We consider the question of minimizing the round complexity of protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC) with security against an arbitrary number of semi-honest parties. Very recently, Garg and Srinivasan (Eurocrypt 2018) and Benhamouda and Lin (Eurocrypt 2018) constructed such 2-round MPC protocols from minimal assumptions. This was done by showing a round preserving reduction to the task of secure 2-party computation of the oblivious transfer functionality (OT). These constructions made a novel non-black-box use of the underlying OT protocol. The question remained whether this can be done by only making black-box use of 2-round OT. This is of theoretical and potentially also practical value as black-box use of primitives tends to lead to more efficient constructions. Our main result proves that such a black-box construction is impossible, namely that non-black-box use of OT is necessary. As a corollary, a similar separation holds when starting with any 2-party functionality other than OT. As a secondary contribution, we prove several additional results that further clarify the landscape of black-box MPC with minimal interaction. In particular, we complement the separation from 2-party functionalities by presenting a complete 4-party functionality, give evidence for the difficulty of ruling out a complete 3-party functionality and for the difficulty of ruling out black-box constructions of 3-round MPC from 2-round OT, and separate a relaxed "non-compact" variant of 2-party homomorphic secret sharing from 2-round OT.
@InProceedings{applebaum_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.71, author = {Applebaum, Benny and Brakerski, Zvika and Garg, Sanjam and Ishai, Yuval and Srinivasan, Akshayaram}, title = {{Separating Two-Round Secure Computation From Oblivious Transfer}}, booktitle = {11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020)}, pages = {71:1--71:18}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-134-4}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2020}, volume = {151}, editor = {Vidick, Thomas}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.71}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-117560}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.71}, annote = {Keywords: Oracle Separation, Oblivious Transfer, Secure Multiparty Computation} }
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