Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory

Authors P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ronald Peeters

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P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Ronald Peeters

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P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Ronald Peeters. Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory. In Equilibrium Computation. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7471, pp. 1-40, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)


This paper presents a survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection theories. We present the relevant techniques underlying homotopy algorithms. We give detailed expositions of the Lemke-Howson algorithm and the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person games, and the Herings-van den Elzen, Herings-Peeters, and McKelvey-Palfrey algorithms to compute Nash equilibria in general $n$-person games. We explain how the main ideas can be extended to compute equilibria in extensive form and dynamic games, and how homotopies can be used to compute all Nash equilibria.
  • Homotopy
  • Equilibrium computation
  • Non-cooperative games
  • Nash Equilibrium


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