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Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences

Authors Leonard J. Schulman, Vijay V. Vazirani



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Leonard J. Schulman
Vijay V. Vazirani

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Leonard J. Schulman and Vijay V. Vazirani. Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences. In 35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 45, pp. 543-559, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2015)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.543

Abstract

We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of strategy-proofness (incentive compatibility). In addition (and even when extended to the case of Leontief bundles) it enjoys Pareto efficiency, envy-freeness, and time efficiency.
Keywords
  • Mechanism design
  • lexicographic preferences
  • strategyproof
  • Pareto optimal
  • incentive compatible

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