@InProceedings{hosseini_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.86,
author = {Hosseini, Mojtaba and Vazirani, Vijay V.},
title = {{Nash-Bargaining-Based Models for Matching Markets: One-Sided and Two-Sided; Fisher and Arrow-Debreu}},
booktitle = {13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)},
pages = {86:1--86:20},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-217-4},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2022},
volume = {215},
editor = {Braverman, Mark},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.86},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-156821},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.86},
annote = {Keywords: Matching-based market design, Nash bargaining, convex optimization, Frank-Wolfe algorithm, cutting planes, general equilibrium theory, one-sided markets, two-sided markets}
}