Document Open Access Logo

Creating incentives to prevent execution failures: an extension of VCG mechanism

Authors Yingqian Zhang, Mathijs de Weerdt

Thumbnail PDF


  • Filesize: 183 kB
  • 18 pages

Document Identifiers

Author Details

Yingqian Zhang
Mathijs de Weerdt

Cite AsGet BibTex

Yingqian Zhang and Mathijs de Weerdt. Creating incentives to prevent execution failures: an extension of VCG mechanism. In Planning in Multiagent Systems. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8461, pp. 1-18, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)


When information or control in a multiagent planning system is private to the agents, they may misreport this information or refuse to execute an agreed outcome, in order to change the resulting end state of such a system to their benefit. In some domains this may result in an execution failure. We show that in such settings VCG mechanisms lose truthfulness, and that the utility of truthful agents can become negative when using VCG payments (i.e., VCG is not strongly individually rational). To deal with this problem, we introduce an extended payment structure which takes into account the actual execution of the promised outcome. We show that this extended mechanism can guarantee a nonnegative utility and is (i) incentive compatible in a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) incentive compatible in dominant strategies if and only if all agents can be verified during execution.
  • Mechanism design
  • multiagent planning


  • Access Statistics
  • Total Accesses (updated on a weekly basis)
    PDF Downloads
Questions / Remarks / Feedback

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing

Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail