Brief Announcement: Communication-Efficient BFT Using Small Trusted Hardware to Tolerate Minority Corruption

Authors Sravya Yandamuri, Ittai Abraham, Kartik Nayak, Michael Reiter

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Sravya Yandamuri
  • Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
Ittai Abraham
  • VMware Research, Herzliya, Israel
Kartik Nayak
  • Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
Michael Reiter
  • Duke University, Durham, NC, USA

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Sravya Yandamuri, Ittai Abraham, Kartik Nayak, and Michael Reiter. Brief Announcement: Communication-Efficient BFT Using Small Trusted Hardware to Tolerate Minority Corruption. In 35th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 209, pp. 62:1-62:4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)


Small trusted hardware primitives can improve fault tolerance of Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols to one-half faults. However, existing works achieve this at the cost of increased communication complexity. In this work, we explore the design of communication-efficient BFT protocols that can boost fault tolerance to one-half without worsening communication complexity. Our results include a version of HotStuff that retains linear communication complexity in each view and a version of the VABA protocol with quadratic communication, both leveraging trusted hardware to tolerate a minority of corruptions. As a building block, we present communication-efficient provable broadcast, a core broadcast primitive with increased fault tolerance. Our results use expander graphs to achieve efficient communication in a manner that may be of independent interest.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Communication complexity
  • communication complexity
  • consensus
  • trusted hardware


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