Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of `Mens Rea'

Broersen, Jan M.

doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.09351.4

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Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of `Mens Rea'

Author Jan M. Broersen

Part of: Volume: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9351
Part of: Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)
License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
Publication Date: 2009-11-04

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DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09351.4
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-22296

Subject Classification

Keywords

Product update
agency
stit theory
knowingly doing

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Abstract

Most juridical systems contain the principle that an act is only unlaw-
ful if the agent conducting the act has a `guilty mind' (`mens rea'). Dif-
ferent law systems distinguish different modes of mens rea. For instance,
American law distinguishes between `knowingly' performing a criminal
act, `recklessness', `strict liability', etc. I will show we can formalize several
of these categories. The formalism I use is a complete stit-logic featuring
operators for stit-actions taking effect in `next' states, S5-knowledge op-
erators and SDL-type obligation operators. The different modes of `mens
rea' correspond to the violation conditions of different types of obligation
definable in the logic.

Cite As Get BibTex

Jan M. Broersen. Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of `Mens Rea'. In Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9351, pp. 1-22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009) https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.09351.4

Author Details

Jan M. Broersen

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