Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling

Authors Diodato Ferraioli , Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre

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Diodato Ferraioli
  • Università degli Studi di Salerno, Italy
Adrian Meier
  • ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Paolo Penna
  • ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Carmine Ventre
  • King’s College London, UK

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Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, and Carmine Ventre. Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling. In 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 144, pp. 46:1-46:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)


Catering to the incentives of people with limited rationality is a challenging research direction that requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms and approximation algorithms. Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms have recently emerged as the concept of interest to this research agenda. However, the majority of the literature in the area has either highlighted the shortcomings of OSP or focused on the "right" definition rather than on the construction of these mechanisms. We here give the first set of tight results on the approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms for scheduling related machines. By extending the well-known cycle monotonicity technique, we are able to concentrate on the algorithmic component of OSP mechanisms and provide some novel paradigms for their design.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Algorithmic mechanism design
  • Bounded Rationality
  • Extensive-form Mechanisms
  • Approximate Mechanism Design


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