Until now, distributed algorithms for rational agents have assumed a-priori knowledge of n, the size of the network. This assumption is challenged here by proving how much a-priori knowledge is necessary for equilibrium in different distributed computing problems. Duplication - pretending to be more than one agent - is the main tool used by agents to deviate and increase their utility when not enough knowledge about n is given. We begin by proving that when no information on n is given, equilibrium is impossible for both Coloring and Knowledge Sharing. We then provide new algorithms for both problems when n is a-priori known to all agents. However, what if agents have partial knowledge about n? We provide tight upper and lower bounds that must be a-priori known on n for equilibrium to be possible in Leader Election, Knowledge Sharing, Coloring, Partition and Orientation.
@InProceedings{afek_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2018.5, author = {Afek, Yehuda and Rafaeli, Shaked and Sulamy, Moshe}, title = {{The Role of A-priori Information in Networks of Rational Agents}}, booktitle = {32nd International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2018)}, pages = {5:1--5:18}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-092-7}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2018}, volume = {121}, editor = {Schmid, Ulrich and Widder, Josef}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2018.5}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-97945}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2018.5}, annote = {Keywords: rational agents, distributed game theory, coloring, knowledge sharing} }
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