ξ³m⁒x+m⁒γ↦γ(m⁒α)⁒x+(m⁒α)⁒γ. (7)

Given hmγ∈BΞ³, we call its image ϕαγ⁒[hmΞ³]∈BΞ³ the Ξ±-relabel of hmΞ³.

Note that ϕαγ is mapping one line in BΞ³ to another line also in BΞ³. The following observation shows why we have chosen to call it a relabeling; the proof follows from the fact that for any α∈Ωq, the map m↦m⁒α is a permutation of 𝔽qβˆ—, and that each element mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ— corresponds to a distinct element hmγ∈BΞ³.

Observation 24.

For all Ξ±,γ∈Ωq, ϕαγ:BΞ³β†’BΞ³ is a permutation of BΞ³.

Given some hmγ∈BΞ³ and α∈Ωq, we denote by ϕαγ⁒[hmΞ³]⁒(Ξ±) the evaluation of the Ξ±-relabel of hmΞ³ at an evaluation point Ξ±. We show that the multiplicative relationship between lines in BΞ³ and lines in B1 (Observation 21) is preserved by this relabeling.

Theorem 25.

Let Ξ±,γ∈Ωq and hmγ∈BΞ³. Then ϕαγ⁒[hmΞ³]⁒(Ξ±)=γ⁒α⋅gm⁒(1).

The proof is deferred to [3]. We extend Theorem 25 with the following corollary, whose proof is immediate. This is the Ξ±-relabel analogue of Observation 22, and it is the tool we will need to reduce a subset of QM to a simpler algorithm in the following section.

Corollary 26.

For all mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ—, Ξ±,γ∈Ωq, and TβŠ†π”½q,

ϕαγ⁒[hmΞ³]⁒(Ξ±)∈T⇔gm⁒(1)=m+mβˆ’1∈1γ⁒α⁒T. (8)

3.3 Reinterpreting Leakage Functions

We now map the sets Ti (defining bit-valued leakage functions; see Algorithm 1) to our new, relabeled setting. Suppose a round i∈[t] is associated with a server indexed by Ξ±i∈Ωq (i.e., the server holding the evaluation f⁒(Ξ±i)). A candidate hmγ∈BΞ³ is deemed inconsistent with the ith leakage bit b (hence, eliminated as a candidate for f) if b=0 and hmγ⁒(Ξ±i)∈Ti, or if b=1 and hmγ⁒(Ξ±i)βˆˆπ”½qβˆ–Ti.

Definition 27.

Given some round i∈[t] associated with Ξ±i∈Ωq and TiβŠ†π”½q, define

Ui:=β‹ƒΞ³βˆˆΞ©q{ϕαiγ⁒[hmΞ³]:hmγ∈BΞ³,hmγ⁒(Ξ±i)∈Ti}βŠ†π”½q⁒[x]. (9)

Furthermore, define Vi:=(1/αi)⁒{f⁒(αi):f∈Ui}.

Theorem 28.

As per Definition 17, consider an instance of QM restricted to coefficient products and Reed-Solomon evaluation points that both lie in Ξ©q. During a QM round indexed by i∈[t], let mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ—, Ξ³,Ξ±i∈Ωq; then

hmγ⁒(αi)∈Ti⟹gm⁒(1)∈1γ⁒Vi. (10)
Proof of Theorem 28.

Suppose that we query a server indexed by αi∈Ωq holding f⁒(αi), whose ith leakage bit bi is inconsistent with some candidate hmγ∈Bγ for the underlying Reed-Solomon message polynomial f⁒(x). Assume without loss of generality that bi=0. Then removing hmγ from consideration occurs precisely when hmγ⁒(αi)∈Ti. By the construction of Ui,Vi,

hmγ⁒(Ξ±i)∈Ti βŸΉΟ•Ξ±iγ⁒[hmΞ³]∈Ui⟹1Ξ±i⋅ϕαiγ⁒[hmΞ³]⁒(Ξ±i)∈Vi. (11)

By Theorem 25, we rewrite

1Ξ±i⋅ϕαiγ⁒[hmΞ³]⁒(Ξ±i)=1Ξ±i⁒(γ⁒αiβ‹…gm⁒(1))=Ξ³β‹…gm⁒(1) (12)

which, substituted into (11), yields the desired result. β—€

4 Proof of Main Theorem

In this section, we use the tools from Section 3 to prove Theorem 4. We begin in Section 4.1 by proving the result for the subcase of QM under the restrictions of 17. Then we extend it to prove Theorem 4 in Section 4.3.

4.1 mQM: β€œmini QM”

We start by defining the restricted version of our problem that we will solve first.

Definition 29 (mQM).

We denote by mQM⁒(𝛂,𝐓,𝐛) an instance of QM⁒(𝛂,𝐓,𝐛) (Algorithm 1), subject to the additional constraints of Definition 17.

In particular, Definition 17 restricts us to only considering lines fβˆˆπ”½q⁒[x] satisfying g⁒(𝐟)∈Ωq; accordingly, we need only distinguish among leakage transcripts corresponding to lines with quadratic residue coefficient products.

Definition 30 (Leakage transcript validity).

Given some π›‚βˆˆΞ©qt and fixed sequence of leakage sets 𝐓=(T1,…,Tt), we say that a t-bit leakage transcript π›βˆˆ{0,1}t is valid if there exists some f⁒(x)βˆˆπ”½q⁒[x], deg⁑(f)≀1 satisfying g0,1⁒(𝐟)∈Ωq such that

𝐛i={0f⁒(Ξ±i)∈Tj1else (13)

for all i∈[t].

Since mQM need only distinguish between coefficient products lying in Ξ©q rather than all of 𝔽q, we adjust the notion of success accordingly.

Definition 31 (mQM validity).

We say that an instance of mQM is (s,t)-valid if for any choice of size sβˆˆβ„€+ sized subset SβŠ†Ξ©q, there exists some fixed π›‚βˆˆSt and fixed sequence of leakage sets 𝐓 such that mQM⁒(𝛂,𝐓,𝐛) returns β€œSuccess!” for every t-bit valid leakage transcript 𝐛.

Definition 32.

We say that s-server mQM has round complexity t if, for all (s,tβ€²)-valid mQM schemes, tβ€²β‰₯t.

4.2 pQM: β€œprojection QM”

We now define an algorithm121212So-called as it β€œprojects” subsets BΞ³βŠ†π”½q⁒[x] onto B1⁒(1)βŠ†π”½q. pQM, analogous to Algorithm 1, presented as Algorithm 2. Our main objective in the section is to show that a valid mQM scheme implies a successful pQM scheme, which is established in Theorem 34. To that end we define a notion of pQM validity similar to that of Definition 31.

Algorithm 2 pQM⁒(𝐕,𝐛).
Definition 33.

We say that an instance of pQM is t-valid if there exists some sequence 𝐕 of leakage sets such that pQM⁒(𝐕,𝐛) succeeds for all π›βˆˆ{0,1}t. We say that pQM has round complexity t if, for all tβ€²-valid pQM schemes, tβ€²β‰₯t.

We may now formally state the key theorem that will allow us to analyze the round complexity of pQM to derive a lower bound on that of mQM - and by extension, QM itself.

Theorem 34.

Let s,tβˆˆβ„€+ and suppose there exists an (s,t)-valid instance of mQM. Then there exists an r-valid instance of pQM, for some positive integer r≀t.

Proof.

Fix some server schedule 𝜢∈Ωqt supported on s distinct server labels in Ξ©q. Suppose that 𝐓 is a sequence of leakage sets defining an (s,t)-valid mQM scheme; then for any valid t-bit leakage transcript 𝐛, mQM⁒(𝜢,𝐓,𝐛) returns β€œSuccess!”, implying that at the end of its execution, 𝐁⁒(Ξ³)=βˆ… for all but one value γ∈Ωq; denote this unique value δ∈Ωq.

Let γ∈Ωqβˆ–{Ξ΄}. Then for each hmγ∈BΞ³ there exists some round im∈[t] such that precisely one of

𝐛im=0andhmγ⁒(Ξ±im)∈Tim;or𝐛im=1andhmγ⁒(Ξ±im)βˆˆπ”½qβˆ–Tim (14)

holds, otherwise hmΞ³ would never be removed from BΞ³ and 𝐁⁒(Ξ³)β‰ βˆ…; take im to be the least such value. Assume that 𝐛im=0; the case 𝐛im=1 is verbatim. From 𝐓, construct the length t sequence 𝐕 of leakage sets by applying Definition 27 to each entry of Ti↦Vi, i∈[t]. Then by Theorem 28, (14) holding in some round im∈[t] implies

hmγ⁒(αim)∈Tim⟹gm⁒(1)∈1γ⁒Vim. (15)

Consider an instance pQM⁒(𝐕,𝐛). By (15), hmΞ³βˆ‰πβ’(Ξ³) implies gm⁒(1)βˆ‰SΞ³j at the conclusion of every round j∈[t], jβ‰₯im. Since every hmΞ³, mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ— is removed in some round im∈[t] of mQM⁒(𝜢,𝐓,𝐛), it follows that every gm⁒(1), mβˆˆπ”½qβˆ— will be removed no later than the same round im∈[t] of pQM⁒(𝐕,𝐛). Hence, 𝐁⁒(Ξ³)=βˆ… implies SΞ³t=βˆ… for all γ∈Ωqβˆ–{Ξ΄}. It follows that there exists at most one value, namely δ∈Ωq, satisfying SΞ΄tβ‰ βˆ…; accordingly, pQM will return β€œSuccess!”, as desired, in at most t rounds. β—€

4.3 Round Complexity of pQM, and Proof of Theorem 4

Theorem 34 shows that any under bound on the round complexity of pQM (Algorithm 2) is an under bound on the round complexity of mQM, which in turn is a sub-case of QM (Algorithm 1). With this relation established, we now focus on the task of under bounding the round complexity of pQM. We will show the following theorem.

