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False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms

Author Makoto Yokoo

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Makoto Yokoo

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Makoto Yokoo. False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)


In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e.g., multiple e-mail addresses). If only one good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a {em false-name bid}. In this talk, I describe the summary of existing works and open problems on false-name bids.
  • Combinatorial auctions
  • mechanism design
  • false-name bids


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