Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of `Mens Rea'

Author Jan M. Broersen

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Jan M. Broersen

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Jan M. Broersen. Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of `Mens Rea'. In Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9351, pp. 1-22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)


Most juridical systems contain the principle that an act is only unlaw- ful if the agent conducting the act has a `guilty mind' (`mens rea'). Dif- ferent law systems distinguish different modes of mens rea. For instance, American law distinguishes between `knowingly' performing a criminal act, `recklessness', `strict liability', etc. I will show we can formalize several of these categories. The formalism I use is a complete stit-logic featuring operators for stit-actions taking effect in `next' states, S5-knowledge op- erators and SDL-type obligation operators. The different modes of `mens rea' correspond to the violation conditions of different types of obligation definable in the logic.
  • Product update
  • agency
  • stit theory
  • knowingly doing


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