Theorem 35.

Fix 𝔽q=𝔽pe for prime p>2 and qβ‰ 5; or p=2 and eβ‰₯3. Then any t-valid pQM scheme over 𝔽q must satisfy

tβ‰₯{2⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’1)βˆ’3p>2,peβ‰ 52⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’2)βˆ’4p=2,eβ‰₯3.

We will prove Theorem 35 later, as it relies on Theorem 37 in the next section. For now, we observe that Theorem 35, along with the above reasoning, implies Theorem 4. We will do so in two steps:

  1. 1.

    Theorem 36 shows that Theorem 34 and Theorem 35 imply Theorem 4 in the restricted parameter regime where k=2, i=0, and j=1 - i.e., under Assumption 8.

  2. 2.

    shows that Theorem 36 implies Theorem 4 for all kβ‰₯2, via a reduction argument.

Theorem 36 (Theorem 4, restricted to k=2).

Fix 𝔽q=𝔽pe; let sβ‰₯3, k=2, and suppose there exists a t-bit, s-server QM scheme for g0,1 and RS codes of dimension k (Definition 3) over 𝔽q. Then its download bandwidth must satisfy

tβ‰₯{2⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’1)βˆ’3p>22⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’2)βˆ’4p=2.
Proof.

First, any lower bound on the bandwidth of mQMs implies the same lower bound for QMs; we argue that the restrictions in Definition 17 are without loss of generality. Once we have assumed that k=2, Definition 17 restricts the mQM coefficient product g⁒(𝐟)∈Ωq and requires all queries to be made to servers indexed by some α∈Ωq. The former is strictly a sub-problem of QM. The latter restriction is without loss of generality: the client may query any s servers but must download at least one bit per query, so the bound of Theorem 4 is relevant only when s≀2⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’2)βˆ’4 in the characteristic 2 case, or s≀2⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’1)βˆ’3 in the odd characteristic case. On the other hand, the order of Ξ©q is at least |Ξ©q|β‰₯(qβˆ’2)/2, which is always greater than 2⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’1)βˆ’3 for all prime powers q.

Now Theorems 34 and 35, along with the fact noted above that lower bounds for mQMs imply the same lower bounds for QMs, implies Theorem 4 in all cases except when q=2,4,5. However, for such values of q, Theorem 4 is vacuously true. β—€

Theorem 4 (Main Theorem). [Restated, see original statement.]

Let kβ‰₯2 and fix i,j∈[0,kβˆ’1], iβ‰ j. Fix 𝔽q=𝔽pe; let sβ‰₯3, and suppose there exists a t-bit, s-server QM scheme (Definition 3) for gi,j and RS codes of dimension k over 𝔽q. Then the download bandwidth satisfies

tβ‰₯{2⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’1)βˆ’3p>22⁒log2⁑(qβˆ’2)βˆ’4p=2. (1)
Proof.

Let ℬ⁒(p) denote the right-side term of the inequality in (1). For k>2, distinct i,j∈[0,kβˆ’1] with i<j, Ο„βˆˆβ„€+, and sβ‰₯3, suppose exists a Ο„-bit, s-server QM Ξ¦ over 𝔽q=𝔽pe computing gi,j⁒(𝐟)=fi⁒fj for all πŸβˆˆπ”½qk≃RSq⁒[n,k]. Consider the dimension 2 subspace of 𝔽qk given by π’ž={𝐟=fi⁒ei+fj⁒ej:fi,fjβˆˆπ”½q}≃RSq⁒[n,2] where ei,ej denote the ith, jth standard basis vectors, respectively. Since π’žβŠ†π”½qk, we know Ξ¦ is trivially a Ο„-bit, s-server QM for π’ž. For any πŸβˆˆπ’ž, each server indexed by Ξ±βˆˆπ”½qβˆ— locally holds the codeword symbol f⁒(Ξ±)=fi⁒αi+fj⁒αj. Each server may also locally scale their codeword symbol by Ξ±βˆ’i to recover f^⁒(Ξ±):=Ξ±βˆ’i⁒f⁒(Ξ±)=fi+fj⁒αjβˆ’i.

