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Everest: Towards a Verified, Drop-in Replacement of HTTPS

Authors Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Barry Bond, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Cédric Fournet, Chris Hawblitzel, Catalin Hritcu, Samin Ishtiaq, Markulf Kohlweiss, Rustan Leino, Jay Lorch, Kenji Maillard, Jianyang Pan, Bryan Parno, Jonathan Protzenko, Tahina Ramananandro, Ashay Rane, Aseem Rastogi, Nikhil Swamy, Laure Thompson, Peng Wang, Santiago Zanella-Béguelin, Jean-Karim Zinzindohoué

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Karthikeyan Bhargavan
Barry Bond
Antoine Delignat-Lavaud
Cédric Fournet
Chris Hawblitzel
Catalin Hritcu
Samin Ishtiaq
Markulf Kohlweiss
Rustan Leino
Jay Lorch
Kenji Maillard
Jianyang Pan
Bryan Parno
Jonathan Protzenko
Tahina Ramananandro
Ashay Rane
Aseem Rastogi
Nikhil Swamy
Laure Thompson
Peng Wang
Santiago Zanella-Béguelin
Jean-Karim Zinzindohoué

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Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Barry Bond, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Cédric Fournet, Chris Hawblitzel, Catalin Hritcu, Samin Ishtiaq, Markulf Kohlweiss, Rustan Leino, Jay Lorch, Kenji Maillard, Jianyang Pan, Bryan Parno, Jonathan Protzenko, Tahina Ramananandro, Ashay Rane, Aseem Rastogi, Nikhil Swamy, Laure Thompson, Peng Wang, Santiago Zanella-Béguelin, and Jean-Karim Zinzindohoué. Everest: Towards a Verified, Drop-in Replacement of HTTPS. In 2nd Summit on Advances in Programming Languages (SNAPL 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 71, pp. 1:1-1:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.SNAPL.2017.1

Abstract

The HTTPS ecosystem is the foundation on which Internet security is built. At the heart of this ecosystem is the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which in turn uses the X.509 public-key infrastructure and numerous cryptographic constructions and algorithms. Unfortunately, this ecosystem is extremely brittle, with headline-grabbing attacks and emergency patches many times a year. We describe our ongoing efforts in Everest (The Everest VERified End-to-end Secure Transport) a project that aims to build and deploy a verified version of TLS and other components of HTTPS, replacing the current infrastructure with proven, secure software. Aiming both at full verification and usability, we conduct high-level code-based, game-playing proofs of security on cryptographic implementations that yield efficient, deployable code, at the level of C and assembly. Concretely, we use F*, a dependently typed language for programming, meta-programming, and proving at a high level, while relying on low-level DSLs embedded within F* for programming low-level components when necessary for performance and, sometimes, side-channel resistance. To compose the pieces, we compile all our code to source-like C and assembly, suitable for deployment and integration with existing code bases, as well as audit by independent security experts. Our main results so far include (1) the design of Low*, a subset of F* designed for C-like imperative programming but with high-level verification support, and KreMLin, a compiler that extracts Low* programs to C; (2) an implementation of the TLS-1.3 record layer in Low*, together with a proof of its concrete cryptographic security; (3) Vale, a new DSL for verified assembly language, and several optimized cryptographic primitives proven functionally correct and side-channel resistant. In an early deployment, all our verified software is integrated and deployed within libcurl, a widely used library of networking protocols.
Keywords
  • Security
  • Cryptography
  • Verification
  • TLS

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