Most juridical systems contain the principle that an act is only unlaw- ful if the agent conducting the act has a `guilty mind' (`mens rea'). Dif- ferent law systems distinguish different modes of mens rea. For instance, American law distinguishes between `knowingly' performing a criminal act, `recklessness', `strict liability', etc. I will show we can formalize several of these categories. The formalism I use is a complete stit-logic featuring operators for stit-actions taking effect in `next' states, S5-knowledge op- erators and SDL-type obligation operators. The different modes of `mens rea' correspond to the violation conditions of different types of obligation definable in the logic.
@InProceedings{broersen:DagSemProc.09351.4, author = {Broersen, Jan M.}, title = {{Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of `Mens Rea'}}, booktitle = {Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction}, pages = {1--22}, series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)}, ISSN = {1862-4405}, year = {2009}, volume = {9351}, editor = {Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and Hans Rott}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09351.4}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-22296}, doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.09351.4}, annote = {Keywords: Product update, agency, stit theory, knowingly doing} }
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