Thus, up to local rescaling, each server indexed by some Ξ±βˆˆπ”½qβˆ— holds an evaluation point of the form f^⁒(Ξ±)=b+m⁒αr for some r:=jβˆ’i∈[1,kβˆ’1] and m,bβˆˆπ”½q. Each server may then locally re-index by Ξ±rβˆˆπ”½qβˆ—; after such a re-indexing, each server labeled by some Ξ²=Ξ±rβˆˆπ”½qβˆ— holds a linear evaluation h⁒(Ξ²)=b+m⁒β=f^⁒(Ξ±). Let Sβ€² be the set of server labels Ξ²βˆˆπ”½qβˆ— and sβ€²=|Sβ€²|≀n; then (h⁒(Ξ²))β∈S is a Reed-Solomon codeword in π’žβ€²:=RSq⁒[s′≀n,2]. Importantly, π’žβ€² need not be full-length131313If r divides qβˆ’1, not all evaluation points may be available; that is, only certain Ξ²βˆˆπ”½qβˆ— may appear, corresponding to the image of the map x↦xr over 𝔽qβˆ—. over 𝔽q. Nonetheless, any bandwidth lower bound for QM over a full-length RS code must hold for QM over any subset of codeword positions; otherwise, a client could lower download bandwidth in the former case by querying a subset of available servers.

Thus, recovering g0,1⁒(𝐑)=m⁒b is equivalent to recovering gi,j⁒(𝐟) for πŸβˆˆπ’žβŠ†π”½qk. Since Theorem 36 implies that any QM scheme for full-length RS codes recovering g0,1⁒(𝐑)=m⁒b must download at least ℬ⁒(p) bits, the same requirement holds for our RS code after the relabeling Ξ²=Ξ±r of evaluation points. We see that Ξ¦ must incur a download at least Ο„β‰₯ℬ⁒(p), as desired. β—€

4.3.1 Size of pQM final states

We now focus exclusively on pQM as presented in Algorithm 2, placing aside the problem of coefficient product recovery altogether. We show that, if pQM succeeds, then it must have removed nearly all points from consideration. We state the result below. Due to space constraints, the proof is omitted, and available in [3].

Theorem 37.

Fix 𝔽q=𝔽pe for prime p>2 and qβ‰ 5. Let 𝐕 be some sequence of leakage sets Vi, i∈[t] defining an t-valid pQM (Algorithm 2).

Suppose for some π›βˆˆ{0,1}t there exists a unique δ∈Ωq such that SΞ΄tβ‰ βˆ… at the conclusion of pQM⁒(𝐕,𝐛). Then

|β‹ƒΟƒβˆˆΞ©qSΟƒt|≀{2p⁒ oddΒ 3p=2,eβ‰₯3.

4.3.2 Lower-bounding Round Complexity

We conclude this section with the proof of Theorem 35. We construct a game that is equivalent to pQM, but in an β€œadversarial” context.

Proof of Theorem 35.

Consider a round-based game played between Alice and an (adversarial but honest) Eve. For all γ∈Ωq, Alice initializes the sets Sγ0=B1⁒(1). For each round i∈[t],

  1. 1.

    Alice chooses an arbitrary ViβŠ†π”½q, and denotes Y0:=Vi, Y1:=𝔽qβˆ—βˆ–Vi.

  2. 2.

    Eve computes

    𝐛i:=argmaxb∈{0,1}⁒(βˆ‘Ξ³βˆˆΞ©q|SΞ³iβˆ’1βˆ–(1γ⁒Yb)|) (16)
  3. 3.

    Alice updates the sets SΞ³iβˆ’1, γ∈Ωq according to Eve’s choice of 𝐛i; concretely, for all γ∈Ωq, Alice sets

    SΞ³i:=SΞ³iβˆ’1βˆ–(1γ⁒Y𝐛i). (17)

By observation, the above game is equivalent to pQM where the leakage set Vi and leakage bit 𝐛i are determined round-to-round by Alice and Eve, respectively. Eve’s choice of 𝐛i ensures that at most half of all points still under consideration are removed for each i. By Theorem 37, if Alice wishes to win in t rounds, then t must satisfy:

  • β– 

    If q=pe for an odd prime p: then Ξ©q=QRq and

    t β‰₯⌈log2⁑(βˆ‘Ξ³βˆˆQRq|SΞ³0|)βˆ’log2⁑(2)βŒ‰=⌈log2⁑((qβˆ’1)⁒(q+1)4)βŒ‰βˆ’1
    β‰₯log2⁑((qβˆ’1)2)βˆ’3.
  • β– 

    If q=𝟐e, for eβ‰₯πŸ‘: then Ξ©q=Wq and

    t β‰₯⌈log2⁑(βˆ‘Ξ³βˆˆWq|SΞ³0|)βˆ’log2⁑(3)βŒ‰β‰₯⌈log2⁑((2eβˆ’2)⁒(2e)4)βŒ‰βˆ’2
    β‰₯log2⁑((qβˆ’2)2)βˆ’4.

β—€ This completes the proof of Theorem 35, and hence the proof of Theorem 4.

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