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A Collection of Constraint Programming Models for the Three-Dimensional Stable Matching Problem with Cyclic Preferences

Authors Ágnes Cseh , Guillaume Escamocher , Begüm Genç , Luis Quesada

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Ágnes Cseh
  • Hasso-Plattner-Institute, Universität Potsdam, Germany
  • Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Pécs, Hungary
Guillaume Escamocher
  • Insight Centre for Data Analytics, School of Computer Science and Information Technology, University College Cork, Ireland
Begüm Genç
  • Insight Centre for Data Analytics, School of Computer Science and Information Technology, University College Cork, Ireland
Luis Quesada
  • Insight Centre for Data Analytics, School of Computer Science and Information Technology, University College Cork, Ireland


COST Action CA16228 European Network for Game Theory.

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Ágnes Cseh, Guillaume Escamocher, Begüm Genç, and Luis Quesada. A Collection of Constraint Programming Models for the Three-Dimensional Stable Matching Problem with Cyclic Preferences. In 27th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 210, pp. 22:1-22:19, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)


We introduce five constraint models for the 3-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences and study their relative performances under diverse configurations. While several constraint models have been proposed for variants of the two-dimensional stable matching problem, we are the first to present constraint models for a higher number of dimensions. We show for all five models how to capture two different stability notions, namely weak and strong stability. Additionally, we translate some well-known fairness notions (i.e. sex-equal, minimum regret, egalitarian) into 3-dimensional matchings, and present how to capture them in each model. Our tests cover dozens of problem sizes and four different instance generation methods. We explore two levels of commitment in our models: one where we have an individual variable for each agent (individual commitment), and another one where the determination of a variable involves pairing the three agents at once (group commitment). Our experiments show that the suitability of the commitment depends on the type of stability we are dealing with. Our experiments not only led us to discover dependencies between the type of stability and the instance generation method, but also brought light to the role that learning and restarts can play in solving this kind of problems.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Constraint and logic programming
  • Theory of computation → Design and analysis of algorithms
  • Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
  • 3DSM-cyc
  • Constraint Programming
  • fairness


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