Belief merging, judgment aggregation and some links with social choice theory

Authors Daniel Eckert, Gabriella Pigozzi

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Daniel Eckert
Gabriella Pigozzi

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Daniel Eckert and Gabriella Pigozzi. Belief merging, judgment aggregation and some links with social choice theory. In Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5321, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2005)


In this paper we explore the relation between three areas: judgment aggregation, belief merging and social choice theory. Judgment aggregation studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions. When majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may however give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions (the conclusion). Starting from this so-called doctrinal paradox, the paper surveys the literature on judgment aggregation (and its relation to preference aggregation), and shows that the application of a well known belief merging operator can dissolve the paradox. Finally, the use of distances is shown to establish a link between belief merging and preference aggregation in social choice theory.
  • Judgment aggregation
  • belief merging
  • preference aggregation
  • social choice theory


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