Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik GmbH Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik GmbH scholarly article en Yokoo, Makoto License
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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25621

False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms



In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e.g., multiple e-mail addresses). If only one good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a {em false-name bid}. In this talk, I describe the summary of existing works and open problems on false-name bids.

BibTeX - Entry

  author =	{Makoto Yokoo},
  title =	{False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  year =	{2010},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  number =	{10101},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{},
  annote =	{Keywords: Combinatorial auctions, mechanism design, false-name bids}

Keywords: Combinatorial auctions, mechanism design, false-name bids
Seminar: 10101 - Computational Foundations of Social Choice
Issue date: 2010
Date of publication: 2010

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