Existential-R-Complete Decision Problems about Symmetric Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Multi-Player Games

Authors Vittorio Bilò, Marios Mavronicolas

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Vittorio Bilò
Marios Mavronicolas

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Vittorio Bilò and Marios Mavronicolas. Existential-R-Complete Decision Problems about Symmetric Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Multi-Player Games. In 34th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 66, pp. 13:1-13:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)


We study the complexity of decision problems about symmetric Nash equilibria for symmetric multi-player games. These decision problems concern the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium with certain natural properties. We show that a handful of such decision problems are Existential-R-complete; that is, they are exactly as hard as deciding the Existential Theory of the Reals.
  • Nash equilibrium
  • complexity of equilibria
  • ExistentialR-completeness


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