Exploring Key-Value Stores in Multi-Writer Byzantine-Resilient Register Emulations

Authors Tiago Oliveira, Ricardo Mendes, Alysson Bessani

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Tiago Oliveira
Ricardo Mendes
Alysson Bessani

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Tiago Oliveira, Ricardo Mendes, and Alysson Bessani. Exploring Key-Value Stores in Multi-Writer Byzantine-Resilient Register Emulations. In 20th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 70, pp. 30:1-30:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)


Resilient register emulation is a fundamental technique to implement dependable storage and distributed systems. In data-centric models, where servers are modeled as fail-prone base objects, classical solutions achieve resilience by using fault-tolerant quorums of read-write registers or read-modify-write objects. Recently, this model has attracted renewed interest due to the popularity of cloud storage providers (e.g., Amazon S3), that can be modeled as key-value stores (KVSs) and combined for providing secure and dependable multi-cloud storage services. In this paper we present three novel wait-free multi-writer multi-reader regular register emulations on top of Byzantine-prone KVSs. We implemented and evaluated these constructions using five existing cloud storage services and show that their performance matches or surpasses existing data-centric register emulations.
  • Byzantine fault tolerance
  • register emulation
  • multi-writer
  • key-value store
  • data-centric algorithms


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