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Lipschitz Continuous Allocations for Optimization Games

Authors Soh Kumabe, Yuichi Yoshida

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Author Details

Soh Kumabe
  • CyberAgent, Tokyo, Japan
Yuichi Yoshida
  • National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan

Funding

  • Kumabe, Soh: Supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP21J20547. Most of this work was done while the author was a student at The University of Tokyo.
  • Yoshida, Yuichi: Supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP24K02903.

Cite AsGet BibTex

Soh Kumabe and Yuichi Yoshida. Lipschitz Continuous Allocations for Optimization Games. In 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 297, pp. 102:1-102:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.102

Abstract

In cooperative game theory, the primary focus is the equitable allocation of payoffs or costs among agents. However, in the practical applications of cooperative games, accurately representing games is challenging. In such cases, using an allocation method sensitive to small perturbations in the game can lead to various problems, including dissatisfaction among agents and the potential for manipulation by agents seeking to maximize their own benefits. Therefore, the allocation method must be robust against game perturbations. In this study, we explore optimization games, in which the value of the characteristic function is provided as the optimal value of an optimization problem. To assess the robustness of the allocation methods, we use the Lipschitz constant, which quantifies the extent of change in the allocation vector in response to a unit perturbation in the weight vector of the underlying problem. Thereafter, we provide an algorithm for the matching game that returns an allocation belonging to the (1/2-ε)-approximate core with Lipschitz constant O(ε^{-1}). Additionally, we provide an algorithm for a minimum spanning tree game that returns an allocation belonging to the 4-approximate core with a constant Lipschitz constant. The Shapley value is a popular allocation that satisfies several desirable properties. Therefore, we investigate the robustness of the Shapley value. We demonstrate that the Lipschitz constant of the Shapley value for the minimum spanning tree is constant, whereas that for the matching game is Ω(log n), where n denotes the number of vertices.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Mathematics of computing → Approximation algorithms
Keywords
  • Cooperative Games
  • Lipschitz Continuity

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