We prove that it is PPAD-hard to compute a Nash equilibrium in a tree polymatrix game with twenty actions per player. This is the first PPAD hardness result for a game with a constant number of actions per player where the interaction graph is acyclic. Along the way we show PPAD-hardness for finding an ε-fixed point of a 2D-LinearFIXP instance, when ε is any constant less than (√2 - 1)/2 ≈ 0.2071. This lifts the hardness regime from polynomially small approximations in k-dimensions to constant approximations in two-dimensions, and our constant is substantial when compared to the trivial upper bound of 0.5.
@InProceedings{deligkas_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.38, author = {Deligkas, Argyrios and Fearnley, John and Savani, Rahul}, title = {{Tree Polymatrix Games Are PPAD-Hard}}, booktitle = {47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020)}, pages = {38:1--38:14}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-138-2}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2020}, volume = {168}, editor = {Czumaj, Artur and Dawar, Anuj and Merelli, Emanuela}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.38}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-124458}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.38}, annote = {Keywords: Nash Equilibria, Polymatrix Games, PPAD, Brouwer Fixed Points} }
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